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At the Annual General Meeting of the World Bank in 1996, its President James D. 
Wolfesohn, in an epoch-making speech, referred to the ‘cancer of corruption’ as a 
major barrier to sound and equitable development which had to be dealt with urgently.  
This speech was the culmination of a change in ideology and practice at the Bank 
towards dealing with governance generally and anticorruption in particular. Hitherto, 
the field of international development had dedicated negligible attention to the impact 
of corruption on development and the design of policies and programmes dealing with 
corruption.  In the period since, anticorruption efforts have become a significant pillar 
of the policies and practices of the Bank and other development actors with attendant 
ramifications in countries in the global South, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Using the various moments of ideological change in the law and development 
movement as an analytical framework, this thesis examines the indifference to 
corruption in international development in the period preceding the 1990s, and the 
attributes, challenges and prospects of the current global anticorruption agenda in sub-
Saharan Africa.  With Nigeria as a case study, the research finds that the approach to 
corruption has been overwhelmingly influenced by the respective predominant global 
development ideology during each moment, whilst ignoring local experiences and 
efforts to address corruption.  Hence, despite the heightened attention to the issue in 
the last couple of decades, anticorruption reforms have failed to enhance pre-existing 
efforts to deal with corruption in countries. 
The thesis concludes that the currently evolving paradigm of a rights-based approach 
to anticorruption demonstrates a promising response to some of the shortcomings of 
this approach to corruption over the years.  However, the nature of its conception and 
proposals for its implementation reaffirms the entrenched nature of these 
shortcomings and their inherence in the overall strategy of law and development 
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background to the Thesis 
In the period before the 1990s, there was very little attention to the issue of corruption 
in the law and development movement.  International Development Institutions (IDIs) 
like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations 
(UN) had no clear-cut anticorruption programmes or policies for countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA).  There were no recognised international Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) dealing directly with the issue of corruption either.  Academic 
enquiry into the subject was also negligible.  In the same vein, there were hardly any 
anticorruption institutions, legislation, policies or programmes dealing distinctly with 
corruption - as a development issue rather than as a crime - at the local level. 
 
However, in the period since, corruption has risen to a prominent place in the field of 
development.  Led by the World Bank, anticorruption and the broader issue of 
governance are now central to the work of most IDIs.   There is also now a plethora of 
international instruments dealing with corruption.  This change in approach to dealing 
with corruption at the international level has been duly reflected at the local level in 
countries in SSA.  Most countries in the region now have some sort of anticorruption 
policy or programme.  In certain cases like Nigeria, much legislation has been passed 





However, after about two decades of vigorous attention to corruption, not much has 
been achieved.  Whilst there is admittedly better understanding of the nature and effect 
of corruption on development, the impact of anticorruption efforts on reducing 
corruption, and by implication enhancing development have been disappointing.  
There is little evidence to show that corruption in countries in the region has diminished 
because of the introduction of anticorruption programmes and policies.  
 
Research on this subject often points to how the features of anticorruption policies and 
programmes within countries, the nature of their implementation, and contextual socio-
cultural, economic, political and institutional factors are responsible for their 
ineffectiveness.1  Without questioning the role of these factors, this thesis looks at the 
problems of anticorruption efforts in the region from a broader perspective, as a 
reflection of the attributes and problems of the approach of the law and development 
movement to the issue of corruption over the years. 
 
The three discernible periods of ideological change which the law and development 
movement has undergone in its history – often referred to as ‘moments’2 - are 
employed as an analytical framework for the discourse in this work.   This makes it 
possible to demonstrate the evolution of the approach of the movement to corruption 
from the past to the present and in terms of emerging approaches for the future.  The 
primary objective is to identify the influence of the approach of the movement on 
                                                            
      1 See for instance, Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Hart Publishing 
2014) 51-53; Johann Graf Lambsdorff, ‘Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What do we Know 
from a Cross-Section of Countries?’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed), International Handbook on the 
Economics of Corruption (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 3-51. 
2 A moment is used with reference to a period in which law and development doctrine has 
crystallised into an orthodoxy that is relatively comprehensive and widely accepted.  Other words 
used in its place in law and development literature include ‘period’, ‘globalisation’, ‘generation’, etc.  
See David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal (CUP 2006) 1-2. 
 
 3 
current anticorruption efforts in the region and the ramifications for further reforms.  
Regarding the latter, the thesis examines the emerging concept of a rights-based 
approach in anticorruption efforts.  Since the turn of the century, the idea of tackling 
corruption through a human rights framework has received growing attention from 
academics and relevant IDIs, some of which are already taking steps towards 
operationalising this approach.3 
 
The choice of the rights-based approach for discussing the implications for future 
reforms is drawn from the theoretical and practical justifications underlying the case 
made for its integration in anticorruption efforts.  The approach is considered a 
response to one of the most enduring criticisms of the approach to corruption in law 
and development: the top-down nature of most programmes and policies.  The rights-
based approach is therefore expected to provide a bottom-up element to anticorruption 
efforts built on established human rights principles and practices.  In examining this 
approach, this thesis however questions whether the nature of its conception and 
proposals for its implementation indicate that the lessons of the approach to corruption 
in law and development have been learnt; a stance necessitated by the fact that the 
very problems that precipitated the rights-based approach are inherent in the steps 
being taken towards its implementation.  
 
                                                            
3 See OHCHR, ‘The Human Rights Case Against Corruption’ (UN, Geneva November 2013); 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona and Julio Bacio-Terracino, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: Making 
the Connection’ in Martine Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds.) Corruption & Human Rights: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 25-49; C. Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption, Development and 
Good Governance: Challenges for Promoting Access to Justice in Asia’ (2008) Michigan State 




To provide a specific context to the discourse, Nigeria is used as a case study for 
anticorruption regimes in countries in SSA.  This is to provide a practical illustration of 
the impact of the approach of the law and development movement to corruption at the 
global level on the response to corruption at country level.  Furthermore, the use of a 




1.2 Research Questions 
 
This thesis examines the attributes, challenges and prospects of anticorruption efforts 
in countries in SSA in the context of the broader approach to corruption in the law and 
development movement.   It adopts a historical approach to demonstrate the influence 
of the relationship between the approach of the law and development movement and 
the reasons for the ineffectiveness of anticorruption efforts in the region. 
 
Within this thesis, there are two major research questions: 
 
• What is the approach of the law and development movement to the issue of 
corruption? 
                                                            
 4  Throughout the rest of this work therefore, the use of SSA should be understood in the 
context of Nigeria.  Whilst aware of the need to avoid undue generalisations, the reference to SSA is 
maintained due to the similar implications of the discussions in this work for countries in the region.  
With general development policies and on the issue of anticorruption in particular, IDIs have often 
dealt with countries in the region with a broadly similar approach.  Hence, the unavoidable reference 





• What are the ramifications of this approach - especially its changes over time - 
for current and proposed anticorruption efforts in SSA? 
 
To effectively deal with these major research questions, more detailed questions will 
be examined. 
 
On the first major research question on the approach of the law and development 
movement to the issue of corruption, this thesis will consider further subsidiary 
questions such as, what are the major factors that defined the approach to corruption 
through the different moments of the movement?  What informed the change in 
approach from one moment to the next? Have successive changes in approach within 
the movement been defined by lessons of practical implementation of programmes in 
countries from the previous moments or have they been defined by ideological 
changes within the development field? And finally, are there lines that can be drawn 
through the approach to corruption employed in the different moments and can such 
factors provide insights on the problems of the approach during the various moments? 
 
Regarding the second major research question on the implications of the approach for 
current anticorruption efforts in SSA and proposals for future reforms, the following 
ancillary questions will be examined:  To what extent has the approach to corruption 
in the law and development movement at the global level defined the establishment 
and composition of anticorruption regimes in countries in the region?  Is there any link 
between the problems faced by the law and development movement and the 
challenges faced by anticorruption regimes in the region?  Are the lessons learnt by 
the law and development movement over the years been reflected in the 
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implementation of current anticorruption programmes and policies at the country level? 
If so, has the integration of such lessons enhanced anticorruption efforts in the region, 
and if not, why not?   
 
After over two decades of concerted anticorruption efforts, there is growing frustration 
from both the law and development movement at the global level and from 
governments and citizens in countries in SSA at the rate of progress thus far.  
Explanations for the slow rate of progress has often been directed at the lack of 
political will to implement reforms, political interference in the work of anticorruption 
agencies and weak institutions in countries in the region, amongst others.  In essence, 
the blame for the ineffectiveness of anticorruption efforts has largely been laid on 
internal factors within countries.  However, the overwhelming influence of IDIs in the 
establishment and implementation of anticorruption efforts in these countries makes it 
expedient to examine the possible impact of factors within the development field on 
the ineffectiveness of such anticorruption efforts.  It is hoped that understanding the 
dynamics of the relationship between these internal and external factors will provide 
insights for a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges of anticorruption 








In addressing the research questions, this work adopts a socio-legal methodology, 
with the specific application of document analysis qualitative research method.5  This 
method was chosen because it is apt for analysing the broad range of academic, policy 
and evidentiary documents that the thesis engages in.  Furthermore, document 
analysis provides a dependable means of tracking change and developments on a 
particular subject or in a particular field, as is the case with research undertaken here.6   
 
Due to the wide and varied range of sources and materials consulted in carrying out 
this research, the grounded theory research method was applied in the analysis of the 
documents.7  This method involves developing theory and arguments on a subject 
matter as the research proceeds, rather than testing a hypothesis posited in advance, 
as is often the case.  In practical terms, the application of this method involves going 
through the three stages of open coding, axial coding and reaching conclusions.8  This 
method was chosen because it provides the best method of going through a large 
                                                            
5 Glenn A. Bowen, ‘Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method’ (2009) 9(2) 
Qualitative Research Journal 27-40. 
6 Other advantages of document analysis as a qualitative research method which proved 
essential to its choice for this research include availability, lack of obtrusiveness - which can hardly be 
avoided with other methods like interviews and questionnaires, - stability, accuracy and the ability to 
cover a long span of time and wide range of events and contexts.  See Robert K. Yin, Case Study 
Research: Design and Methods (Sage 2009). 
7 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and 
Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2012) 926-951. 
8 The first stage of open coding involves reading the various documents line by line, analysing 
them and systematically taking notes with the objective of identifying conceptual categories and 
patterns from the data.  The second stage of axial coding entails establishing relationships, 
associations and patterns arising from applying open coding to various documents on the subject.  
This forms the basis for the third stage involving the development of core concepts, theories and 




number of documents, in comparison to other methods like classic document analysis 
and discourse analysis.  Also, the method allows the researcher to follow the natural 
pattern of human enquiry and avoids any preconceived arguments or biases that could 
unduly influence the progressive pattern of the research process.9 
 
It is worth noting that there have been some criticisms of document analysis as a 
qualitative research method.  These include the challenge of accessing needed 
documents and the problem of selective bias.10  In the particular context of this thesis, 
there were no obvious access challenges as most of the documents needed to deal 
appropriately with the research questions were readily available through the wide 
range of sources utilised and identified below.  On the issue of selective bias, much 
attention has been given to the need for objectivity throughout the research process 
and various tests have been applied as guides to ensure such objectivity. The list of 
eight questions developed by Ruth Finnegan to ensure robustness and objectivity in 
the selection, analysis and review of documents in a research process were 
particularly significant in this regard.11 
 
In terms of particular sources used, the work draws on secondary literature and 
materials including academic works, such as books and journal articles of researchers 
for the historical discourse of the law and development movement.  Policy documents 
                                                            
9 ibid. See also Barney G. Glaser, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergency Vs. 
Forcing (Sociology Press 1992) 1-22. 
10 Bowen (n 5) 31-32. 
11 Some of these questions include: Has the researcher considered the issue of twisting and 
selection of facts in the sources used and in the approach of the researcher? How far does a source 
document reflect the general situation? How relevant is the context of the document? What 
presumptions were behind the statistics provided in the document, if any? Does the interpretation 
reasonably represent the context of the document?  See Ruth Finnegan, ‘Using Documents’ in Roger 




of IDIs are also consulted to interpret from such direct sources, the nature and 
attributes of the approach of the movement.  This makes it possible to make 
comparisons between policies, academic commentary on them and their 
implementation. 
 
With regard to the case study of Nigeria, this work draws from a variety of sources to 
appropriately illustrate the basic facets of the anticorruption regime in the country and 
its challenges.  To achieve this, sources consulted include legislation, reported cases 
dealing with corruption, policy documents of IDIs on Nigeria, and reports of relevant 
authorities and institutions, including CSOs.  Where necessary, reference is made to 
news articles on corruption. 
 
It is necessary to make a few points here.  The first is that, with respect to policy 
documents of IDIs, reference is made to documents emanating from the World Bank 
more than any other such institution.  This is because of the central role played by the 
Bank in mainstreaming the issue of corruption in the field of development.  Hence, 
whilst reference is made to policy documents of other IDIs at various stages, the 
principal focus on the Bank is apparent through the work. 
  
Secondly, due prudence has been applied in the use of news articles when discussing 
the anticorruption regime in Nigeria.  Discretion has been exercised to ensure that 
such articles are only used as references for established facts and figures about 
events of corruption that have occurred in Nigeria in the timeframe considered in the 
study.  They are only used to illustrate attributes of the regime in the country and for 
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situations where the facts cannot otherwise be acquired from official or other primary 
sources.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the analysis of the approach to corruption in law and 
development undertaken in this work has been underpinned by the theories of 
modernisation and dependency.  Modernisation theory advances a relationship of 
qualified cooperation between the global South and global North based on the premise 
that former needs to follow the development path of the latter in order to evolve from 
their traditional state to modernised societies.12  Dependency theory, on the other 
hand, states the position that prevalent development models are designed to ensure 
that global South countries remain perpetually dependent economically on countries 
in the global North.  Hence, the latter should rather adopt inward-looking policies that 
prevent their exploitation by countries in the global North.13  The tension between 




1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The rest of this introductory chapter looks at several important concepts that underlie 
this research and therefore require a preliminary consideration.  The following issues 
                                                            
12 Lan Cao, ‘Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning? Review of Anthony Carty 
(ed) Law and Development’ (1997) 32 Texas Intl LJ 545-560; Henry Bernstein, ‘Modernisation Theory 
and the Sociological Study of Development’ (1971) 7(2) The Journal of Development Studies 141-
160. 
13 Kevin E. Davis and Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship between Law and Development: 




are considered: The law and development movement; corruption and the rise of 
“anticorruptionism”;14 and the movement towards a rights-based perspective in 
anticorruption efforts.  The discussion of these issues at this stage is important 
because they are central to the theses of the work.  Also, these are concepts that are 
drawn from fields of research as diverse as development, legal theory, corruption and 
human rights. Their consideration in this work is intended to demonstrate how the 
interplay between developments in each of these areas have informed policy and 
practice in anticorruption.  The final section of this chapter examines and justifies the 
choice of Nigeria as a case study. 
Chapter two discusses the concept of corruption.  The meaning of corruption and its 
various manifestations continue to be a subject of controversy in global development 
discourse.  Widely accepted definitions like that of the World Bank which considers 
corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain” in its work,15 reflects the 
conceptual foundations of the global anticorruption movement.  This chapter considers 
the roots of such definitions and the impact within the conceptual and geographical 
context of this work.  The discussion will also cover the nature and types of corruption 
in SSA, the issues involved in measuring corruption and the impact of the parameters 
used in major indices quantifying corruption.  Also considered is the effect of corruption 
on development.  This part of the work shows how the understanding and attention to 
the effect of corruption progressed in line with predominant global development 
ideology from economic effects to socio-political and on to human development.  
Attention is given to the effect of corruption on human rights which constitutes the main 
justification for the evolving paradigm of a rights-based approach to anticorruption. 
                                                            
       14 The meaning of this term in the context of this work is examined below. 
      15 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the Bank (PREM 1997) 8. 
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Chapter three deals with the approach to corruption in the first and second moments 
of law and development. This is done in manner that highlights the broader relationship 
between development ideology and the approach of the law and development 
movement to corruption.  To this end, the chapter discusses for each moment, the 
prevalent development ideology, the role of law in the development process within 
such ideology and how this relates to the approach adopted towards corruption.  The 
Nigerian situation during both moments is used to provide a national context for the 
approach to corruption.  Both moments are discussed in the same chapter because of 
the similarity in the approach adopted towards corruption during the periods in 
question.    
The possible explanations for the indifferent approach to corruption in the first and 
second moments of law and development are considered in chapter four.   The factors 
discussed here are symptomatic of the broader problems and criticisms of law and 
development through its rather tumultuous history.  There are claims that the change 
in the approach to corruption in the third moment of law and development shows that 
the movement has perhaps learnt lessons from its past.  In this respect, this chapter 
will provide a basis for comparison when discussing the problems of the anticorruption 
movement in the third moment later in the work, to determine the value of such claims. 
Chapter five considers the approach to corruption in the third and current moment of 
the new developmentalism.  Akin to the pattern adopted in discussing the two previous 
moments, the discourse here will start by identifying the major tenets of the moment, 
the predominant definition of development and the role of law during this moment.  
There will be a consideration of the swift change in approach to corruption within the 
movement and the resultant emergence of robust anticorruption regimes in countries 
like Nigeria.  In further illustration of this, the chapter looks at the main facets of the 
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legal and institutional framework for anticorruption in the country since the heightened 
attention to corruption at the global level.    More importantly, the chapter explores the 
question of how much this current robust regime has impacted efforts to address 
corruption in comparison to pre-existing efforts in the country. 
Chapter six brings the discussion full circle by looking at how the factors which explain 
the lack of attention to corruption in the first and second moments of law development 
have persisted under the current moment.  Hence the discussion here is balanced 
against chapter four and examines why the introduction of a robust anticorruption 
regime in a country like Nigeria has had little success in tackling corruption.  In doing 
so, it moves beyond much reiterated internal problems in countries that impede 
anticorruption efforts and looks at ‘supply side’ factors within the law and development 
movement that betray the acclaimed commitment to addressing corruption, especially 
in the last couple of decades. 
In the light of the negligible results achieved by efforts to deal with corruption in 
countries like Nigeria, chapter seven looks to the future of anticorruption efforts 
especially for countries in SSA.  It focuses on the emerging concept of a rights-based 
approach to anticorruption as an alternative to the current top-down institutional 
approach.  The chapter discusses its background and potential practical advantages 
in terms of what it would add to current anticorruption efforts.  The chapter concludes 
by looking at the proposals for the implementation of this approach by academics and 
various IDIs in the last decade or so and questions if the approach - as indicated by 
such proposals - provides the right answers to the lingering problems of the approach 
of law and development to corruption. 
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Chapter eight terminates the thesis by looking at conclusions and the policy 
implications in the area of anticorruption for the law and development movement. 
 
 
1.5 The Law and Development Movement 
 
The relationship between law and development has been a subject of academic 
interest since at least the eighteenth century.  Classical scholars like Marx, Weber, 
Maine and Montesquieu all refer, in varying ways, to the role of law in the process of 
economic development within the broader scope of their respective works.16  However, 
the origin of the modern discourse on law and development can be traced back to the 
initiatives of academics in the United States and development experts in the 1950s to 
1960s.  The movement itself evolved out of the need to promote legal and institutional 
reforms in the newly independent countries of the so-called global South with the 
objective of facilitating economic development based on the model of countries in the 
so-called global North.17   
Following the wave of independence of countries in the global South in the post-World 
War II era, the policy of IDIs like the World Bank underwent a considerable change in 
                                                            
16 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected 
Edition (OUP 2008).  For further discussion of this, see chapter 3 below. 
17 The terms ‘global South’ and ‘global North’ are preferred in this work to similar terms such as 
‘Developing’ and ‘Developed’, “Third World’ and ‘First World’, ‘Core’ and ‘Periphery’ ’Non-Western’ 
and ‘Western’, ‘Minority World’ and Majority World.’  Without necessarily going into the connotations 
and historical implications that the use of these words provokes, global South, as used here, refers to 
the countries that are the focus of law and development policies, programmes and scholarship.  In 
contrast, global North refers to countries from which most such policies and programmes emanate 
and which do not constitute the focus of law and development policies and programmes. 
The origin of the terms ‘global South and ‘global North’ is attributed to the Brandt Report which 
was published by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by the 
former German Chancellor Willy Brrandt.  The report identified a North/South line dividing the world 
into richer industrial countries at the time and poorer countries.  The line was located south of the 
latitude 30° North. 
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focus beyond just post-war reconstruction.  The promotion of economic development 
in these newly independent countries became a major area of attention.18  The 
attainment of this objective required certain structural and institutional changes to be 
implemented in these countries.  The legal system was considered an area of 
importance.  The law and development movement became the vehicle through which 
legal reforms conducive to economic development were conceptualised and 
implemented. 
In this work therefore, the movement refers generally to efforts of development 
agencies and initiatives to initiate and implement various legal and institutional reform 
projects in countries in the global South.  On the other hand, the discourse on the 
subject - or what is otherwise referred to as law and development doctrine - is a 
reference to the body of knowledge that has informed the work of the movement over 
the years.19  This includes theoretical perspectives, empirical research, policy 
prescriptions and critical practice that have developed simultaneously with the history 
of the movement.   
It is worth noting here the mutually dependent nature of the relationship between the 
movement and the discourse.  As development agencies committed to pursuing 
development in the global South in the post-war era, they looked increasingly to 
                                                            
The preference for these terms in comparison to other terms is informed by the relative 
ideological neutrality of the terms in the context of development discourse.  For more on the history 
and meaning of the various terms identified above and reasons supporting my preferences, see 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, ‘What’s Wrong with the Global North and the Global South’ (Voices From 
around the World, January 2015) <http://gssc.uni-koeln.de/node/454> accessed 20 April 2017; 
Jonathan Rigg, An Everyday Geography of the Global South (Routledge 2007) 2-5; Koen De Feyter, 
World Development Law: Sharing Responsibility for Development (Intersentia 2001) 17-20. 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A Programme for 
Survival (Pan Books 1980). 
18 Heather Anne Marquette, ‘The Origins and Development of the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption 
Programme’ (PhD Thesis, Durham University 2002) 32. 
19 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, ‘Introduction: The Third Movement in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in D. M. Trubek and A. Santos 
(eds) The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 1-18. 
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academia to provide guidance in the formulation and planning of development 
projects.  The movement is the response from the legal field to this need.  However, 
the development agencies also often recruited the personnel to man these projects 
from academia.  This meant that the same group of persons involved in the discourse 
were engaged in the practical assistance projects of “legal development”.20  This 
inevitably led to the fusion of the movement and the discourse and laid the foundation 
for the internal disenchantment in law and development aptly illustrated by the 
notorious self-critical article by Trubek and Galanter in 1974.21  This synthesis between 
the movement and the discourse is apparent in the discourse in this work. 
In the years since its crystallisation, the movement has evolved through various 
phases and been applied for various purposes whilst retaining the fundamental 
objective of its evolution: the reform of legal systems in countries to promote 
development.  There are three such discernible phases:  The moment of the classic 
developmental state (from the late 1950s to 1970s), the moment of the neoliberal 
market (from the late 1970s to early 1990s) and the current moment of the new 
developmentalism (from the late 1990s to date). 
As the timing identified for each moment demonstrates, determining the end of a 
specific moment and the commencement of another is not straightforward.  The body 
of thought on the relationship between law and development and therefore the nature 
of legal reform efforts pursued by the movement continue to change.  It is however the 
                                                            
20 D.M. Trubek and M. Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis 





wide acceptance and comprehensiveness of an orthodoxy in the movement that 
provides the indication of the crystallisation of a particular moment.22 
In terms of what precipitates change in approach from one moment to another, two 
factors are broadly identifiable: the change in general development ideology and the 
practice of development agencies.  These factors are however not necessarily 
disparate as development ideology and practice influence and is influenced by the 
policies of major development institutions.  The law and development movement - 
basically a product of this interaction - has continued to provide the needed theoretical 
foundation and policy mechanism through which law facilitates the predominant 
development ideology and policies.  This role of law has however changed with each 
moment. 
A major identifiable change between the first and second moments of law and 
development on the one hand, and the third moment on the other, is the approach of 
the movement to the issue of corruption.  Hitherto, law and development, reflecting 
broader ideologies and polices in the development field, dedicated negligible attention 
to the understanding of corruption, its impact on development and the design of 
policies and programmes to tackle corruption.  The period since the late 1990s has 
however witnessed a substantial amount of research, policies and programmes on 
corruption and the broader issue of governance within which it is contained.23  Taking 
this into consideration, law and development therefore provides the defining 
ideological background to the global anticorruption movement.  This informs its choice 
as a theoretical framework in this work.  After about two decades of intense attention 
                                                            
22 Trubek and Santos (n 10) 2. 




to corruption, the ever-present strand of critical practice within the movement is 
beginning to question the ramifications of approach of the field to corruption for the 
development of countries in the global South.  
Until now, research considering this issue within the movement has either considered 
the international component of it by looking at the policies and programmes of 
development agencies on corruption, or the national component by looking at local 
factors that inhibit the success of measures put in place to tackle corruption.  This work 
takes the conversation further by considering the issue of corruption and particularly 
anticorruption measures in countries in SSA within the broader context of the law and 
development movement.  It does so on the premise that a balanced comprehension 
of the issues surrounding the subject can best be gotten by looking at both the 
international and national - demand and supply - sides of the approach to corruption 
together, especially in terms of understanding the influence of the former on the latter. 
 
 
1.6 Corruption and the Rise of “Anticorruptionism”  
 
There is now a global consensus that corruption is one of the most potent obstacles 
to the development of countries in the global South.  SSA is particularly considered 
vulnerable to the negative effects of corruption on its development.   Since the latter 
end of the 1990s, development institutions, donor countries, and civil society alike 
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have directed their policies towards dealing with corruption within the wider framework 
of promoting good governance in countries in the region. 
This however only tells the story of the last two decades.  Prior to this, corruption had 
little or no place in development policy or programmes.   In fact, systematic research 
on the effects of corruption on development only began to emerge in the 1990s.  Whilst 
a few instances of such research preceded the marked attention to corruption in 
international development, the large proportion of research on the subject appears to 
have come alongside or after the swift attention to corruption by major development 
agencies, beginning with the change in policy at the World Bank.24  This has created 
some sort of a ‘cart-before-the-horse’ situation where research has been pursued to 
justify the focus on corruption rather than the other way round - research informing the 
change in policy.25 
This was the case even though corruption has always been a constant factor in the 
economic, social and political history and reality of countries in SSA.  This indifference 
somehow persisted despite overwhelming evidence in public purview of the existence 
of massive corruption especially amongst political elites in countries in the region. 
In Nigeria for instance, there are records of widespread corruption since the time of its 
first post-independence democratic government.  The officers who carried out the first 
military coup in the country on 15 January 1966 referred to corruption amongst political 
elites as the major reason for their actions.26   Through the years, other clear-cut cases 
                                                            
24 See Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development 
(The University of Chicago Press 2008) 38-51. 
25 Moran Goodwin and Kate Rose-Sender, ‘Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome 
Addition to the Development Discourse’ in Martine Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds), Corruption and 
Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 221-240. 
26 Olurungbemi Simeon Toyin, ‘The Impact of Military Coup D’etat on Political Development in 
Nigeria’ (2015) 6(10) Int’l Journal of Business and Social Science 194-202. 
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of corruption have also emerged with military and political leaders amassing mammoth 
amounts of wealth through corruption.27  This notwithstanding, there was no policy or 
programme directed at addressing the manifest corruption from IDIs who were actively 
implementing various development programmes in cooperation with the government.   
However, this all changed in the latter years of the 1990s with corruption becoming a 
major concern in the development field.  At the Annual General Meeting of the World 
Bank in 1996, its President James D. Wolfesohn, in an epoch-making speech referred 
to the ‘cancer of corruption’ as a major barrier to sound and equitable development 
which had to dealt with urgently.28  By 1999, he went even further to assert that 
corruption is ‘the largest single inhibitor of equitable economic development’.29  The 
speech of Wolfesohn in 1996 was the culmination of a change in ideology at the bank 
towards dealing with corruption within the broader spectrum of governance reforms 
that began towards the end of the 1980s.  In the period since, anticorruption efforts 
have become a significant pillar of development policy and discourse at the Bank and 
other development institutions. 
This rather sudden heightened attention to corruption - referred to in this work as ‘the 
rise of “anticorruptionism”’ - was accepted with enthusiasm in the field of development 
at the international level and duly replicated in individual countries in SSA.  Between 
1996 and 2006 alone, no less than ten global and regional international instruments 
on corruption were adopted.  At the same time research on corruption also flourished 
at unprecedented levels.  These were often on the initiative of major development 
                                                            
27 Details of these cases of corruption are discussed in detail below in sections 1.8 and 3.3. 
28 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘Corruption – A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank’ (1997) 15(3) Dickinson Journal of International Law 451-485. 
29 Tara Polzer, ‘Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse’ (2001) Development 
Studies Institute Working Paper Series No. 01-18, 2 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP18.pdf> accessed 17 October 2016. 
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institutions like the World Bank and CSOs like Transparency International.  In fact, 
research-based measurements of corruption in countries from both institutions played 
a major role in pressuring countries to act against corruption.  The governance 
indicators of the World Bank and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index became a major consideration for foreign investors, donor organisations and 
other stakeholders in the development sector in dealing with countries.  This made it 
imperative for countries to be seen to be acting on corruption. 
Thus, at the national level, countries started taking specific actions aimed at tackling 
corruption in line with the global drive.  The passing of anticorruption legislation, 
establishment of anticorruption institutions and the initiation of public sector reforms 
were some of the main actions that were encouraged and pursued vigorously.   In 
Nigeria, following the return to democratic rule in 1999, the first anticorruption 
institution, the ICPC was established with urgency the following year under the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.  Since then, a considerable amount 
of anticorruption legislation, institutions and policies have been put in place. 
The enthusiasm and momentum that greeted the rise of anticorruptionism in the law 
and development movement are not however reflected in the results achieved after 
two decades.  Success stories have been few and far between with an apparent sense 
of disillusionment on the prospects of anticorruption efforts.  This work looks to provide 





1.7 Towards a Rights-Based Perspective  
 
The penultimate chapter of this thesis examines the idea of a rights-based approach 
to anticorruption.  This concept has evolved slowly within the law and development 
movement since the turn of the century, with action towards its implementation 
currently being considered by certain development institutions, led by the United 
Nations Human Rights Council.  The concept arose as a reaction to some of the 
problems of current anticorruption efforts, including their top-down nature, lack of 
accountability to ordinary members of society and the lack of effective remedies for 
victims of corruption. 
A rights-based approach, it is argued, will provide a bottom-up approach to 
anticorruption efforts built on the human rights principles of transparency, participation, 
accountability and the provision of effective remedies.30   Other arguments include the 
stance that such integration would make available to anticorruption efforts the 
established monitoring and compliance mechanisms of the human rights systems of 
the United Nations and other human rights institutions.  This is expected to put to rest 
some of the concerns of the current perception-based and ranking-based 
measurements of corruption that have been subjected to much criticism.  However, at 
the foundation of the whole move towards a rights-based approach is the 
ineffectiveness of the current regime for anticorruption in countries.   
                                                            
30 International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) and Transparency International (TI), 
Integrating Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, Possibilities and Opportunities 
(ICHRP, Switzerland 2010) 7-8. 
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This approach is therefore discussed in this thesis to provide a forward-looking 
component in the assessment of anticorruption efforts in countries in SSA.  The 
foundations of this approach and current actions being taken within the law and 
development movement for its implementation are also discussed.  This will allow for 
the assessment of the persistence or otherwise of the problems of the movement and 
their ramifications, not just for the past and present but also prospective anticorruption 
efforts.  The consideration of this approach also provides a comprehensive and up-to-
date assessment of anticorruption efforts in the region. 
 
 
1.8 Nigeria as a Case Study  
 
This section provides a background to Nigeria, the case study for this thesis.  The 
objective is to highlight basic facts about the country in terms of its development 
indicators and history.   Reference is also made to the incidence of corruption in the 
country and actions taken to tackle it.  All this will be done vis-a-vis the law and 
development movement to demonstrate what informed the choice of the country as a 
case study for this thesis. 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of over 
186 million people.31  It became an independent country, from British rule, on 1 
October 1960.  The country has had a turbulent political history with alternating 
                                                            
31 United Nations, ‘World Statistics Pocketbook - Nigeria’ 
<http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=NIGERIA#Summary> accessed 17 October 2016. 
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democratic and military regimes, although it has enjoyed stable democratic rule from 
1999 until date. 
Nigeria is blessed with a broad spectrum of natural resources including gold, coal, tin, 
iron ore, columbite, limestone and lead.  But its most important resource is its rich oil 
wealth which is the central stay of the country’s economy.  Nigeria is the tenth most 
petroleum-rich country in the world and has the largest reserves of oil in Africa with an 
estimated 37 billion barrels in reserves.32   The value of its annual petroleum exports 
is put at over 40 billion dollars, accounting for 70 per cent of government revenue.33  
The country has the second largest economy in Africa with a GDP of just under 500 
billion dollars, and for a couple of years following a rebasing exercise in 2014 was 
considered to have the largest economy on the continent.34 
Despite all its natural and human resources, the country continues to achieve below 
its potential in terms of development.  The latest Human Development Index of the UN 
ranks Nigeria at 152 out of the 188 countries reported on.35  A breakdown of this shows 
that the country scores below the global average on almost all the human development 
indicators:  Life expectancy stands at 52.8 years and an estimated 62 per cent of the 
total population live below the poverty line.  Perhaps graver is the fact that 76.6 per 
cent of the working population are also considered poor, living on less than 2 dollars 
per day.36   
                                                            
32 OPEC, ‘Nigeria Facts and Figures’  <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> 
accessed 17 October 2016. 
33 ibid. 
34 BBC News, ‘Nigeria Becomes Africa’s Biggest Economy’ (6 April 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26913497> accessed 17 October 2016. 
35 UNDP, Human Development Report (UNDP, New York 2015) 47-50 
36 UNDP, ‘Human Development Indicators 2015: Nigeria’ 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NGA> accessed 17 October 2016. 
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Other social and economic indicators that illustrate the development challenges of the 
country include its literacy rate that stands at a meagre 51 per cent.  The picture within 
the education system does not look any better with primary schools having a pupils-
per-teacher ratio of 37.6 to 1 and a dropout rate of 20.7 per cent.  The country still 
deals with a high fatality rate for most curable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis 
and has an infant mortality rate that stands at a high 74.3 per 1.000 live births.37  High 
levels of inequality, gender imbalance, lack of social and overall human security are 
some of the other issues that have bedevilled the country over the years.   
The blame for the country’s lack of development in the light of the resources available 
to it has often been put on widespread corruption.  In the last couple of decades, 
especially since the global attention to corruption, other possible explanations like poor 
management, a weak democracy, conflict and unfavourable economic policies have 
all moved to the background.  Corruption is now considered the prime factor 
responsible for the poverty and overall underdevelopment in the country.  Several 
corruption events in the same timeframe attest to the nature and magnitude of the 
problem.  Estimates indicate that the country lost more than 157 billion dollars in the 
past decade to illicit financial outflows alone.38  Internally, various sources indicate that 
the country loses between 5 to 10 per cent of its annual budget to embezzlement and 
                                                            
37 ibid. 
38 Global Financial Integrity, ‘Data by Country: Average Annual Illicit Financial Outflows: 2004-
2013’ <http://www.gfintegrity.org/issues/data-by-country/> accessed 17 October 2016. 
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other forms of corrupt activity by public officials.39  Past and current public officials help 
themselves to mammoth amounts of the public wealth of the country.40   
Unsurprisingly, the country performs poorly on most indices and surveys of corruption.  
Nigeria consistently scores below average on the control of corruption component of 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index.  The latter’s most recent index ranks 
Nigeria at 136 out of 176 countries with a score of 28 out of 100.41  A 2012 survey 
carried out by Transparency International showed that 84 per cent of Nigerians 
believed that corruption was on the increase,42 whilst other surveys indicate that 
Nigerians, like most people in SSA, considered corruption to be one of the most 
significant challenges to the development of the country.43  Corruption has become a 
central issue of social and political concern.  It was arguably the main determinant of 
the victory of the opposition party at the country’s last general election in 2015.44   
                                                            
39 Transparency International, ‘Transparency International Calls on the Nigerian Government to 
Step Up its Fight Against Corruption and Welcomes an Investigation into the Oil Sector’ (27 February 
2014) 
<http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_calls_on_the_nigerian_g
overnment_to_step_up_its> accessed 17 October 2016. 
40 Particular cases in this regard are considered when the incidence of corruption in SSA is 
discussed below in section 2.4. 
41 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2016’ 
<http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>  accessed 20 April 
2016. 
42 Transparency International, ‘ Global Corruption Barometer 2013 - Nigeria’ 
<http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=nigeria>  accessed 17 October 2016. 
43 Maria Ramos, ‘What’s the Biggest Challenge for Africa in 2015?’ (World Economic Forum 
Survey on the Global Agenda 2015 (9 November 2014) <https://agenda.weforum.org/2014/11/whats-
biggest-challenge-africa-2015/> accessed 23 October 2015; CNN, ‘Survey of Young Africans on the 
Challenges and Future of Africa’ (CNN Inside Africa, 13 December 2013) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/africa/africa-post-mandela-survey-
jana/index.html?hpt=hp_c1> accessed 23 October 2015. 
44 See Max Siolllu, ‘How Goodluck Jonathan Lost the Nigeria Election’ The Guardian (London, 1 
April 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/01/nigeria-election-goodluck-jonathan-lost> 
accessed 26 April 2017; The Economist, ‘Nigeria’s Election: Three Cheers for Democracy’ (4 April 
2017) <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647616-muhammadu-buhari-was-least-bad-
presidential-candidate-nigeria-may-he-rise-his> accessed 26 April 2017. 
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Since the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999, successive governments 
have made tackling anticorruption a central policy objective.  Whilst this may be 
considered a logical response to the challenge of corruption, there is another important 
factor worth considering.  The timing of Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 
coincided with the change in policy in the development field, with an emphasis on 
dealing with corruption.  The country responded accordingly to this heightened 
attention to corruption at the global level.  Within a year of its return to democracy, it 
had passed the first anticorruption legislation, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act of 2000 which established its first major anticorruption institution, the 
ICPC.  Two years later, another anticorruption statute, the Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act 2002 was passed establishing the country’s foremost 
anticorruption institution, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).    
In the years since, the country has passed multiple anticorruption laws and established 
a considerable number of institutions intended to address corruption.  Nigeria’s current 
anticorruption regime is considered one of the most progressive in the SSA region, in 
theory.  It also compares favourably with post-1990s anticorruption regimes elsewhere 
in the World.  As the discourse in this work will show, the country has put in a place a 
robust legal and institutional framework that accords with and reflects the rise of 
anticorruptionism at the global level.  This is a factor that partly informs the choice of 
the country as a case study to illustrate within a context, the approach of the law and 
development movement to corruption. 
Two other factors are also worth pointing out about the choice of Nigeria as a case 
study.  The first is the mixed results of its anticorruption regime.  Despite the relatively 
comprehensive and progressive nature of the anticorruption regime in the country, 
there are no clear signs of any significant reduction in the rate of corruption, or indeed 
 
 28 
an improvement in development indicators because of gains from the supposed ‘fight 
against corruption’.  Success stories of corrupt pubic officials or institutions being held 
accountable are few and often tainted by allegations of anticorruption efforts being 
motivated by political, ethnic and other considerations.  This situation therefore 
provides a good background against which to ask the questions about the 
effectiveness of the current global anticorruption drive.  The size of the country – 
especially in terms of its population – and the significance of the country, politically 
and economically in the SSA region, also makes it an apt choice as a case study of 
the region. 
Secondly, the development history of the country provides an apposite country-level 
illustration of the work of the law and development movement through its various 
moments.  Nigeria became an independent country in 1960 at about the same time as 
the crystallisation of law and development thought and projects.  The country 
implemented most of the reforms proposed by the movement as the latter progressed 
through the phase of the classic developmental state to the phase to neoliberal 
policies, and onto the current moment of the new developmentalism.   From its 
independence to the 1970s, the state played a principal role in the economic 
development of the country.  Most sectors like education, health and even industry 
were state controlled.  This period also saw the establishment of the state-owned oil 
company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1977.45  All this was 
in accordance with the predominant theory of state-led development.  With the change 
in ideology to neoliberal policies in the decade that followed, Nigeria was also one of 
the countries that implemented the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF and 
                                                            
45 NNPC, ‘History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry’ 
<http://nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/businessinformation/oilgasinnigeria/industryhistory.aspx> 
accessed 20 April 2017. 
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World in the 1980s.46  The country has also implemented most of the current policy 
reformulations in the last couple of decades that followed the period of structural 
adjustment reforms in countries in the global South and SSA specifically.  The 
emphasis on governance and anticorruption are arguably the most central elements 
of these policy formulations that continue to be pursued by the country. 
It is these apparent and typical parallels that have informed the choice of Nigeria as a 
case study.  By discussing the background, features, problems and prospects of 
anticorruption efforts in the country through the framework of the various moments of 
the law and development movement, this work highlights the dynamics, influence and 
problems of the approach of the movement in countries in SSA.  As the effectiveness 
of the robust anticorruption regime in the country continues to be hampered by factors 
that are often considered distinctive to the social, economic and political milieu of 
Nigeria, the objective here is to contextualise these factors within the broader global 
law and development movement and especially the foundations of anticorruption 
reforms.
                                                            
46 See World Bank, Nigeria: Structural Adjustment Program; Policies, Implementation and Impact 
(World Bank, Washington, DC 1994). 
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Corruption is considered the most serious challenge to development globally, but more 
so in countries in the global South.  It is estimated that over one trillion dollars is paid 
in bribes alone around the world every year.1  A study by Global Financial Integrity 
showed that countries in the global South lose close to that amount in illicit financial 
outflows annually, with countries in SSA estimated to be losing an average of 6.1 per 
cent of total GDP each year due to such outflows.2  At a broader level, corruption 
distorts business activities, hampers the functioning of institutions, limits access to 
social services, and ultimately impacts negatively on development in all facets of 
society. 
There has been long standing interest in this relationship between corruption and 
development.  However, the last couple of decades has seen a heightening of this 
interest.  This has led to multidisciplinary enquiry and policy-oriented studies that have 
informed anticorruption policy and programming from IDIs, CSOs and other 
stakeholders. 
                                                            
1 Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption’ in Global Competitiveness 
Report (World Economic Forum 2005-2006).  For a discussion of the methodology in arriving at this 
figure, see Matthew Stephenson, ‘The Source of the $1 Trillion in Annual Bribes Figure’ (The Global 
Anticorruption Blog, 24 April 2014) <http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/24/the-source-of-the-
1-trillion-in-annual-bribes-figure/> accessed 22 September 2014. 
2 Global Financial Integrity, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013’ (Global 
Financial Integrity, December 2015) viii. 
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This chapter looks at the broad range of issues regarding corruption and its impact – 
including its conception, measurement, incidence and effect on development - with the 
objective of establishing the conceptual foundations of the study.  The aim is to show 
the evolution and intricacies of the conceptual discourse on corruption and the 
relationship between this and the initiation and implementation of mechanisms to 
tackle it.  
 
2.1 Conception of Corruption  
 
Conceptualising corruption is a challenge that is as complex as the phenomenon itself.  
Corruption is used to refer to a wide range of activities including bribery, 
embezzlement, nepotism, fraud, favouritism and extortion.  The word, in general 
usage, therefore carries a negative connotation.  It is in this context that the Oxford 
Dictionary defines the adjective, ‘corrupt’ as ‘having or showing a willingness to act 
dishonestly in return for money or personal gain’3.  Derived from this, the noun form of 
the word ‘corruption’ is defined as ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, 
typically involving bribery’4   
This simple conception does not however grasp the complex practical issues that 
dealing with corruption entails.  At a basic level, it does not answer the question of 
what actions amount to corruption and what actions do not in particular contexts?  Is 
the determination of corrupt actions to be done by reference to law - in terms of legality 
and illegality - or by reference to morality or some other ethical or even cultural 
                                                            





standard?  Answering these questions is particularly important with reference to 
anticorruption measures, which this work is concerned with.   
The discussion that follows highlights a couple of factors in this respect.  Firstly, it 
shows an apparent connection between the way corruption is defined and the 
conception of policies to deal with it.  Hence, the approach of specific institutions and 
systems to dealing with corruption reflects how it is conceptualised by such institutions 
or systems.  Secondly, the manner corruption is defined is often informed by a wide 
range of underlying socio-cultural, historical, ideological and politico-economic 
influences.  The implication of this is that definitions of corruption need to be seen 
beyond their denotative conception, but rather as an exercise in post-structuralist 
thought where ‘language and discourse are not seen as reflective of social reality, but 
constitutive of it’.5  
At the inception of its anticorruption programme in 1997 the World Bank defined 
corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’.6  This definition, with an 
apparent emphasis on public sector corruption was not novel.  It echoed Rose-
Ackerman’s conception of corruption as illegal payments to a public agent to obtain a 
benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of payoffs.7  The World Bank’s 
definition was also in accordance with the popular definition of corruption as ‘the sale 
by government officials of government property for personal gain’ by Shliefer and 
Vishny.8  It is however testament to the central role of the Bank in the initiation and 
promotion of the global anticorruption agenda that this particular definition of 
                                                            
5 Arturo Escobar, ‘Anthropology and Development’ (1997) 154 International Social Science Journal 497, 
503. 
6 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (Washington DC 
1997) 8. 
7 Susan Rose-Akerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (Academic Press Inc 1978) 6-7. 
8 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Corruption’ (1993) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 599. 
 
 33 
corruption is now widely accepted and adopted by most stakeholders.  More 
importantly, this conception of corruption explains why the current anticorruption 
regime is mainly focused on the public sector.  
This public-sector focus can be traced to the good governance foundations of the 
current anticorruption agenda.  The World Bank’s work on good governance which 
began in the 1980s was mainly a response to the failure of its Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in the global South.  The SAP of the Bank and the IMF which 
emphasised neoliberal polices of privatisation, market economy and deregulation in 
the 1970s and 1980s failed to bring about expected economic development in the 
countries where they were implemented.9  This failure was imputed, not to the 
programmes themselves, but rather to poor governance in the countries which failed 
to provide the needed support for the success of the programme.10  In essence, the 
IFIs came to the conclusion that the failure of the SAPs was due to the failure of 
governance in the public sector.  Hence, whilst retaining their faith in neoliberalism, 
good governance was introduced to bring about public-sector reforms that were 
needed to make the market polices effective. 
As discussed in detail later in this work11, owing to a range of factors including a 
management-driven attention to corruption within the Bank, anticorruption became a 
central element of the good governance agenda.  It is therefore logical that the 
conception of corruption through this process had an apparent focus on the public 
sector.  Anticorruption efforts were introduced to deal with corruption as a major 
                                                            
9 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa (Penguin 
Books 2009) 22. 
10 Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development (The 
University of Chicago Press 2008) 32-42. 
11 The origin and development of the World Bank’s anticorruption agenda is discussed in detail in 
chapter 6, specifically section 6.1 below. 
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obstacle to development.12  Since the blame for these obstacles had already been put 
squarely on the public sector, corruption was therefore defined in a manner that fitted 
this narrative and the founding objective of the anticorruption agenda; the 
improvement of governance in the public sector. 
It is however noteworthy that this conception of corruption is different from that found 
in most instruments that constitute the international anticorruption regulatory 
framework.  These instruments provide a broader notion of corruption that 
encompasses actions in both the public and private sectors.  Even though they do not 
often provide a straightforward definition of corruption in recognition of the polyvalent 
nature of the term, the meaning attributed to the term can be gleaned from the overall 
provisions of the instruments.  Thus, the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) states the meaning of acts of corruption like bribery, 
embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, trading in influence, and illicit enrichment 
by public officials,13 and also makes provision for acts of bribery and embezzlement in 
the private sector.14 
This approach can also be found in the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption.  Article 2 of the Convention provides that ‘corruption 
means the acts and practices including related offences proscribed in this Convention'.  
In listing the acts and practices of corruption within the scope of the Convention, Article 
4 refers to offences like bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation and illicit enrichment 
in both the public and private sectors.  Similarly, Article 6 of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption defines 
                                                            
12 World Bank (n 6) 1. 
13 Articles 15 - 20 of UNCAC. 
14 Articles 21 and 22 of UNCAC. 
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acts of corruption under the Protocol to include actions and omissions by persons in 
the public and private sector.  The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
Protocol Against Corruption, on its part, attempts a definition of corruption that appears 
more comprehensive than any of those already examined.   In addition to a listing of 
acts of corruption in Article 3 that reflects the approach of the other instruments, the 
Protocol includes a definition of corruption as: 
. . . any act referred to in Article 3 and includes bribery or any other 
behaviour in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in the 
public and private sectors which violates their duties as public officials, 
private employees, independent agents and other relationships of that 
kind and aimed at obtaining undue advantage of any kind for 
themselves or others.15 
This broad conception of corruption can also be found in the Council of Europe’s Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption.16  One clear exception to this appears to be the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption which limits its definition of corruption to 
actions that take place in the public sector.  Article VI of the Convention which lists the 
acts of corruption to which the Convention applies limits the actions to those carried 
out by a ‘government official or a person who performs public functions’.17  It is worth 
noting however that there is a provision in Article VI which criminalises the actions of 
                                                            
15 Article 1 of the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol against Corruption.  Even though 
the addition of “independent agents and other relationships” suggests an intention to extend the scope 
of the definition of corruption beyond just the public and private sectors, the practical effect of this may 
make little difference.   Such independent agents and other relationships cannot be expected to operate 
in any sphere other than the public and private sectors.   
16 See Article 2 of the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 
17 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996) 35 ILM 724. 
 
 36 
conspirators, accomplices and instigators of the acts of corruption of public officials 
which may be interpreted to include private sector actors.  
Despite this broad conception of corruption in international instruments, it is the 
definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain championed by the 
World Bank that has obviously informed the anticorruption strategies and programmes 
of countries in SSA.  The provisions of the first major anticorruption legislation in 
Nigeria, the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000, reflects this.  
Even though the Act defines corruption in neutral terms as including bribery, fraud and 
other related offences,18 it limits the duties of the anticorruption agency created under 
the Act to dealing with practices, systems and procedures of public bodies19 and only 
criminalises acts of corruption committed by any person ‘in the discharge of his official 
duties or in relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of 
a Government department, or corporate body or other organisation or institution in 
which he is serving as an official.’20 
Most other laws that constitute the legislative framework for anticorruption in the 
country also show an apparent focus on corruption in the public sector.  The Code of 
Conduct Act,21 the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007, the Public Procurement Act 2007, 
and the Freedom of Information Act 2011 are all laws established to address 
corruption and entrench good governance with a specific focus on the public sector.  
It is also instructive that most of these laws were enacted in the aftermath of the 
heightened global attention to corruption.  Even laws with a focus on acts of corruption 
                                                            
18 Section 2 of the Act. 
19 Section 6 of the Act. 
20 Section 8 of the Act.  Other offences under the Act are provided for from Section 9 - 26 of the Act and 
all make reference to corrupt activities undertaken by public officials or which take place in the public 
sector. 
21 Cap C15, LFN 2004. 
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in the private sector like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Establishment) Act 200422 and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 have 
been implemented in a manner that evinces the public-sector focus of the overall 
anticorruption regime.  
This overwhelming focus on the public sector in the conception of corruption at country 
level is understandable considering its origins go beyond the World Bank and includes 
other stakeholders.  The IMF in its first major policy document on good governance in 
1997 wholly adopted the World Bank’s definition of corruption as the abuse of public 
office for private gain, to inform its assistance to countries in the area of governance.23  
On its part, USAID, whilst recognising the existence of corruption in the public and 
private sectors, nevertheless noted that its policy would be directed towards corruption 
in the public sector alone.24  The reasons given for this include the Agency’s belief that 
focusing on how the public sector manages its resources expands the impact of 
USAID programmes with regard to development.   
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that this work favours a 
comprehensive approach to the conception of corruption.  It adopts the perspective of 
the international instruments examined above to the effect that the definition of 
corruption encompasses a wide range of actions that show abuse of power for private 
gain in both the public and private sectors.  Hence, the definition provided by 
Transparency International which considers corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted 
                                                            
22 The Act established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) after the ICPC to 
deal especially with private sector corruption which was not within the mandate of the ICPC.  
However, since its establishment to deal with economic and financial crimes in the county, the EFCC 
has gained more attention for its prosecution of public officials and less for dealing with economic and 
financial crimes that are rampant in the private sector. 
23 IMF, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role (Washington D.C. 1997) 2. 
24 USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy (Washington, D.C. 2005) 8-9. 
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power for private gain’25 is preferred. This is to the extent that the term ‘entrusted 
power’ is given the loosest possible meaning.  There are instances where power is 
used or abused by persons to whom such power has not technically been formally 
‘entrusted’.26  Actions taken in such situations would nonetheless amount to 
corruption.  Whilst this may serve for the purpose of definition, it is important that within 
this broad framework, each country should be able to define, enforce and interpret 
actions that amount to corruption within their peculiar prevailing circumstances.  And 
the laws, institutions, and other mechanisms put in place to address corruption should 
ideally reflect these differences. 
 
2.2 Typology of Corruption  
 
Generally, the following have been variously discussed as manifestations of 
corruption: bribery, favouritism and nepotism, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, illegal 
contribution and abuse of power, amongst others.27  The list is broad and some actions 
may constitute corruption in certain countries and not in others, owing to legal and 
cultural differences.  More so, a case of corruption might involve more than one activity 
                                                            
25 Transparency International, The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide (TI 2009) 14. 
26 An example of this would be corruption perpetrated by military regimes that seize power through 
unconstitutional means. 
27 See  Petter Langseth, ‘Measuring Corruption’ in Charles Sampford and Others, Measuring Corruption 
(Routledge 2016) 7-14; Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Better the Devil You Don’t Know: Types of Corruption 
and FDI in Transition Economies’ (2008) 14 Journal of International Management 12-27; Pranab 
Bardhan, ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’ (1997) 35(3) Journal of Economic 
Literature 1320-1346; Joseph Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’ 
(1967) 2 American Political Science Review 419 
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and might also include other illegal activities, apart from corruption, to be successfully 
executed.28   
Corruption takes place in a wide range of ways in society and this has been discussed 
extensively in various texts.29  As international and local anti-corruption measures 
have been strengthened over the years, individuals engaged in corruption have also 
engendered innovative ways to avoid detection and prosecution.  The discussion that 
follows is a classification of acts of corruption based on a varying range of broad 
criteria with relevance to this work.   
As discussed above, corruption may take place in the public or private sector.  
Corruption in the public sector may be classified according to the level at which it 
occurs and with reference to the position of individuals who engage in it.  In this regard, 
Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests a distinction between Political Corruption and 
Bureaucratic Corruption.30  Political corruption is that which is perpetrated by elected 
or appointed political officials who abuse public office and resources for their private 
gain.  Bureaucratic corruption also involves the abuse of public office or authority for 
private gain, but is rather perpetrated by those who Rose-Ackerman refers to as low-
level bureaucrats and civil servants.31  Owing to their positions as formulators of 
legislation and policies (as politicians) and implementers and administrators of 
government policies (as bureaucrats), both groups are afforded a wide range of 
authority and discretion in dealing with various entities in society, which may be 
                                                            
28 For instance, a public official who engages in bribery might have to engage in corollary illegal actions 
like identity theft to hide the proceeds or escape prosecution. 
29 See for instance, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform (CUP 1999); Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (University of California Press 1988); 
Susan Rose-Akerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (Academic Press Inc 1978). 
30 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (ibid) 10. 
31 ibid.  See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Political Corruption and Democratic Structure’ in Arvind K. 
Jain (ed), The Political Economy of Corruption (Routledge 2001) 35-62. 
 
 40 
subjected to abuse.  This accords with Robert Klitgaard’s formulation of corruption as 
monopoly plus discretion minus accountability (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - 
Accountability).32  Such acts may be committed before, during or even after leaving 
office.  They range from bribery to favouritism, embezzlement, extortion and money 
laundering, amongst others.   
Political corruption is often referred to as ‘grand’ corruption because of its potential to 
have a large-scale impact on society.  This is especially so when carried out by top 
ranking officials in government, such as heads of state, ministers and federal 
legislators.33  In contrast, bureaucratic corruption is used synonymously with ‘petty’ 
corruption.34  This is however not an indication that its effect is always petty in contrast 
to grand corruption.  In certain situations, corruption carried out by high-ranking 
bureaucrats in the public service like permanent secretaries in the Nigerian civil 
service for instance, may have as much or even more detrimental impact than political 
corruption.    
A taxonomy of corruption akin to this is provided by the World Bank, based on the 
scale of the intended result of acts of corruption.  The Bank contrasts ‘State Capture’ 
and Administrative Corruption.35  State capture refers to situations where individuals 
or enterprises provide private gains to policy makers to secure informal and 
preferential access to government policy-making.  Also referred to as ‘regulatory 
                                                            
32 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (n 28) 75.  Klitgaard therefore argues that corruption 
flourishes when such public officials have monopoly power over clients, when they have great discretion 
and when their accountability is weak. 
33 USAID, USAID Anticorruption Strategy (Washington, D.C 2004) 8. 
34 Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa’s Anti-Corruption Convention’ (2003) 
7 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 447-488; Nihal Jayawickrama, ‘A Holistic 
Approach to Combating Corruption’ (199) 25(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 658-679. 
35 World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate (The World Bank, 
Washington, D. C 2000) 1. 
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capture’,36 the aim of individuals and organisations who engage in this manner of 
corruption is to influence the formulation of laws, regulations and policies in their 
favour.  Administrative corruption on the other hand, refers to the provision of favours 
or private gains to public officials, but for purposes that are more specific and more 
limited than state capture.  These include the exchange of bribes for the unlawful 
granting of contracts, permits, licences or state bank loans and the misdirection of 
public resources by state officials for their personal benefit. 
Corruption can also be classified according to whether the public official engaged in it 
for economic gains or for non-economic gains.  Corruption engaged in for economic 
gains could either be embezzlement or bribes.  Whilst embezzlement involves the 
expropriation of public funds, bribes, on the other hand, involve the appropriation of 
funds from private individuals or organisations by the public official.37  In the latter 
case, public officials may ask for and receive bribes in order to perform their duties or 
not to perform their duties, or to otherwise carry out some action by virtue of their 
office.38  Furthermore, it is important to refer here to the work of Shleifer and Vishny 
which draws a distinction between corruption ‘with theft’ and corruption ‘without 
theft’.39  Corruption with theft occurs where the official, in collecting bribes, does not 
turn over the official price of the public good or service provided to the government.  
                                                            
36 Joel S. Hellman and others, ‘Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and 
Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies’ (2000) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2312, 1-5. 
37 Michael J. Trebilcock and Marianna M. Prado, What Makes Poor Countries Poor: Institutional 
Determinants of Development (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2011) 176-178. 
38 In this regard, it is worth noting the International Council on Human Rights Policy’s definition of 
corruption as ‘the promise, offering, or giving, to a public official, or the solicitation or acceptance by a 
public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his official duties.’  See 
International Council on Human Rights Policy and Transparency International, Corruption and Human 
Rights (ICHRP, Switzerland 2009) 19. 
39 Shleifer and Vishny (n 8) 601-602. 
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Corruption ‘without theft’ on the other hand, occurs where the official turns over the 
official price to the government whilst retaining the extra, the bribe.40  
Corruption involving non-economic gains refers to situations where the public official 
confers benefits on individuals or groups through the use of his position or influence 
or the manipulation of political processes, in order to generate political support or some 
other benefit for himself.41  The most popular forms of such corruption include 
clientelism, patronage and nepotism, where public office is used to provide benefits 
and privileges for persons who are affiliated to the public official personally, ethnically, 
politically or otherwise.  This can also be considered a type of ‘political corruption’ in 
the context that the ill-gotten gains often benefit the public official in his official 
capacity.42 
In terms of a categorisation of corruption which seeks to explain its prevalence and 
perseverance, corruption may be classified as being Individualistic or Systemic.43  The 
former refers to a purely opportunistic kind of corruption which is perpetrated by a few 
incongruous individuals, often in a society that is largely ‘clean’ in terms of corruption.  
On the other hand, Systemic corruption refers to situations where corruption manifests 
in an organised manner in society and therefore permeates various facets of such 
society through intricate and widespread networks.  In general terms, individualistic or 
what the World Bank refers to as isolated corruption44 can rarely be considered 
pervasive in society as corruption is considered an anomaly which can be dealt with 
                                                            
40 ibid. 
41 Trebilcock and Prado (n 37) 177. 
42 Mark Philip, ‘Conceptualising Political Corruption’ in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston 
(eds), Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts (3rd edn, Transaction Publishers 2002) 41-58. 
43 USAID (n 33) 8. 




on a case by case basis.  In contrast, systemic corruption, as the name suggests, is 
often widespread and pervasive.   
The discussion thus far has looked at corruption in the public sector.  But corruption 
also takes place in the private sector and can take various forms, including bribery and 
fraud. The potential impact of this can be devastating for economic development in a 
country through the distortion of economic trends.  It can also undermine foreign 
investment and make a country vulnerable to financial crisis and engender 
macroeconomic instability.45  Furthermore, private sector corruption can lead to 
discrimination against individuals and groups in society leading to human right 
violations, and impeding human development. 
This notwithstanding, public sector corruption continues to be the major focus of 
anticorruption efforts for reasons already examined.  Other explanations for this trend 
include the fact that public sector corruption is considered a more serious problem in 
countries in SSA.  Controlling public sector corruption is also considered a prerequisite 
for dealing with corruption in the private sector.46 
In his work on the typology of corruption, Michael Johnson notes that countries 
experience corruption differently.  He therefore recommends that the type of corruption 
prevalent in a country should be taken into consideration in designing and 
implementing anticorruption programmes, stating: ‘corruption problems require 
responses appropriate to their histories, realities and prospects.’47  This reasoning can 
also be found in USAID’s anticorruption strategy.  Whilst discussing types of corruption 
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within the broad categories of Grand and Administrative Corruption, the strategy 
stipulates different programmatic responses to each type of corruption.48  It goes 
further to state how the policy of USAID is directed more at dealing with administrative 
and grand corruption in the public sector vis-à-vis private sector corruption.  On its 
part, even though the World Bank recognised the difference in manifestations of 
corruption and categorised them into bribery, theft, political and bureaucratic 
corruption and isolated and systemic corruption, it adopts a different strategy in terms 
of its response.49  The Bank’s anticorruption policy reveals a general response to 
dealing with public sector corruption, rather than prescribing particular actions with 
respect to different types of corruption in the public sector. 
The ramifications of this for anticorruption efforts in SSA are considered later in this 
work.50  It suffices to state however that, even if the Bank and other stakeholders 
considered the typology of corruption in countries in formulating anticorruption 
policies, the results would hardly be any different.  This is because, as demonstrated 
by the case of the World Bank and USAID, the anticorruption policies of each 
institution are informed by their ideology, the legal qualifications of their establishment 
and what furthers their strategic interests.  The realities in each country based on the 
prevalent type of corruption feature little in the process.  And even if they did, it is 
inconceivable to see how each of these large IDIs would be able to distinctly adapt to 
such realities. This is especially so where the realities conflict with the legal and 
ideological assumptions and agenda of the IDIs.  The result of this is therefore the 
current situation where there are very broad generic anticorruption regimes in 
countries with components dealing with everything - institutions, legislation, advocacy 
                                                            
48 USAID (n 33) 19-20. 
49 World Bank (44) 9-11. 
50 This issue is discussed in depth in section 6.2.1 of chapter six. 
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judiciary etc. - and conveniently contained under the umbrella of good governance. 
The supply-side-driven nature of current anticorruption regimes in countries mean that 
such regimes have no chance of being responsive to the nature and types of 
corruption prevalent in a country.  On the contrary, as current efforts continue to bear 
negligible results, anticorruption programmes have the potential of expanding even 
more in a bid to be more comprehensive, instead of being tailored narrowly to the 
contextual realities of each country.  
 
 
2.3 Measuring Corruption 
 
The imperative for clandestinity in corrupt practices is an apparent and often cited 
challenge to measuring its occurrence.51  This has however not prevented large-scale 
measurements of corruption in the last couple of decades. The advent of the 
systematic measurement of corruption has taken place alongside the rise of 
anticorruptionism, with such measurement seen as an integral part of the process of 
understanding the nature and effect of corruption.  This is, in turn, expected to identify 
those responsible for corruption and assist in designing appropriate anticorruption 
strategies.52  However, whilst the measurement of corruption has had an undeniable 
                                                            
51 See Gauthier De Beco, ‘Monitoring Corruption from a Human Rights Perspective (2011) 15(7) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 1108-1124; Global Integrity and UNDP, A User’s Guide to 
Measuring Corruption (Oslo, Norway 2008) 8-9. 
52 De Beco (ibid) 1109. 
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effect in bringing the issue of corruption to the forefront of international development 
discourse and practice, its impact on enhancing anticorruption efforts is debated. 
Over the years, various organisations have developed tools to measure levels of 
corruption in countries.  These assessments are however relatively recent having 
started around the 1980s and picked up pace in the decade after.  Hence, there is also 
the constraint in research of being unable to analyse the evolution of corruption over 
longer periods of time.53 
The nature of corruption as an activity that requires secrecy to be successful has 
meant that its measurement necessarily includes elaborate constructions that are 
subject to complex and often subjective inputs.54  Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
observe that, against myths held by some that corruption cannot be measured due to 
these apparent challenges, corruption can be and is currently being measured through 
one of the following three methods: (1) Perceptions of individuals and stakeholders; 
(2) Using institutional profiles in areas such as budget management or procurement 
practices as a proxy for corruption, and (3) Auditing particular projects as a sample of 
national practices.55  They however note that none of these measures can actually be 
relied on as direct measures of corruption and that the most direct indicators of 
corruption being relied on are surveys that gather information on the real experiences 
of businesses and individuals of corruption, especially in the area of paying bribes.56 
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54 Francisco-Javier Urra, ‘Accessing Corruption - An Analytical Review of Corruption Measurement and 
its Problems: Perception, Error and Utility’ (2007) Edmund A. Walsh School of Public Service, 
Georgetown Washington 2. 
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More recent efforts at measuring corruption have seen the rise of ‘aggregate 
indicators’ that provide average measures of corruption.  This is done by combining 
several primary assessments by different research groups who measure the 
perceptions of corruption in varying sectors of a country.  Some of these aggregate or 
‘second generation’ indicators57 include the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey58, the World Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank59 
and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).60  Kaufmann and 
Kraay identify the following as the main advantages of aggregate indicators of 
corruption in comparison to individual indicators: (1) they allow for a broader country 
coverage; (2) they provide a useful and functional summary of a wide range of 
individual indicators; (3) they reduce measurement errors and the influence of 
individual biases by averaging out the idiosyncrasies of the data sources used; and 
(4) they allow for the calculation of explicit margins of error.61  
                                                            
57 Michael Johnson, ‘Measuring the New Corruption Rankings: Implications for Analysis and Reform’ in 
Arnold. J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnson (eds), Political Corruption: Concepts and Context 
(Transaction Publishers 2001) 865-884. 
58 The Business Environment and Enterprise Survey is an initiative of the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development which examines the quality of business environment in 
countries by providing firm-level data on a wide range of issues including relations between business 
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This notwithstanding, aggregate indicators are also being subjected to some criticism.  
Understanding and analysing the process behind the summary statistics provided by 
aggregate indicators proves particularly difficult for those without in-depth knowledge 
of statistical analysis.  Even those with such knowledge find it daunting.  This is 
corollary to the second criticism which relates to the utility of such indicators for 
purposes of reform.  As Kaufmann and Kraay admit, it is difficult to ascertain how 
progress measuring corruption in individual sectors of a country and grasped by one 
source for instance, affects the overall score or ranking of a country on an aggregate 
indicator.62  There is of course the oft-cited problem of the unreliability of perception-
based measurements of corruption, aggregate or otherwise.  Studies based on survey 
evidence of real experiences of people have shown that perceptions do overestimate 
local experiences of corruption.63    
Despite these critiques, there are some who rationalise the use of perceptions for 
measuring corruption.  They argue that no measure of corruption can be a 100 per 
cent reliable yardstick of the occurrence of corruption.  Even the use of real data would 
yet be subject to imprecision and statistical measurement errors, between for instance, 
actual corruption and indicator reading.64  Arguments such as this and the relative 
advantages of using aggregate indicators stated above have almost led to a certain 
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degree of acceptance of perception-based measurement of corruption.  Urra however 
warns that the necessity to rely on subjective perception-based measurement of 
corruption due to the lack of better alternatives should not lead to an implicit 
acceptance of such indicators as standard practice.65  This may detract from efforts to 
continually work towards arriving at more objective and real measurements of 
corruption in the long run. 
Specifically, the most widely accepted and utilised of the aggregate indicators, the 
CPI, has often been criticised for its overwhelming use of expert assessments by elite 
business panels and professionals, with an inadequate representation of perceptions 
of local households and little businesses.66  For instance, of the thirteen data sources 
used to construct its latest 2016 CPI, only one - the World Justice Project Rule of Law 
Index - directly includes a poll of the general public.67  This demonstrates an obvious 
imbalance in the perceptions that comprise the index which favours the formal sector 
and businesses over the experiences of the poor in society and the informal sector.  
The above notwithstanding, the CPI is the most comprehensive index yet which 
measures corruption in the public sector globally.  The fact that its data is sourced 
from about thirteen different organisations accessing corruption in various parts of the 
world and from different perspectives avoids, to a large extent, the biases that plague 
individual indicators of corruption. 
In recent times, research in this area has tilted towards survey-based measures such 
as the World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
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(BEEPS) and the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS).  These surveys have 
however, also had to deal with the challenge of eliciting truthful responses.  This is 
especially the case in answers to questions like whether respondents have requested 
or paid bribes.  Another alternative involving the use of administrative data to measure 
corruption has not fared any better, with gaps appearing in such data, often caused 
by dysfunctional government bookkeeping.68  The task of getting reliable data on 
corruption is therefore one that will always remain.  It has to do more with the nature 
of the activity that is being measured than with the merits of the tools used for 
measurement. The difficulty associated with measuring a venture that is both secret 
and illegal cannot be easily overcome. 
More importantly for this work, determining the usefulness of corruption measures for 
anticorruption efforts is a question that continues to engender variegated responses.  
Ideally, the measurement of corruption is expected to enhance anticorruption efforts.  
This should be achieved by drawing attention to the problem, showing the nature and 
trends in its occurrence, encouraging governments to act against corruption and 
mobilising public support.  According to Global Integrity and UNDP’s User’s Guide to 
Measuring Corruption, ‘[T]here is little value in a measurement if it does not tell us 
what needs to be fixed.’69  To an extent, this objective has been achieved but only in 
a general and preliminary sense. Having drawn attention to the incidence of corruption 
and the need to act, measures of corruption need to be sufficiently detailed and identify 
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key problems and priorities to prove useful in anticorruption efforts.  It is in this area 
that the measurement of corruption has failed to meet expectations.70   
The result is a growing call amongst practitioners for actionable data, especially in the 
form of disaggregated indicators, to guide policy decisions.71 The statistical and 
composite nature of current measures of corruption makes them devoid of requisite 
focused and easily understandable information that would provide insights for 
anticorruption efforts.  They also fail to reveal the nature and extent to which corruption 
occurs in particular situations or the impact it has on development in different sectors.  
This therefore limits their value for anticorruption efforts.  On the contrary, they serve 
to pressure states, sometimes unduly, on the urgency of acting generally against 
corruption with no specifics on how to achieve this.72  In the same vein, they have the 
potential to leave anticorruption practitioners embarrassed and helpless, whilst 
providing little assistance. 
Despite the limitations, it is safe to assume that current measures of corruption like the 
CPI and WGI will remain predominant for the foreseeable future.  Pressure from 
academia and practitioners might lead to the development of more actionable 
indicators of corruption that would prove useful for anticorruption efforts.  But these 
would hardly supplant or gain as much popularity or acceptance as the current 
statistical aggregate indicators.  This is because, despite all the criticisms over time, 
these indicators have remained prevalent due to their usefulness to economic and 
political actors.  The CPI and WGI constitute an integral component of the factors 
considered by corporations and other stakeholders when making investment 
                                                            
70 Urra (n 54) 8. 
71 Global Integrity and UNDP (n 51) 35. 
72 De Beco (n 51) 1110. 
 
 52 
decisions.73  The statistical nature of the indicators makes them particularly apposite 
for such economic decision-making.  Also, bilateral and multilateral donor 
organisations use these indicators in making lending and assistance decisions.74  The 
fact that these indicators are both sophisticated in process and overtly simplistic in 
output at the same time serves these purposes well.  It saves such corporations and 
organisations money, time and effort that would otherwise be spent in carrying out risk 
analysis and research on corruption on the ground before making the required 
decisions.  Hence, irrespective of all their pitfalls, these indicators have continued to 
thrive.  It demonstrates how subservient their apparent lack of utility for national 
anticorruption efforts is to the broader international economic and political interests 
which they serve appositely.  
Furthermore, these indicators have also thrived due to the relationship between them 
and the anticorruption agenda.  Systematic and institutional measurement of 
corruption began around the same time as the World Bank and other development 
institutions turned to anticorruption in the 1990s.75  The fact that both issues developed 
simultaneously meant that the indicators of corruption did not necessarily precede and 
therefore precipitate the rise of anticorruptionism.  It was not the case that the 
measurement of corruption led to a better understanding of its nature and effect, which 
in turn gave rise to a focus on anticorruption in the development field.  Instead, the 
measurement of corruption can best be understood as having arisen alongside 
anticorruptionism, to justify an agenda that had its origins rooted elsewhere.76  The 
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World Bank for instance, only started systematic research into corruption years after 
the introduction of governance into its development agenda.77  The first of its WGI was 
released in 1996, the same year identified as marking the threshold of its 
anticorruption programme.  Hence, as well as drawing global attention to the issue of 
corruption, these indicators have served as justification for the concerted good 
governance and anticorruption programmes of IDIs.78  By drawing attention to the poor 
scores and rankings of countries, especially in the global South, these indicators have 
succeeded in pressuring governments on the urgency of addressing corruption.  In so 
doing, they simultaneously fuel the demand for assistance in the area of anticorruption, 
which is then supplied by the various IDIs and civil society.79  This self-fulfilling circle 




2.4 Incidence of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Corruption is pervasive and detrimental to development globally.  Although it is 
considered especially prevalent in SSA, it is not worse in aggregate terms than 
corruption in many other parts of the world.  In terms of scale, the sums of money 
involved in cases of corruption in the region are modest when compared to scandals 
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of corruption that take place in countries in the global North like the United States, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom.80  The major difference appears to be that the 
developmental consequences of corruption in the region are far worse and more 
obvious due to its level of development.81 
The problem is however serious and available statistics show the gravity of corruption 
in SSA.  Estimates indicate that the cost of corruption in the region is roughly between 
$120 and $150 billion annually.  This is significant when one considers that the total 
amount of money given in aid to countries in the region in the same timeframe stood 
at just about $22.5 billion.82  Current research indicates that corruption is on the 
increase in the region.  A 2015 Transparency International study found that people 
living in Ghana and Nigeria considered corruption to have increased 76 and 75 per 
cent respectively in the twelve months covered by the study.  For South Africa, the 
figure was 83 per cent.83  It is therefore not surprising that a high percentage of people 
in the region consider their governments to be doing very badly in tacking corruption.  
Over 70 per cent of people hold this view in countries like Madagascar, Liberia, 
Zimbabwe, Benin, South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius and Ghana.84 
Transparency International’s CPI indicates that about half of the bottom fifty countries 
on the index are from SSA.85  In fact only five countries in the region - Namibia, 
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Mauritius, Rwanda, Cape Verde, and Botswana - scored above average (50 out of 
100) in the organisation’s annual indicator of perceived level of public sector 
corruption.86  Notably, over 90 per cent of countries in the region continue to score 
below average on the CPI. 
The perception of corruption in Nigeria has always been in the lowest 30 per cent in 
terms of its score on the CPI from 1995 until date. For 2016, the country is ranked 136 
out of the 176 countries on the index with a score of 28 out of a possible 100.87  Beyond 
these statistics, the country is estimated to lose nearly 40 per cent of its natural wealth 
to corruption or corruption-related mismanagement.88  In fact, Transparency 
International's Global Corruption Barometer indicates that things are getting worse.89  
A number of corrupt events attest to the nature and magnitude of the problem.  The 
country lost more than 157 billion dollars in the past decade to illicit financial outflows 
alone.90  Furthermore, the country loses between 5 to 10 per cent of its annual budget 
to embezzlement and other forms of corrupt activity by public officials.91  Past and 
current public officials help themselves to mammoth amounts of the public wealth of 
the country.   
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For instance, a former military leader, Gen Sani Abacha who ruled the country from 
1993 until his death in 1998 is estimated to have embezzled up to 5 billion dollars 
whilst in office.92  In recent times, a whopping sum of 20 billion dollars is alleged to 
have disappeared from the state-owned oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation in 2014 with no one being held to account for the said sums.93  And in 
2015, the immediate past National Security Adviser of the country, Sambo Dasuki was 
arrested for the alleged misappropriation of over 2 billion dollars meant for the 
procurement of arms for the country’s military.94 
Against this background, it is therefore not surprising to find the grave way corruption 
in SSA has been described.  Andreski, for instance posits that ‘it lies in the nature of 
graft that we cannot have statistics which indicate its extent but there can be no doubt 
that in all African states, the wealth acquired through illegal use of public office looms 
large’.95 
In his introductory notes to a recent study by the organisation of corruption in Africa, 
José Ugaz, the Chair of Transparency International remarked that: 
Corruption creates and increases poverty and exclusion.  While 
corrupt individuals with political power enjoy a lavish life, millions of 
Africans are deprived of their basic needs like food, health, 
education, housing, access to clean water and sanitation.96 
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During his recent speech to the African Union in Addis Ababa, President Barack 
Obama of the United States referred to the challenge of corruption in Africa in the 
following terms: 
Nothing will unlock Africa’s economic potential more than ending the 
cancer of corruption. . .. Here in Africa, corruption drains billions and 
billions of dollars from economies that can’t afford to lose billions of 
dollars - that’s money that could be used to create jobs and build 
hospitals and schools.97 
On its part, the World Bank in its 2010 Africa Development Indicators described the 
nature of corruption in the region as follows: 
Corruption is embedded in the political economy of Africa.  A number 
of studies describe the interaction between various forms of corruption 
and how it is intrinsically linked to the way power is exercised.98 
Corruption is therefore considered the most serious challenge to development in the 
region.  This is a position that informs the policy of most IDIs in dealing with countries 
in the region in the last couple of decades.  It is one that also now plays a predominant 
role in social and political discourses and events.  This is a situation that however 
requires caution.  Without denying the high incidence of corruption in countries in SSA, 
Morris Szeftel reckons that statements like the above ‘both exaggerate and 
underestimate the importance of corruption’ in the region at the same time:99 
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They exaggerate the extent to which it is a cause of crisis in Africa 
rather than a symptom, albeit a virulent symptom, of deeper problems.  
And they underestimate both the depth of its roots in the very fabric of 
the post-colonial state and its resilience in the face of reform measures 
imposed from abroad.”100 
Naím provides another reason to exercise caution.  He notes that data showing an 
increase in the rate of corruption in the region and in the global South generally in the 
last couple of decades may be attributed more to an increase in publicity than an actual 
atypical increase in the level of corruption.101  The expansion of democratic regimes 
in the region and the transparency that accompanies the process of democratic 
transition might be creating an ‘eruption of awareness’ about corruption.  This might 
be responsible for the increased levels of perception about corruption.102 
Furthermore, Lambsdorff suggests that developments such as decentralisation, 
marketisation, financial integration and globalisation of business, media and politics 
might be creating new forms and opportunities for corruption to thrive.103  If this is the 
case, it becomes precarious to ascertain reliable trends in the incidence of corruption 
over time.  However, these factors are not peculiar to SSA or Nigeria.  They are models 
and polices pursued globally, even though their effect in specific contexts may vary.  
Whatever their effect in SSA might be, the fact is that corruption continues to be a 
major challenge for development efforts. 
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The high level and impact of corruption in the region has led many to the conclusion 
that the situation is now fatal; that the entrenched and pervasive nature of corruption 
in these countries means that they have reached a point of no return, where nothing 
much can be done about it any longer.104  A consequence of this is the disempowering 
effect on ordinary people in terms of acting against corruption.  A recent Transparency 
International study showed that almost 40 per cent of people in SSA feel that ordinary 
citizens cannot make a difference in anticorruption efforts.  People in Nigeria felt least 
empowered in terms of acting against corruption.105  In addition to looking at the 
problems of current anticorruption efforts, this work therefore considers the role that a 
rights-based approach can play in galvanising bottom-up citizen-led response against 
corruption.  This is the subject of chapter seven. 
 
 
2.5 Effects of Corruption on Development 
 
Corruption has multifaceted effects on development.  This is the foundation on which 
the anticorruption agenda is built; to address corruption and minimize its impact on 
development.106  This section therefore examines the nature of the impact of 
corruption on development.  It does this by showing the ways in which corruption 
affects economic development, social and political development, human development 
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and human rights.  The discourse shows how the understanding of the effect of 
corruption has evolved in accordance with the broadening conception of development 
in the post-war era.   
From a predominant focus on the economy as the central determinant of development, 
concern for social and political development was slowly mainstreamed into 
development discourse and practice. 107   Since the turn of the century, development 
has increasingly been defined with reference to human development and human 
rights.  This section therefore discusses how corruption affects these various aspects 
of development as a justification for anticorruption efforts.   But first it is necessary to 
consider some arguments that have been put forward as to the possible positive 





2.5.1 Arguments on Possible Positive Effects of Corruption  
 
Most arguments around the possible desirability of corruption revolve around two 
points.  The first is that that certain forms of corruption work like a direct form of 
payment for public officials.  This serves as motivation for them, thereby enhancing 
the functioning of government.  Bribes for instance, can serve as supplements for a 
bureaucrat’s salary, especially in countries where the remuneration of civil servants is 
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low.108  Their effect has been compared to government raising taxes and increasing 
the remuneration of public servants.109 
Those in support of this therefore hold the view that corruption - especially petty 
corruption - is need-based and occurs because of poverty.110  Hence, public servants 
who seek bribes do so because of their meagre salaries, or in worse situations, 
because their salaries are unpaid.  This argument should however be considered with 
caution.  Public servants, low-ranking or not, are expected to perform the duties for 
which they are employed for the pay they are entitled to.  It is therefore both immoral 
and illegal for them to seek bribes and engage in other acts of corruption on grounds 
of the meagre nature of their income.  Moreover, there are established mechanisms 
within a democratic society for such workers to advocate for improvements in their 
wages and overall welfare. 
The second argument is that businesses and private individuals are able, through 
corruption, to overcome clumsy bureaucratic regulations that slow down business and 
other developmental efforts.  The ready example here again is bribery.  The contention 
is that bribery could serve as an informal mechanism that improves the efficiency of 
administration in poorly functioning governments.  Through what has been called 
‘speed money’,111 delays in moving files in public offices can be avoided, thereby 
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enhancing efficiency.112  Such bribes can also assist in getting private individuals and 
firms ahead in slow moving queues for public services, by serving as an ‘oil that 
greases’ ineffective and corroded bureaucracies.113  Bardhan captioned the essence 
of this thus: 
“In the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing 
countries, corruption may actually improve efficiency and help growth.  
Economists have shown that in the second-best world with pre-existing 
policy-induced distortions, additional distortions in the form of black-
marketeering and smuggling might actually improve welfare . . ..  As non-
economists usually point out, corruption is the much-needed grease for 
the squeaking wheels of a rigid administration.”114 
These arguments on the positives of corruption raises questions.  The secretive nature 
of corruption makes it very distortionary and unpredictable.  It is therefore difficult to 
reconcile such unpredictability and distortionary tendencies with the argument that 
corruption enhances efficiency.  Businesses would ordinarily be reluctant to invest in 
an environment with unpredictable costs which engaging in bribery entails.  Mauro’s 
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Corruption?’ in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis 
(Holt Rinehart and Winston 1970) 36. 
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1995 paper on corruption and growth demonstrated the negative correlation between 
corruption and foreign direct investment owing to this fact.115 
Furthermore, bribes may diminish rather than enhance efficiency by serving as an 
incentive for public officials benefitting from such cumbersome bureaucratic systems 
to maintain the status quo.116 In this regard, corruption may have the effect of ‘throwing 
sand in the wheels’ rather than ‘greasing the wheels’ of bureaucracy.  The incentive 
of bribes could encourage public officials to increase unnecessary regulations to 
create opportunities for further corruption.117  Furthermore, inefficiency could result in 
situations where, as noted by Bardhan, a public official is influenced by nepotism or 
favouritism and not the size of the bribe, or where bribery is utilised by a business to 
limit competition from rival firms.118   
The efficiency argument also fails considering contracts between the briber and the 
bribee are not enforceable in courts on grounds of illegality.  It is therefore impossible 
to achieve necessary enforcement that will allow for certainty and therefore efficiency.  
In any case, the efficiency argument overall appears to consider the objective of short-
term efficiency over long-term challenges.119  These include issues with 
macroeconomic reforms and inequality that would result from such bribery.120 
It is instructive that the quote above from Bardhan’s work refers to a ‘second-best 
world’ scenario.  These arguments on the potential positives of corruption are 
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therefore, at best, attempts to find some constructive angle in a society that has failed 
to achieve preferable solutions and situations.  The need to counter inefficiency in a 
system with additional distortions in the form of corrupt practices, or to speed up slow-
moving bureaucratic processes through bribery would not arise if the systems were 
operating in an efficient and timely manner in the first place. 121 
 
 
2.5.2  Negative Effects of Corruption  
 
Away from the above arguments, corruption is generally considered negative, with its 
effect on development described with metaphors like ‘cancer’, ‘virus’ and ‘disease’.122 
Trebilcok and Prado stated in brief the negative effects of corruption in countries in the 
global South, thus: 
The cost of corruption is high for developing countries, because it has 
a negative impact on a country’s economy (impairing growth), its 
politics (affecting governmental regulation and policy decisions), its 
international relations (affecting FDI and diverting foreign aid from its 
intended purposes), and its society (worsening the distribution of 
wealth).123 
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As noted above, the effect of corruption on economic development, social and political 
development, human development and human rights is examined below.  
 
2.5.2.1 Effect of Corruption on Economic Development 
 
The existence of corruption in a country impacts negatively on its economic 
development in diverse ways.  Firstly, it discourages foreign investment.  A major 
reason for this is the distorting nature of corruption which results in an unpredictable 
business environment and random costs for businesses.  Also, in the usual case of 
having to pay a bribe to get the requisite permits and licences to do business in a 
corrupt country, the prospect of incurring such high and avoidable transaction costs 
alone serves as a disincentive to invest. Notably, whilst in most countries, losses 
incurred by businesses can be deducted from investment income under tax systems, 
there is no such corresponding provision in the case of bribes. This is a factor which 
discourages potential investors from taking the risk to do business in corrupt countries.  
Mauro demonstrated this fact empirically by showing a negative correlation between 
corruption and foreign investment, as well as overall growth.124   
Related to this is the fact that corruption may hinder innovation by stifling the entry of 
new goods and technology into the economy.125  Innovators usually require 
government-supplied goods like permits and licences which puts them directly or 
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indirectly at the mercy of public officials.  Where such officials are corrupt, they may 
unduly delay the process of acquiring permits and licences, or make it unduly difficult 
in order to extract bribes or other favours.  Such behaviour negatively impacts 
innovation, especially where the innovators or producers are unwilling to meet the 
demands of the corrupt officials or decide to invest elsewhere instead.  
Furthermore, corruption also leads to a wastage of resources that would otherwise be 
utilised more efficiently by businesses to increase productivity.  Studies suggest that 
in countries where corruption is common, as compared to less corrupt countries, 
representatives of private enterprises spend a lot more time with public officials, 
reflecting a wastage of valuable resources like money and time in rent-seeking 
activities.126 
However, whilst studies generally affirm this negative impact of corruption on 
economic growth,127 some indicate that the effect is not always direct.  A study by Mo 
indicates that the channels through which corruption affects growth include its impact 
on the ratio of investment to GDP, the level of political instability in a country, and its 
impact on human capital formation - measured by average schooling years.128  Such 
seemingly intervening factors notwithstanding, there is little doubt that a country 
fraught with corruption is likely to fare less well economically than a less corrupt 
country. 
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2.5.2.2 Effect of Corruption on Socio-Political Development. 
The social costs of corruption arise from corrupt officials engaging in activities and 
making decisions that provide the best opportunities for their selfish ends.  This leads 
to inefficient resource allocation and wastage of public funds on things that are 
inappropriate to the developmental needs of the country, with attendant social 
consequences.129  It explains why poor countries often end up spending most of their 
resources in sectors like infrastructure and defence where there are better 
opportunities for corruption,130 than in sectors which offer fewer opportunities, but are 
more socially expedient.  A 1998 study by Mauro found that corruption significantly 
reduces government expenditure on education and health in particular, in view of the 
lesser rent-seeking opportunities provided by those sectors in comparison to others.131  
Also, the imperatives of secrecy and continuation of corruption make officials hostile 
to change and innovation, if they perceive ideas as threats to the continuation of their 
corrupt activities.  The fact that such ideas may be beneficial to the social wellbeing of 
the country and its people becomes immaterial in such circumstances.  Hence, a 
corrupt public official might object to the digitalisation of public services which would 
reduce interface with people and thereby reduce opportunities to seek bribes.  This 
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would be the case, even though such digitalisation would provide cost savings to 
government and the people and ensure better delivery of public services.132   
Related to this is how the motivation of corrupt public officials to consolidate their gains 
and practices also impacts negatively on social development.  To achieve their aim of 
fashioning more opportunities for corruption, extra regulations are often introduced 
leading to the creation of more bureaucratic structures.  This invariably leads to 
unnecessary costs required to enforce such regulations, when those sums might have 
been put to better use in the provision of social services like education, health and 
infrastructure.133   
Corruption also defeats the effectiveness of legislation and policies intended to serve 
social purposes such as environmental controls, building codes and prudent banking 
practices.  Through corruption, individuals and organisations can circumvent their 
obligations under such legislation and policies, thereby causing serious social harm.134  
The most glaring example of this is environmental regulations which are often 
successfully bypassed by corporations that are able to bribe public officials charged 
with enforcing and monitoring compliance.  
Another perspective on the socio-political costs of corruption is that the prevalence of 
corruption in a country often leads to the state spending a lot on anti-corruption 
programmes at the expense of spending on much-needed social services.  Klitgaard 
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notes that trying to eliminate even the smallest amount of corruption can create 
excessive red tape and divert resources from other objectives.135  In extreme cases 
the cost of reducing corruption may be somewhat greater than the harm caused by 
the corruption.136  The fact that anticorruption programmes in most countries in SSA 
tend to be ineffective only justifies more spending on such programmes, when these 
sums might have been put to better use on social programmes.  This is a vicious circle 
in which most countries in the region are trapped. 
Corruption also creates distributional injustices in society.  A public system running on 
bribery and other forms of corruption is likely to favour those who can afford to pay 
bribes and exclude the poor, thereby perpetuating inequality.137  The poor may 
therefore be denied access to even basic social amenities like electricity and water, 
where they cannot afford to pay the required bribe.   
In political terms, corruption in the form of nepotism has the potential of creating 
injustices in power distribution. The result of this in terms of peace, stability and overall 
development could be costly.  A USAID working document notes that when corruption 
seriously compromises the legal and political system by negatively impacting on the 
protection of civil liberties and public order, predation by the rich and powerful in 
society can reach catastrophic dimensions.138  The rule of law and other political 
institutions also suffer.   This leads to the fundamental weakening of legitimacy and 
effectiveness of democratic governance.139  Michael Johnson surmises this thus: 
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‘corruption erodes the ability of a nation to reform itself and to build more open, 
responsive, credible and legitimate political institutions’.140 
 
 
2.5.2.3 Effect of Corruption on Human Development  
 
Drawing from UNDP’s 1992 report, human development is generally accepted to be 
‘the process of enlarging the range of people’s choices - increasing their opportunities 
for education, healthcare, income and employment - and covering the full range of 
human choices from a sound physical environment to economic and political 
freedoms.’141  This conception of human development leads to the notion which is now 
widely accepted, that the ‘human’ component is the central point at which development 
in all other sectors of society - economic, political, social and cultural - converge.  In 
the light of this, the above discussion on the negative effect of corruption on economic, 
social and political development leads to the conclusion that corruption impacts 
negatively on human development. 
Beyond this logical inference, there are studies that directly affirm the negative impact 
of corruption on human development.  Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme’s 2002 
paper examined how corruption reduces social spending, fosters inequality in 
education and causes unequal distribution of land and income in society.142   Research 
by Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobaton found that corruption reduces life expectancy, 
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infant mortality rates and literacy levels.143  Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson’s empirical 
work also reveals how corruption increases child and infant mortality rates and 
increases dropout rates in primary school.144  These studies show that there are 
various ways in which this effect of corruption may be manifested.  It may be through 
an increase in the cost of healthcare, education and other public services through 
bribery.  This would put such services out of the reach of the poor.  Corruption could 
also leads to the lowering of the quality of such services.145  
Akcay’s 2006 work considered the direct effect of corruption on human development 
by using the 1998 human development index as the dependent variable and 
considering it against data on corruption from the corruption index of Transparency 
International (TI), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) compiled by Political 
Risk Guide and the corruption index devised by Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi.  
Exploring this relationship in a sample of 63 countries, Akcay concluded that ‘there is 
a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption indexes and human 
development.’146   
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2.6 Effect of Corruption on Human Rights 
 
Building on the established negative impact of corruption on human development,147 
there is a further case that no individual can enjoy development without respect for 
and protection of their human rights.148  The argument that the enjoyment of human 
rights is essential to human development establishes, at least at a theoretical level, a 
relationship between corruption and human rights.  This section explores this 
relationship by discussing the practical ways in which corruption affects human rights. 
The impact of corruption on human rights may be direct or indirect.  This is the 
classification used here for purposes of clarity.  It is however worth mentioning other 
ways in which this effect has been classified.  The UN Human Rights Council for 
instance, suggests a classification based on the different obligations arising from the 
human rights commitments of states.149  Hence, corruption can have an individual 
negative impact, where it results in the violation of the rights of an individual.  It can 
also have a collective negative impact where the impact is on groups of individuals in 
society like the poor, ethnic minorities, women, children, elders, persons with 
disabilities or indigenous people.150  Finally, corruption can have a broader general 
negative impact, in which case, the effect is on society at large.151  As noted above, in 
each of these cases, the impact of corruption may be direct or indirect. 
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2.6.1 Direct Effect of Corruption on Human Rights 
The direct effect of corruption on human rights arises where an act of corruption results 
in the deliberate violation of a right or where an act of corruption can be considered 
the cause of the deprivation of the enjoyment of human rights.  This may occur, for 
instance, where a party in a case offers a bribe to a judge, thereby affecting his 
impartiality and averting the course of justice.  This would constitute a violation of the 
right to fair trial of the other party.152  The Advisory Committee of the Human Rights 
Council noted the serious way judicial corruption in such cases imperils the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights.153  Other ways in which corruption negatively impacts 
human rights directly include the buying of votes to undermine the right of citizens to 
political participation. 
Furthermore, the direct impact of corruption on human rights can also be understood 
from the perspective of the denial of access to basic services like education, health 
and housing due to corruption of public officials.  The right to health is violated for 
instance, where medical staff in a public hospital fail to provide needed treatment to 
someone, whilst providing such treatment to other patients who pay bribes to the staff.  
In such cases, according to Julio Bacio-Terracino, it is the conditionality of access 
based on the giving of a bribe that leads to the violation.154  Similarly, a violation of the 
right to education occurs where schools are unable to provide good education for 
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students because public officials embezzle the budgetary allocation for the education 
sector.  Another example is where poor families cannot benefit from social security 
programmes because authorities in charge administer such programmes based on 
patronage systems.155    
Hence, the impact of corruption on human rights becomes apparent in any situation 
where the resources available to government for the provision of education, health 
and other services are diminished or depleted because of corruption or where there is 
discriminatory access to such services.  In other words, corruption impairs the ability 
of governments to fulfil their human rights obligations to dedicate the maximum of their 
resources to the protection and realisation of the rights of their citizens.156  In the 
situations discussed, corruption affected the availability, affordability accessibility and 
quality of human rights-relevant goods and services.157   
 
2.6.2 Indirect Effect of Corruption on Human Rights  
Corruption affects human rights indirectly in situations where an act of corruption 
constitutes an essential element in a chain of events that culminates in the violation of 
a right.158  Here, the corrupt act can be considered a factor that fuels the violation of 
human rights.  The UN Human Rights Council suggested that a good way of looking 
at the distinction between situations where corruption impacts human rights directly 
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and indirectly is to consider the former as a case where corruption leads to a ‘violation 
of human rights’ and the later as a case where corruption negatively ‘affects human 
rights’.159   
Instances where corruption may constitute a violation of human rights indirectly include 
where a public official, due to a bribe, fails to inspect and ensure the completion of a 
project for the building of a school by a contractor.  The result of this may be the denial 
of access to education to students.  Even though this may directly be attributed to the 
failure of the contractor to complete the project, the act of corruption that influenced 
the lack of supervision by the public official could be considered an indirect cause of 
the denial of the right to education.  This illustration might appear theoretical, but the 
analysis of problems like this beyond the usual political, budgetary or administrative 
parameters, to the indirect role of corruption may provide much-needed insights for 
resolving them.  It deepens the understanding of the role of corruption in such 
situations.  
Various studies have established the impact of corruption on the quality and 
effectiveness of institutions.160  Courts and other government institutions responsible 
for the protection of human rights are no exception.  Hence, corruption can be 
considered a structural obstacle to the realisation of human rights to the extent that it 
negatively impacts on the effectiveness of institutions that are integral to the protection 
and fulfilment of human rights.161  Reference to this can be found in the cross regional 
statement delivered by Morocco to the 20th Session of the Human Rights Council in 
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2012 which noted the weakening of state institutions as a fundamental way in which 
corruption negatively impacts human rights.162  In broader terms, ‘corruption 
undermines the very foundation of a representative government, the rule of law, good 
governance and the tenets of human rights law’.163 
The discourse in the earlier parts of this chapter considered how the impact of 
corruption on the socio-economic development of individuals invariably leads to 
poverty and inequality.  Poverty hampers the capabilities of people that would enable 
them to understand, demand and enforce their human rights.  This is yet another way 
in which corruption negatively impacts on the enjoyment of human rights, albeit 
indirectly.   
Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of interdependence of human rights,164 
the negative effect of an act of corruption on human rights may be manifested in the 
violation of more than one right.165  This is especially so in instances where the effect 
is indirect.  Hence an act of corruption which violates the right to fair trial could also 
affect a person’s right to education or health or work, where the violation of one of 
these rights constitutes the issue in the case where fair trial was averted.  Similarly, 
where a person’s right to education is violated due to corruption, this would, in the long 
run, affect the ability of such person to enjoy other rights like the rights to health, a 
decent standard of living, the right to dignity of the human person, and even the right 
to life.  
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The instances where corruption can lead to a violation of human rights are numerous 
and cannot all be examined here.166  It may however be noted that the consequences 
of the violation may be long-term and not immediately apparent, especially where the 
impact is indirect.167  Hence, making the indirect link between corruption and human 
rights violations requires an understanding of how the cycle of corruption facilitates, 





This chapter has considered conceptual and practical issues about corruption.  It has 
argued for the adoption of a broad definition of corruption that encompasses the public 
and private sector.  Whilst such conception of corruption finds expression in 
international instruments on the subject and is also applied by CSOs like Transparency 
International, the compelling public-sector focus of anticorruption efforts is obvious.  
This is because the World Bank and other neoliberal development institutions that 
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were pivotal in the introduction and mainstreaming of the current anticorruption 
agenda adopted a conception of corruption focused on the public sector.  
Beyond this, the discussion in the chapter establishes the complex nature of most 
issues regarding corruption such as its typology, measurement and understanding of 
its incidence in SSA.  It notes the fact that despite such complexities, there appears to 
be an attempt in the literature and the approach of institutions to provide simplistic 
answers and solutions on the issue of corruption.  A balanced perspective of the 
various views on these issues is presented in the chapter with the objective of 
ascertaining what impact they may have or could yet have on the conception and 
approach of current anticorruption efforts.  The practical outcome of this is not 
considered here, as it is considered later in the work when the anticorruption regime 
in Nigeria is examined. 
The impact of corruption on development is one area where there is evident 
consensus.  Corruption is generally seen as having a negative impact on development.  
In this chapter, the discussion of this impact is carried out in a manner that 
demonstrates the evolution of the understanding of the impact of corruption in the field 
of development.  It shows that this has progressed from a consideration of its impact 
on the economy to broader issues of socio-political and human development.  This 
progression will become even more apparent in the next chapter when the changing 
conception of development itself over the years is discussed.  The impact of corruption 
on human rights is particularly important in the context of this work.  It stands at the 
foundation of a whole new approach to anticorruption - the rights-based approach - 
which is considered in chapter seven. 
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Chapter Three:  THE APPROACH TO CORRUPTION IN THE FIRST AND 




This chapter examines the approach to corruption in the first and second moments of 
law and development.  It looks at what informed the approach in each moment and 
the relationship between the approaches in both moments and how corruption was 
dealt with locally in countries in the region.  
Both moments are discussed in one chapter due to the similarity of their approach in 
contrast to the approach in the third moment which is considered later.  For each 
moment, the conception of development is first discussed.   This is followed by the 
role of law in the development process and then the approach to corruption during that 
moment.  The general pattern that emerges from the discussion is that the approach 
to corruption in each moment was informed by both the manner development was 
defined and the role law played in the development process.  
This discussion is necessary because it provides insights on why it took long for the 
field of international development to engage with the issue of corruption.  More 
importantly, it provides an important background to current anticorruption efforts, 






3.1 The Moment of Law and The Classic Developmental State 
3.1.1 Conception of Development:  The Economic Growth 
Paradigm 
 
The first two decades marking the commencement of intense development efforts on 
the international stage were focused on promoting the economic growth of countries 
in the global South.  The drive for economic progress was considered essential for 
most of these countries which had just gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Development agencies and practitioners were heavily reliant on economic models for 
development proposed by top economists like John Maynard Keynes whose work 
dominated development discourse during this period.  The means for achieving 
economic growth was considered to be through industrialisation and increase in 
productivity.  Progress was measured based on increase in economic parameters like 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP).  
Whereas the emphasis on economic growth was pervasive during this period, there 
was less agreement amongst development practitioners on the predominant sector 
that should drive the development process.  Hence, in the first couple of decades 
immediately following the independence of countries in SSA, the state was considered 
most suited to drive the development process.  Aptly referred to in law and 
development discourse as the moment of the ‘classic developmental state’, state-run 
industries were prevalent and the state was required to mould and direct economic 
behaviour.  This approach saw the emergence of Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) in most Latin American and African countries, characterised by state-led 
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economic development policies such as nationalisation, subsidisation of vital 
industries and increased taxation.   
In October 1973, because of an embargo on oil placed by Arab states over United 
States support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war, the price of oil rose dramatically.  This 
led to a rise in inflation and recession in most countries.  In SSA, food prices rocketed 
and a lot of suffering ensured.  In reaction, the World Bank under Robert McNamara, 
initiated a shift in strategy towards a more poverty-oriented approach.1  Other donors 
such as the United Kingdom and the United States also followed suit in focusing on 
alleviating the ensuing poverty and corruption.2  However, this ultimately proved to be 
a temporary reaction to the situation and the seeming shift in strategy towards social 
dimensions of development waned as prevailing circumstances changed.  By the mid-
1980s, following the debt crisis at the start of that decade, occasioned by another oil 
crisis in 1979 that threatened to break down the economies of most countries in the 
region, the focus was firmly back on economic development.  The World Bank and the 
IMF became focused on implementing the neoliberal structural adjustment of the 
economies of countries in the region.  This eventually led to the crystallisation of the 
second moment of development thought, considered in section 3.2 below.  
The predominantly economic conceptualisation of development during the first 
moment of law and development has been supported on a few grounds.  The use of 
GNP and GDP in measuring development for instance, provides a convenient means 
                                                            
1 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Makes Things Worse in Africa and How There is Another 
Way for Africa (Penguin Books 2009) 16. 
2 To this effect, the United Kingdom in 1975 published a white paper titled, ‘The Changing 
Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest’.  It detailed the strategy of the Overseas 
Department to ensure that British aid directly benefitted the poorest people in recipient countries and 
concentrated on sectors like housing, health, education and family planning. 
On its part, the United States passed the International Development and Food Assistance Act 
with the object of making sure that 75 per cent of its Food for Peace programme went to countries 
with the lowest per capita income. 
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of determining the development trend of a country.  In addition, these indicators are 
useful in establishing progress about development objectives and in planning future 
courses of development.  Whilst they may not indicate challenges in the social and 
political scene of a country, they highlight sectors of the economy that may need 
improvement for a country to reach its overall development targets. 
Furthermore, economic growth can be an indicator of development potential.  A 
country with a good outlook in terms of economic growth, although not achieving 
poverty reduction or reducing inequality in the interim, may in fact be directly and 
indirectly establishing the systems, institutions and conditions necessary for 
comprehensive development.  Factors including a good fiscal system, greater savings, 
high levels of per capita investment, etc. that are all typical of economic growth may 
well foreshadow and prove instrumental in the ability of a country to realise genuine 
development in the future.3   
The fact however is that the emphasis on ‘the economic’ during this period downplayed 
the significance of the social, political and cultural facets of development in society.  
The following pitfalls are identifiable in this respect.  Firstly, development experts, 
including economists, now recognise the fact that economic growth, by itself does not 
always lead to meaningful development in society generally and the alleviation of 
poverty in particular;4 a reality that has come to be termed ‘growth without 
development’.5  Indices of GNP and GDP are often technical indications of 
development which do not represent a corresponding improvement in the quality of 
                                                            
3 Dudley Seers, ‘The Meaning of Development’ (1969) Institute of Development Studies 
Communication 44, 1-26. 
4 Kerry Rittich, ‘The Future of law and Development: Second-Generation reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social’ in D. M Trubek and A. Santos, The New Law and Economic Development: 
A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 203. 
5 Robert W. Clower et. al, Growth Without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia (North-
Western University Press 1966) 1-16. 
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lives of the individuals in society.  Such measurements do not also highlight much 
required social and political change in most countries in the global south.  Todaro and 
Smith recall that the questioning of an economic model of development was signalled 
by the experience of most countries in the 1950s and 1960s that reached their 
economic growth targets with no resultant improvement in the living standards of their 
masses.6   Sen therefore argues that a comprehensive conception of development 
must look beyond the growth of GDP and other income-related variables and the 
general accumulation of wealth.7  
Secondly, it has been noted that, in extreme cases, growth has been achieved at the 
expense of social and political advancements.  The result being that general 
development itself becomes negative in the long run.8  According to Rist, ‘the essence 
of development’, in such instances, is the transformation and destruction of social 
relations and the natural environment in order to increase the production of 
commodities geared by demand’.9  Seers points to the manifestation of this in 
countries with positive indicators on measures of economic development but which 
are afflicted with social problems and political upheavals that adversely impacts the 
wellbeing of citizens.10  It has been argued that, in such situations, poverty could be 
seen, not as a failure of capitalism to bring about development, but rather as proof of 
the proper functioning of capitalist systems.11   
                                                            
6 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development (11th Edn, Addison Wesley 
2012) 14. 
7 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 1999) 14. 
8 Seers (n 3) 2. 
9 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (Zed Books 
1997) 12. 
10 Seers (n 3) 2. 
11 See Generally, the work of Jeremy Seabrook, The Race for Riches: The Human Cost of Wealth 





3.1.2 Law in Aid of the Classic Developmental State  
 
The understanding of the role of law in development can be traced as far back as 
Adam Smith’s discussion of ‘the economic effect of mercantile legislation’ in his 
landmark work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, first 
published in 1776.12  Apart from Adam Smith, other early scholars who showed an 
interest in the relationship between law and development include Maine, Montesquieu, 
Weber and Marx.13   The recent history of law and development as a discipline is 
however linked to the initiatives of US academics and development experts in the early 
1960s.  These initiatives were aimed at promoting legal and institutional reforms in the 
newly independent countries of the so-called ‘Third World’ based on Western 
models.14  These efforts signalled the commencement of the first moment of law and 
development. This moment was basically state-centric based on development theories 
that emphasised the role of the state as the driver of economic growth.  Law in this 
setting was regarded as an instrument of intervention by the State in the economy to 
foster development.15  To achieve this, several law reform projects were initiated in a 
                                                            
      12 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected 
Edition (OUP 2008). 
13 Kevin E. Davis and Michael. Trebilcock ‘The Relationship between Law and Development: 
Optimists Versus Skeptics’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 895-946. In fact, the 
works of the Weber and Marx would go on to have a tremendous effect on the theories of 
modernisation and dependency which transverse development discourse in modern times. 
14 Kalidou Gadio, ‘The Role of Law in Development for the African Continent from a Development 
Agency Perspective’ (Harvard African Law and Development Conference, Cambridge, MA, 16-18 
April 2010) 
15 F. C. Sherman, ‘Law and Development Today: The New Developmentalism’ (2009) 10 (9) 
German Law Journal 1258-1273. 
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few states along the lines of ‘professionalisation’ of the legal profession and transplant 
of supporting legal institutions and modern laws. 
 
Davis and Trebilcock rightly point out that the moment of law and the classic 
developmental state was characterised by the theoretical foundation of the concept of 
modernisation which advances a relationship of qualified cooperation between the 
‘developed and developing nations’ of the world.  This concept was premised on the 
fact that modernisation is a prerequisite to development and that global South 
countries must evolve from their traditional state to modernised societies to be 
developed.16  Rostow laid out the classic five stages of this evolution process as 
follows: 
[F]irst, the traditional society, organised around agrarian subsistence 
modes of production; second, the preconditions for take-off, triggered by 
encounters with external forces; third, the take-off, marked by industrial 
development and increased economic growth; fourth, the drive towards 
maturity with a sustained level of economic productivity and greater 
linkages with the international economy, and finally, the age of mass 
production, where consumption needs replace basic subsistence 
needs.17 
                                                            
16 Davis and Trebilcock (n 13) 900-901. 
17 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (CUP 1960) 4-
14, as quoted by Lan Cao, ‘Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning? Review of Anthony 
Carty (ed) Law and Development’ (1997) 32 Texas Intl LJ 545, 549. 
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Law was considered central to this evolution.18  This was based on the widely-held 
view that ‘a more developed legal system leads to a more highly developed economy 
and polity’.19  The expectation was therefore that law would provide the requisite legal 
infrastructure on which development would thrive.  Sherman aptly summarised the 
role of law during this period: 
The classic developmental state required laws and legal institutions that 
would allow it to direct and mould economic behaviour.  Legislation 
served as a tool for effecting national economic planning and law more 
generally served to create the framework for bureaucratisation and 
governance of state industry.  Lawyers working in development 
agencies, universities and other organisations in the United States and 
Europe took up the agenda of law reform in this context.  Thus, they held 
a functionalist conception of law as an instrument with which to facilitate 
state-led development.20 
As noted earlier, a major preoccupation of this moment was to modernise the legal 
culture of countries in SSA through educational reform.  This was because legal 
education was regarded as the source of legal formalism, which designers of law and 
development programmes at the time considered as a central impediment to a 
functionalist legal culture in the global South.  Legal formalism was considered a notion 
of law as autonomous and abstract principles that can be deduced and applied without 
regard to socio-economic and policy objectives.  Thus, a significant step taken towards 
modifying this notion was the reforming of law schools with the object of implementing 
                                                            
18 David M. Trubek and Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States’ (1974) Wisconsin Law Review, 1062-
1103. 
19 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, 52-53. 
20 Sherman (n 15) 1262 
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a functionalist legal culture that was conducive to economic development.21  Training 
lawyers to see and use law as an instrument for change, it was assumed, would 
promote the developmental goals of the state.22   
The second major fixation of this moment was legal transplants of modern laws and 
institutions which, according to scholars and practitioners, were lacking in countries in 
the global South. It was considered of utmost importance ‘to strengthen the legal 
capacity of state agencies and state corporations and modernise the legal profession 
by encouraging pragmatic, policy-oriented lawyering’.23  The focus of the transplants 
was on economic laws on the pretext that the resulting development would have a 
spill-over effect and create a liberal-democratic order.  Connecting with the first policy 
fixation for the moment mentioned above, the assumption was that if the ideas taught 
in law schools in the global South could be changed, the attitude of lawyers would 
change also, and if the right laws were created, they would be enforced.  Furthermore, 
it was expected that the ‘western rule of law’ would be embraced and implemented if 
its positive benefits could be demonstrated.24  Whether or not such benefits accrued 
to global South countries in tandem with this line of thought continue to be a subject 
of debate. 
The justification for considering the transplant of modern legislation as the best means 
to solve the many development problems in SSA was that such problems were so 
pressing, and ‘so contracted [was] the time span for development that direct and 
                                                            
21 ibid 
22 Davis and Trebilcock (n 13) 901 
23 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 1-18. 
24 David M. Trubek, ‘Law and Development’ in N.J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioural Sciences (Pergamon 2001) 8443-8446. 
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manageable solutions were considered necessary’.25  Supporting this outlook, Rene 
David, author of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960 declared, ‘Ethiopia cannot wait 300 
or 500 years to construct in an empirical fashion a system of law which is unique to 
itself.  The development and modernisation of Ethiopia necessitate the adoption of a 
“ready-made” [sic] system’.26  Others have claimed that this was necessary because, 
although the customary law of the peoples of SSA was sufficient in handling certain 
subsistence purposes in tandem with the lifestyle of the people at the time, it was ill-
adapted to the demands of the anticipated economic development.  This was 
especially the case in the areas of commercial law and public law like finance, banking, 
labour law, state enterprises, import controls, exchange controls, limitations on the 
repatriation of profits, income taxation, trade unions and a host of others27  
However, the reality on the ground and the limited success of most of such 
transplanted legislations in fostering development in the region has subjected this 
approach to a good deal of criticism from both within and outside the field of law and 
development.28  A lot of the criticism on the adoption of a modernisation framework at 
the beginning of law and development programming has centred upon the fact that 
the massive transplantation of a different system of laws to global South countries 
occurred without necessary adaptation to suit the socio-political situations in the 
respective countries.  Scholars like Tamanaha iterated this point by adopting terms 
such as ‘context matters’, and ‘circumstances on the ground shape how things work’ 
                                                            
25 Elliot M. Burg, ‘Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and Critique of “Scholars in 
Self-Estrangement”’ (1977) 25 American Journal of Comparative Law 492, 506. 
26 Rene David, ‘A Civil Code for Ethiopia: Considerations on the Codification of the Civil Law in 
African Countries’ (1963) 37 Tulsa. Law Review 187, 188. 
27 Robert Seidman, ‘Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-
Saharan Africa’ (1966) Wisconsin L. Rev. 999-1027.   See also Robert Seidman, ‘Law and 
Development: A General Model’ (1972) 6 Law & Society Rev. 311-327. 
28 See for instance, the classic work of D.M. Trubek and M. Galanter: “Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States” 
(1974) Wisconsin Law Review 1062. 
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to describe the drawbacks of this approach.29  Another reason corollary to this was the 
ill-considered focus on formal legal systems alone, excluding customary laws and 
other informal legal orders that regulated the lives of people in various countries.30  
However, as rightly observed by Davis and Trebilcock, a lot of the critique was not 
about whether or not legal reform was feasible or whether law had the potential to 
promote development, but rather about the appropriate programme of legal reforms 
pursued to engender development.31    
 
 
3.1.3 Approach to Corruption  
 
Owing to the instrumentality role ascribed to law essentially towards economic ends, 
the scholarship and policies furthered by the law and development field during this 
moment did not consider serious social and democratic legal institutions.  It also failed 
to engage with other critical issues that may have a negative effect on the goal to 
achieve economic development.  One of the most significant of such issues was 
corruption.  The prevailing situation created by the institutional framework of the 
moment granted a lot of discretion and power to public officials in terms of regulating 
the political economy of countries.  Despite this, very little or no regard was given to 
                                                            
29 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development’ (2011) 
44 Cornell Int’l Law Journal 209-247. 
30 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Lessons of Law and Development Studies’ (1995) 89(2) American 
Journal of International Law 470-486. 
31 Davis and Trebilcock (n 13) 28 
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the challenge of corruption – in terms of probable abuse of such powers - which had 
the singular potential of derailing development programmes and objectives. 
For reasons that will be examined in the next chapter, there was hardly any research, 
policy framework or practical work done to deal with corruption from a development 
perspective during the period comprised in the first moment of law and development 
thought.  This was so even though, at the same time, there were various studies 
showing the effect of corruption on development being carried out by economists and 
other social scientists.32    
This slow reaction was however reflective of the broader role of legal reform in the 
development process.  As aptly expressed by Trubek and Galanter, ‘lawyers were late 
comers to the development research game, responding more slowly than [economists 
and] social scientists to the demand for theoretical insights into the process of 
development’.33  This exemplifies the lopsided nature of development advanced at the 
time with all the focus being on promoting economic development through the 
instrumentality of the law.  Hence, within the context of the peculiar challenges of SSA, 
this economic growth-based denotation of development ignored most of the pressing 
issues that were important to ensure holistic development.34  Economic development 
without corresponding social and political development may have enhanced economic 
growth but it failed in tackling challenges like corruption, considered one of the greatest 
barriers to development in the region. 
                                                            
32 See for instance Nathaniel H. Leff, ‘Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption’ 
(1964) 8(3) American Behavioural Scientist 8-14; A. O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 (3) American Economic Review 291-303; Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘The 
Economics of Corruption’ (1975) 4(2) Journal of Public Economics 187-203. 
33 Trubek and Galanter (n 18) 1065. 
34 Mashood. A. Baderin, ‘Law and Development in Africa: Towards a New Approach’ (2011) 1 (1) 





3.2 The Moment of Law and the Neoliberal Market  
3.2.1 Conception of Development:  Continuation of the 
Economic and Indications of the Social 
 The definition of development during the second moment of law and development 
continued to focus on the economic dimensions of development, as was the case with 
the first moment.  Following from the 1979 oil crisis, the early 1980s brought about an 
opportunity for development institutions to advance neoliberal policies in countries in 
the global South.    The oil crisis had led to high levels of inflation in most countries 
around the world.  The reaction of the United States, the United Kingdom and other 
major economies was to tighten monetary policy by mainly increasing interest rates.  
Since most of the bank loans to countries in SSA at the time were based on floating 
interest rates, an inevitable outcome of this was that these countries were no longer 
able to keep with their debt repayment obligations to their commercial lenders.35 
Between 1981 and 1983, about eleven countries in the region, including Nigeria had 
defaulted on their obligations.36  With similar defaults in other regions of the world like 
South America, there was need to find a solution to the debt crisis.  Consequently, the 
IMF and the World Bank stepped in to restructure the debt of the countries in default 
by lending them money to help them repay their debts.  This was conditional on the 
                                                            
35 Moyo (n 1) 18. 
36 These countries were Zambia, Angola, Cameroon, Tanzania, Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, 
Gambia, Congo, Ivory Coast and Gabon.  See Frederico Sturzeneggar and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 
Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises (MIT Press 2007) 3-30. 
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countries adjusting the structure of their economies to encourage greater trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, reducing price rigidities and implementing other neoliberal 
policies.  The pursuit of these polices meant that the attention of countries in the region 
became largely about achieving economic stability and then growth.  Social concerns 
had little place in the ensuing package of policies for development that were 
implemented through this process.    According to Rittich, social issues of development 
‘were seen as not only extraneous to but sometimes in conflict with the pursuit of 
economic development’.37   
The economic paradigm of development therefore persisted for most of the second 
moment of law and development.  The defining departure between this moment and 
the previous was however the transposition of the state with the market as the main 
driver of economic development.  This was the case until the latter stages of the 1990s 
when indications for the mainstreaming of social concerns in development started 
taking hold.  And by the turn of the century a whole new paradigm of development had 
evolved, with social development a central component. 
It is important to establish, at this point, what the social dimension of development 
entails and the context in which it is used in this work.  The social conception of 
development encompasses a broad range of issues.  It is often understood to mean 
development in all non-economic sectors of society.  According to the United Nations 
Agenda for Development, social development includes development in health, 
education and training, housing and shelter, water and sanitation, transparent, 
                                                            
37 Rittich (n 4) 203. 
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representative and accountable governance, popular participation, rule of law, civil 
peace, equity and equality and human rights, amongst others.38    
This facet of development is variously referred to as socio-political development, 
socio-legal development, second generation reforms or the post-Washington 
Consensus.39  In contrast to the economic conception of development, the use of 
social development here refers to the political, social and legal spheres, amongst 
others. This is not intended to trivialise the importance of discussing the meaning of 
development in each of these areas which are all important.  Rather, it is in keeping 
with the general trend in development discourse of considering development in 
economic terms in comparison and contrast with development in other areas that are 
often referred to simply as the ‘the social’.40 
Prior to the mainstreaming of social development around the turn of the century, the 
idea and need to define development with less emphasis on the economic growth had 
featured in development literature and policy documents of some international 
development organizations like the United Nations.  Seers opined, back in 1970 that 
the most significant questions to ask when determining a country’s development are: 
What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? 
What has been happening to inequality?  He concluded that it is the increase or 
decrease of the levels of these three central problems in society that is the actual 
measure of development, irrespective of whether per capita income had doubled 
within a period.41 
                                                            
38 United Nations, The United Nations Agenda for Development: Development for All (New York 
1997) 
39 Rittich (n 4) 203-204. 
40 ibid. 
41 Seers (n 3) 5. 
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The apparent delay in the mainstreaming of the ‘social’ in the light of such long-
standing references to it can be attributed to the sharp distinction that existed between 
social and economic concerns.42  Whilst the United Nations and some NGOs 
continued to push the social agenda long before and into the 1990s, IFIs like the World 
Bank and the IMF concentrated on the economy; considering social concerns as 
mostly political and therefore beyond their development mandate.  It was also believed 
that economic development would have the impact of automatically satisfying social 
needs.  A few events in the 1990s however led to indications of the ‘social’ in the work 
of IFIs and thereby provided inroads for the convergence of both sides, eventually 
leading to the mainstreaming of social development at the turn of the century.   
Amongst these factors was the East Asian financial crisis of 1990s.  Akin to the Latin 
American debt crisis two decades earlier - that eroded faith in state-led development 
models - the East Asia crisis that began in 199743 led to a re-questioning of a purely 
economic conception of development and steadfast trust in the markets as the main 
driver of development.  Another factor was the obvious failure of the neoliberal polices 
of the Washington Consensus to stimulate growth in most of the countries in which 
they were implemented, especially in SSA.44  A significant indication of this was the 
increased poverty in most countries in the region during the period of implementation 
                                                            
42 Rittich (n 4) 203. 
43 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ in Paul 
Kraugman (ed.) The Currency Crisis (University of Chicago Press 2000) 105-161. 
44 Sayre P. Schatz, ‘Structural Adjustment in Africa: A Failing Grade So Far’ (1994) 32(4) The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 679-692; Fantu Cheru, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, 
Development and Democracy (Zed Books 1989); William Easterly, ‘The Lost Decades; Explaining 
Developing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform 1980-1998’ (2001) 6(2) Journal of 
Economic Growth 135-157. 
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of structural adjustment.  This heralded calls to move social concerns from the 
periphery to a central place in the development process.45 
A third factor, as mentioned earlier, was the alternative narrative from the United 
Nations or other IDIs that emphasised social issues in development.  The work of 
United Nations agencies like UNDP played an important role in the reconceptualisation 
of development beyond the ‘economic’.  The publication, by the agency, of the Human 
Development Report from 1990 drew attention to the social component of 
development.  Issues like human security, gender, poverty, democracy and human 
rights, which were not central to the prevailing economic conception of development, 
became central themes of the annual publication by the Agency.  Whilst it may seem 
logical to assume that this broader conception of development ultimately led to the 
consideration of the issue of corruption in the context of development and how to deal 
with it, this was not the case.  The origin of the global anticorruption movement lies 
elsewhere.  This will be discussed in chapter six below.   The role of law in the second 
moment is considered next. 
 
 
3.2.2 Law in Aid of the Neoliberal Market 
 
The second moment of law and development is recognised for being largely market-
centric and driven by neo-liberal ideas about development.  Here, law was used to 
limit the intervention of the state in the economy in favour of promoting a controlling 
                                                            
45 Morag Goodwin and Kate Rose-Sender, ‘Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome 
Addition to the Development Discourse’ in Martin Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds) Corruption and 
Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 222. 
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role for the market instead.46  In line with the concept of free markets, the policies 
pursued during this period - which can be regarded as loosely commencing from the 
late 1970s to the early 1990s - included privatization, deregulation, fiscal discipline 
and liberalization.  Trubek, in summarising aptly, the role of law in advancing economic 
development during this era, noted that: 
This perspective assumes that market institutions are necessary 
for economic growth, and sees modern law as essential to the 
creation and maintenance of markets.  The emphasis here is on 
modern law’s predictability as a set of universal rules uniformly 
applied.  As a result of such predictability, modern law 
encourages men to engage in new forms of economic activity and 
guarantees that the fruits of this activity will be protected.  Law 
thus . . . assures the individual that his decisions will be enforced 
by state authority, [and] his acquisitions protected from the 
depredations of others.  Through institutions such as contract and 
private property rights, modern law promotes development and 
hence economic development.47 
This pro-neoliberalism shift involved a set of development policy prescriptions 
promoted by the Washington-based IFIs, namely the IMF, World Bank and the 
economic agencies of the US government.48  They were collectively termed the 
‘Washington Consensus’ by English economist John Williamson in 1989.49  The 
                                                            
46 Baderin (n 34) 12. 
47 David.M. Trubek, ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and 
Development’ (1972) 82 (1) The Yale Law Journal 1. 
48 See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2002). 
49 John Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened (Institute for 
International Economics 1990). 
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development of legal institutions for the protection of property and contractual rights 
was seen as particularly essential to economic development.50  This was so as to 
provide security, certainty and predictability for private sector actors in the economy. 
There was therefore a practical reversal of the hitherto established development model 
by radically altering the role of the state in the development process.  Legal 
instruments such as statutes and decrees that created the regimes of import 
substitution, government development plans and general interventionism, were now 
used for dismantling those systems.51 A market-oriented variant of rule of law was 
pursued with private law becoming a principal tool for limiting state interference in the 
economy.52  
 
According to Sherman, with this new direction arose also the need for entirely new 
legal structures to allow the market to function freely, and especially to protect 
participants in the market in areas like finance and banking, corporate/commercial law, 
intellectual property, insurance, privatisation, trade and foreign investment, among 
others.53  There was an apparent fresh impetus for the modernisation of the legal 
systems of countries in SSA.  Explaining the justification for this ‘modern’ law, David 
Apter declared: 
 Modern law promotes economic development because a regime 
of contract and other laws facilitates economic planning.  It 
promotes political development because it restrains arbitrary 
                                                            
50 Douglas C. North, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5(1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 97-112.  See 
also Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990) 
51 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 45) 224. 
52 John Ohnesorge, ‘Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxy and the 
Northeast Asian Experience’ (2007) 28 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 219, 
247. 
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state action and allows the state to derive legitimacy through 
rational rules and principles.  Thus, the evolution towards 
progressively higher states of economic development should 
result in the reproduction of political, social, and legal institutions 
akin to those that exist in the West, creating not just a free market 
economic system but also the foundations of liberal 
democracy.54 
With effective enforcement being pivotal to these new rule-based systems, rule of law 
scholars and practitioners during this moment of law and development were also 
particularly concerned with effective adjudication and judicial independence.55   
Sceptics of neoliberalism have pointed out that the ‘rule of law’ theorisation upon which 
it is built is difficult to reconcile with the fact that most countries during this period, 
especially in Asia, achieved considerable economic development even though they 
had legal systems that did not meet the prerequisites advanced by neoliberal 
theories.56  The most obvious example of these was China.57  The country achieved 
considerable economic growth despite much of the productive property in the country 
being collectively owned, with informal networks of relations among business people 
treated as more important to transactions than contract law.58  This has given rise to 
claims that ‘Asian style neo-mercantilism and economic nationalism’ may prove to be 
more suited to rapid economic development at the earlier stages of a country’s 
                                                            
54 David E. Apter, Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and Postmodern Politics 
(SAGE Publications 1987) as quoted by Cao (n 17) 549. 
55 ibid 
56 Ohnesorge (n 52) 219-308. 
57 Mark Beeson and Iyanatul Islam, ‘Neoliberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington 
Consensus’ (2005) 41(2) The Journal of Development Studies 197-219. 
58 See Tom Ginsburg, ‘Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia’ 
(2000) 34 Law and Society Rev 829-856. 
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development than promoting market capitalism through law.59  Such policy 
emphasises state control of natural resources, state run investment funds, and export-
oriented production pursued together with import barriers and protection of national 
industries.  Moreover, the prescriptions of neoliberal ideology did not necessarily 
enhance the ailing economic and political institutions in countries in SSA into the mirror 
images of their western counterparts, as was anticipated.60 
 
 
3.2.3 Approach to Corruption  
 
The construction of a neoliberal rule of law during this moment was viewed as essential 
for development because systems of state regulation and intervention in the previous 
era of law and development were viewed as inefficient, stagnant and corrupt.61  
Despite this foundation, very little was done to deal with corruption during this period.  
Such anti-corruption initiatives that existed were largely limited to the judicial arm of 
government.  Addressing corruption directly with respect to its negative effect on 
development was not a central goal of rule of law programmes during this moment.  
Hence programmes against corruption were focused on curbing abuse of discretion 
within the judiciary by formalising procedures, modernising courts, professionalising 
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judgeship and strengthening the independence of the judiciary as an institution of the 
court system.62   
These initiatives were geared towards achieving the formalisation and transparency 
of the legal system, considered a prerequisite for the security of private actors in the 
economy.  They focused on economic issues such as bribes and political exchanges, 
procedural irregularities like delays and substantive concerns dealing with legal 
interpretations and judicial decisions.63   
IDIs like the World Bank therefore only engaged in anticorruption work indirectly 
through programmes of the nature mentioned above.  This was done in the hopes that 
enhancing the transparency and efficiency of the judiciary would contribute to the 
viability of their market mechanisms and enhance economic development. Writing on 
the importance of the focus on the judiciary, Gonzalez de Asis noted:   
 Absence of meritocracy along with pervasive politicisation 
undermines professionalism and fuels corruption: decisions on 
recruitment, appointments and promotion of judges tend to be 
arbitrary. . . Sometimes judges are appointed by different political 
parties or as a result of delicate bargains struck by them or even 
amongst factions within parties . . . The deference of judges to their 
political godfathers can be reflected, for example, in the acceptance 
of suggested legal case [sic] leading to pre-determined decisions or 
the speeding up (or slowing down) of certain cases.  Hence, the 
adoption of predictable procedures and clearer rules to administer 
                                                            




judicial careers, along with incentive structures more prone to 
preserve the independence of the judiciary, such as promotions, 
clarity in career paths and unbiased rotations were seen as effective 
means for decreasing potential political interference.64 
This strategy has however been criticised for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the strategy 
concentrated basically on professionalisation and formalisation of the judiciary without 
taking the effects of informal relationships into cognisance in its approach to 
anticorruption.  Rule of law reformers focused on redesigning the appointment 
procedures of judges away from predominantly political appointment procedures to 
more independent mechanisms regulated by ‘judicial councils’ comprised of judges, 
bar associations, members of parliament and renowned scholars.  However, as Linn 
Hammergren highlights - based on his research on the effect of judicial councils in 
Latin America - such institutional changes have had limited impact in insulating judges 
from the influence of other branches of government.  The underlying challenges of 
patronage and clientelism tended to endure.  The situation was worsened by the lack 
of political will to empower the judicial councils to function independently as envisaged 
by their mandate.65 
Furthermore, Gonzalez de Asis refers to the nature of the composition and limited 
powers granted to these judicial councils as a major impediment to their effectiveness.  
In some countries, the composition included members of parliament who, as 
politicians, often protected their political interest.  In other cases, the councils were not 
empowered to administer the budget of the judiciary.  This impeded their 
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rule of Law Series, Working Paper 28 < 
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independence and subjected them to whims of other arms of government.66  This 
notwithstanding, the assigning of the power of appointment of judges to a singular 
independent body was considered a positive step towards achieving transparency in 
the judiciary. 
Apart from dealing with possible external influences on the judiciary, attention was 
also dedicated to ensuring accountability within the judiciary itself.  Rule of law 
reformers were deeply concerned with how much the independence of the judiciary 
could be insulating it from accountability and control.  This was more so in cases where 
the judiciary exercised control over its budget.  There were also issues with the 
overbearing influence of senior judges over lower-rank judges.  These concerned 
matters like evaluating their performance for purposes of promotion, assignments and 
salary progression.67  Other factors considered essential to ensuring accountability 
and transparency in the judiciary included proper case management, adherence to 
procedural law, use of technology for efficient record-keeping and remuneration for 
judges. 
Therefore, the neoliberal law and development doctrine with a primary focus on the 
market showed little concern for the role of law as a guarantor for political and civil 
rights or as a protector of the weak and the disadvantaged in society.68  This was the 
case when the role of law in that regard would have had the effect of addressing the 
issue of corruption especially of the political and systematic kind. 
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Before examining the reasons for the indifferent attitude to corruption during the 
second moment of law and development – as was the case in the first - the next section 
looks at how corruption was tackled in Nigeria during both periods. 
 
 
3.3 Anti-Corruption Efforts in Nigeria in the First and Second 
Moments of Law and Development  
 
The first and second moments of law and development coincided with a turbulent and 
eventful period in Nigeria’s history.  It covers the time from the independence of the 
country from British rule in 1960 to arguably the most corrupt regime that ruled the 
country, led by the military dictator General Sani Abacha, which ended in 1998.69   
Following his death on 8 June 1998, his successor General Abdulsalami Abubakar led 
the country through a period of transition to democratic rule culminating in the election 
of Olusegun Obasanjo as President of the Fourth Republic70 of the country in May 
1999.  In stark contrast to what was hitherto the norm, by this time there was marked 
attention to corruption at the global level.  This was reflected in the country with the 
                                                            
69 This covers a period of 39 years. In that time, the country was under democratic rule for a total 
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the presidential election eventually culminated in the military continuing in office under Gen. Sani 
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setting up of a broad range of legal, institutional and other supporting frameworks 
aimed at addressing corruption.71  These frameworks and their ramifications are 
discussed later as part of the approach to corruption in the current moment of the new 
developmentalism. 
 
There are three principal factors to be noted in the approach to corruption in Nigeria 
during the first and second moments of law and development.  First, there is a 
consensus that there was widespread corruption during this period that negatively 
impacted development in the country in all ramifications - economic, social, political 
and otherwise.72  Secondly, IDIs paid little attention to corruption in its policies and 
practices in the country.  Finally, regardless of the lack of attention to corruption by 
IDIs, there were efforts made by different regimes in the country in the period in 




3.3.1 The Reality of Corruption in the Country 
On gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria first practiced a parliamentary system of 
government with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe 
as President.  The evident hope and promise of the new country was however cut 
short after just six years by a coup d’état on 15 January 1966.  The young middle-rank 
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army officers who took over power predicated their actions mainly on the widespread 
corruption of political leaders.73 
In fact, even before the country gained independence, there were reports of officials 
abusing their office for personal enrichment.74  For instance, in 1956 an enquiry by a 
special tribunal, the Foster-Sutton Tribunal found that Nnamdi Azikiwe who was then 
Premier of the Eastern Region of the country used his position to influence government 
policy in favour of the African Continental Bank, an institution in which he had a major 
stake.75  Specifically, the report noted how Azikiwe used his influence to get public 
funding for the Bank with the claim of stimulating economic development in the region.  
The Bank subsequently gave out loans at lower interest rates and over extended 
periods of time to Zik Group of Companies, owned by Azikiwe.76 
Corruption became worse and centralised after independence.  Federal Ministers were 
seen in possession of wealth not justified by their legal means.  There were allegations 
of ministers using their influence to secure contracts for companies owned by them.  
This was often done with a sense of impunity and without remorse.  For instance, the 
Minister of Aviation at the time K.O Mbadiwe was once asked how he had gotten the 
money used in building a mansion in his hometown.  His reportedly replied, ‘From 
sources known and unknown’.77  In response to a similar question, his counterpart in 
the Ministry of Finance Chief Festus Sam Okotie-Eboh, using a biblical reference, was 
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quoted as saying, ‘To those that have, more shall be given.  From those that do not 
have, shall be taken even the little they have.’78  The widespread corruption in the 
public sector affected so many parastatals, including the Nigeria Railway Corporation, 
Nigeria Ports Authority and Nigeria Airways.79  It was therefore unfortunate, albeit not 
surprising that there was jubilation when the government was overthrown by the 
military.  The military pointed to the widespread corruption as justification for their 
actions.80  In his first radio broadcast, the leader of the coup Major Chukwuma Kaduna 
Nzeogwu remarked:  
‘Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in 
high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 per cent; those 
that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can 
remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalist and the 
nepotists, those that make the country big for nothing before 
international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put 
the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds’81 
Whilst it would be impossible to provide a chronological narrative of the incidence of 
corruption in the country during successive military and civilian governments, a few 
more major events that demonstrate the incidence of corruption during this period will 
be discussed.  In 1975, a probe into corruption instituted by the six months-long military 
regime of General Murtala Mohammed found that ten out of the twelve military state 
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governors under the previous regime of General Yakubu Gowon were guilty of 
corruption.  They were duly dismissed with ignominy and forced to give up their ill-
acquired wealth.82  Another enquiry in the same period found that there were 
widespread cases of contract inflation and manipulation of procurement processes in 
government ministries and parastatals.  One such case involved the Ministry of 
Defence in what came to be known as the ‘Cement Armada’ scandal.  The Ministry 
had ordered 16 million metric tons of cement at a cost of 557 million Naira for the 
renovation and building of military installations around the country.  Due to congestion 
at the Lagos harbour, the ships carrying the cement were unable to offload their cargo.   
This led to the Federal Government incurring substantial demurrage charges and 
raised suspicion on the overall purpose of the contract and the procedure for their 
procurement.  The inquiry revealed that the Ministry had inflated the contract for the 
cement by almost 100 per cent from 40 dollars per ton to 75 dollars.83  Moreover, to 
increase the margin of its loot, the Ministry of Defence was found to have ordered 16 
million metric tons of cement when it needed only 2.9 million metric tons that should 
have cost the government just 52 million Naira.84 
Akin to the end of the First Republic, Nigeria’s Second Republic from 1979 to 1983 
was also brought to an abrupt end by the military chiefly on grounds of corruption.85  It 
is claimed that in the four years of the Second Republic under Shehu Shagari, over 16 
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billion dollars of oil revenues were unaccounted for.86  In justifying the incursion of the 
military, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari pointed out that: 
“While corruption and indiscipline has been associated with our state 
of under-development, these two evils in our body politic have 
attained unprecedented height in the past few years.  The corrupt, 
inept and insensitive leadership in the last four years have been the 
source of immorality and impropriety in our society.  Since what 
happens in any society is largely a reflection of the leadership of that 
society, we deplore corruption in all its facets.  This government will 
not tolerate kickbacks, inflation of contracts and over-invoicing of 
imports etc.  Nor will it condone forgery, fraud, embezzlement, 
misuse and abuse of office and illegal dealings in foreign exchange 
and smuggling”87 
 The regime of Buhari – who is also the current democratically elected president - was 
however cut short less than two years later in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babangida in 
a bloodless coup.  The leadership of Babangida and his substantive military successor 
General Abacha were arguably the most corrupt in the history of the country.88  The 
former who ruled the country from 1985 to 1993 is considered to have institutionalised 
corruption in a manner never experienced.  He is seen as having introduced a regime 
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of impunity by releasing from prison individuals previously detained or convicted of 
corruption.   The extent of corruption under Babangida’s regime was detailed in the 
report of a panel of enquiry, the Okigbo Panel Report, which concluded its work in 
1994.  It found that the government had mismanaged the sum of 12.4 billion dollars.89  
The amount consisted of accumulated oil revenues that accrued to the country 
between 1988 and 1993.  These revenues were unscrupulously diverted through 
various high-profile projects and other fiscal mechanisms put in place by the 
government that never achieved their stated purposes.90  For instance, the panel found 
that a Stabilisation Account that was set up to receive the windfall of oil proceeds in 
the Gulf War had a balance of only 206 million dollars in June 1994 even though 
billions of dollars from oil revenues were supposed to have been deposited in the 
account.91 
The high level of political corruption under Babangida’s regime affected a wide range 
of government departments including the Nigeria Police Force, Customs, Inland 
Revenue Department, National Youth Service Corps, Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company and Nigerian Telecommunications Limited.92   
This trend of corruption continued and arguably got worse under General Abacha’s 
regime from 1993 to 1998 when Nigeria was consistently ranked amongst the most 
corrupt countries in the world on Transparency International’s CPI.93   At the end of 
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his tenure, it was estimated that Abacha, his family members and associates had 
embezzled public funds estimated to be up to five billion dollars.94  These sums were 
kept in foreign banks in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein.  Since his death in 1998, they are being 
repatriated back to the country in tranches at the behest of the Nigerian government.95 
Corruption has therefore been a constant feature in Nigeria’s economic and political 
reality since independence.96  It has been perpetrated both at the national and regional 
levels of government and under military and civilian regimes.  This was the case 
through the period of the first and second moments of law and development. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Lack of Attention to Corruption in the Country by International 
Development Institutions (IDIs). 
Despite the obvious nature of it, there was a palpable disregard for corruption in the 
polices and activities of IDIs in the country during the period in question.  The 
significance of this is important considering the impact of corruption on the country’s 
development.  Apart from the impact of the massive looting of public revenues on 
development, corruption was also having a direct effect on the use of funds provided 
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by development institutions for various projects.  This notwithstanding, there were no 
positive statements or actions on the part of especially IFIs on the impact of corruption 
or on ways of dealing with the problem.  This is a fact that becomes obvious from a 
search of the database of the World Bank for projects implemented in Nigeria.  It 
reveals that between 1960 and the commencement of the current democratic era in 
1999, there is no single project specifically intended to deal with corruption.97  In fact 
there was only one governance-related project in that period that may be considered 
as having a potential impact on reducing corruption.  This was the Economic 
Management Technical Assistance Project initiated in 1992 in accordance with the 
economic governance focus of the Bank in the early 1990s.98 
At the United Nations, efforts to introduce corruption onto the international 
development agenda did not make much progress either.  A 1975 General Assembly 
Resolution on measures against corrupt practices of transnational and other 
corporations provided no framework or clear-cut policy on corruption.99  It simply called 
on home and host states to cooperate in taking action to prevent such practices.100   
Being a resolution with no binding effect, its impact was negligible.  A more purposeful 
resolution that proposed particular international measures met with resistance, and a 
Code of Conduct put forward by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to tackle 
the challenge of transnational illicit payments through an international agreement was 
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rejected by the General Assembly in 1980.101  In any case, even though the success 
of these initiatives would have had an impact in bringing corruption to a central place 
in development at the time, their focus was on transnational economic forms of 
corruption.  This means that they would have made little difference in tackling political, 
bureaucratic and other forms of corruption that were predominant in countries in SSA. 
A factor worth considering in this respect is the role of the development policies 
pursued at the time.  The state-centric model of development advanced in the first 
moment of law and development bestowed considerable power on government 
officials.  As a newly independent country without strong institutions to check the use 
of such powers, it was easy for such public officials to abuse their positions with 
impunity.  This was exactly what happened, with the military having to step in on 
various occasions in the absence of strong democratic institutions to check such 
abuse of powers, as was the case in countries in the global North on which the policy 
was modelled. 
Furthermore, the change to neoliberal policies in the second moment of law and 
development provided further opportunities for corruption to thrive.  The policy of 
privatisation for instance, which is a major step in the transition of countries from state-
led development to market economies provides enormous opportunities for state 
officials to manipulate the process of selling state assets in a manner that furthers their 
personal gains.102 
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Despite this, the institutions promoting these models and policies disregarded 
corruption, allowing it to thrive in the country.  There was therefore an obvious 
mismatch between the reality on the ground and the approach of the law and 
development movement.  The reasons for this are discussed in the next chapter.  The 
next section looks at efforts taken by various regimes to tackle corruption in the country 
during this period. 
 
 
3.3.3 Local Efforts to Address Corruption  
The lack of attention to corruption in international development did not preclude action 
at the local level against corruption.  A considerable number of initiatives were 
undertaken by successive governments in Nigeria to deal with corruption.  The 
conception and implementation of these programmes were different, depending on the 
will and objective of the leader under whose government they were initiated.  This also 
had a concomitant effect on the prospect of each initiative. 
Despite these differences, there are certain general factors that applied to all of them.  
The first is that anticorruption initiatives were often ad hoc and short term.  Even 
though corruption was provided for as a crime under the law,103 there were hardly any 
records of routine prosecutions by designated prosecutorial authorities under the 
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Criminal Code or Penal Code.104  Each government dealt with corruption with 
reference to specific scandals, groups of public officials or a specific administration.  
This often involved constituting tribunals, special panels or commissions of enquiry 
and acting on their findings and recommendations.   
The first such major enquiry into corruption post-independence took place in 1966 
following the overthrow of the First Republic by the General Aguiyi Ironsi-led military 
coup.  Having taken power mainly as a result of widespread corruption, the 
government instituted a series of commissions of enquiries into the activities of public 
officials in various government departments including the Nigeria Railway Corporation, 
Nigeria Airways and the Nigeria Ports Authority.105  The findings revealed how 
government ministers used their influence to secure contracts for their private 
companies and also disregarded laid down procurement procedures in the award of 
public contracts.106  Following the inquiries, those public officials found culpable were 
subjected to detention by the military government.  
The subsequent regime of General Yakubu Gowon did very little to tackle corruption 
and is considered to have rather encouraged corruption by, amongst other things, 
freeing politicians detained for corruption under the previous regime.  Although it 
established a special anticorruption force - the ‘X Squad’ - to deal with corruption, the 
investigations of the special force never led any serious prosecutions or 
punishments.107   This was often blamed on Gowon’s conciliatory approach to 
governance and his overall conservative nature.108  His government was therefore 
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recognised less for tackling corruption and more for overseeing the mismanagement 
of the unprecedented revenues that accrued to the state from elevated oil prices in the 
early 1970s.   
Hence, the next significant ad hoc anticorruption initiative took place under the 
government of General Murtala Mohammed which toppled the Gowon regime.  With 
an approach of leading by example, General Mohammed began by declaring his 
assets and demanded that that all public officials follow suit under the Corrupt 
Practices Decree.109  Other initiatives of the regime include the establishment of the 
Assets Investigation Panel, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the Special 
Anti-Corruption Tribunal.110    
Like Ironsi’s regime discussed above, Mohammed instituted several probes into 
corruption in the previous government.111  The most renowned of these was the probe 
carried out by the Federal Assets Investigation Panel of 1975.  As noted earlier, it 
concluded that ten out of the twelve state governors under the previous regime were 
guilty of corruption.  They were accordingly dismissed from the military and forced to 
forfeit their ill-gotten wealth worth over ten million Naira to the State.112  Similarly, the 
Belgore Commission of Inquiry set up by the Murtala regime to investigate the ‘Cement 
Armada’ scandal revealed serious incidence of corruption in the Ministry of Defence 
under the previous regime and provided answers to a case of corruption that brought 
international embarrassment to the country. 
                                                            
109 Decree No. 38 of 1975 
110 Emma Chukwuemeka, Barthlomew J. Ugwuanyi and Ngozi Ewuim, ‘Curbing Corruption in 
Nigeria: The Imperatives of Good Leadership’ (2012) 6(3) African Research Review 338-358. 
111 ibid 342. 
112 Maduagwu (n 82) 7. 
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The anticorruption initiatives of the General Murtala Mohammed era were brought to 
an abrupt end when he was assassinated only six months into his tenure in February 
1976.  His successor General Olusegun Obasanjo initiated no distinctive initiatives 
against corruption until 1979 when he transferred the reins of power back to a 
democratic government after 13 years of successive military regimes.  The Second 
Republic under the Presidency of Shehu Shagari, described as a ‘soft-spoken and 
mild-mannered gentleman’,113 saw a resurgence of corruption.  The government 
however, did establish the Ethical Revolution of 1981 with the objective of curbing 
corruption by transforming the country’s national values.  This ultimately turned out to 
be a soft measure with no identifiable accomplishment in tackling corruption.  Its failure 
was blamed on the inability of the President to stop his ministers and other top 
government officials from embezzling state funds and engaging in other forms of 
corruption.114  It was this high level of corruption that ultimately led to the return of the 
military. 
In 1983, the government was overthrown in a coup led by General Muhammadu 
Buhari who promised to put end to corruption and restore discipline and integrity to 
public life.  To this end, the regime introduced its famous War Against Indiscipline in 
1984 to address corruption, and to achieve a broader aim of instilling patriotism and 
discipline in the citizenry.115  Other decrees promulgated to achieve this purpose 
included the Public Property Decree and the Public Officers (Special Provision) 
Decree, all of 1984.  Although the measures taken under the government recorded 
                                                            
113 Ogbeidi (n 92) 8; Solomon Olusoji, ‘Shehu Shagari at 91: A National Hero’ This Day (Lagos, 
11 March 2016) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/11/shehu-shagari-at-91-a-national-
hero/> 14 December 2016. 
114 Chukwuemeka, Ugwuanyi and Ewuim (n 110) 343. 
115 Charas Madu Tella and Shehu Mustapha Liberty, ‘Poor Leadership, Indiscipline and 




some notable accomplishments,116 they were also criticised for being draconian and 
violating human rights.  The administration sentenced public officials found guilty of 
corruption to absurd prison terms some of which ranged from 100 to 340 years.117   
The administration’s extreme actions also included detaining persons suspected of 
corruption indefinitely without trial.118  It was mainly this high-handedness that led to 
the toppling of the Buhari administration by General Ibrahim Babangida in a bloodless 
coup in August 1985. 
As discussed above, the regime of Babangida and that of his successor, General Sani 
Abacha were acknowledged for their tolerance of corruption, rather than for any 
actions taken to tackle corruption.  This notwithstanding, a few measures were taken 
by both administrations on corruption.  Babangida’s administration coincided with the 
commencement of the second moment of law and development.  In accordance with 
the neoliberal policies of the time, the regime initiated the Mass Mobilisation for Social 
Justice, Self-Reliance and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) in 1985.  The approach 
adopted under the initiative was in line with the broader economic reforms of structural 
adjustment that were being implemented at that time.  Even though the government 
pushed through the economic reforms, not much was done with respect to corruption 
under the initiative.119   
                                                            
116 By the end of 1984, it was reported that the various tribunals set up under the government had 
recovered over 112 million Naira and 688 thousand pounds from corrupt public officials.  Another 346 
million Naira was recovered from FEDECO alone and another 48.5 million Naira from the National 
Assembly.   See Uddoh (n 107). 
117 Ogbeidi (n 92) 13. 
118 This was carried out under various draconian decrees such as Decrees Nos 20, 21 and 22 of 
1984. 
119 Basil C. Nwankwo, Stephen Ocheni and Moses Atakpa ‘A Review of the Contributions of 
Military Regimes to Social Mobilisation in Nigeria, 1966-1996’ (2012) 3(2) Journal of Arts, Science 
and Commerce 24-32. 
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On his part, General Abacha is known to have constituted various panels to probe the 
Nigerian Customs Service, Nigeria Ports Authority, Nigerian Airports Authority and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, amongst other government agencies.120  The most significant 
action against corruption took place when the administration set up a special panel of 
eminent Nigerians chaired by a reputable economist, late Dr Pius Okigbo to investigate 
the receipts and uses of the oil windfall from the Gulf War.  The Okigbo Panel Report 
which was submitted to Abacha in September 1994 detailed how 12.4 billion dollars 
of oil revenue from 1988 to 1994 was mismanaged with grave cost to the development 
of the country.  However, the report of the panel was ultimately of no consequence.  It 
was kept secret by the government and nobody was held to account as a result of its 
findings.  In fact, the content of the report only became public when it was leaked to 
the press in 2005, years after the end of both administrations.121  The concealing of 
the report had to do with the fact that it did not only indict the government of Babangida, 
but also indicted that of his successor General Sani Abacha who constituted the 
panel.122    
Apart from the above probes, the Abacha administration promulgated some 
commendable laws on corruption, some of which are still part of the current 
anticorruption legislative framework in the country.  These include the Failed Banks 
and other Financial Institutions Decree of 1994123 which dealt with acts of recklessness 
and corruption in commercial banks.  Abacha also promulgated the Advance Fee 
Fraud and Other Related Offences Decree of 1995124 to deal with the rising trend of 
                                                            
120 Uddoh (n 107) 65. 
121 Alli (n 89). 
122 ibid. 
123 The current amended version of this Decree is the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and 
Financial Malpractices in Banks Act, Cap F2, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
124 This has been amended by the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006. 
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fraudulent schemes perpetuated by unscrupulous individuals.  These schemes 
constituted a considerable percentage of private sector corruption in the country and 
remain a challenge to date.  Despite these laudable initiatives, Abacha himself and his 
associates would go on to plunder the coffers of the country in the most despicable 
manner until his death in 1998.  
His successor General Abdulsalami Abubakar made no significant effort towards 
curbing corruption.  This was understandable as he committed his short one-year 
tenure to keeping his commitment of returning the country to democratic rule.125  This 
notwithstanding, some are of the view that his tolerance for corruption in that period 
was discouraging.126  He did not only fail to probe officials in the previous government 
that were obviously corrupt, but retained them in their positions throughout his term in 
office.    
By the time the country returned to democratic rule in 1999, a drastic paradigm shift 
had taken place and corruption had become a central factor in development discourse 
globally.  Consequently, Olusegun Obasanjo who became the first elected President 
of the Fourth Republic established the foundation for the present anticorruption 
regime. 
It is worth noting that a natural outcome of the ad hoc and short-term nature of the 
response to corruption under the various regimes is that the strategies reflected the 
overall personality and leadership style of the person in office at a point in time.  The 
draconian approach of the Buhari regime for instance, reflected the general high-
handedness with which he led.  This can be contrasted with the mild and tolerant 
                                                            
125 Chukwuemeka, Ugwuanyi and Ewuim (n 110) 344. 
126 Victor E. Dike, Nigeria and the Politics of Unreason: A Study of the Obasanjo Regime (Adonis 
and Abbey Publishers 2003) 2-50. 
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approach of his predecessor Shagari, who was generally considered soft in personality 
and in governance.127  The corollary of this was that anticorruption initiatives and 
projects were unsustainable over long periods of times.  They often did not survive the 
administration under which they were initiated. 
Furthermore, the above discussion illustrates another important element of 
anticorruption initiatives during this period.  This was the fact that each regime 
essentially used the machinery of state to probe the actions of the preceding 
administration.128  Whilst this may have been justifiable in certain cases and not so 
much in others, it was obvious that anticorruption efforts were used as a tool to justify 
the capture and use of state power.  They were also used to harass and intimidate 
actual or potential opposition.  There was a simultaneous disregard and often 
deliberate cover-up of corruption taking place within the regimes in office.  For 
instance, at the end of the probe into the ‘Cement Armada’ scandal by the Belgore 
Commission, the regime of Murtala Mohammed released a white paper stating that 
the commission had cleared Obasanjo, Murtala Mohammed’s second in command, of 
any wrongdoing.  The government never permitted the release of the original report of 
the Commission.  Its white paper revealed just enough information to blame the 
preceding government of Gowon for the acts of corruption revealed by the scandal.  It 
was however difficult to rationalise how Obasanjo was cleared of any wrongdoing 
considering he was the Director of Army Engineering Corps and later Federal 
Commissioner of Works at the time of the Scandal under Gowon’s regime.129 
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Similarly, as noted above, even though General Abacha’s government put in place a 
commendable amount of anticorruption initiatives and laws, he also used the 
apparatus of state to shield and facilitate the massive acts of corruption carried out by 
him, his family and associates.  This was also the case under the regime of Babangida 
and other leaders. 
There was therefore an evident notion of instrumentality in the manner successive 
administrations used anticorruption initiatives to achieve their preferred purposes.  In 
the broader picture, it is interesting that this was taking place at a time when the law 
and development movement emphasised the instrumentality of law to achieve 
development objectives.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, law was used as an 
instrument for the intervention of the state in the economy to promote growth in the 
first moment, and as a mechanism to promote market reforms in the second.  The use 
of the instrument of law and the apparatus of the state by successive regimes in this 
period to achieve their purposes with the claim of tackling corruption can therefore be 
considered an extension of the instrumentality model to the local level.   This was, no 
doubt, one of the unintended outcomes of the conception and implementation law and 
development programmes. 
Finally, actions taken to deal with corruption were generally top-down with little 
decentralisation and implemented through the apparatus of state.  The initiatives were 
often conceived at the very top level of government, usually by the head of state and 
implemented from the federal level.  Of the various regimes considered above, it was 
only during the regime of General Murtala Mohammed that there were recorded cases 
of probes into corruption that took place at the state level having any meaningful 
impact.  In other cases, actions taken against corruption were highly centralised which 
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also impacted on the sustainability of the initiatives.  Little room was created for 
alternative mechanisms to supplement or even complement state-led top-down 
actions against corruption.   
 
 
3.4 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has considered the approach to corruption in the first and second 
moments of law and development.  It has shown that even though development was 
defined differently in both moments and the role of law was therefore different in each, 
the approach to corruption was substantially similar.  This similarity in approach is 
particularly evident when considered with reference to the development policies and 
programmes pursued by IDIs in countries in SSA in the period in question. 
The case of Nigeria provides a good example of this.  The country has experienced a 
high incidence of corruption especially in the public sector since its independence.  
This has had grave consequences, not just for its economic and social development, 
but also its political development.  Even though the country has been under democratic 
rule in the past two decades, the preceding four decades since its independence in 
1960 were marked by various military coups.  These incursions by the military have 
often been blamed on corruption. 
Despite this reality of corruption, IDIs like the World Bank related with the country 
without regard for or response to the incidence and impact of corruption on 
development.  Loans and grants to promote economic development in the country 
continued to flow from IDIs to successive regimes.  The law and development 
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movement continued to play its instrumental role in support of predominant 
development policies and programmes without regard to the obvious corruption in the 
country. 
Despite this, successive governments in Nigeria took various initiatives to tackle 
corruption.  Both democratic and military regimes established legislation, special 
programmes, policies, probes and other measures in response to the high incidence 
of corruption.  However, most of these initiatives proved unsustainable and ineffective 
overall.  Certain conclusions were reached as to what was responsible for this.  The 
initiatives were often ad hoc, short term and therefore unsustainable.  Furthermore, 
the initiatives and strategies for their implementation were generally formulated and 
implemented in a top-down manner from the topmost levels of the executive.  Also, 
both military and democratic regimes saw such initiatives as instruments to harass 
and intimidate political opponents and to achieve broader political goals.  In the case 
of military administrations especially, anticorruption initiatives were used to justify the 
seizure and use of state power. 
For these reasons, anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria during the first and second 
moments of law and development proved ineffective.  The nature of their conception 
and implementation and the reasons for their ineffectiveness provide a significant 
backdrop to current anticorruption efforts in Nigeria and the SSA region generally.  
There are striking parallels between these factors and the challenges faced by current 






Chapter Four:     EXPLANATIONS FOR THE APPROACH TO CORRUPTION IN 




In his classical work, Law in Aid of Development, the late Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Ghana, Justice T. M. Ocran, described the intellectual discipline of Law and 
Development as a study of the conscious use of the normative system called law to 
bring about economic development.  He pointed out that in pursuing this goal, law can 
be seen as serving a dual purpose.  Referring to the development process 
metaphorically as a vehicle in motion, he noted that: 
Law could serve both as ‘accelerator’ to keep the process moving 
and as ‘brake’ to save the process from derailment.  As accelerator, 
law must be consciously evoked as a tool for social engineering 
towards development with both legislation and enforcement of law 
serving as crucial instruments in this regard.  As brake, law must 
also be consciously evoked as an instrument for stemming 
pathologies such as ‘corruption’ and other impediments in the 
development process.1 
 
The literature on law and development in the first and second orthodoxies reveals that 
the relationship between law and development was essentially driven by the need to 
                                                            
1 Tawia M. Ocran: Law in Aid of Development, (Ghana Publishing Corporation 1978) as quoted by 
Moshood A. Baderin, ‘Law and Development in Africa: Towards a New Approach’ (2011) 1 (1) NIALS 
Journal of Law and Development 18. (emphasis added). 
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utilize law for the purpose of accelerating economic development.  Terms such as 
‘instrumentality’ and ‘functionalist’ were used to describe the primary role of law in this 
regard.  As shown in the previous chapter, far too little attention was paid to the role 
of law serving as a check on factors that could be potentially antithetical to 
development like corruption.  This was the case in circumstances where the facts on 
the ground and studies in other fields suggested otherwise.2  The following discussion 
explores the reasons for this approach to corruption in law and development in the first 
and second moments of its evolution.3   
 
 
4.1.1 Generic Legal Transplantation and Disregard for Local 
Context 
 
The first explanation is the disregard for local context in exporting legal structures and 
institutions to countries in SSA.  The basic approach adopted by the law and 
development movement was to replicate legal institutions that were believed to have 
stimulated growth in the global North in countries in the region.  As noted by various 
scholars4, in doing this, there was an obvious indifference to the practical effects of 
                                                            
2 See David H. Bayley, ‘The Effect of Corruption in a Developing Nation’ (1966) 19 Western Political 
Quarterly 719-732; Stanislav Andreski, ‘Kleptocracy or Corruption as a System of Government’ in 
Stanislav Andreski, The African Predicament; A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation (Atherton 
1968); Michael Bratton, ‘The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa’ (1989) 17 World 
Development 569-587; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (Academic 
Press 1978). 
3 It is noteworthy that the reasons examined below, whilst aimed at providing answers to the approach 
to corruption, also mirror some of the broader critiques of law and development over the years. 
4 David M. Trubek and Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis 
in Law and Development Studies in the United States’ (1974) Wisconsin Law Review, 1062-1101; 
Moshood A. Baderin, ‘Law and Development in Africa: Towards a New Approach’ (2011) 1 (1) NIALS 
Journal of Law and Development 1; Kelvin E. Davis and M. Trebilcock: ‘The Relationship between Law 
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the institutions being transplanted.  Furthermore, there was evident disregard for the 
pre-existing formal and especially informal structures prevailing within the countries 
and how these would interact with and affect the transplanted regime.  Hence this 
basic approach of modernisation continued in the first moment of law and development 
for instance, even though most observers acknowledged its shortcomings with respect 
to corruption.5  J. P. Nettl and Karl von Vorys noted at the time how, through the state-
led model of development, a lot of money had been lost in capital intensive projects 
that benefited only a few corrupt and privileged elites.  This was done to the detriment 
of meaningful development for the general citizenry.6  Therefore, whilst the agenda of 
transplanting modern legal systems was taking place at the formal level, elites on the 
ground were actively engaged in co-opting those same institutions for their personal 
purposes and undermining legal reforms which threatened to dilute their authority.7   
About a decade after the crystallisation of law and development, Trubek also 
expressed concerns about the strategy of transplanting foreign legal models through 
an elite-driven approach.  His major concern was that it did not consider the cultural, 
social and political realities of recipient countries.8  Friedman further lamented the 
strategy’s indifference to endemic corruption amongst legal officials at the time.  He 
claimed that this led to dysfunctional institutions and laws that amounted to nothing 
more than words on paper.9   In their popular self-critical article, Trubek and Galanter 
blamed this commitment to legal transplantation for the decline of the law and 
                                                            
and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 895, 
899. 
5 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Developmen’ (2011) 44 
Cornell Int’l L J 209-247. 
6 J. P. Nettl & Karl von Vorys, ‘The Politics of Development’ (1968) 46 Commentary 52-54. 
7 ibid. 
8 David M. Trubek, ‘Law and Development’ in N.J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioural Sciences (Pergamon 2001) 8443-8446. 
9 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘Legal Culture and Social Development’, (1969) 4 Law and Soc. Rev. 29 
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development movement to a deadened condition less than two decades after it began.  
They described the strategy as an inept attempt to offer American legal models to 
other countries: models which were flawed and susceptible to executive control and 
authoritarian abuse.10  On the general effort of the law and development community, 
Kevin Davis notes candidly that, ‘foreign actors lack the knowledge, capacity and 
legitimacy to craft legal interventions that promote development’ in other countries.11   
Although there was little attention to specific attributes of the strategy of transplantation 
like the indifference to corruption, there existed general explanations for the incidence 
of unintended phenomena from the implementation of law and development 
programme during this period.  One of these was provided by Robert B. Seidman.  His 
work referred to the lack of a supporting ‘legal culture’ in the countries where the legal 
institutions promoted by modernisation were being set up.12  This led to the realisation 
of different results from those achieved with the same legal institutions in the global 
North.13  His theory, often referred to as ‘the law of the non-transferability of law’ states 
that ‘a particular law in two places with different social, political, economic and other 
circumstances can . . . only by coincidence induce similar behaviour in both places’.14  
Montesquieu had long before expressed a similar view by stating that  ‘[Laws] should 
be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it should be 
a great chance if those of one nation suit another.’15  In same vein, Katherina Pistor 
argues that transplanting legal norms is impractical since they are often expressed 
with regard to other concepts and norms in society.  Hence, without the understanding 
                                                            
10 Trubek and Galanter (n 4) 1062-1101. 
11 Kevin E. Davis, ‘The Prospects for Anti-Corruption Law: Optimists Versus Skeptics’ (2012) Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law 319, 320. 
12 Robert B. Seidman, The State, Law and Development (Croom Helm 1978) 34-6. 
13 ibid. 
14 Ibid 35-36. 
15 Anne M. Cohler et al. (eds and trs), Charles De Secondat and Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of 
the Laws: Book 1 (CUP 1989) 6 cited by Davis and Trebilcock (n 10) 904. 
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and experience of the normative system, the members of the receiving society will find 
it challenging to adapt to such norms.16 
This perspective therefore reiterates the general sentiment of dependency theorists 
who reject models of development that are based on their successful application in 
other societies.  They maintain that even if certain types of legal institutions did make 
positive contributions to the development of some countries, similar institutions will not 
necessarily make parallel contributions to the development of other countries.17   
In a subsequent work on the Interface between Policy and Implementation, Seidman 
provided another plausible reason for the attitude towards concerns like corruption in 
earlier moments of law and development.  He noted that the initial inquiry into the 
relationship between law and development had three basic domains: conflict 
amelioration, law and society studies and problem solving.18  A lot of attention was 
however centred upon the second element which allowed academics to study the legal 
systems of the Third World.  This was however not done with the objective of 
ameliorating the torment of countries in the global South - the area of concern for the 
third domain.  It rather saw such legal systems as an exotic laboratory in which to test 
various variables of their chosen academic discipline or the legal systems of countries 
in the global North.  Applying more of a problem-solving methodology within the third 
domain of inquiry identified by Seidman, would require undertaking research into the 
difficulties faced by countries in SSA.  This would have encouraged more research on 
                                                            
16 Katherina Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Countries’ (2002) 50 Am. 
J. Comp. L 101-134; Dan Berkowitz, Katherina Pistor and Jean Francois Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 Eur Econ. Rev 165-1995. 
17 Kevin E. Davis and Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimist 
versus Sceptics’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 895-946. 
18 Robert B. Seidman, ‘Law and Development: The Interface Between Policy and Implementation’ 
(1981) 2 Boston College Third World L.J. 47, 49. 
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the practical challenges to development like corruption and the best means of 
approaching those challenges.   
The existence of views like this notwithstanding, the movement continued its 
modernisation project in SSA, with contextual problems like corruption going 
unheeded.  This may have been the case because of the underlying motivation for 
modelling the legal systems of countries in the region after those of the West.  
According to Trubek, this was because it promoted the interest of western countries 
by making the legal systems of countries in SSA congenial to Western capital and 
firms.19  The approach of legal transplantation also demonstrated a palpable lack of 
faith in the ability of countries in SSA to evolve organically in the same way as their 
counterparts in the global North. This was the case even though considering the 
peculiar social, political and cultural factors in each country would have informed 
policies to deal with problems like corruption much earlier.     
 
 
4.1.2 The Influence of International Financial Institutions  
 
Further explanation for the approach to corruption during this period can be found in 
the intricate relationship between the field of law and development and International 
Financial Institutions (IFI), chiefly the World Bank.  This influence is reflected in the 
objectives and scope of both research and programming in the field.  The introduction 
to the recent collection of works by prominent academics in the field, edited by Trubek 
and Santos reiterated this position.  It noted that, at any point in time, the doctrine of 
                                                            
19 Trubek (n 8) 8446. 
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law and development can best be understood as the intersection between economic 
theory, legal ideas and the practice of development institutions.20  Whereas current 
discourse in the field strives towards a more balanced approach to the place of each 
of these three components, the methodology of earlier orthodoxies was different.  
Economic theory and institutional practice of IFIs dominated the agenda and 
objectives of the field during the first and second moments of law and development.  
As noted in the previous chapter, law played only an instrumental role in the equation 
in aid of the prevalent economic theories and institutional practices.   
Until the last couple of decades, law and development had mainly focused on the 
parameter of economic development with the bulk of funding provided by IFIs with a 
commitment to particular models and conditions.21  Thus, ‘while law and development 
projects were uniformly presented as being for the benefit of recipient countries and 
their people, they were often not by or of recipient countries and their people’.22  
Lurking at the background was the fact that legal reforms were essentially imposed as 
conditions that must be fulfilled before recipient countries could secure loans and other 
support from IFIs.23  Reform initiatives were therefore more reflective of the ideological 
                                                            
20 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development 
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in The New Law and Economic Development: A 
Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 4. 
21 See Robert C. Effros, ‘The World Bank in a Changing World: The Role of Legal Construction’ (2001) 
35 International Law 1341, 1344.  Certain scholars argue that it was the Bank’s financial prowess in 
comparison to other development institutions that led to the prioritisation of economic development 
models and philosophy over other issues.  They argue that in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation, 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation saw agriculture as key to development; the UN Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organisation said it was education; the World Health Organisation made the 
case for health, whilst the Bank believed that economic infrastructure was key.  The Bank’s position 
became predominant because it was only the Bank that could back up its theory with money.  See 
Heather Anne Marquette, ‘The Origins and Development of the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption 
Programme’ (PhD Thesis, Durham University 2002) 36-40; Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The 
World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Brookings Institution Press 1974) 62. 
22 Tamanaha (n 5) 243 
23 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So 
Much Ill and So Little Good (OUP 2006) 146 
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imperatives of such institutions than the pressing challenges of recipient countries like 
corruption.   
Easterly opines that the paramount objective of most reforms was ensuring that the 
legal systems of recipient countries were modernised and streamlined with those of 
the West to allow for smooth trade and economic relations.24  Hence even though they 
were stated as being for the development of the former, such streamlining practically 
benefitted the economies and corporations of the latter.  The reforms provided more 
favourable markets, conducive regulatory environments and sources of raw materials 
and cheap labour.25   
The influence of IFIs on the scholarship of law and development is also reflected in 
the history of the field itself.  Its early scholars admit that ‘many of the early writings on 
law and development resulted directly from assistance activity, and many scholars 
formed an interest in law and development through their work in assistance efforts’.26  
With development defined in economic terms at the time by the IFIs, programmes were 
adjudged successful provided the parameters set for the economy were adhered to.  
Hence, depending on the moment, issues like efficiency of state enterprises, securing 
property and contractual rights, and well-trained judges dominated the agenda of the 
movement.  There was no apparent necessity to give heed to corruption and other 
obstacles to especially socio-political development in recipient countries; such 
questions having the potential of bringing into question the burgeoning law and 
development enterprise. 
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26 Trubek and Galanter (n 4) 1063. 
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It may be the case that IFIs needed to hold on to the simple model of transplanting 
legal reforms for economic development which was easily supported by the traditional 
tools of foreign assistance.27  It may have seemed really daunting to accept that each 
country was unique with its challenges.  The same would have applied to recognising 
that there was no easy answer to the question of what laws and what areas were more 
important in each country, or that the expertise of these institutions in the area of legal 
reform was generally of dubious value.28   
A similar factor with the evolution of the field which may have impacted on its approach 
is that, in cases where its objectives were not being dictated by IFIs, they were dictated 
by western countries committed to similar goals.  Lan Cao observes that ‘the American 
law and development movement arose out of the Cold War objectives of the United 
States to “modernise” developing countries and bring them within the orbit of the West 
rather than the Soviet bloc.’29  When used in the context of the US therefore, the term 
‘law and development’ is associated with efforts of American governmental 
organisations such as the USAID, the Peace Corps, Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Ford Foundation aimed at promoting ‘Western-friendly economic institutions and 
Western-oriented legal infrastructures’.30  In a broader way therefore, foreign actors 
were found to be involved in the promotion of certain legal reforms which advanced 
their own interests in matters like global security or exporting particular values, as 
opposed to the primary objective of helping poor countries to develop.31   
                                                            
27 Trubek (n 8) 8445. 
28 ibid. 
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and Development’ (1997) 32 Texas Internationall Law Journal 545. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) Promoting the 
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The central perspective to the IFIs argument is therefore the fact that corruption was 
considered a challenge within the categorisation of internal politics and therefore 
outside the mandate of these institutions.  The Articles of the World Bank, for instance, 
prohibits the Bank from interfering in political activities or being influenced by political 
considerations in its activities.  Its decisions are required to be influenced only by 
economic issues.32  Since corruption was conceptualised as political rather than an 
economic issue at the time, it was therefore avoided by these institutions on grounds 
of legality.  On the other side of the equation, Gonzalez De Asis points out that leaders 
of the recipient countries also resisted any form of involvement in anticorruption work 
by donors on the grounds of interference in the domestic affairs of their countries.33 
 
 
4.1.3 The Challenge of Data 
 
A third explanation for the discouraging approach towards corruption concerns the 
lack of reliable empirical data explaining the effect of law and development 
programmes in the global South: what proved successful and what did not, how much 
change was being experienced on the ground, what factors were aiding success and 
what factors were inhibiting progress in the various countries.  Trubek points to the 
fact that the first and second moments of law and development were based on a 
simplistic model of history which presumed causal and linear relationships between 
the establishment of a ‘modern’ legal system and market democracy.  Little evidence 
                                                            
32 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of Agreement. Art. III, s 4(vii) and 
Art. IV, s 10 




was produced to support this theory which represented nothing more than an 
ethnocentric and imperialistic projection of the ideals of the legal culture of the West.34  
The outcome of this is that billions of dollars have been spent on legal reforms that 
were guided more by intuition, assumptions and hope, than by data or systematic 
knowledge of circumstances on the ground. 
Commenting on the general state of knowledge accumulated in the field of law and 
development, Thomas Carothers, director of the rule of law project for the Carnegie 
Foundation tells of how a long-time participant in law and development projects 
confided in him that ‘we know how to do a lot of things, but deep down, we don’t know 
what we are doing’.35  Early researchers such as Burg lamented the general lack of 
definitive knowledge on the relationship between law and development.36  Nyhart 
notes that where knowledge existed, it was at best superficial.37  In any case, the result 
of this was the formulation of development programmes and policies with challenges 
of meaningful implementation and a propensity to produce unintended outcomes.   
It has been observed that most countries in the global South showed an apparent 
commitment to the ideals of liberty, national power and economic growth.  However, 
the reality was that ‘third world governments often in fact constitute or represent 
narrow and self-centred elites whose vital concern is to protect and augment their 
dominant positions’.38  And they were able to do so with the aid of legal mechanisms 
promoted by law and development.  Regarding judicial reform for instance, Tamanaha 
observes that certain reforms in Latin American countries that were aimed at achieving 
                                                            
34 Trubek (n 8) 8444. 
35 Thomas Carothers (ed), ‘The Problem of Knowledge’ in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search 
of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006) 15. 
36 Elliot M. Burg, ‘Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and Critique of “Scholars in Self-
Estrangement”’ (1977) 25 American Journal of Comparative Law 492-530. 
37 J. D. Nyhart, ‘The Role of Law in Economic Development’ (1962) 1 Sudan L.J and Reports 394-410. 
38 Trubek and Galanter (n 4) 1093. 
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judicial autonomy led to rampant nepotism and further opportunities for corruption to 
thrive.39  The dearth of empirical knowledge in the field made it difficult to discern these 
situations and for reformers to react accordingly.  The lack of empirical knowledge was 
further exacerbated by the practice of development organisations who often relied on 
‘foreign’ consultants in the implementation of development programmes.  This was 
done at the expense of using local experts with context-specific knowledge and 
experience.   
The waning of faith in the law and development movement in the 1970s has often been 
attributed to the realisation of this glaring discrepancy between models for legal 
development in the global South and the realities on the ground.  These realities were 
revealed by the findings of empirical research carried out by social scientists and 
reflections of legal scholars.  They exposed major flaws in the approach of law and 
development.40  
There are admittedly obvious challenges to measuring the impact of legal reform 
policies and programmes.  This notwithstanding, the lack of such definitive data played 
a role in the lack of attention to contextual issues like corruption in the earlier stages 
of the movement. 
 
                                                            
39 Tamanaha (n 5) 223. 




4.1.4 The Predominance of the Economic Paradigm of 
Development 
 
The fourth explanation is a point that has been referred to earlier; that the agenda of 
the field of law and development was and continues to be dictated by economic 
conceptions of development.  During both moments under consideration, law was 
mainly a responsive mechanism used in the promotion of economic objectives.  In 
accordance with the dominant economic tone of this period, policy formulation in law 
and development was ‘arguably . . . a function of prevalent economic development 
models and their conception of the proper relationship between the market and state, 
which in turn has been reflected in international development assistance.’41   Trubek 
and Santos opine that this relationship between economics, legal theory and the 
practice of development institutions is fluid and dynamic rather than a one-way causal 
relationship.42  However, as noted earlier, this does not describe appropriately the 
situation in the earlier moments of law and development.  Trubek himself had admitted 
in an earlier work that lawyers were latecomers to development research, responding 
slower than economists and other social scientists to the need for insight into 
development theory.43  Some scholars admit that in many situations, due to the 
predominance of economics, it was often difficult to disentangle the ‘law’ part of the 
                                                            
41 F. Charles Sherman, ‘Law and Development Today: The New Developmentalism’ (2011) 10 German 
Law Journal 1258-1273. 
42 Trubek and Santos (n 20) 4. 
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development programmes.44  Law was considered epiphenomenal, the outcomes of 
legal norms ultimately shaped by more fundamental economic forces.45 
This is particularly significant with respect to the approach to corruption.  The reason 
for this is that, during this period, there were conflicting perspectives on the effect of 
corruption on economic development.  As discussed in section 2.5 above, there were 
studies that confirmed the negative effects of corruption on development.  There were 
however others that pointed to the possibility of corruption enhancing economic 
development by providing a mechanism to overcome cumbersome regulations and 
institutional shortcomings, and further providing extra motivation for public servants to 
perform their duties more effectively.  With findings such as the latter appearing in 
economic studies, and law and development playing a complementary role to 
economic policies and programmes at the time, it is understandable how such 
perspectives would have influenced the indifferent approach to corruption in law and 
development.  
 
4.1.5 Blind Spots of Law and Development  
 
A final point which has been made from a variety of viewpoints is the possibility that 
the very agenda and approaches that defined law and development thought during 
this period may have aided the escalation of corruption in countries in SSA.  The 
argument here is that being the proponents of the frameworks and institutions may 
have unsighted scholars and practitioners of law and development.  This may have 
                                                            
44 D. Daniel Sokol. ‘Law and Development – The Way Forward or Just Stuck in the Same Place?’ (2010) 
104 Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 238-243 
45 Davis (n 11) 320. 
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prevented them from investigating the subject-matter of corruption especially in terms 
of its manifestations within the institutions and mechanisms being established.  For 
instance, the bureaucratic institutions promoted by the legal reforms of the first 
moment emphasised control of economic activities by the state through import 
substitution industrialization.  It was obvious that this framework provided favourable 
conditions for corrupt public officials to thrive, yet it was not dealt with by reformers.  
Another example is the doctrine of ‘legal liberalism’46 which was promoted by the 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s.  The basic assumption underlying it is that law 
should operate in a neutral and objective way in society.   Tamanaha observes 
however that this concealed the fact that law was being used to maintain an unjust 
social order in the service of the elite in society who exploited the transplanted legal 
institutions to perpetuate their corrupt activities.47  He further remarked that: 
Critical legal theorists were especially scathing about legal 
formalism, which they attacked as a false claim of objective rule 
application, when the truth is that indeterminate legal rules allow 
judges substantial room to manoeuvre. . . they are deceptive when 
they hide behind formalistic rule-bound reasoning to come to 
preferred ends while pretending that the decision was compelled by 
law.48  
Trubek and Galanter raised similar questions. They noted that emphasis on liberal 
legalism may have blinded researchers to important questions on the possibility of the 
                                                            
46 For general discussion of the doctrine of legal liberalism within the historical context of the 
development of its jurisprudence in the United States of America, see Robin West, ‘Law, Rights and 
other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud’s Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1986) 134 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 817-882. 




model generating a very different set of results that might flow from expanding the role 
and orientation of the legal profession in a country.  For instance, might not an 
enlarged and modernised legal profession increase social inequality by raising the 
cost of legal services beyond the reach of the ‘have-nots’ in society? And might not a 
more instrumental approach to law, say, in an authoritarian regime weaken instead of 
strengthening individual rights?49  Most of these questions found little place in law and 
development which was rather preoccupied with the positive presuppositions of liberal 
legalism.  It was assumed that legal development would enhance individual liberty and 
contemporaneously guarantee that governments acted in the best interest of the 
citizens.  Great faith was placed in the ability of law to curb arbitrary government action 
and ensure greater governmental responsiveness.50  The other possibilities that this 
might lead to were rarely considered.  The fact that law may serve as an instrumental 
tool in the hands of the state for selfish purposes rather than the general good was not 
explored.  Legal liberalists carried on believing that all positive aspects of the 
assumptions of the doctrine would eventually work out. 
Furthermore, some scholars have come to the realisation that legal instrumentalism, 
in some cases, produced the very antithesis of what was intended.  Instead of being 
considered as institutional rules for reconciling conflicting interests, it was adopted by 
governments as a mechanism for the legitimisation and consolidation of state power 
in most cases.51  Understandably, this effect intensified as the power of the state 
increased through the instrumentality of law, and non-state traditional structures 
experienced corresponding erosions of power.52 
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The point of emphasis here is that the instrumental application of law for certain goals 
during this period ‘may have not only been irrelevant to development, but in certain 
circumstances downright harmful by enabling corruption, establishing inequality and 
generally impeding development’.53  Referring to this effect as the ‘negative face’ of 
the law in their reflective essay in 1974, Trubek and Galanter noted that ‘intimations 
of [the] badness’ of law in relation to the method of its use in the law and development 
movement become apparent when you consider that law may be used to justify and 
legitimise arbitrary actions by government rather than to curb or ban such excesses.54  
Also, ‘increased instrumental rationality in legal processes together with governmental 
regulation of economic life may contribute to the economic wellbeing of only a small 
elite, leaving the mass no better, or even worse off.’55  The tone of their essay indicates 
that this was the case, not just in countries in SSA, but in the United States itself from 
which most of the law and institutions originated. 
The above discussion shows that there were cases where the adverse effects of the 
approach of law and development were recognised.  They were however ignored or 
downplayed and regarded as uncommon deviations from the normality of the 
instrumentality of law in advancing development.56  The reality of corruption in 
countries in SSA during this period - as discussed in section 3.3.1 of the previous 
chapter - shows that these deviations were more common than the movement 
recognised or admitted. 
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This chapter has examined various reasons for the lack of attention to corruption in 
law and development in the first two moments of its evolution.  The 1990s heralded a 
drastic change which saw concern for corruption take a central place in development.  
This change was considered a part of a wider ideological adjustment in the definition 
of development and its objects.  The nature of this change and its influence on 
anticorruption efforts at the local level are considered in the next chapter. 
 
It is however important to understand the place of the factors discussed in this chapter 
in the broader context of the change in approach to corruption in the third moment of 
law and development.  Did the change in approach take place as result of the 
movement learning from the pitfalls discussed above or did it take place in spite of 
them?  Has law and development moved on from most of these factors that relate to 
core assumptions that underlie the reform efforts? If so, what impact has this had on 
the current approach to corruption?  These are some of the questions at the 




Chapter Five:    THE APPROACH TO CORRUPTION IN THE THIRD MOMENT 




Following the epoch-making speech of the President of the World Bank in 1996 which 
highlighted the effect of the “cancer of corruption” on development and the need to 
deal with it,1 the last twenty years have witnessed unprecedented developments in 
anticorruption.  This transverses research, international policies and cooperation and 
national anticorruption efforts.  The hitherto lacklustre non-interventionist approach of 
IDIs towards the subject has since witnessed a dramatic reversal.   These institutions 
have over time rolled out an appreciable number of rule of law and good governance 
programmes with the objective of tackling corruption.  A robust system of multilateral 
and regional treaties has also emerged since 1996 dealing with the criminal and civil 
aspects of dealing with corruption.   
 
The combined effect of the commitments undertaken by countries through the signing 
of these treaties and the pressure from IDIs to implement good governance 
programmes has seen the emergence of anticorruption regimes in most countries.  In 
                                                            
1 World Bank, Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of the World Bank 
President James D. Wolfesohn, 1995-2005 (World Bank, Washington DC 2005) 45. 
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SSA, most countries now have robust anticorruption regimes comprised of legislation, 
institutions and broader governance initiatives.2  
 
This chapter looks at this new approach to corruption and its impact on efforts to tackle 
corruption at the country level.   To do so, it looks first at the changes in the conception 
of development and the role of law in the development process that have taken place 
in the third moment of law and development.  These changes provide a background 
to the approach to corruption during this moment which is discussed next.  The rest of 
the chapter illustrates the influence of this change in approach on the legal and 
institutional framework for anticorruption at the country level in Nigeria.  More 
significantly, the discourse looks at the practical impact of these changes in terms of 
improving anticorruption efforts in the country.  This is done by examining the 
performance of the new regime against the background of the problems of pre-existing 




5.1 Interdependence of Development: The Comprehensive 
Development Framework 
 
The more comprehensive conception of development during the third moment of law 
and development provides an important context for the approach to corruption during 
                                                            
2 See Marie Chêne, ‘Update on UNCAC Implementation in Africa’ (2006) U4 Anti-Corruption 
Resource Centre Expert Answer <http://www.u4.no/publications/uncac-and-africa/> accessed 29 April 
2017. 
As of 12 December 2016, over 90 per cent of countries in the region were state parties to 




this period.  As discussed in section 3.2.1 of chapter three above, the 1990s saw the 
gradual mainstreaming of social concerns in development practice.  This was not a 
move away from the pre-existing predominantly economic development paradigm but 
rather an addition to it.  And by the turn of the century, an interdependent and 
comprehensive perspective of development that emphasized progress in all sectors 
of society – economic, social, political, cultural and legal – had taken hold.3 
Amartya Sen provided the most vivid illustration of the importance of this 
comprehensive approach to development in his paper delivered at the World Bank 
Legal Conference in 2000.  In expressing the need for the different groups of American 
revolutionaries to stick together, Benjamin Franklin had, in 1776 proclaimed: "Yes, we 
must all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately."  In his paper, 
Sen quoted Benjamin Franklin’s statement in arguing that if the different aspects of 
development are not simultaneously considered and addressed for analysis and 
action, they may end up ‘hanging [to death] separately’.4  Furthermore, writing on the 
interdependence of various factors and actors on development, he observed 
elsewhere that: 
It is hard to think that any process of substantial development can 
do without very extensive use of the market, but that does not 
                                                            
3 James D. Wolfesohn, ‘Building an Equitable World: 2000 Annual Meetings Address’ (The World 
Bank Group, 26 September 2000) 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBARCHIVES/0,,MDK:222014
09~menuPK:64654237~pagePK:64660187~piPK:64660385~theSitePK:2564958,00.html> accessed 
29 December 2016. 
4 Armatya Sen, ‘What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process’  
(World Bank Legal Conference on the Role of  Legal and Judicial Reform in Development, 
Washington DC, June 2000) 1 <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-




preclude the role of social support, public regulation, or statecraft 
when they can enrich – rather than impoverish – human lives.5 
A natural implication of this is the revision of neoliberal ideas with the overarching idea 
of development in this context being a functional amalgamation of hitherto distinct 
development concerns.6  In fact, Sen reckons that this goes beyond just causal 
interdependence and ‘involves a constitutive connection in the concept of 
development as a whole.’7 
On his part, Baderin compares the interdependence of development to the African 
proverbial three-legged stool.  He avers that for sustainable development to be 
achieved in Africa, all three ‘legs’ of development, namely economic, socio-political 
and human development, must be firmly in place.8   
In 1999, the World Bank issued its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), 
which, amongst other things, emphasised the interrelation of all elements of 
development.  This includes social, structural, human, governance, environmental, 
economic, and financial.9  The proposal of the framework reiterates that ‘[T]he 
macroeconomic aspects on the one side, and the social, structural and human on the 
other, must be considered together.’10  It notes that the CDF has been widely and 
                                                            
5 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (OUP 1999) 7. 
6 David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 3. 
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8 Moshood. A. Baderin, ‘Law and Development in Africa: Towards a New Approach’ (2011) 1 (1) 
NIALS Journal of Law and Development 28. 
9 World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’.  
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accessed 31 May 2014. 
10 James Wolfensohn, ‘A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework’ (World Bank, 
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explicitly accepted by the international community in recognition of its importance to 
achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development.11  Due to the central role of 
the Bank in dictating development policy globally, the title of this document became 
synonymous with this new paradigm of development that defines the third moment of 
law and development. 
 
Earlier works by scholars like Seers suggests that certain aspects of development 
need to be achieved before others within a comprehensive approach to development.  
He posits that poverty, unemployment and inequality need to dwindle in society before 
issues related to political and economic goals, legal development and environmental 
concerns are addressed.12  He reasons that development in the mould of the latter 
would make little meaning if hunger, unemployment and inequality were yet persisting 
in society.  The rationale for this argument is understandable in the context of people 
being able to achieve a basic level of sustenance as a foundational aim of 
development.  In fact, it is this line of argument that informs the setting of a poverty 
line as a marginal measure of development.13   
However, as discussed in section 3.2.1 of chapter three above, there is an intricate 
reciprocal relationship between development in political, legal and other ‘higher’ goals 
of development and more basic goals such as poverty reduction.  Moreover, 
simultaneously pursuing development in all sectors is important for countries in SSA 
that require accelerated development to ‘catch up’ with the rest of the World.  Adhering 
                                                            
11 ibid. 
12 Dudley Seers, ‘The Meaning of Development’ (1969) Institute of Development Studies 
Communication 44, 6. 
13 Currently, the poverty line is pegged at $1.90 per day by the World Bank based on 2011 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).  For statistics on current level of people living below the poverty line, 
see World Bank, ‘FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq> accessed 29 April 2017. 
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to theories of development that propose a sequential pursuit of development goals 
may have the effect of reducing the urgency of achieving comprehensive development 
in such countries.            
 
 
5.2 Law and the ‘New Developmentalism’ 
 
Apart from the comprehensive conception of development, the major driving force for 
development and the role of law in the development process were other factors that 
defined the third moment in law and development.  The 1990s witnessed a loosening 
of the strict market-oriented rule of law approach.  This led to a discernible departure 
from pre-existing orthodoxies in law and development towards a broader strategy for 
development.   
Writing on the evolution of this approach, Hauserman recounts that during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the global South was hit by a series of economic crises that questioned 
the foundations of existing assumptions about international development as espoused 
by the Washington Consensus.  Hence, by the turn of the century, a fundamental 
modification of the global approach to development could be identified.14  Although 
some have argued that this shift represents no more than a ‘christened 
                                                            
14 Bridget Hauserman, ‘Review Essay – Exploring the New Frontiers of Law and Development. 
Reflections on Trubek/Santos eds., The New Law and Economic Development (2006)’ (2007) 8 (6) 
German Law Journal 533-547. 
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neoliberalism’,15 this new perspective has come to be known as the ‘new 
developmentalism’16 or the moment ‘law and the new developmental state’.17   
Unlike previous orthodoxies that emphasised the importance of the state or the market 
over the other in fostering economic development, the new developmentalism prompts 
a rethink of the role of the state in the light of obvious shortcomings of the prevailing 
emphasis on markets.  In doing so, it seeks to encourage extensive collaboration, 
communication and overlap between the public and private sectors in policy 
formulation and implementation.  In this respect, Trubek was quick to stress that the 
reinvention of the role of the state under the new developmentalism is not a mere 
reversion to older and largely discredited systems of state intervention.  Rather the 
new developmental state is inspired by a new political economy in which state action 
is used to empower the private sector in areas in which the latter may be lacking such 
as risk reduction and subsidising knowledge creation.18  
This stream of law and development thought also encompasses a broader conception 
of the role that law should play in development.  The rule of law is now pursued as a 
substantive component of the development agenda in its own right.19  Tamanaha 
refers to this new role as the ‘progressive law and development package’.20  He 
                                                            
15 David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law”, Political Choices and Development Common Sense’ in D. 
M. Trubek and A. Santos, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 
95, 150. 
16 The use of this term is often attributed to Luiz Carlos Bresser-Perereira, from his work Luiz 
Carlos Bresser-Pereira, ‘The New Developmentalism and Conventional Orthodoxy’ (2006) 20(3) Sao 
Paulo Em Perspectiva 5-24.  It has also been prominently referred to as the moment of law and the 
developmental state by Wisconsin Law Professor and long-time expert and founder of research on 
law and development, David Trubek. 
17 David M. Trubek, ‘The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New 
Developmental State’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 28-32. 
18 ibid 31. 
19 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn 
of Reflective Law’ (2008) 56(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 769-808; Thomas Carothers 
(ed), ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006) 3-13. 
20 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development’ (2011) 
44 Cornell Int’l Law Journal 209, 232. 
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observes that this moment pushes for expansion beyond just aiding economic 
development to include integrated reforms as well.21  Hence the role of law was 
extended to address a wide variety of issues including poverty reduction, democracy, 
human rights, due process, adequate social safety nets, equity and good governance.   
Support for this new strand of legal reform programmes from the World Bank and other 
development practitioners flourished on the belief that the various aspects of the 
reform package would be mutually reinforcing in all directions, the rule of law serving 
as the mega-structure with responsibility for the whole.22  Whilst not trivialising its role 
in support of the market, this moment requires that law facilitate development by being 
sensitive to ‘the social’ as well.23  This expansive approach is seen by some as an 
attempt to remedy the failures of the preceding moments of law and development, and 
an attestation that law is not just adaptable to fostering development, but also 
responsive, reflective and based on a learning mode of legal regulation.24   
The current orthodoxy therefore charts a course that flows from a confluence between 
two dominant projects which may collectively be referred to as the promotion of market 
democracy.  The first is the project of democracy with an emphasis on the 
specification, recognition and protection of human rights at the international level and 
nationally.  The second is the project of economic reform, based on Douglas North’s 
New Institutional Economics theory and which reaffirms the role of law as an institution 
for creating and securing an enabling environment for the development of the 
market.25  Hence the rule of law, in its current dimension, has become an attractive 
                                                            
21 ibid. 
22 Guillermo A. O’Donell, ‘Why the Rule of Law Matters’ (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 32-46. 
23 Kennedy (n 15) 158. 
24 Jane E. N. Murungi, ‘Review of D. M. Trubek and A. Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal’ (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 685-692. 
25 David M. Trubek, ‘Law and Development’ in N.J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Social & Behavioural Sciences (Pergamon 2001) 8443-8446. 
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unifying factor for both pro-democracy and pro-market interests, which originally 
appeared to be at odds.26  Based on this, the widened scope of legal reform strategies 
for the new developmentalism range from dominant themes during the first moment of 
law and development like legislative drafting, legal education and professionalisation 
of the bar, to effective administration of justice, protection of property and contract 
rights, independence of the judiciary and other dominant subjects of the second 
moment. 
In terms of approach, it is safe to say that legal reform efforts under the new 
developmentalism continue to be based on the transplanting of western ideas of 
an ideal legal system for development in pursuing the above objectives.  This is 
the case despite well-established critiques of this  strategy and the apparent 
shortcomings of attempting to replicate legal institutions in different countries 
without due consideration of the social, political, economic and cultural dynamics 
of each country.27  In what has been termed a ‘modernisation theory redux’, the 
assumption that the political, economic and legal arrangements promoted by 
western ideas of the rule of law are the best available and represent the future 
trajectory of societies around the world that hope to thrive still reigns supreme.28  
In this era, as was the case in the first and second: 
The faith in legal change through top-down reforms supported by 
Western legal expertise remains strong.  The idea that there is one 
best way to build the legal institutions for markets and democracy 
is still pervasive, as is the faith that this path has already been trod 
                                                            
26 Murungi (n 24) 688. 
27 Kerry Rittich, ‘The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social’ in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 204. 
28 Tamanaha (n 20) 215. 
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by the rich countries of the West which stand as models and a 
source of expertise.  People still believe that Western laws can be 
transplanted to countries as diverse as Brazil and Bangladesh.29 
Hence, despite the repeated excoriation of modernisation, it continues to define the 
approach in all three moments of law and development, albeit in a more nuanced way 
in the current moment.  According to Tamanaha: 
What helps disguise this resurrection is that the elements are not 
bundled together as tightly as before – capitalism is now promoted 
separately as essential to wealth creation; democracy is 
championed as the touchstone of a free and peaceful society; the 
rule of law is said to be essential to wealth creation and limiting 
government tyranny; and human rights are claimed to be 
universal.30 
This has led some scholars to regretfully observe that the lessons of the first and 
second moments of law and development appear not to have been learnt by 
current practitioners of the rule of law reform enterprise.31   
It is however worth noting that, at least in theory, the new developmentalism seems 
to be responding to the lingering criticism of non-consideration of local contexts in 
the formulation and implementation of development programmes.  Attention is 
being drawn to the need to focus on fostering experimentation and revision, 
                                                            
29 Trubek (n 25) 8445. 
30 Tamanaha (n 20) 215. 
31 Wade Channell, ‘Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Thomas Carothers ed. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 2006) 137, 139. 
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coupled with a disposition to finding out what works through policy innovation.32    
Development policy is now approached as involving large scale knowledge 
coordination between governments and market participants, as well as, ‘search, 
experimentation and tailoring of public action to specific needs and contexts’.33  
The process of learning that derives from this is regarded as a central component 
of the new developmentalism.  There is now more emphasis on the consideration 
of local institutions and local participation in the design and implementation of 
reforms.34  The ultimate objective of this is to encourage local groups to take 
ownership of reforms and projects.35 
Whether this is the case in practice is considered with respect to the approach to 
corruption during this moment. 
 
 
5.3 Approach to Corruption  
 
The approach to corruption under the new developmentalism is intrinsic to two factors 
that define the moment itself.  The first is the broader attitude to development already 
discussed.  Baderin notes that it would be difficult to realise such comprehensive 
                                                            
32 David M. Trubek, ‘Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political 
Economy of Development and Law (2009) University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series Paper No. 1075 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349163> accessed 12 August 2017. 
33 ibid 8. 
34 Nilima Gulrajani, ‘The Art of Fine Balances: The Challenge of Institutionalising the 
Comprehensive Development Framework Inside the World Bank’ in Diane Stone and Christopher 
Wright (eds), The World Bank and Governance: A Decade of Reform and Reaction (Routledge 2006) 
48-66. 
35 John Ericsson, The Comprehensive Development Framework: A Multi-Partner Review (World 
Bank Operations Evaluation Department Document 2003) 2. 
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development in Africa without the promotion of, amongst others, the social facets of 
development which encompass: 
Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic 
and effective institutions, combating corruption, transparent, 
representative and accountable governance, popular participation, 
an independent judiciary, the rule of law and civil peace, all of which 
the UN Agenda for Development classify as indispensable 
foundations of development.36 
Within this approach to development therefore, greater attention has been paid to 
corruption and its effect on development under the new developmentalism.  
Development now requires balancing the various attributes of the new developmental 
state in a manner that allows for administrative flexibility, discretion and engagement 
with the private sector, whilst maintaining predictability and preventing corruption.37  
Accordingly, anticorruption policies, programmes and initiatives on the international 
stage and locally have flourished as the era has progressed.   
The second factor is the especial role played by the World Bank.  As pointed out 
above, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn during his leadership, 
accentuated the effect of corruption on development in a manner that had never before 
been addressed by the Bank or indeed other IDIs.38  He noted the ‘need to deal with 
                                                            
36 Baderin (n 8) 24 (emphasis added). 
37 F. Charles Sherman, ‘Law and Development Today: The New Developmentalism’ (2011) 10 
German L.J. 1258, 1260. 
38 Vinery Bhargava (ed), ‘Curing the Cancer of Corruption’ in Global Issues of Global Citizens: An 
Introduction to key Development Challenges (World Bank 2006) 341-370. 
James D. Wolfensohn was president of the World Bank from 1995-2005, comprised of two five-
year terms.  He spoke about the need to tackle corruption at the first Annual General Meeting of the 
Bank and the IMF under his presidency in 1996 and introduced the Bank’s first anticorruption strategy 
a year later.  For more on his role in this regard, See World Bank, ‘History: James David Wolfensohn’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/james-david-wolfensohn>  
accessed 13 February 2017. 
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the cancer of corruption’ in order for countries to achieve growth and poverty 
reduction.39  And for this purpose, he pledged the Bank’s willingness to ‘support 
international efforts to fight corruption’ and assist member countries looking to 
implement national programmes to discourage corrupt practices.40  This event was a 
culmination of a number of factors that had taken place in the field of development, 
global politics and also within the Bank itself between the 1980s and early 1990s which 
provided the preconditions for the Bank’s anticorruption agenda.41  This singular event 
was however a major turning point in attitudes towards corruption globally and 
heralded the era of anticorruptionism in development discourse and practice.  This era 
has since witnessed the emergence of an extensive and complex global regime for 
dealing with corruption which has redefined national efforts to tackle corruption in 
countries like Nigeria.  
Firstly, several international instruments on corruption have since been adopted by 
multilateral and regional bodies like the UN, OECD, EU, OAS and the AU.  These 
include the Inter-American Convention against Corruption 1996; the 1997 Convention 
on the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Community or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union; the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption 1999; the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption 1999; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions 1997; and arguably the most significant and 
comprehensive, the 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption.  At the regional level, 
                                                            
39 James D. Wolfensohn, ‘People and Development’ (Address to the Board of Governors at the 
Annual General Meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, I October 1996), 
reprinted in World Bank, Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of World Bank 
President James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005 (Washington, D.C 2005) 50. 
40 ibid 51. 
41 Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption’ (1997-1998) 29 
Law and Policy in International Business 93-114.  These factors are discussed in detail in section 6.1 
of the next chapter. 
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the following instruments apply to SSA: the African Union Convention on Preventing 
and combating Corruption 2003; the 2001 Southern African Development Community 
Protocol Against Corruption; and the Economic Community of West African States 
Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption also adopted in 2001. 
Although there are apparent variations in terms of geographical coverage and the 
content of obligations, the substance of these conventions is essentially similar.  The 
provisions usually cover the broad categories of prevention, criminalisation, 
implementation mechanisms, asset recovery and international cooperation.  Whilst the 
details and effect of these international instruments are discussed below with regard 
to their application to Nigeria, it suffices to state here that the provisions of the 
applicable instruments have dictated the legal and institutional framework for dealing 
with corruption in the country to a considerable degree.  For instance, the country has 
established several anticorruption institutions in accordance with its obligations under 
these international instruments.42   
During this era, various donor agencies also commenced taking a wide range of 
strategic steps focused on anticorruption in terms of research, programmes and 
policies.  For instance, the aid agencies of the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway 
and Germany established the Utstein Group Anti-Corruption Resource Centre in 1999 
‘to share information, build knowledge and disseminate lessons learned in their anti-
corruption efforts’.43  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) got 
involved in anticorruption work through its Programme for Accountability and 
                                                            
42 This is in accordance with, for instance, Articles 6 of UNCAC which provides that each party 
shall ensure the existence of a body or bodies responsible for the prevention of corruption, whilst 
Article 36 prescribes the establishment of a body or bodies in each state specialised in combating 
corruption through law enforcement. It will be shown later in the chapter how the country has acted in 
accordance with these provisions. 




Transparency (PACT) in 1995/6, and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) did the same through the work of its Centre for Democracy and 
Governance (CDG).44  The United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DfID) has since 1999 undertaken a number of projects in support of 
anticorruption efforts in various countries and of general global initiatives targeting 
corruption,45 as has the European Union, albeit to a limited degree.46 
Furthermore, following the ground-breaking work of Transparency International in 
drawing global attention to corruption also in the 1990s,47 other CSOs also began to 
emerge with an interest in the manifestations of corruption in different sectors and with 
respect to different issues.  Some of these are Global Financial Integrity (GFI)48 which 
works on research and policy solutions for illicit financial flows globally and Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP)49 which promotes financial transparency in the extractive 
industry with chapters in countries around the world, amongst many others.50 
The reforms pursued also included rule of law programmes that concentrated on 
providing judiciaries with adequate tools to effectively address corruption.  For 
instance, due to an increased flow of information between the various parties involved 
                                                            
44 Heather Marquette, ‘The Origins and Development of the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption 
Programme’ (PhD Thesis, Durham University 2002) 155-159. 
45 DfID, The Department for International Development’s Approach to Anti-Corruption 
(Independent Commission for Aid Impact Report, November 2011) 
46 Marquette (n 44) 168-169.  The EU’s programme on anticorruption is more limited in scope in 
comparison to that of the United States, the United Nations, the World Bank and other IDIs.  See 
European Commission, ‘The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratisation in Third Countries’ COM (2001) 252 final.  It is worth noting that the anticorruption 
policies and programmes of most of these IDIs have expanded considerably since the 1990s. 
47 NORAD, Evaluation of Transparency International (NORAD, Oslo February 2011) 7-10. 
48 For more information on this, see <http://www.gfintegrity.org/> accessed 31 December 2016. 
49 For more information on this, see <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/> accessed 31 
December 2016. 
50 Mills’ 2012 thesis show that this heightened attention to corruption went beyond the actions of 
IDIs and CSOs.  There was also a significant increase in media attention to corruption beginning from 
the late 1990s.  See Linnea Cecilia Mills, ‘Questionable and Unintended Consequences: A Critical 
Assessment of the International Donor Community’s Fight against Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 2012) 13-15. 
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in corruption because of technological advances made in the last few decades, 
Gonzalez de Asis notes that recent rule of law programmes have focused on training 
judges, prosecutors and support staff on the mechanics of the new legal domain.  This 
includes how to interpret and otherwise deal with the various kinds of information they 
must work with to address corruption.51 
As noted above, much credit for the rise of anticorruptionism is attributable to the World 
Bank.  It is therefore necessary to briefly discuss the components of the Bank’s 
anticorruption strategy as part of the global agenda.  It is however worth noting that, 
whilst the Bank’s strategy for directly dealing with corruption was released in 1997,52 
components of its earlier-established governance reforms were also directed at 
addressing corruption.  These governance reforms which were introduced to 
strengthen broader economic development policies, dealt with corruption indirectly.53  
The agenda of promoting good governance was however a precursor to the Bank’s 
involvement in anticorruption efforts.  It remains the broader framework within which 
the Bank’s anticorruption strategy is expressed.  It is therefore not unusual to find good 
governance being used as synonymous to anticorruption and used as being 
antithetical to corruption.54  Indeed, the understanding and application of good 
                                                            
51 Gonzalez De Asis (n 43) 12. 
52 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (PREM, 
September 1997) 3. 
53 The major reason for this was that the Bank, at the time of the introduction of the governance 
agenda around 1989-90, still considered corruption a political issue which was outside its mandate.  
However, even though the governance reforms were conceptualised as applicable to the realm of the 
economy, the scope of their application meant that they touched on issues of corruption, especially in 
terms of prevention. 
With the later direct focus of the Bank on anticorruption, most of the governance reforms are now 
recognised as having both a direct and indirect impact on tackling corruption and remain an integral 
part of the Bank’s overall anticorruption reform strategy.   
The origin of the governance agenda of the Bank and the progression of the Bank’s focus from 
governance reforms with economic objects to directly dealing with corruption years later are 
discussed in detail in section 6.1 of the next chapter. 
54 See for instance, the use of good governance and anticorruption interchangeably in Daniel 
Kaufmann, ‘Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge’ in Philip Alston and Mary 
Robinson, Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (OUP 2005) 352-402 
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governance to broadly describe efforts aimed at tackling corruption goes beyond the 
Bank to include other IDIs.  For this purpose, its meaning and place within the global 
anticorruption agenda will be examined here together with the Bank’s anticorruption 
strategy. 
 
5.3.1  Good Governance 
The concept of governance is not one that lends itself to a straightjacket definition, 
even though there appears to be a reasonable level of consensus on the general 
principles and policies that good governance entails. 
 
The authors of the World Bank Governance Indicators define governance as ‘the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’.55  The UNDP 
provides a more comprehensive definition of governance as: 
 
The exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in 
the management of a country’s affairs at all levels.  Governance 
comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate 
their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.56 
 
                                                            
55 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues’ (2010) World Bank Draft Policy Research Working Paper 3 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/WGI.pdf>  accessed 3 February 2016. 
56 UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Development (1997) UNDP Policy Document 




On the basis of this definition, UNDP considers its work on good governance as 
encompassing key institutions like the legislature, judiciary and electoral bodies, public 
and private sector management, decentralisation and support for local governance 
and civil society organisations.57  Broadly speaking therefore, the concept of good 
governance has over the years become associated with a wide and varied range of 
institutions, policies and issues that directly and indirectly concern the proper 
administration of a state.  It is, among other things, considered to be ‘participatory, 
transparent and accountable.  It is also effective and equitable.  And it promotes the 
rule of law’.58 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton consider the broad fundamental aspects of 
governance in their work on aggregating governance indicators at the World Bank to 
be the rule of law, government effectiveness, and issues of graft.59   Other areas which 
are considered in the World Bank’s work on evaluating governance in countries 
include voice and accountability, political stability, absence of violence and regulatory 
quality.  The standard of budgetary and financial management, the efficiency of 
revenue mobilisation and public expenditure and transparency and accountability are 
also considered.60  In terms of the construction of governance, there has been a fluid 
expansion of the Bank’s conception of governance over the years covering issues 
such as transparency, participation, accountability, freedom and rule of law.61    Within 
this broad framework, the policy work of the Bank has been built around the four main 
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59 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, ‘Aggregating Governance Indicators’ 
(1999) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2195, 5 





areas of public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for 
development  and information and transparency.62 
 
The IMF describes governance as the broad range of interactions between 
government and citizens.  The initial focus of its work on governance had two basic 
aspects that are in conformity with its expertise and its mandate to be involved only in 
issues that have current and potential impact on the macroeconomic performance of 
member countries.63  These areas entail improving the management of public 
resources and supporting the development and maintenance of stable and transparent 
economic and regulatory environments that are conducive to efficient private sector 
activities.64  The former means reforms in public sector institutions like the central 
bank, civil service and treasury.  The latter deals with actions that affect price systems, 
general banking systems and exchange and trade regimes.65    
 
However, the IMF has since 1997 expanded its governance programme by including 
anti-money laundering efforts,66 and providing corruption-specific governance advice 
as part of its surveillance function.67  A concern for good governance has also been 
                                                            
62 World Bank, Governance and Development (Washington D.C 1992). 
63 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note’ 
(Approved by the IMF Executive Board, 25 July 1997) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 2 November 2015. 
64 International Monetary Fund, ‘Good Governance: The IMF’s Role’ (Washington, D.C. 1997) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 2 February 2016. 
65 Specific policies designed to achieved these dual objectives include ‘better fiscal expenditure 
control, publication of audited accounts of government agencies and state enterprises, streamlined 
and less discretionary revenue administration, greater transparency in the management of natural 
resources, the publication of audited central bank accounts and better enforcement of banking 
supervision’  See IMF, ‘IMF and Good Governance: Fact Sheet’ (10 September 2015) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm> accessed 2 November 2015. 
66 International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Board Discusses the Fund’s Intensified Involvement in Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (Washington D.C. 2001) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2001/pn01120.htm> accessed 2 February 2016. 
67 International Monetary Fund, ‘Factsheet: IMF Surveillance’ (Washington D.C. 23 September 
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integrated into the way the IMF discharges its lending function.68  Reforms to improve 
governance and address corruption have increasingly become a part of IMF lending 
conditionality.  This is however only to the extent that such conditions are essential to 
the realisation of the prospects of broader policy implementation.69  An equally crucial 
part of the IMF’s work on good governance is in the area of technical assistance.  
Assistance in enhancing policy implementation capacity in sectors like tax and 
customs administration is considered to have direct bearing on good governance.  The 
IMF also provides technical assistance to countries who ask for same in implementing 
codes of transparency in fiscal and financial policies, with such codes considered 
useful tools for controlling corruption.70 
 
The emphasis on promoting good governance in anticorruption efforts in the last 
couple of decades is based on the understanding that a wide range of governance-
related issues like those mentioned above are directly or indirectly integral to dealing 
with corruption.  Pursuing good governance is therefore a recognition of the fact that 
laws and institutions specifically established to curb corruption will achieve little if 
issues like the rule of law, regulatory quality, mechanisms for budgetary and financial 
management and other measures that promote transparency and accountability are 
not put in place.   
 
                                                            
68 Generally, the promotion of good governance by the IMF is streamlined in its relationship with 
member countries in the three key areas of policy advice, financial support and technical assistance. 
69 Harold James, ‘From Grandmotherliness to Governance: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality’ 
(1998) 35(4) Finance and Development 44-47. 
70 Anton Op De Beke, ‘IMF Activities to Promote Good Governance and Combat Corruption: An 
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Within this broad conception of good governance therefore, programmes aimed at 
controlling corruption are often pursued specifically under the twin frameworks of 
transparency71 and accountability.72  These will therefore be the major focus of the 
discussion of good governance measures, especially when looking at the Nigerian 
context later in section 5.4 below.  
 
 
5.3.2  The World Bank’s Anticorruption Strategy 
As noted earlier, the World Bank was the foremost IDI to articulate a strategy to directly 
tackle corruption.  This was in 1996 and within a year, the Bank released it first 
anticorruption strategy.  The document noted that the Bank would address corruption 
at four levels, namely:  
 
• Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects. 
• Helping countries that request Bank support to reduce corruption.  
                                                            
71 Transparency in governance relates to actions and mechanisms that ensure that citizens have 
access to and understand the actions of government and the basis of their decision-making.  The 
various ways in which this can be achieved include accurate and reliable financial reporting, 
publication of accounts and audit reports of government departments and agencies, broadcasting of 
parliamentary debates, enabling legal access to government records, etc. 
See Friedl Weiss and Silke Steiner, ‘Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the 
Practice of the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison’ (2006) 30(5) Fordham International Law 
Journal 1545-1586. 
72 Accountability denotes the obligation to explain and take responsibility for decisions and 
actions.  Accountability in government is achieved by mechanisms and approaches that ensure that 
the activities and outputs of government meet intended and agreed goals and standards 
The concepts of transparency and accountability work conjointly since governments can only be 
held accountable where citizens have access to and possess adequate information on the 
performance records of government, their decisions and justifications.   Apart from being integral to 
the sustenance of democratic governance, transparency and accountability are essential for 
preventing corruption as the lack of both incentivises and creates more scope for corruption to thrive. 
See OECD, Accountability and Democratic Governance: Orientations and Principles for 
Development (DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD Publishing 2014) 19-29. 
 
 163 
• Taking corruption more explicitly into account in country assistance strategies, 
country lending considerations, policy dialogue, analytical work, and the choice 
and design of projects. 
• Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption.73 
 
The document noted that although dealing with corruption in each area required 
different strategies, each level had obvious links with the others.  For instance, 
addressing corruption in Bank-financed projects should be done in ways that help 
countries build their procurement and financial management systems.  Also, the 
Bank’s efforts in helping design and implement anticorruption strategies would be 
enhanced by more active participation in international efforts to combat corruption.74  
However, the most relevant dimension in terms of its impact on anticorruption efforts 
in countries is the second.  The Bank’s strategy for helping countries combat 
corruption involve building their capacity in the following five areas: 
 
• Economic Policy and Management (deregulation, tax simplification, 
macroeconomic stability and demonopolisation) 
• Administrative and Civil Service Reform (pay and meritocracy, decentralisation 
and community action) 
• Financial Controls (financial management, audit and procurement) 
• Legal and Judicial Reform (legal framework, judicial independence, judicial 
strengthening, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms) 
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74 ibid 4. 
 
 164 
• Public Oversight (parliamentary oversight, civil society and media, independent 
agencies/NGOs).75 
 
As the discussion below will show, Nigeria has implemented a substantial amount of 
reforms in accordance with the Bank’s anticorruption strategy, and also those of other 
IDIs.  This has been made imperative by the introduction of governance conditionality 
in dealings between IDIs and countries.76  This is especially so as the global attention 
to corruption in the late 1990s coincided with return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 
1999.77  The restoration of amiable relations between the country and international 
institutions in the light of this and the enthusiasm that followed the return to democracy 
meant that that country was quick in implementing the governance and anticorruption 
reforms that were particularly central in the field of development at the time. 
 
Overall, the broad nature of the composition of the current anticorruption agenda as 
examined above shows that it is not only designed to cover institutions established 
                                                            
75 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 
(PREM, June 2000) 22.  It is worth noting that the policy of the African Development Bank on good 
governance and anticorruption clearly mirrors the policies of the World Bank in this regard.  See Africa 
Development Bank, ‘Bank Policy on Good Governance’ (November 1999) < 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/21-EN-
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result of a G7 statement on corruption issued in 1996 urging regional banks to formulate policy based 
on the principles established by the World Bank. See Marquette (n 44) 140. 
76 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank (n 75) 5.  See 
also Tara Polzer, ‘Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse’ (2001) Development Studies 
Institute Working Paper 01-18, 9-10 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP18.pdf> accessed 1 February 2017; 
Gerald J. Schmitz, ‘Democratisation and Demystification: Deconstructing “Governance” as a 
Development Paradign’ in David B. Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development 
Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press Ltd 1995) 54-90. 
77 Before 1999, the country had been under successive military regimes for 16 years. This led to a 
reasonable level of isolation of the country by certain IDIs, including the World Bank.  Due to the 
failure of the country to fully implement its economic reform conditionalities, its inability to service its 
debt and the general irresponsibility shown by some military leaders, the Bank reduced its 
engagement with Nigeria throughout most of the 1990s until the return to democracy in 1999.  See 
Jonathan G. Joseph, ‘World Bank and the Crises of Development in Nigeria (1999 to 2008)’ (M.Sc. 
Dissertation, University of Nigeria 2010) 32-36. 
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principally to address corruption.  It includes other actors, institutions and initiatives 
that generally enhance democracy, human rights and development.  These are 
referred to as supporting frameworks in this work and include the judiciary, 
constitutional mechanisms for legislative oversight, whistleblowing initiatives, 
transparency and accountability institutions, civil society and the media.  Some of them 
play complementary roles in addressing corruption whilst others are understood to 
have an indirect impact in tackling corruption.  The analysis of the anticorruption 
regime in Nigeria that follows looks at legal and institutional reforms established 
specifically to tackle corruption in the third moment of law and development.  However, 
reference will be made to such supporting institutions where necessary, and to the 
extent that they contribute to the discourse of the legal and institutional frameworks 
established to address corruption. 
 
 
5.4 The Anticorruption Regime in Nigeria  
 
The discussion here focuses on institutions and initiatives through which corruption is 
addressed during the third moment of law and development.  It commences first with 
a consideration of the robust legal framework which provides the significant 
infrastructure for anticorruption efforts in the country.  The consideration of the legal 
framework is necessary to provide a proper background to the discussion of 
institutions and initiatives that follows.  This is also important in the broader context of 
the conception of development under the new developmentalism.  As discussed in 
section 5.2 above, legal reforms now constitute a central component of development 
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agenda.  In addition to the erstwhile instrumental role of law in development - 
exemplified in terms of providing the infrastructure for anticorruption efforts -  legal 
reforms are now a substantive indicator of development policy.  Hence, the legal 




5.4.1  Legal Framework 
The legal framework for anticorruption in Nigeria is comprised of constitutional and 
legislative provisions.  Before considering these however, it is necessary to note the 
international treaties on corruption to which the country is party, as the nature and 
content of the obligations derived from such instruments impact on the local legal 
framework for anticorruption.    
 
 
5.4.1.1 Relevant International Instruments  
 
The first is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).78  As of 
December 2016 the Convention has 181 parties.  Nigeria became signatory to UNCAC 
on 9 December 2003 and ratified the Convention on 14 December 2004.79   UNCAC 
remains the most comprehensive international instrument yet on anticorruption.  Its 
substantive provisions are divided into the key issues of prevention, criminalisation, 
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international cooperation, asset recovery and implementation mechanisms.  Whilst 
there are certain innovative and proactive provisions in some of the other international 
instruments dealing with corruption, UNCAC is a point of reference due to its wide 
coverage and extensive provisions on various facets of anticorruption. 
 
Next is the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.80  As 
of April 2016, 48 of the 54 members states of the AU had signed the Convention with 
37 ratifications.  Nigeria became a signatory to the Convention on 16 December 2003 
and ratified it on 26 September 2006.81  Much like UNCAC, the AU Convention 
provides for preventive measures, criminalisation, international cooperation and asset 
discovery.  The AU Convention however emphasises bribery by private sector entities, 
thereby providing wider coverage of both demand and supply sides of corruption.82  
Other unique provisions of the AU Convention include those dealing with mandatory 
requirement for declaration of assets by public officials and restrictions on the 
immunity of such public office holders.83    The related issues of access to information 
and whistle-blower protection are also dealt with in Articles 9 and 5 respectively of the 
Convention. 
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It is worthy of note that the AU makes the most extensive reference to human rights in 
the context of corruption. The preamble to the convention takes cognisance of the 
need to foster the promotion of economic, social and political rights in line with the 
provisions of the African Charter and other human rights instruments.  Article 3 states 
respect for human and peoples’ rights as one of the founding principles of the 
Convention.  Although these provisions are innovative by recognising the nexus 
between corruption and human rights, the lack of substantive provisions in the 
Convention on how this relationship might prove important in anticorruption efforts - 
the object of the Convention - diminishes their significance.  This notwithstanding, 
these provisions can prove useful in advancing the evolving paradigm of a rights-
based approach to anticorruption.  This will be explored further in chapter seven. 
 
Another international anticorruption instrument that applies to Nigeria but is yet to be 
incorporated into the legal framework is the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption.  It was adopted on 21 
December 2001 by ECOWAS Heads of States and is expected to enter into force upon 
ratification by at least 9 signatory states, which is yet to take place.  The Protocol was 
ratified by Nigeria on 23 August 2002 and will therefore become part of the legal 
framework of the country when it enters into force.  With specific application to the 
ECOWAS sub-region, the Protocol covers general issues such as requiring states to 
adopt necessary legislative measures for criminalising bribery in the public and private 
sectors and laundering of proceeds of corruption.  It also deals with measures for 
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member countries to cooperate on legal assistance and law enforcement and to 
ensure the protection of victims of corruption.84  
 
In terms of the application of these instruments within the legal framework of Nigeria, 
it is important to examine Section 12 of the Constitution of the country.85  It provides 
that treaties to which Nigeria is party shall only have the force of law when enacted as 
an Act of the National Assembly.  None of the above instruments have yet been 
enacted into law in accordance with this provision.  In line with the dualist doctrine of 
international law, the argument can therefore be made that they do not constitute the 
legal regime for anticorruption within Nigeria.  This is a factor that has led to calls for 
the domestication of these instruments to enhance anticorruption efforts.86  However, 
the mere lack of domestication does not mean that in effect these instruments are not 
binding on the country.  By duly signing and ratifying these conventions, the country 
has clearly expressed its consent to be bound by the obligations contained in them.  
Moreover, it is an established principle of international law that a country ‘may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty.’87  In any case, this argument is of little practical significance considering most 
of the provisions of these conventions have been expressed in the various laws 
passed by the National Assembly to address corruption.    
 
 
                                                            
84 The provision on mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation is found in Article 
15, whilst Article 9 of the Protocol provides for assistance and protection of victims. 
85 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
86 Mohammed Albakariyu Kabir, ‘Anti-Corruption Conventions in Nigeria: Legal and Administrative 
Challenges’ (2015) 9(4) International Science Index, Law and Political Sciences 1174-1184. 
87 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
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5.4.1.2 Constitutional Provisions  
 
The relevant provisions in the constitution are broadly geared towards preventing 
corruption in the public sector and setting standards to ensure transparency, 
accountability and ethical behaviour for public office holders.  
 
Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution provides for a Code of Conduct 
for Public Officers.88  The salient provisions of the code include Paragraph 1 which 
states that, “a public officer shall not put himself in a position where his personal 
interest conflicts with his duties and responsibilities.”  The code also prohibits public 
officers from maintaining or operating a bank account in a foreign country.89  It further 
directs that a public officer shall not ask for or accept property or other benefit of any 
kind for himself or another on account of something done in the discharge of his 
duties.90  The offering of a bribe by any person to a public officer for the granting of 
any favour in the discharge of the public officer’s duties is also prohibited.91  Public 
officers are also enjoined not to abuse their office by doing or directing to be done, any 
arbitrary act which is prejudicial to the rights of any other person.92  Other relevant 
provisions of the Code include prohibitions on public officials from holding two paid 
public offices, on certain retired public officials from taking employment in foreign 
companies and on pensioners from receiving remuneration from public funds in 
addition to their pension.93 
                                                            
88 Under the Constitution, public officers for the purpose of the Code of Conduct are the president, 
vice president, president and deputy president of the senate, speaker and deputy speaker of the 
house of representatives, governor and deputy governors, amongst others.   
A full list of the public officers to which the code applies can be found in Paras. 1-9, Pt II of the 
Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 
89 Par. 3, Pt.1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 
90 ibid.  Par. 6. 
91 ibid. Par. 8 
92 ibid. Par. 9. 




An important mechanism for preventing corruption contained in the code and worth a 
special mention is the provision for assets declaration.  This provision is found in 
Paragraph 11 of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.  It instructs all public 
officers to submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau a written declaration of all their 
properties, assets and liabilities, including those of their unmarried children below the 
age of eighteen.  The declaration is to be done immediately after taking office and 
thereafter at the end of every four years, and at the end of the term of office.  Failure 
to make such declaration or the making of false declaration is considered a breach of 
the code of conduct for public officers.  The constitution does not however require the 
declaration to be made public, neither is the Code of Conduct Bureau required to 
publicise declarations made, or even grant access to such declarations on request.  It 
is therefore almost impossible for private citizens to monitor or enforce compliance 
with the provision on assets declaration. 
 
Certain public officers however do publicise their assets declaration either on their own 
volition or in response to public pressure.  For instance, the current president of 
Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari and his deputy Yemi Osinbajo voluntarily made public 
details of the assets which they declared to the Code of Conduct Bureau.94  Cases like 
this are however few and there is no mechanism to confirm the veracity of such 
declarations.  Hence, whilst the directive to declare assets is one that promotes 
accountability and transparency in theory, the implementation mechanism provided 
for under the constitution has apparent flaws.  Leaving the outcome of the mechanism 
                                                            
94 The Punch, ‘Details of Buhari, Osinbajo Assets Declaration’ (Lagos, 3 September 2015) 




of assets declaration to the discretion of public officials and the Code of Conduct 
Bureau seriously jeopardises its effectiveness.  This is especially so due to the high 
likelihood of political interference in the work of anticorruption institutions as the 
discussion below shows. 
  
The Fifth Schedule to the Constitution refers to the Code of Conduct Bureau to which 
allegations that a public officer has breached the provisions of the Code are to be 
made.95  It also establishes the Code of Conduct Tribunal with the responsibility to 
entertain and adjudicate on such allegations, and to impose a range of appropriate 
sanctions upon conviction.96   
 
Furthermore, the Constitution contains provisions requiring public office holders to 
take oaths of office.  The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution contains oaths of 
allegiance and of office to be taken by a wide range of public servants including the 
president, governors of states, the vice president, deputy governors, ministers, 
commissioners and special advisers.  There are also separate oaths for members of 
the national assembly and state houses of assembly and for judicial officers.  In 
essence, persons who are elected or appointed into public offices recognised by the 
constitution are required, by the various constitutional provisions creating such offices, 
to take an oath of office.97 
 
                                                            
95 The Code of Conduct Bureau is originally established by The Code of Conduct and Tribunal 
Act, Cap. C15, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
96 Paras. 12 and 15 respectively of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.  The effectiveness of 
the Bureau and the Tribunal in carrying out their constitutional responsibilities in this respect is 
considered in detail as part of the institutional framework for anticorruption below. 




The significance of this lies in the fact that these oaths require those taking same to 
act in ways that do not abuse the powers entrusted in them by the constitution for their 
personal benefit.  In other words, they are obligated by the oath to act in a non-corrupt 
manner.  The oath of office for the president, for instance, requires him to solemnly 
swear amongst other things, ‘not to allow [his] personal interest to influence [his] 
official conduct or [his] official decisions’.  The president further commits to ‘strive to 
preserve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
contained in the Constitution’.98  A relevant fundamental objective of the Nigerian state 
contained in Section 15(5) of the Constitution is that ‘the state shall abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuse of power’.  There is also a further commitment in the oath to abide 
by the Code of Conduct examined above.99 
 
Another constitutional provision of relevance to anticorruption efforts is the creation of 
the office of the Auditor-General at both the federal and state levels.100  The Auditor-
General for the Federation is empowered to audit and report on the accounts of the 
Federation and of all offices and courts and to submit such reports to the National 
Assembly.101  For the purpose of performing this function, the Auditor-General is to 
have access to all books, records, returns and other relevant documents.102  Upon 
receipt of the audit report, the National Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to 
direct the investigation of the conduct of any person, authority, ministry or government 
department with respect to the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated 
or to be appropriated by it.  This power is to be exercised, amongst other reasons, for 
                                                            
98 Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 
99 ibid. 
100 Sections 85-89 and Sections 125-129 provides for the establishment, appointment, tenure and 
powers of the Auditor-General for the federal government and state governments respectively. 




the purpose of exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in the disbursement or 
administration of appropriated funds.103  This function which is an extension of the 
constitutional doctrine of checks and balances to the objective of checking corruption 
has the potential to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of public funds.  
It is however a mechanism that has suffered much neglect in preference for newer 
specialised anticorruption institutions.  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that the Nigerian Constitution makes specific reference 
to addressing corruption as one of the fundamental objectives and directive principles 
of state policy.  The Constitution provides that the state shall abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuses of power.104   However, the constitution itself makes this 
provision nugatory by providing that no issue or question as to whether any act or 
omission or as to whether any law or judicial decision is in conformity with the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles provided for in the constitution shall be 
entertained by the courts.105  In essence, the provision that the state shall abolish 
corruption and all the other laudable objectives stated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
are not justiciable.  Citizens therefore have no legal standing to challenge any 
government action - legislative, executive or judicial - for non-compliance.  The 
constitutional objective of the state to address corruption, in the light of this, can only 
be considered aspirational.  It has been argued that a binding effect may be deduced 
from the inclusion of these objectives in the constitution to the extent that a failure to 
enforce them may be considered a breach of public trust and the oaths of office of 
                                                            
103 Section 88 of the Constitution.  Again, similar powers are granted to the state Houses of 
Assembly under Section 128 of the Constitution. 
104 Section 15 (5) of the Constitution. 
105 Section 6 (6) of the Constitution. 
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public officers.106  Without any judicial recognition of this interpretation, the fact 
remains that the lack of justiciability makes it possible for these otherwise significant 
provisions to be ignored without legal consequence. 
 
 
5.4.1.3 Legislative Provisions  
 
The National Assembly has passed an appreciable number of laws on corruption since 
the Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999.  These laws criminalise a wider range 
of corrupt acts than those that existed under the pre-existing criminal and penal 
codes.107  More significantly, they establish a wide range of institutions and initiatives 
to tackle corruption, and push through various good governance reforms promoted by 
IDIs like the World Bank and IMF. 
 
For the purpose of this discussion, the legislative framework will be considered in two 
broad categories:  laws that deal with corruption generally and those that deal 
specifically with particular types of corrupt conduct108 or particular issues of relevance 
to anticorruption efforts.109  Due to how central they are to the anticorruption regime, 
the first category will be discussed in detail here, whilst the latter will be considered at 
various points in the chapter when the respective issues to which they apply are 
considered.  Laws in the first category are the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
                                                            
106 Taiwo A. Olaiya, ‘Interrogating the Non-Justiciability of Constitutional Directive Principles and 
Public Policy Failure in Nigeria’ (2015) 8(3) Journal of Politics and Law 23-35. 
      107 This refers to provisions dealing with corruption in the public sector in Chapter 12 of the 
Criminal Code, Cap C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (applicable in the south of the 
country) and Chapter 10 of the Penal Code Act, Cap P3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
(applicable in the north of the country). 
108 Advance fee fraud and money laundering for instance. 
109 Examples of this would include issues like good public procurement practices and 
transparency in governance. 
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Offences Act 2000110 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(Establishment) Act, 2004.111 
 
The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (ICPC Act)112 was the 
first major anticorruption legislation that was enacted following the rise of 
anticorruptionism.  The Act established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Commission with the responsibility to receive and investigate 
complaints and prosecute offenders who violate the provisions of the Act.113  Other 
responsibilities of the Commission include advising on, assisting and reviewing the 
practices, systems and procedures of public bodies on ways by which corruption or 
fraud may addressed.  Furthermore, the Commission is to educate the public on 
corruption, as well as enlist and foster public support in tackling corruption.114   
 
The application of the Act focuses on corruption in the public sector.115  It defines 
corruption as including bribery, fraud and other related offences.116  An interpretation 
of the exact meaning of these words is not stated in the Act.  However, an inference 
of their meaning can be made from the offences provided for under the Act which 
include giving or accepting gratification, fraudulent acquisition or receipt of property 
and making false statements or returns.117  The Act also confers on the Commission 
                                                            
110 Cap. C31 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010. 
111 Cap. E1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010. 
112 The Act is often referred to as the ICPC Act, derived from the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and Related Offences Commission (ICPC) which was established by the Act. The use of ICPC Act in 
the rest of this work should therefore be understood as referring to the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act. 
113 Section 6 of the Act.  By the combined effect of Section 6 and 26 (2) of the Act, the Act, 
despite its bid to be a comprehensive legislation on anticorruption, recognised the existence and 
validity of other laws on corruption. 
114 ibid. 
115 See the provisions for offences under Sections 8-26 of the Act. 
116 ibid Section 2. 
117 See Sections 9 to 27 for general offences and penalties under the Act. 
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powers of investigation, search, seizure and arrest when carrying out its duties.118  
Also, it provides for evidentiary matters in corruption cases instituted under Act and 
other sundry issues.119 
 
The other general legislation on corruption is the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 (EFCC Act).  The Act created the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), another central anticorruption institution.  
In comparison to the ICPC Act, the EFCC Act has a wider scope in terms of its 
provisions and the responsibilities of the Commission established under it.  The broad 
range of duties of the institution include the investigation of all financial crimes such 
as advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, 
futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer 
credit card fraud and contract scams.120  The Act bestows on the Commission 
complementary powers of prevention, prosecution, enforcement, freezing, seizure and 
forfeiture of assets derived from corrupt acts, amongst others.121 The commission is 
also to coordinate and enforce all laws on economic and financial crimes and the 
activities of any other person or authority within the scope of its broad functions.122   
 
Under the Act, economic and financial crimes are defined as referring to ‘non-violent 
criminal and illicit activity committed with the objective of earning wealth illegally either 
individually or in a group or organised manner thereby violating existing legislation 
                                                            
118 ibid Sections 27-42. 
119 ibid Sections 53-70. 






governing the economic activities of government and its administration…’123  The 
definition of such crimes however extends to a broad range of illegal activities such as 
fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting, 
illegal arms dealing, smuggling, human trafficking, child labour, illegal oil bunkering 
and illegal mining, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods, open market abuse, 
theft of intellectual property and piracy, foreign exchange malpractices including 
counterfeiting of currency and tax evasion124 
 
As noted earlier, in addition to the ICPC Act and the EFCC Act, there are other laws 
that make up the legislative framework for anticorruption in Nigeria.  Such laws deal 
with more specific issues of relevance to efforts to address corruption.  These include 
the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012, the Advance Fee Fraud 
and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) 
and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994 (as amended), the Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 1991, the Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative Act 2007, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007, the Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act 1991 (as amended)  the Miscellaneous Offences 
Act 2004 and the Freedom of Information Act 2011.125  The provisions of these laws 
cover most important facets of an anticorruption regime.  These include the prevention 
of corruption, punishment of corrupt individuals and organisations, the enhancement 
of governance by improving the general efficiency of the economy and state 
administration, and the creation and strengthening of general democratic institutions 
that are relevant to anticorruption efforts.    
                                                            
123 Section 46 of the EFCC Act. 
124 ibid. 
125 A number of these statutes have been amended in the course of time to take into account 




This robust framework therefore provides the legal foundation for the anticorruption 
regime.  Whilst the country has made commendable progress towards having this 
requisite legal infrastructure, there are obvious challenges to having such an extensive 
framework.  For instance, these laws do not always complement each other.  There 
are cases where they overlap and in extreme cases conflict.  The effect of this and the 
general effectiveness of these laws in dealing with corruption will become obvious in 





5.4.2  Institutional Framework 
The institutional framework will be discussed under two broad categories in this work:  
The primary institutions and complementary institutions. 
 
Primary institutions refer to the basic anticorruption agencies established for the 
enforcement of the general anticorruption laws discussed above.  The creation of 
these institutions is a mandatory provision under international instruments like UNCAC 
and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.126  They are 
considered central to anticorruption efforts in any country.  In Nigeria two institutions 
fall under this category:  The ICPC and EFCC. 
 
                                                            
126 See Article 36 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and Article 5 (3) of the AU 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
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In the second category are institutions that deal with specific issues that are significant 
to dealing with corruption and improving the overall regime of good governance.  In 
comparison to the primary institutions that enforce anticorruption laws, the roles of 
most of these institutions are often geared towards preventing corruption and providing 
the ideal environment for governance to proceed free of corruption.  The institutions in 
this category include the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal, the Bureau of Public 




5.4.2.1 Primary Institutions  
 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) 
 
The ICPC was the first major anticorruption institution established after Nigeria’s return 
to democratic rule in 1999.  It came into operation a little over a year later in September 
2000.  The Commission recorded about 23 prosecutions at the close of its second 
year and 49 at the end of its third year in September 2003.128  However, as of March 
2015, its official report indicated that it had 264 criminal cases, concluded or pending.  
This is in addition to a further 142 civil cases relating to the general functions of the 
Commission to which it was party.129  The number of cases instituted in court should 
                                                            
127 It is worth noting that, apart from these institutions, there are other institutions within the 
democratic governance framework of the country whose activities have some kind of impact on efforts 
to deal with corruption.  However, these cannot all be considered within the scope of this work, and 
the choice has been made to discuss those institutions that are relatively central to the anticorruption 
regime in the country. 
128 David Uchenna Enweremadu, ‘Anti-Corruption Policies in Nigeria Under Obasanjo and 
Yar’adua: What to do After 2011’ (2010) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Discussion Paper 1, 7 
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07813.pdf> accessed 21 November 2015. 
129 ICPC, ‘Status of Criminal and Civil Cases as at March 2015 - Part 1’ (2015) 
<http://icpc.gov.ng/downloads/> accessed 21 November 2015.   
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however not be considered an indication of the success of the Commission.130  In fact, 
the success rate of the Commission in terms of securing convictions is particularly 
poor131 and contributed to the eventual establishment of a second institution, the 
EFCC. 
 
The ICPC is also bestowed with the duty of educating the public on corruption and 
enlisting public support in its efforts to tackle corruption.132  As the first major 
anticorruption institution, the Commission concentrated its efforts in fulfilling this 
function with good results in certain sectors.133  In recent times however, there appears 
to be an over-concentration on engaging in public education to the detriment of other 
important functions of the Commission such as investigating and prosecuting corrupt 
public officials.  A report by Human Rights Watch indicates that the Commission only 
prosecuted ten ‘high profile’ cases in its first ten years of operation, out of which only 
one had led to a conviction as of 2011.134   The reasons for the continued discouraging 
performance of the ICPC is discussed under the analysis of the challenges of the 
regime below.  
 
 
                                                            
These civil cases mostly involve applications for declaratory and injunctive reliefs brought against 
the Commission by persons being investigated or tried, or in some cases by third parties whose 
propriety interest is adversely affected by the work of the Commission. 
130 Enweremadu (n 128) 8. 
131 This factor and the general inefficiency of the ICPC is discussed in detail below. 
132 See Section 6 of the ICPC Act.  For a discussion of other statutory duties of the Commission, 
see discussion of the legal framework for anticorruption above. 
133 ICPC, ‘Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) 
Nigeria: Recent Interventions in the Education Sector (August 2013) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2013-August-26-
28/Presentations/ICPC_INTERVENTION_IN_THE_EDUCATION_SECTOR.pdf>  accessed 4 
January 2016. 
134 Human Rights Watch, Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (Human Rights Watch, August 2011) 47.  The conviction secured was that of a 
former Chairman of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Bello Lafiaji who was convicted on 
seven counts of financial crimes. 
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The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
 
The EFCC was established in April 2003 partly as a reaction to some of the challenges 
faced by the ICPC and its ineffectiveness.  The EFCC was granted wider powers to 
investigate and prosecute corruption involving public officials and  private individuals 
and particularly crimes of a financial and economic nature.135    As a considerable 
improvement on the efforts of the ICPC, between 2004 and 2006, the EFCC reportedly 
arraigned about 300 persons, securing 92 Convictions.136  In 2013 alone, corruption 
convictions by the EFCC stood at 117, whilst the figure for 2014 was 126.137   These 
figures need to be viewed with caution however, in judging the performance of the 
Commission.  Most of the prosecutions and convictions of the Commission relate to 
relatively petty economic and financial offences that take place in the private sector 
like forgery, obtaining money by false pretences, impersonation, bank fraud, and 
advance fee fraud.138  Very few cases involved the prosecution of public officials 
involved in corruption.   
 
This notwithstanding, the overall performance of the EFCC is a lot better than the 
ICPC.  The prosecution of political corruption now seems almost an exclusive reserve 
of the EFCC, which is a situation that negatively impacts the anticorruption regime.  
The EFCC was granted a scope of authority wider than that of the ICPC to deal with 
cases of corruption in areas not adequately covered by the ICPC Act, like economic 
                                                            
135 Section 6 of the EFCC Act.  Such crimes include money laundering, bank fraud, and advance 
fee fraud 
136 Nuhu Ribadu, ‘Combating Money Laundering in Emerging Economies: Nigeria as a Case 
Study’ (Financial Institutions Training Centre/Nigerian Institute Of International Affairs Lagos, Guest 
Lecture Series, 10 August 2006). 





and financial crimes.  It is therefore ironic that the EFCC is now more active in 
prosecuting political and bureaucratic corruption, the central mandate of the ICPC.  
This has pushed the ICPC to a place of relative irrelevance in efforts to deal with 
corruption.  The ramifications of this are considered in further detail later.   
 
5.4.2.2 Complementary Institutions  
The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) 
 
The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) is a body created by the Constitution.139  As 
referred to above,140 it has the primary responsibility of enforcing the code of conduct 
for public officers.141  The specifics of its powers include receiving asset declarations 
by public officials, examining the declarations to ensure compliance with the code of 
conduct provided for in the constitution, retaining custody of declarations made and 
the general enforcement of the code.142   
 
In terms of institutions dedicated to the prevention of corruption, the CCB is one of the 
oldest existing, considering it was established under the 1979 Constitution during the 
country’s Second Republic.143  It was later confirmed in a Decree when the country 
was under military rule in 1989 before its incorporation into the 1999 Constitution 
                                                            
139 See Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
140 The establishment of the CCB was mentioned as part of the discussion of the constitutional 
framework for anticorruption in Nigeria in section 5.4.1.2 above. 
141 Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution makes copious provisions for a code of conduct 
for public officers in Nigeria.  
According to Part II of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, public officers for the purpose of the 
Code of Conduct are the president, vice president, president and deputy president of the senate, 
speaker and deputy speaker of the house of representatives, governor and deputy governors, 
amongst others.  A full list of the public officers to which the code applies can be found in Paras. 1-9, 
Pt II of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 
142 Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution. 
143 See Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. 
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following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule.144  Accessing its effectiveness in 
implementing the code of conduct for public officers is rather complicated. This is due 
to the limited attention given to its role and some perennial challenges it faces.  It is 
estimated that Nigeria has over two million public officials whose conduct the CCB is 
expected to oversee.145  Issues of underfunding and lack of manpower and expertise 
mean that it is almost impossible for the Bureau to track and verify all assets 
declarations made by public officials; a fact which has been pointed out by its 
leadership.146   
 
This notwithstanding, the above challenges hardly justify the fact that there are only a 
handful of cases of false declaration of assets that the Bureau has investigated or 
uncovered since its establishment.  This is disturbing when considered in the context 
of the numerous cases of corruption by public officials that come to light frequently, 
and are accordingly prosecuted by primary anticorruption agencies like the EFCC.  
Since such corrupt public officials are expected to have declared their assets before 
and after holding public office, the failure or inability of the CCB to discover cases of 
false declarations or general noncompliance with the Code questions its effectiveness.  
This has made its role within the institutional framework for anticorruption appear 
increasingly nominal.  Public officers, it seems, simply make declarations of their 
assets, truthfully or otherwise, in fulfilment of the provisions of the constitution with no 
ramifications.  The powers of the CCB to ensure the veracity of such declarations and 
their compliance with the code are rarely used. 
 
                                                            
144 See Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap 58, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
1990. 
145 Human Rights Watch (n 134) 49. 
146 ibid 49-50. 
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The Bureau can also, where it considers it appropriate upon receiving and 
investigating a complaint of a possible breach of the Code, refer the matter to the Code 
of Conduct Tribunal (CCT).147  This is also a power that is seldom used by the CCB. 
 
 
The Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) is also established by the Constitution148 with 
powers to interpret the provisions of the constitution on the code of conduct for public 
officers.  It is worth noting that the CCT should ordinarily not be categorised as an 
institution established for the prevention of corruption due to the adjudicatory nature 
of its functions.  However, it is discussed here because of its role as a complementary 
tribunal for the CCB.  It is empowered to hear complaints on the contravention of the 
Code and impose punishments on offenders.  These include vacation of office or seat 
in a legislative house, disqualification from membership of a legislative house or from 
holding any public office for a period not exceeding ten years and the seizure and 
forfeiture of property acquired in abuse of office.149    A prerogative of mercy cannot 
be exercised in favour of any person convicted and punished by the CCT.150   
 
Like its sister institution the CCB to which its jurisdiction is tied, the CCT has remained 
largely ineffective within the institutional framework against corruption.151  Overall 
therefore, the framework for dealing with the breach by public officers of the code of 
                                                            
147 Paragraph 3 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution. 
148 Section Paragraph 15 of the Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution.  An earlier 
reference to the CCT in this work can be found in section 5.4.1.2 as part of the discussion of the 
constitutional framework for anticorruption in Nigeria. 
149 Paragraph 18 of the Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. 
150 ibid. 
151 For instance, the progress report of both institutions in 2012 shows a less than 5 percent 
conviction rate for the few cases brought before the tribunal.  See Code of Conduct Bureau, ‘Progress 
Report’ <http://www.ccb.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=500> 
accessed 29 April 2017. 
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conduct is essentially ineffective.   The failure of these preventive institutions inevitably 
puts undue strain on primary anticorruption agencies such as the ICPC and EFCC.  A 
proper scrutiny of assets declared by public officers and the prosecution of those 
whose means after office cannot be justified by reference to their income whilst in 
office, would serve as a deterrent for illegal and unchecked acquisition of wealth by 
most public officers.  This however does not occur and the ineffectiveness of the CCB 
and CCT is largely blameworthy in this respect. 
 
Furthermore, in Ogbuagu vs. Ogbuagu,152 the Supreme Court held that a private 
citizen cannot challenge a public officer for violating the Code.  The court noted that 
the purpose of the code is to protect public interest and therefore, it does not vest in 
private individuals a right or interest on which relief could be claimed.  The only option 
left for a private citizen to enforce the Code is to bring an allegation of a breach before 
the CCB.  It would appear, from the wording of the constitution, that the Bureau can 
exercise discretion on whether to investigate such allegation.  It can further decide on 
whether such allegation should be brought before the CCT.153  This is therefore, yet 
another factor that seriously hampers the effectiveness of this mechanism as a viable 
tool for dealing with corruption.  Leaving its enforcement to an institution which has 
proved to be ineffective over the years and which is exposed to political interference 
– as the discussion below will show -  jeopardises the prospects of the mechanism 
provided by the Code. 
                                                            
152 [1981] 2 NCLR 680. 
153 This is one of the areas where a rights-based approach - considered in chapter seven - would 
improve the situation for anticorruption efforts by providing a means through which private individuals 
can bring cases in court for corruption. 
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The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) 
 
The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) was established as a regulatory body 
responsible for monitoring and exercising general oversight over public procurement 
in Nigeria by the Public Procurement Act 2007.154  Its stated objectives are: 
 
(a) The harmonisation of existing government policies and practices on public 
procurement and ensuring probity, accountability and transparency in the procurement 
process 
(b) The establishment of pricing standards and benchmarks  
(c) Ensuring the application of fair, competitive, transparent, value-for-money 
standards and practices for the  procurement and disposal of public assets and 
services, and  
(d) The attainment of transparency, competitiveness, cost effectiveness and 
professionalism in the public sector procurement system.155 
 
To achieve these objectives, the Bureau, working under the guidance of the National 
Council on Public Procurement established by the Act156 performs a wide range of 
functions.  These include supervising the implementation of procurement policies, 
publishing the details of major contracts in a procurement journal, undertaking 
procurement research and surveys, performing procurement audits and submitting 
                                                            
154 As discussed earlier in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 of this chapter, the establishment of a 
regulatory body for procurement processes is an essential part of the broader reform focus of IFIs like 
the IMF and World Bank whose governance reforms emphasises the establishment of economic and 
regulatory environments conducive to economic private sector activities. 
155 Section 4 of the Public Procurement Act 2007. 
156 ibid Section 1. 
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such report to the National Assembly and coordinating relevant training programs to 
build institutional capacity.157 
 
The establishment of the BPP by the Public Procurement Act of 2007 provided a 
comprehensive system for preventing corruption in public procurement, and gave 
legislative backing to the pre-existing system for public procurement.  The introduction 
of reforms in public procurement was an integral part of the Economic Reform Agenda 
pursued by the government of Nigeria following the return to democracy in 1999.158  
Corruption in various stages of public procurement was considered a major cause of 
concern by the government, as estimates indicated that over $10 billion was being lost 
annually due to fraudulent practices in the award and execution of public contracts.159  
The range of activities sought to be prevented or improved on included poor budgeting 
processes, lack of competition, inflation of contract cost, lack of procurement plans 
and poor project prioritisation.  In response to this, the government in 2001 set up the 
Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU), which became popularly 
known as the “Due Process” office.160 
 
The Due Process office was originally established as a unit within the Presidency, and 
the then president Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Obiageli Ezekwesili as the pioneer 
head of the Unit.  Ezekwisili is a founding director of Transparency International and 
was, until her appointment, Director of the Harvard - Nigeria Economic Strategy 
                                                            
157 ibid Section 5. 
158 See World Bank, Nigeria: Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) (World Bank, 
Washington D.C 2000). 
159 Bureau of Public Procurement, ‘Background’ 
<http://www.bpp.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=109&Itemid=739> accessed 
19 April 2017. 
160 Ikeopuwapo Omolara Fayomi, ‘Public Procurement and Due Process Policy in Nigeria: Thrust, 
Prospects and Challenges’ (2013) 1(4) Peak Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 39-45. 
 
 189 
Programme where she worked with Professor Jeffrey Sachs at the Centre for 
International Development at Harvard University.  She got a lot of acclaim for her work 
in reforming the country’s public procurement process, and for establishing 
transparency and accountability in the public sector.   She is also credited with being 
the principal architect of the 2007 Public Procurement Act which established the BPP 
that replaced the BMPIU.161 
 
The overall impact of the BPP and its predecessor the BMPIU in preventing corruption 
by introducing transparency in public procurement processes in Nigeria has been 
largely positive.   Prior to their establishment, mechanisms to ensure transparency in 
procurement procedures was almost non-existent, allowing for widespread bribery and 
other corrupt activities.162  By October 2004, the Unit claimed to have saved Nigeria 
over 140 billion Naira through reduced contract costs, and that amounts of up to 11 
billion Naira were saved from singular contract transactions.163   
 
The unit has been able to block inherent loopholes in the various stages of awarding 
public-sector contracts and ensured a certain level of sanity in procurement processes.  
This has been done by enforcing the guidelines and procedures provided for in the 
Public Procurement Act.  For instance, the Bureau is charged with ensuring that all 
public entities involved in procurement advertise and solicit for bids in a transparent 
manner and in accordance with guidelines issued from time to time.  To further ensure 
                                                            
161 The Public Procurement Act 2007 was enacted in response to a growing public demand to 
institutionalise the reforms introduced under the BMPIU and to further provide legal backing for the 
reforms.  The Act was passed by the National Assembly on the 30th of May 2007 and subsequently 
signed into law by the President on the 4th of June 2007.  See <http://www.bpp.gov.ng/> accessed 11 
January 2016. 
162 G. T. Aduda, ‘Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (Due Process): A Mechanism for 
Combating Corruption in Infrastructure Delivery in Nigeria’ (Partnering to Combat Corruption Series, 
WEDC, Loughborough University UK 2007) 29-33. 
163 ibid 33. 
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accountability, CSOs working in the areas of transparency, accountability and 
anticorruption are mandatorily required to be part of any procurement process.164 
 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) 
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) was established by the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2007.165  Its functions include undertaking fiscal and financial 
studies, their analysis and diagnosis and dissemination of the results to the public.  It 
is also empowered to ‘disseminate such standard practices including international 
good practice that will result in greater efficiency in the allocation and management of 
public expenditure, revenue allocation, debt control and transparency in fiscal 
matters’.166  The Act further empowers the Commission to monitor and enforce its 
provisions generally.  One of these provisions with relevance to anticorruption efforts 
in terms of ensuring transparency and accountability is the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF).167 
 
The adoption of the MTEF was intended to cure most of the defects inherent in the 
country’s budgetary process, such as poor implementation of budgets, unsustainable 
spending, poorly conceived projects and weak monitoring, auditing and reporting.168  
The implementation of the MTEF is also expected to  result in accountability by 
ensuring that items inserted in the budget by various ministries and parastatals are 
                                                            
164 See Section 19 of the Public Procurement Act 2007. 
165 Section 1 of the Act. 
166 Section 3(1) of the Act. 
167 Section 11 of the Act. 
168 Osita Agbu, ‘Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria: The Challenge of Delivery’ (2004) 
Transparency International Working Paper, 21. 
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harmonised in line with priority targets set by the central economic team of the 
government.  This is supposed to check the abuse of discretion by top public officials 
in terms of what is included in the budget.  To this end, the Federal Government is 
required, in consultation with the States, to prepare for approval of the National 
Assembly, a MTEF for the next three financial years, not later than four months before 
the commencement of each financial year.169  The framework is expected to form the 
basis for the annual budgets of the country.170 
 
The implementation of the MTEF can be said to have achieved some of its stated 
objectives171 in terms of improving macro-economic planning and improving the 
budgetary process overall.  However, its effect in ensuring accountability in the 
management of public funds has been relatively minimal.  The experience of applying 
the MTEF in the last decade or so in Nigeria has proven that the framework, of itself, 
cannot be a panacea to the lack of accountability in public budgetary processes.  
Research indicates that in 2010 for instance, the implementation of the MTEF did not 
appear to have captured all revenues that accrued or were expected to accrue to the 
government in the medium-term projections.172   A significant omission in this regard 
was the revenue expected from the sale of public corporations as part of the 
privatisation exercise in the power sector.   Similarly, on the expenditure side, there 
                                                            
169 Section 11 of the Act. 
170 Section 18 of the Act. 
171 According to the World Bank, the objectives of the MTEF are: (a) improved macroeconomic 
balance by developing a consistent and realistic resource framework; (b) improved allocation of 
resources to strategic priorities between and within sectors; (c) increased commitment to predictability 
of both policy and funding so that ministries can plan ahead and programmes can be sustained; (d) 
provision to line agencies of a hard budget constraint and increased autonomy, thereby increasing 
incentives for efficient and effective use of funds.   
See World Bank, Public Expenditure Handbook (Washington D.C 1998) 48. 
172 Kanayo Ogujiuba and Omoju Sola, ‘Medium Term Expenditure and Fiscal Management in 




was no reflection of the funding for six new universities created by the Federal 
Government in 2010 in the MTEF.173 
 
These sorts of lapses have made it difficult for the MTEF to serve as a viable 
mechanism for promoting accountability.  The effectiveness of MTEF is largely 
dependent on the existence of a range of other factors that are not established in 
countries like Nigeria.174  For instance, the existence of a strong sense of 
accountability amongst public officials for their actions and decisions, especially in the 
allocation and spending of public resources is imperative for the MTEF to achieve its 
goals.  There is also the significant challenge of implementing a rigorous MTEF.   A 
typical MTEF is comprised of macro-economic policy and projections, a fiscal strategy 
paper, a revenue and expenditure framework, and a statement of the strategic 
economic, social and developmental priorities of government.175  The broad, detailed 
and technical nature of the document makes it difficult for civil society, the media and 
individual citizens to use it a basis for holding public officials accountable.  This has 
led to calls for the Federal Government to sensitise Nigerians on the general nature of 
the document and the meaning and effect of the various stipulations contained in it.176 
 
 
                                                            
173 ibid.  It is worth noting that the failure of the executive branch to provide detailed MTEFs and 
execute them properly has continued to hamper budgetary process in the country.  This was 
particularly a problem that caused much acrimony between the executive and the legislature which 
delayed the passage of both the 2016 and 2017 budgets.  See Hassan Adebayo, ‘In Another Blow, 
Senate Rejects Buhari’s “Empty” Fiscal Proposals’ Premium Times (Abuja, 3 November 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/214472-another-blow-senate-rejects-buharis-
empty-fiscal-proposals.html> accessed 29 April 2017. 
174 Oxford Policy Management, ‘Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks - Panacea or Dangerous 
Distraction’ (OPM Review 2000) 2. 
175 ibid.  See also Section 13 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
176 News Agency of Nigeria, ‘Expert Advises FG to Sensitise Nigerians on Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework’ (Abuja, 9 December 2015) <http://nannewsnigeria.com/expert-advises-fg-
sensitise-nigerians-medium-term-expenditure-framework>  accessed 11 February 2016. 
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Office of the Auditor-General (AG) 
 
The office of the AG is one of the few anticorruption mechanisms established by the 
Constitution.177  Section 85 of the 1999 Constitution provides for the office of the AG 
of the Federation who is empowered to audit the accounts of offices and courts of the 
Federation and submit such reports to the National Assembly.178  For the purpose of 
exercising this function, the AG or any person authorised by him in that behalf can 
have access to all the books, records, returns and other documents relating to such 
accounts.179   The AG is also empowered to carry out periodic checks of all 
government statutory corporations, authorities and agencies, including all bodies and 
persons established by the National Assembly.  In terms of audit however, the AG is 
only empowered to provide such corporations, authorities and agencies with a list of 
qualified auditors from which they can appoint their external auditors.180  The office of 
the AG is therefore not authorised to conduct direct audits for such bodies, but can 
comment on their annual accounts and the auditors’ reports thereon.181   
 
This limitation on the powers of the AG regarding government statutory corporations, 
commissions, authorities and agencies is because of the understanding that such 
bodies operate within a corporate regulatory framework.  This takes auditing functions 
into consideration in a manner that would not otherwise be applied by ministries and 
departments of government.  The AG is nonetheless empowered to perform oversight 
over their accounts and auditing processes, including providing them with a list of 
                                                            
177 Detailed provisions regulating audit in the public sector can be found in the Audit Act of 1956.  
Other laws that regulate the carrying out of audit in the country include the Finance (Control and 
Management) Act of 1958, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and the Public Procurement Act of 
2007. 
178 Section 85 (1-2) of the 1999 Constitution. 
179 ibid. 




qualified external auditors from which to appoint their external auditors and issuing 
guidelines on the level of fees to be paid to such external auditors.182  This power 
reflects the wide-ranging role of the office of the AG in ensuring accountability in the 
public sector. 
 
To ensure the independence of the AG, his appointment and removal, whilst made by 
the president, is subject to confirmation by Senate.  A two-thirds majority in the Senate 
is required in the case of removal of the AG, which can only be for reasons of 
incapacity or misconduct.183   Specifically, Section 85 (6) of the Constitution provides 
that the AG shall not be subject to the direction or control of any authority or person in 
the exercise of his constitutional functions. 
 
The above functions of the office of the AG and the constitutional guarantee of its 
independence means that the office can serve as a key organ to check 
misappropriation and other forms of corruption both at the federal and state levels.184  
This is especially so considering the AG is required to submit his audit reports to the 
National Assembly within ninety days of receipt of the Accountant-General’s financial 
statement, for consideration by the Public Accounts Committees of each House of the 
National Assembly.185  The Committees are expected to consider the report with a 
view to ensuring that monies appropriated in the budget of each financial year were 
spent for approved purposes and with due regard to effectiveness, efficiency and 
accountability.  In doing this, the Committees can, amongst other things, require the 
                                                            
182 Under Section 85(3)(b) The AG can also comment on the annual accounts of such bodies and 
the auditor’s reports on such accounts. 
183 Section 87 of the 1999 Constitution. 
184 Sections 125 -127 of the 1999 Constitution makes corresponding provisions for the office of 
the AG at the State level. 
185 Section 85 (5) of the 1999 Constitution. 
 
 195 
attendance of any person or production of any papers or records to clarify issues 
raised in the audit and to report to the Senate and House of Representatives from time 
to time.186 
 
Regrettably, this constitutional mechanism through which the legislature can exercise 
oversight on the executive and the judiciary in accordance with the doctrine of checks 
and balances is not used sufficiently in checking corruption.  This is for reasons that 




5.5 Impact of Anticorruption Regime Under the New 
Developmentalism  
 
We have considered thus far, the regime for anticorruption in Nigeria under the new 
developmentalism.  This section will examine the impact of this new regime in 
addressing corruption in Nigeria.  There is no doubt that since the rise of 
anticorruptionism at the global level, there have been significant changes in the regime 
for anticorruption in the country.  These include the passing of laws dealing specifically 
with corruption,188 establishment of specialised anticorruption institutions to enforce 
those laws,189 the reform of fiscal policies in the public sector and the creation of 
institutions and initiatives that promote transparency and accountability in 
                                                            
186 Order XIII, Rule 97 (5) of the Senate Standing Orders 2007 (as amended) and Order XVII, 
Rule A 6 (1) of the House Standing Orders. 
187 These issues are discussed below. 
188 Such as the EFCC Act and the ICPC Act. 
189 The EFCC and ICPC fall under this category. 
 
 196 
governance.190  Efforts to tackle corruption are now more extensive, intense and 
intricate. The discussion that follows looks at the impact of these third-moment 
changes on anticorruption endeavours: Have these changes translated into better 
results in tackling corruption?  Has the current regime improved on pre-existing efforts 
to tackle corruption by remedying the problems that hampered those efforts?  
 
To examine these questions, the performance of the current regime will be discussed 
in the light of the factors that bedevilled previous anticorruption efforts.  In section 3.3.3 
of chapter three, efforts to deal with corruption in Nigeria during the first and second 
moments of law and development were discussed.  The discussion highlighted some 
factors which were responsible for the ineffectiveness of previous anticorruption 
efforts.  In summary, the following factors were identified:  
 
• The efforts were often ad hoc and short term, varying according to each 
government in office  
• They were top-down state-led initiatives formulated and implemented from the 
uppermost levels of the executive leadership in the country. 
• Anticorruption efforts were often subject to political interference and used to 
achieve political goals.191 
 
In considering the current regime in relation to these factors, particular cases of 
corruption, institutional reforms and anticorruption initiatives that have taken place in 
the period in question since the return to democracy in 1999 will be examined.  The 
                                                            
190 Institutions and initiatives established for these purposes include the Bureau of Public 
Procurement and accompanying reform of procurement processes in the public sector, the Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. 
191 Detailed discussion of these factors is found in section 3.3.3 of Chapter 3. 
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discussion spans the four different administrations that the country has since 
witnessed under Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Yar’Adu, Goodluck Jonathan and the 
incumbent government of Muhammadu Buhari.192 
 
 
5.5.1 Ad Hoc and Short-Term Nature 
Previous efforts to address corruption in Nigeria during the first and second moments 
of law and development were usually ad hoc and short term.  Each government 
established its specific plans and strategies that fitted its peculiar objectives.  Hence, 
such efforts rarely survived beyond the term of government that constituted them.  This 
deprived anticorruption efforts of the sustainability needed for a long-term impact. 
 
This is however, one area where much has changed under the new developmentalism.  
The establishment of institutions and initiatives backed by law means that there is now 
continuity in anticorruption efforts.  Agencies like the EFCC and ICPC have been 
permanent features of the anticorruption regime for over fifteen years now, surviving 
all four administrations since the return to democracy.  Other institutions like the BPP 
and FRC have also been part of the regime since their establishment in 2007.  Hence, 
the fiscal policies and broader governance reforms that these institutions were 
                                                            
192 Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president of Nigeria following the return to democracy in 
1999.  He served two four-year terms before leaving office in 2007.  His successor Umaru Yar’Adua 
died in office in 2010 having served three out of his four-year term.  He was succeeded by his vice-
president Goodluck Jonathan who completed the term of his boss before being elected as substantive 
president in 2011.  His tenure ended in 2015 and after an unsuccessful re-election bid, Goodluck 
Jonathan was succeeded by Muhammadu Buhari. 
Most of the substantive reforms of the current anticorruption regime were established by the 
government of Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007.  There have however, been a few 
initiatives initiated by the other administrations.  These will become obvious in the discussion that 
follows in the rest of this section. 
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established to oversee have also endured.  The same applies to the components of 
the regime established by the constitution like the CCB, CCT and the office of the AG. 
 
A few factors can be identified to explain the difference between the current regime 
and previous efforts in this regard.  The first is the fact that the country is presently 
enjoying its longest democratic dispensation since independence.193  This has 
enhanced the chances of reforms enduring from one administration to another due to 
the prevalence of the rule of law and separation of powers.   Any changes to basic 
facets of the anticorruption regime would need to go through the due process of law 
requiring both legislative, executive and potentially judicial input.  The erstwhile 
situation where leaders under military regimes could easily abolish pre-existing 
initiatives and replace them arbitrarily by simply making decrees to that effect has been 
eliminated.     
 
Another factor responsible for the sustainability of the current regime is the influence 
of external actors like IDIs and global and regional organisations.  This is a direct result 
of the rise of anticorruptionism which has meant that there is increased international 
scrutiny of anticorruption efforts.  Changes can no longer be done easily without 
reasonable justification and accountability.  Moreover, the initiation and sustenance of 
most reforms - particularly those related to governance and fiscal policies - are now 
important conditions for the country to access loans and aid from most IDIs in the light 
                                                            
193 Since independence in 1960, Nigeria had only been under democratic rule for six years (from 
1960 to 1966) and another four years (from 1979 to 1983) before the commencement of the current 
18-year democratic dispensation (from 1999 to date). 
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of the prevalence of governance conditionality.194  This provides added motivation to 
ensure continuity.   
 
Furthermore, commentary and advocacy by international CSOs like Transparency 
International and Human Rights Watch on developments in the country’s 
anticorruption regime adds to the pressure against making radical changes.195   The 
impact of such international pressure is made more impactful considering the apparent 
consensus on the substance of reforms that meet international governance and 
anticorruption standards.  Any changes that appear contrary to such standards are 
likely to bring about increased external pressure.  In any case, with the issue of 
governance now a central element, not just for IDIs, but also for private investors, it is 
also in the interest of the country economically to maintain and project an image of 
stability in its efforts to tackle corruption. 
 
Whilst the stability of anticorruption efforts under the current regime is a positive 
development, the effect of this in terms of remedying the problems of previous efforts 
to address corruption will become clearer in the examination of the other factors that 
defined those efforts.   
 
 
                                                            
194 Heather Marquette, Corruption, Politics and Development: The Role of the Bank (Palsgrave 
Macmillan 2003) 39-73; International Monetary Fund (n 65). 
195 Examples of such comments include Human Rights Watch, ‘Nigeria: Firing of Anti-Corruption 
Czar Won’t Fix Agency’ (23 November 2011) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/23/nigeria-firing-
anti-corruption-czar-wont-fix-agency>; Transparency International, ‘Transparency International Calls 
on Nigerian Government to Step Up its Fight Against Corruption and Welcomes an Investigation into 
the Oil Sector’ (17 February 2014) 
<https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_calls_on_the_nigerian_
government_to_step_up_its> accessed 29 April 2017. 
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5.5.2  Top-Down State-Led Structure 
A major problem with previous anticorruption efforts was their top-down structure.  
Both under civilian and military regimes, efforts to tackle corruption were often state-
led with policies and programmes formulated and implemented from the topmost 
levels of executive leadership.  This exposed them easily to changes in government 
and made them amenable to political influences.   
 
Not much has changed in this respect under the current anticorruption regime.  As 
discussed above, there has been an obvious expansion of anticorruption efforts, 
especially as they reflect the broad and extensive attributes of the global anticorruption 
agenda.  In contrast to previous efforts where anticorruption efforts concentrated on 
dealing with corruption as a crime, or in some cases a moral wrong, current efforts 
now deal with corruption from various perspectives.  In addition to dealing with 
corruption as a crime - as dictated by most international instruments on corruption - 
corruption is also now tackled with reference to its impact on social and especially 
economic development.  This has led to good governance and fiscal and economic 
reform programmes championed by the World Bank and other IDIs aimed at tackling 
corruption.   
 
This expansion has however not radically altered the structural emphasis of the 
regime.  Efforts to tackle corruption are still mostly driven from the top and through the 
mechanism of the state.  The dismal failures of such state-led top-down initiatives to 
tackle corruption in the past has apparently not informed any change of strategy in this 
regard.  Unsurprisingly, the results have been no different under the current regime, 





5.5.2.1 Inefficiencies of General Structure   
 
The first and most obvious demonstration of this is the inefficient way anticorruption 
institutions have been established and run.  The institutional framework for addressing 
corruption is made up of multiple agencies with often overlapping jurisdictions.  
Naturally, this results in an absurd and inefficient duplication of functions.  Where a 
public official engages in bribery for instance, any of the following institutions has legal 
authority under the current framework to act:  the EFCC,196 ICPC,197 CCB,198 and the 
Nigeria Police Force.199   
 
This is in addition to other supporting institutions that might be involved in the 
processes of investigation, prosecution and enforcement.  These include the office of 
the Attorney General and the Department of State Services.  The impact of this 
duplication is manifold.  Firstly, it makes it difficult to ascertain a single integrated 
approach in dealing with particular cases of corruption as each institution acts 
independently in accordance with its enabling legislation.  The duplication of functions 
also means that no specific institution is held responsible for the overall failures of the 
institutional framework for dealing with corruption.   
 
A final point worth making is the exorbitant cost of running these institutions.  Scarce 
state resources are applied to funding these multiple anticorruption institutions that 
                                                            
196 Sections 6 and 18, EFCC Act. 
197 Section 8, ICPC Act. 
198 Par. 6, Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. 
199 Section 98 of the Criminal Code Act and Section 115 of the Penal Code Act. 
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perform similar and in some cases, the same functions.  Hence, even where the overall 
allocation made for anticorruption efforts is reasonable, the funds become negligible 
once broken down to show what goes to each institution.  For instance, even though 
a total sum of 31.1 billion Naira is allotted for anticorruption efforts in 2017, a 
breakdown shows that institutions like the ICPC got only 5.93 billion Naira with just 
1.49 billion Naira going to the BPP and 2.73 billion Naira to the CCB.200  These 
institutions are likely to engage in the usual complaint of inadequate funding to excuse 
any failures on their part at the end of the year.  It would be very different if the lump 
sum was given to a single anticorruption institution with better chances of performing 
the functions of these institutions effectively in a more coordinated and efficient 
manner. 
 
The ineffectiveness of state-led efforts is further exemplified by the unsuccessful 
efforts to deal with this problem of multiplicity of anticorruption institutions.  Even 
though the Act establishing the EFCC empowers it to coordinate and enforce ‘all 
economic and financial crime laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other 
person or authority’,201 the Commission has failed in performing the role of acting as 
a central point for the convergence of all anticorruption efforts.  Repeated initiatives to 
ensure coordination of the activities of all anticorruption institutions under the auspices 
of the EFCC202 have thus far not borne any concrete results. 
                                                            
200 Basil Obasi, ‘FG Fights Graft with N31bn in 2017’ The Sun (Abuja, 30 December 2016) 
<http://sunnewsonline.com/fg-fights-graft-with-n31bn-in-2017/> accessed 9 January 2017.   
The EFCC, as expected, received 17.2 billion Naira representing 55 per cent of the total sum 
allocated. 
201 Section 6(c), EFCC Act. 
202 For one of such instances, see Chuka Odittah, ‘EFCC, ICPC, CCB Plan Joint Operations’ 
Leadership (Abuja, 19 September 2012) < http://allafrica.com/stories/201209190236.html> accessed 
10 January 2017.  It is worth noting that in 2009, the Inter-Agency Task Team (IATT) was established 
as a working group of anticorruption agencies in Nigeria.  Its member organisations include the 
EFCC, ICPC, Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR), CCB, CCT, 




Despite the obvious need to reform the law on this issue, broader efforts by successive 
governments to do so have all failed.  The immediate past leadership of Goodluck 
Jonathan rejected a recommendation to merge the EFCC, ICPC and CCB to make 
them more effective.203  The recommendation was made by a special committee set 
up by the government to review Nigeria’s ministries, departments and parastatals with 
a view to making governance more efficient.  Despite the Committee’s statement of 
the obvious rationale and benefits of such merger, the government in its white paper 
on the report of the Committee, rejected the recommendation without giving any 
reasons for its decision.204   
 
Furthermore, on assumption of office in 2015, the current administration of 
Muhammadu Buhari promised to merge anticorruption institutions in the country.205  
Despite widespread public support for the initiative,206 the government is yet to keep 
its promise.  Instead it has embarked on creating new anticorruption institutions, whilst 
current ones continue to falter.  Shortly after resuming office, the government 
                                                            
of Justice.  Despite its many years, of existence, there is no strategic integration of anticorruption 
efforts through its work.  Instead its efforts have been limited to issues like joint staff training and 
sharing of opinions and ideas, with each institution’s core operations taking place independently and 
performing often duplicated functions.  See ICPC, ‘Inter-Agency Task Team Reviews Progress 
Report’ (11 June 2015) <http://icpc.gov.ng/inter-agency-task-team-reviews-progress-report/> 
accessed 2 August 2017. 
203 Premium Times, ‘Breaking: Orasanye Report: Federal Government Rejects Merger of EFCC, 
ICPC; to Merge Aviation Agencies’ (Abuja, 7 April 2014) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/158291-breaking-orosanye-report-nigerian-government-
rejects-merger-efcc-icpc-merge-aviation-agencies.html> accessed 10 January 2017. 
204 Federal Republic of Nigeria, ‘White Paper on the Report of the Presidential Committee on 
Restructuring and Rationalisation of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions and Agencies’ 
(Federal Government Printer, Lagos, March 2014) 12. 
205 Soni Daniel, ‘Buahri to Merge EFCC, ICPC; 42 Ministries Reduced to 19’ Vanguard (Lagos, 21 
June 2015) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/buhari-to-merge-efcc-icpc-42-ministries-reduced-
to-19/> accessed 10 January 2017. 
206 Editorial, ‘Nigerians Okay Planned Merger of MDAs, EFCC, ICPC, Others’ The Guardian 
(Lagos, 25 August 2015) <http://guardian.ng/news/nigerians-okay-planned-merger-of-mdas-efcc-icpc-
others/>  accessed 10 January 2017. 
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established a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anti-Corruption which has become 
the leading body for setting anticorruption policy.207  The Committee, with a very vague 
mandate, has simply taken on the role of defending the anticorruption efforts of the 
government without adding any significant value to the regime.   
 
Regrettably, its first two policy decisions appear ill-considered with the potential to 
perpetuate existing structural problems.  The first was advising against the merger of 
the EFCC and ICPC or other anticorruption institutions, without giving any concrete 
reason for that position.208  The other was to seek the establishment of Special Courts 
to try corruption cases.209  The Committee noted that this was necessary to ‘aid speedy 
dispensation of justice in high profile corruption cases in the country’.210  It is difficult 
to rationalise the establishment of a different judicial mechanism for corruption cases 
when there is a more expedient need for reforms in the overall regime.  This is a step 
that appears designed to do nothing more than score political points for the current 
administration.  There is no guarantee that these courts will be any more effective or 
insulated from the inefficiency of the judiciary and public sector in Nigeria.  Moreover, 
the effort and resources to be committed to establishing special courts for corruption 
cases would prove strategically more beneficial if used to improve the country’s overall 
court system.  The positive impact of such alternative course of action would extend 
beyond just anticorruption efforts to the overall state of the rule of law and democratic 
                                                            
207 BBC News, ‘ Nigeria President Appoints Anti-Corruption Advisers’ (London, 11 August 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33857545>  accessed 10 January 2017. 
208 Akinola Ajibade, ‘Merger of EFCC, ICPC, Others not Foreseeable’ The Nation (Lagos, 15 
February 2016) <http://thenationonlineng.net/merger-of-efcc-icpc-others-not-foreseeable/>  accessed 
10 January 2017.  The Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Anti-Corruption, Prof Itse 
Sagay, whilst expressing this position, simply stated that even though discussions are ongoing on the 
issue, it is not likely that the organisations would merge. 
209 Premium Times, ‘Special Courts Coming for Corruption, Kidnapping, Others - Sagay’ (Abuja, 
24 June 2016) <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/205873-special-courts-coming-




governance.  Also, in the face of resource restraints faced by the CCT for instance, 
which presides over corruption cases, establishing extra courts that would likely face 
similar challenges raises questions about the wisdom behind such an initiative. 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Inefficiency of Particular Institutions  
 
The structural problems of the current anticorruption regime extend also to the 
activities of specific institutions.  The actions of anticorruption institutions with respect 
to certain cases evinces this inefficiency.  The case of Peter Odili who was governor 
of Rivers State, a sub-region in the south of the country for two four-year terms from 
1999 to 2007, provides a good example.211  Towards the end of his tenure, the EFCC 
disclosed how it had investigated financial misappropriations by the governor212 and 
intended to charge him in court the moment he left office and lost his constitutional 
immunity.213  Apprehensive of this, the Attorney-General of the State applied to court 
and secured an injunction barring the EFCC from investigating the finances of the 
State or arresting the governor on the basis any purported investigation.  The 
                                                            
211 Rivers State is located in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  The State witnessed 
unprecedented income levels during the tenure of Peter Odili but did not enjoy commensurate 
development due largely to mismanagement of resources and corruption.  A 2007 report by Human 
Rights Watch showed that much of the corruption was perpetrated by the Governor’s office, where 
millions of dollars were allocated for questionable purposes like ‘grants, contributions and donations’, 
($33.2m in 2016 alone) unspecified ‘special projects’ ($77m in 2016) and a ‘security vote’ of about 
$38.5m, just to mention a few.   
See Human Rights Watch, ‘“Chop Fine”: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government 
Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria’ (Vol 19, No. 2(A), 2007) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/01/31/chop-fine/human-rights-impact-local-government-corruption-
and-mismanagement-rivers> accessed 20 February 2017. 
212 Sahara Reporters, ‘N100 Billion Looting of Rivers State: The EFCC Interim Report’ (New York, 
28 December 2016) <http://saharareporters.com/2006/12/28/n100-billion-looting-rivers-state-efcc-
interim-report> accessed 14 December 2015. 
213 Section 308 of the Constitution of the country grants immunity from legal proceedings to the 
President and Vice- President and Governors and Deputy-Governors of the various states of the 
federation, whilst they are in office.   The implication of this is that no anticorruption institution can 




application was made on the ground that such investigation was ‘prejudicial to the 
smooth running of the Government of Rivers State’.214  The EFCC filed a notice of 
appeal against this decision but did nothing more.   A couple months after the governor 
left office, he personally applied for and was granted ‘a perpetual injunction restraining 
the EFCC from arresting, detaining and arraigning Odili based on his tenure as 
governor relying on the purported investigation.’215  The EFCC failed to take any steps 
in terms of appealing this second injunction until the legal limit for appeals under the 
rules of court expired.  Reports indicate that top officials of the Commission were 
unable to explain the reason for this failure or indeed why the trial of Odili has failed to 
commence until date, despite an obvious case of corruption against him and repeated 
calls for him to be prosecuted.216 
 
The ICPC has also proven to be inefficient in carrying out its functions as a primary 
anticorruption institution.  Even though it was the first anticorruption institution 
established after the return to democracy in 2000, it continues to play second fiddle to 
the EFCC in tackling public-sector corruption.  This is the case even though it is 
granted wider powers in certain respects than the EFCC.  For instance, unlike the 
EFCC, it can require public officials to explain how they are in possession of properties 
that can be deemed excessive having regard to their past and present salaries and all 
other relevant circumstances.217  Furthermore, the chairman and members of the 
ICPC are accorded a more secure tenure by law than the leadership of the EFCC.  
                                                            
214 Attorney-General for Rivers State vs. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission & 3 
Others (FHC/PHC/CS/78/2007). 
215 Dr. Peter Odili vs. The Attorney General of the Federation & The Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (FHC/PHC/1291/2007). 
216 Human Rights Watch (n 134) 42-43. 
217 See Sections 44-8 of the ICPC Act.  The powers of the EFCC in this regard are more limited in 
comparison.  See Sections 7, 25-6 of the EFCC Act. 
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The former can only be removed by the president acting on an address supported by 
two-thirds majority of the Senate.218  In the case of the EFCC, the president can 
remove them from office without the need for confirmation by the Senate or any other 
authority.219   
 
Ordinarily, these factors should empower the ICPC to be more proactive in its 
anticorruption efforts.  However, this has not been the case.220 The inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the ICPC is a perception also shared by the public as shown by a 
2008 public poll.221  81 percent of Nigerians polled named the EFCC as the first anti-
corruption agency that came to mind when asked about anticorruption agencies in 
Nigeria, compared to 16 percent that named the ICPC.   
 
The inefficiency of state-led anticorruption efforts can also be seen from the operations 
of complementary anticorruption institutions.   The BBP for instance, despite its 
revolutionary impact in engendering transparency and accountability has been 
criticised for being inefficient.  Most complaints about the Bureau relate to delays in its 
‘due process’ certification process.  Government ministries and private contractors 
alike, have had to wait for unduly long periods of time to get through all the requisite 
processes before contracts are awarded.222  Furthermore, the dissemination of 
                                                            
218 Section 3(8) of the ICPC Act.  This may be done on the grounds of inability to discharge the 
functions of their office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for 
misconduct. 
219 See Section 3(2) of the EFCC Act.  A member of the Commission may be removed at any time 
by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of 
mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct or if the President is satisfied that is is not in the 
interest of the Commission or the interest of the public that the member should continue in office. 
220 Human Rights Watch, ‘Chop Fine’ (n 211) 95. 
221 See Convention on Business Integrity, ‘Report of the Public Perceptions of the Anti-Corruption 
Agencies’ (2010) 28, cited in Human Rights Watch (n 134) 47. 
222 O.J Ameh and O. Ogundare, ‘Impact of Due Process on Construction Projects in Nigeria’ 
(2013) 4 (1) Journal of Building Performance 13-23; Tobi Soniyi, ‘Due Process Delays Release of 
N350bn Capital Vote’ This Day (Lagos, 9 June 2016) 
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information about procurement processes has been done quite poorly by the 
Bureau.223  Even though substantive aspects of the processes are provided for in the 
Public Procurement Act, their complicated and extensive nature requires strategic 
communication by the Bureau to ensure effective compliance.  This is a responsibility 
it has failed to discharge effectively, thereby hampering the impact of the overall public 
procurement reforms.   
 
There are two important points worth making about the inefficiency of state-led efforts 
in tackling corruption.  Firstly, even though the discussion here is about anticorruption 
institutions and initiatives, the problems identified illustrate the broader problem of 
inefficiency in the public sector in Nigeria.  Various studies have pointed to the 
cumbersome, inefficient and unproductive nature of the public service.224  As with the 
case of the anticorruption regime, efforts to reform the public service to make it more 
efficient have also borne few results.225  It is therefore illogical to expect that efforts to 
tackle corruption through state institutions operating within the generally inefficient 
public service in Nigeria will be efficient.226  
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223 Tunde Oyasanya, ‘The Challenges of Due Process Procedure’ Leadership (Abuja, 1 January 
2009) <http://allafrica.com/stories/200901020450.html> accessed 6 January 2016. 
224 Abiodun Akinwale, Public Administration and Personnel Management in Nigeria (Spectrum 
Books Ltd 2007); Ladipo Adamolekun, John Erero and Basil Oshionebo, ‘“Federal Character” and 
Management of the Federal Civil Service and the Military’ (1991) 21(4) Publius 75-88; Vitalis 
Onyekachi Nweze, ‘Assessing the Effects of State Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS) in the Development of Public Service in Enugu State: A Case Study of Ministries of 
Education and Finance (1999-2007)’ (MSc Dissertation, University of Nigeria 2010). 
225 Alex Sekwat, ‘Civil Service Reform in Post-Independence Nigeria: Issues and Challenges’ 
(2002) Public Administration Quarterly 498-517; Adewale Banjo, ‘Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria: 
1999-2009’ in Shikha Vyas-Doorgapersad, Lukamba-Muhiya and Ernest Peprah Ababio (eds) Public 
Administration in Africa: Performance and Challenges (Routledge 2013) 83-96. 
226 This point has been made in more detail in: Matthew Ayibakuro, ‘The Futility in Fighting 
Corruption in an Inefficient Public Sector: The Nigerian Case’ (The Africa Development Dialogue, 27 
September 2016) <https://theafricadevelopmentdialogue.com/2016/09/27/the-futility-of-fighting-
corruption-in-an-inefficient-public-sector-the-nigerian-case/> accessed 20 February 2017. 
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The second important point is that the problems discussed above are sometimes 
symptomatic of political influence in anticorruption efforts.  The nature and impact of 
this is discussed next. 
 
 
5.5.3  Political Interference and Instrumentalism 
A significant factor that defined actions and initiatives dealing with corruption in Nigeria 
during the first and second moments of law and development was their use for political 
purposes.227  This is a trend that continues under the current post-1999 regime.  In 
fact, the rise of anticorruptionism has arguably provided more impetus for the 
‘instrumentalisation’ of anticorruption efforts for political purposes.  Due to the 
heightened global attention and pressure for action to be taken at the local level, 
certain unfair and oppressive actions by government are now easily justified through 
the use of anticorruption rhetoric.  IDIs and other international actors often emphasise 
the importance of political will to tackling corruption.228   Ironically however, the 
exercise of such will has often led to less desirable outcomes.   
 
There are a myriad cases where, instead of being applied to genuinely deal with 
corruption, political will has rather been exercised, to ‘defuse opposition, bolster 
                                                            
227 Ejovi Austine, Mgbonyebi Voke Charles and Akpokighe Okemute Raymond, ‘Corruption in 
Nigeria: A Historical Perspective’ (2013) 3(16) Research on Humanities and Social Science 19-26. 
228 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption (n 52) 5; Roberto Martinez B. Kukutschka, 
Building Political Will: Topic Guide (Transparency International 2015) 1; OECD, ‘Reinforcing Political 
Will to Fight Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia’ (Report of High-Level Meeting of OECD 
Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2012) 6-9; Rick Messick, ‘The Political 
Will to Fight Corruption: Lessons From Nigeria’ (GAB, 31 December 2014) 
<https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/12/31/the-political-will-to-fight-corruption-lessons-from-
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support or placate external agencies.’229  The assessment of the performance of 
anticorruption institutions show a classic case of politicians using such institutions to 
‘publicise allegations and evidence of corruption in an effort to demonstrate opponents’ 
and former administrations’ hypocrisies and their own virtue.’230  In extreme cases, 
anticorruption institutions are used to get rid of political opponents and particular 
anticorruption campaigns designed as ‘tactical responses to political challenges, 
rather than sincere attempts to reform.’231  
 
To examine the nature of political interference under the current regime, a number of 
cases involving the EFCC as a primary anticorruption institution will be examined.  
Thereafter, the influence of politics on the activities of complementary anticorruption 
institutions will be discussed. 
 
5.5.3.1 Political Interference and Instrumentalism and the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission  
 
This use of anticorruption institutions for political purposes became a hallmark of the 
activities of the EFCC under the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo232 and continued 
under succeeding governments.  The agency earned plaudits from Nigerians and the 
international community in the first few years of its operation as the statistics examined 
                                                            
229 Sahr Kpundeh and Phyllis Dininio, ‘Political Will’ in Rick Stapenhurt, Niall Johnston and 
Riccardo Pellizo (eds), The Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption (World Bank 2006) 41-42. 
230 ibid. 
231 ibid. See also Sahr J. Kpundeh, ‘Political Will in Fighting Corruption’ in UNDP, Corruption and 
Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries (United Nations, New York 1998) 91. 
232 Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president at the return of the country to democratic rule in 
1999 and ruled for two successive terms of four years each.  He left office in 2007 after a failed bid to 
amend the constitution for a third term.  See Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Olusegun Obasanjo’ (25 




above show.  However, the reputation of the agency was called into question when 
instances of political interference in its activities started surfacing.   
 
The conviction in 2005 of the country’s former Inspector General of Police on charges 
of corruption was arguably the highlight of the anticorruption efforts of the EFCC.233  
But any expectation that this would bolster the anticorruption regime and lead to further 
high-profile prosecutions and convictions started filtering away in the months leading 
up to the 2007 general elections.  Obasanjo freely used the EFCC to harass and 
eliminate from the political process those opposed to his agenda, whilst 
simultaneously protecting his allies from prosecution.  This was done with a view to 
ensuring the victory of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party at the polls and more 
particularly installing his chosen successors. 
 
One of the first indications of this occurred in February 2007 when the EFCC published 
a list of 135 aspirants for different positions in the elections across the country, whom 
the agency considered corrupt and therefore unfit to stand for election.234  This 
‘advisory’ list was dominated by opposition politicians and members of the ruling party 
who were opposed to the president.  The most prominent of these was the vice 
president, Atiku Abubakar was had famously spearheaded the opposition to 
Obasanjo’s unsuccessful bid to secure an unconstitutional third term in office.235  The 
federal government set up an ‘Administrative Panel’ to investigate, and after sitting for 
                                                            
233 BBC News, ‘Nigerian Ex-Police Chief Jailed’ (London, 22 November 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4460740.stm> accessed 6 January 2016. 
234 Adbul Jimoh, ‘EFCC Release Lists of Candidates Adjudged Corrupt and Unfit for Elections’ 
Sahara Reporters (New York, 16 March 2007) <http://preview.saharareporters.com/2008/07/09/efcc-
release-lists-candidates-adjudged-corrupt-and-unfit-elections> accessed 28 November 2015. 
235 BBC News Online, ‘Nigerian VP Named on Graft List’ (London, 7 February 2007) 
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only 48 hours, the panel indicted a good number of those on the list.236  This was done 
without giving them any real opportunity to appear and defend themselves before the 
panel.237  It was unsurprising that Atiku Abubakar was one of those indicted.  Relying 
on the indictment, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), citing 
constitutional provisions,238 excluded those indicted from the elections, despite 
widespread criticism of the decision.239  It was only after he challenged his exclusion 
in court and the Supreme Court ruled in his favour just five days before the presidential 
polls that the name of the vice-president was included in the ballot.240 
 
Notably, the EFCC ‘advisory’ list omitted the names of several top-ranking members 
of the ruling party who were widely considered corrupt and whose corrupt activities 
had previously been denounced by the EFCC Chairman.241  These included the vice-
presidential candidate for the ruling party Goodluck Jonathan who had been practically 
handpicked by Obasanjo.  Others were the governorship candidate for the ruling party 
in Oyo State, Christopher Alao-Akala and his counterpart in Ogun State, Olugbenga 
Daniel.242  Various reports condemned the obvious use of the EFCC by the ruling party 
and the presidency in particular, during the events preceding the 2007 elections.243  
                                                            
236 The Panel reviewed a total of 77 cases and recommended that 37 of those named on the list 
be disqualified from running for office at the polls.  36 names were recommended for further 
investigation, with four names cleared.  See This Day, ‘White Paper Reverses Panel Report, 
Disqualifies 37’ (Lagos, 18 February 2007). 
237 Human Rights Watch, Election or ‘Selection’: Human Rights Abuse and Threats to Free and 
Fair Elections in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, April 2007) 32. 
238 Section 137(1)(i) of the 1999 Constitution disqualifies from running for the office of President, 
anyone who has been indicted for embezzlement or fraud by a Judicial Commission of Inquiry or an 
Administrative Panel of Inquiry.  Similar provisions are made in the constitution for other elective 
offices both at the federal and state levels.  See sections 66(1)(h), 107(1)(h) and 182(1)(1). 
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240 Bachir Adigun, ‘Nigerian Candidate Wins Court Ruling’ The Washington Post (Washington 
D.C, 16 April 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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242 ibid. 
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This was a typical case where an anticorruption institution was used by the president 
to simultaneously protect his allies and harass and intimidate his opponents.  
 
This episode tainted the legitimacy of the EFCC and eroded public trust in the ability 
of the agency to successfully deal with corruption.  It also overshadowed previous 
successes recorded by the Commission and the promise shown in the activities of its 
early days.  This culminated in the removal of the head of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu 
within a year of the 2007 elections by the government of Umaru Yar’Adua that 
succeeded Obasanjo.244   His removal was also precipitated by another case of 
political interference.  This case involved the Attorney-General of the Federation at the 
time, Mr. Michael Aondoaaka who accused Mr. Ribadu and the EFCC of human rights 
violations and disregard for due process and rule of law in its prosecutions of former 
governors of the ruling party.245  On these grounds, the Attorney-General of the 
Federation sought to intervene and take over the said trials in exercise of his 
constitutional powers.   Mr. Ribadu’s resistance to this led to his removal and 
replacement.246 
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Further proof of the politicisation of the anticorruption regime in Nigeria was found 
under the presidency of Umaru Yar’Adua.   Following the removal of Nuhu Ribadu, 
Mrs Farida Waziri was appointed to head the EFCC.  In July 2009, it published a list 
of 56 prominent Nigerians who were collectively accused of embezzling over 243 
billion Naira from the nation’s treasury.  Those on the list included former governors, 
ministers, permanent secretaries, heads of state parastatals, legislators and chairmen 
of local governments.  The document stated the amounts embezzled by each 
individual as ranging from 10 million to 100 billion Naira.247  All 56 individuals listed 
were subsequently charged in court in separate cases. 
 
A significant issue with this list was that, much like the one released by Ribadu prior 
to the 2007 elections, it also omitted the names of certain high profile corrupt 
politicians, some of whom were under investigation by the EFCC under the previous 
administration.248  The most apparent of these was the past governor of Delta State, 
James Ibori who was accused of embezzling funds to the tune of over 10 billion Naira 
during his tenure as governor from 1999 to 2007.  The EFCC under Ribadu had made 
concerted efforts to prosecute Ibori but could not charge him because of the 
constitutional immunity he was entitled to whilst in office.249  It was therefore rather 
interesting that, not only was Ibori’s name missing from the list released by Waziri, but 
                                                            
247 Nigerian Tribune, ‘Bode George, Kalu, Ladoja, Dariye, 52 Others looted 243bn - EFCC’ 
Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan, 10 July 2009) 14. 
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Ibori proceeded to secure various legal victories in cases previously instituted against 
him by the EFCC.250 
 
In this case, a further proof of the amenability of the EFCC to the whims of executive 
leadership appeared when Ibori was immediately declared wanted by the EFCC when 
the next president of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan took office following the death of 
Umaru Yar’Adua.  Ibori was eventually tried and convicted in London for embezzling 
about 50 million pounds of public funds.251   
 
 
5.5.3.2 Political Interference and Instrumentalism and Complementary 
Anticorruption Institutions 
 
Cases involving three institutions will be examined here:  The CCB, BPP and office of 
the AG. 
 
The Code of Conduct Bureau  
 
The ongoing prosecution of the current senate president of Nigeria, Bukola Saraki,  
provides an obvious example of the influence of political considerations on the 
activities of the Bureau.  After failing to prosecute any notable public official at the 
federal level since the return to democracy, on 11 September 2015 the Bureau filed a 
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13-count charge of corruption against Saraki.252  The offences contained in the charge 
range from false declaration of assets to operating a foreign bank account and 
acquiring assets beyond his legitimate means.253  The offences were alleged to have 
been committed whilst Saraki was governor of Kwara State in western Nigeria from 
2003 to 2011. 
 
Ordinarily, the trial of the third highest-ranking political office holder on charges of 
corruption would be a welcome development for the anticorruption efforts.  It should 
have also won plaudits for the presidency of Muhammadu Buhari who was elected on 
the promise of ‘fighting corruption’, having come so soon after the elections.   However, 
the circumstances of the trial have led to the allegations that the trial is an act of 
political persecution more than anything else.  The reason for this was that on 9th June 
2015, Bukola Saraki had emerged as Senate President against the inclination of the 
leadership of the ruling party, the All Progressive Congress (APC) on whose platform 
Saraki was elected.  The obvious choice of the party for the position was Ahmad 
Lawan, who was also publicly understood to be the preferred candidate of the 
presidency.  However, in a rather dramatic process that saw Saraki getting the backing 
of senators of the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Saraki was chosen as 
president of the senate, causing much embarrassment to the leadership of his party 
and the presidency.254   
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news/190161-conduct-bureau-slams-13-count-corruption-charge-on-senate-president-bukola-
saraki.html>  accessed 5 January 2016. 
253 These were in violation of the code of conduct for public officers contained in Part 1 of the Fifth 
Schedule to the Constitution. 
254 The Sun, ‘How Saraki Emerged Senate President’ (Lagos, 10 June 2015) 
<http://sunnewsonline.com/new/how-saraki-emerged-senate-president/> accessed 5 January 2016. 
 
 217 
The process of Saraki’s prosecution by the CCB commenced less than three months 
after his emergence as Senate President, leading to the conclusion by certain groups 
that his emergence and subsequent prosecution are not unconnected.255  The details 
of the charges against him and the way the trial has proceeded make it difficult to 
dismiss this conclusion.  Firstly, most of the charges against him relate to statements 
in his assets declaration as governor of Kwara State many years ago.  In fact, some 
of them date back to his assets declaration in 2003 when he was first elected as 
governor.  It is difficult to reconcile the failure of the CCB to detect the alleged false 
declaration for over 12 years, with its doing so a couple of weeks after his problems 
with the presidency.  This is more concerning considering he lost his constitutional 
immunity from prosecution since 2011 when he ceased being governor.   
 
Surely the intention of the draftsman of the Code is that the veracity of assets declared 
by public officers should be checked at the time they take office against their assets 
as at when they leave office, to ensure that their possessions are justified by their 
income whilst in office.  Yet, the CCB failed to discover or act on the alleged falsehoods 
in Saraki’s assets declarations, even though he made four different declarations in his 
two terms as governor and a further three in his time in the Senate.256  The fact that 
the allegations were brought against him only after his dramatic emergence as Senate 
President created a cloud over the work of the Bureau that cannot easily be dismissed.  
 
                                                            
255 The Guardian, ‘Kwara Group Seeks Buhari’s Intervention in Trial of Saraki’ (Lagos, 22 
September 2015) <http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/kwara-group-seeks-buharis-
intervention-in-trial-of-saraki/>  accessed 5 January 2016. 
256 Paragraph 11 of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution requires public officers to 
declare their assets immediately after taking office, at the end of every four years after that and also 
at the end of their term of office. 
The implication of this is that Saraki made four declarations in relation to his time as governor 
(2003-2011), two more in his first term in the Senate (2011-2015) and one more at the beginning of 
his current term as Senate President. 
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Furthermore, the manner the trial by the CCT has proceeded also creates questions 
regarding its independence.  The lead judge of the tribunal on 5 November 2015 ruled 
that the trial of the Senate President must proceed even though there was a pending 
appeal in the Supreme Court against the continuation of the trial.257  It seems that 
there is a sudden urgency on the part of the CCB and CCT to try and convict Saraki 
for charges that could have been brought a long time ago.  And both bodies appear 
prepared to defy even decisions of the Supreme Court in pursuance of this trial.  This 
sets a discouraging precedent not only in terms of the politically tainted nature of the 
trial, but also within the bigger picture of the independence of anticorruption institutions 
and respect for the rule of law.258 
 
It is instructive that on 14 June 2017, The CCT dismissed all the charges against the 
senate president on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove any of the 
allegations.259  This decision vindicated the claims of Saraki and many others – as 
argued in this section – that the prosecution was politically motivated from the onset. 
 
 
                                                            
257 Dr. Olubukola Abubakar Saraki vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2016) LPELR-400013(SC).  See 
The Herald, ‘CCT Trial: Between Advocates of Justice and Judicial Exploiters’ (Lagos, 7 November 
2015) <http://www.theheraldng.com/cct-trial-between-advocates-of-justice-and-judicial-exploiters/> 
accessed 5 January 2016. 
258 It is worth noting that, following the decision of the Supreme Court in February 2016 rejecting 
the appeal of the senate president on the preliminary issue, the trial was duly referred back to the 
CCT for continuation.  See Evelyn Okakwu, ‘Updated: Supreme Court Says Senate President, Bukola 
Saraki, Must Face Corruption Trial’ Premium Times (Abuja, 5 February 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/198003-breaking-supreme-court-rejects-sarakis-
appeal-orders-face-corruption-trial.html> accessed 29 April 2017. 
259 Evelyn Okaku, ‘False Asset Declaration Charge: Saraki Discharged, Acquitted’ Premium 
Times (Abuja, 14 June 2017) <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/234057-breaking-
false-asset-declaration-charge-saraki-discharged-acquitted.html> accessed 5 August 2017. 
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The Office of the Auditor-General  
Despite the constitution guaranteeing the independence of the office of the AG, 
political interests continue to hamper the effectiveness of the office in checking 
corruption.  This is because the effectiveness of the office is dependent on the will of 
the National Assembly to act on its audit reports.260  And the lack of action on the part 
of the National Assembly has been significant and detrimental.  In 2011, the AG of the 
Federation under the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan referred to this when he 
accused the National Assembly of encouraging corruption by failing to act on over 14 
audit reports submitted to it since 1999.261  He noted that the National Assembly had 
failed to question government departments and ministries that had been found to have 
mismanaged public funds as disclosed in the reports.  Furthermore, it had also failed 
to act on others who failed to submit their accounts for audit over the years.262   
 
Even in cases where massive misappropriations disclosed in audit reports were 
confirmed by the National Assembly after carrying out investigations, usually in the 
form of public hearings, individuals and authorities were rarely held accountable.263  
                                                            
260 See Sections 85-89 of the Constitution. As noted earlier in the consideration of the institutional 
framework in Nigeria, the provisions apply mutatis mutandis at level of States in the country. 
261 ThisDayLive, ‘National Assembly is Encouraging Corruption, Says Auditor-General’ (Lagos, 17 
October 2011) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/national-assembly-is-encouraging-corruption-
says-auditor-general/100699/>  accessed 20 January 2016. 
262 ibid.  Some of the departments and agencies indicted for not submitting audit reports in 
accordance with constitutional provisions included the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 
263 A recent case in this regard concerned an audit report submitted by the AG to the National 
Assembly which showed that over 183 billion Naira had been misappropriated in a federal agency, the 
Niger Delta Development Commission between 2008 and 2012.  After an exchange of claims and 
counter-claims between officials of the agency, the AG and the National Assembly, the matter has 
slowly disappeared from public purview without any individual or authority being held accountable for 
the revelations.   
See OAuGF, ‘Report on Special Periodic Checks on the Activities and Programmes of Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) for the Period 2008-2012’ (Abuja 14 August 2015); Bassey Udo, 
‘NDDC Diverted N183bn Niger Delta Development Money, Auditor General Insists’ Premium Times 
(Abuja, 19 August 2015) <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/188697-nddc-diverted-
n183bn-niger-delta-development-money-auditor-general-insists.html> accessed 24 January 2017. 
 
 220 
This is therefore one way in which political interests - in this case apathy and lack of 
commitment to an anticorruption mechanism - impacts on the effectiveness of the 
office of the AG in performing its role in checking corruption.   
 
However, a more extreme case of political interference with the office of the AG took 
place in 2003 under the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo.  The AG at the time Vincent 
Azie submitted an audit report to the National Assembly for the very first time since 
1999.  The report showed misappropriation of funds by most government ministries 
and departments, including the Presidency, National Assembly and the Judiciary.  This 
caused considerable embarrassment to the government and its acclaimed 
commitment to tackle corruption.  Shortly after the submission of the report, the 
Federal Government, through its Minister of Information, Professor Jerry Gana, openly 
criticised the report and the AG was subsequently removed from office.264   The official 
justification put forward by the government for its decision was that the AG was only 
in office in acting capacity and that his tenure as acting AG had expired.  However, it 
was rather ironic that the replacement chosen by the government was Joseph Ajiboye 
who had previously served as acting AG and failed to produce any audit report as 
constitutionally required of his office and whose nomination by the President in 2002 
as substantive AG had been rejected by the Senate.265  At the time of his re-nomination 
as substantive AG to replace Azie in 2003, a new Senate had just been elected and 
his appointment was confirmed this time around.266 
                                                            
264 Editorial, ‘Using Auditor-General’s Report to Fight Corruption’ The Authority (Abuja, 18 
December 2015) <http://authorityngr.com/2015/12/Using-Auditor-General-s-report-to-fight-
corruption/> accessed 24 January 2017. 
265 Nature Umar and Iyefu Adoba, ‘Senate Rejects Auditor-General Nominee’ This Day (Lagos, 25 
January 2002) <http://allafrica.com/stories/200201250147.html> accessed 14 January 2016. 
266 Henry Omunu, ‘Nigeria: Senate Confirms Ajiboye as Auditor-General’ Daily Trust (Abuja, 30 
July 2003) <http://allafrica.com/stories/200307300187.html> accessed 14 January 2016. 
Even though the earlier rejection of the nomination of Ajiboye was based on the grounds that his 




The removal of Azie seriously tainted the supposed commitment of the government at 
the time to tackle corruption and further exemplified the lack of independence from 
political influence of anticorruption institutions in Nigeria. 
 
 
The Bureau of Public Procurement  
 
As discussed above, the BPP suffered from many efficiency problems especially 
during its early years of operation.  This notwithstanding, it was largely celebrated for 
its revolutionary reforms in the public sector in Nigeria.   However, for all the good work 
of the Bureau and its pioneer director Obiageli Ezekwisili, questions have been raised 
about how the Bureau under her command failed to detect a lot of the corrupt scandals 
that hit the country during her term in office.  This is especially so for cases that went 
through contractual processes that were overseen by the Bureau.267  These include 
estimates of over 16 billion dollars spent by the federal government under Obasanjo 
on the electricity sector with no tangible results.268  Another was the award of 214 
                                                            
constitution because at that time, the Accountant-General of the Federation and the Governor of the 
Central Bank (the principal offices in the public finance sector) were all from the South-West region of 
the country, the fact that he had failed to perform the duties constitutionally required of his office whist 
holding the office of the AG in an acting capacity should have discouraged his renomination and 
subsequent appointment. 
267 Al Jazeera, ‘Head to Head - Nigeria’s Future: Failed State or African Superpower’ (2 May 
2015) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAY04VWpWfE>  accessed 11 January 2016. 
In an interview with Mehdi Hassan of Al Jazeera, Ezekwisili was unable to provide a direct answer 
to the question of whether or not the government of Obasanjo who appointed her head of the BMPIU 
was corrupt or not.  This is despite the fact that the government of Obasanjo was generally 
considered corrupt and his time as leader of Nigeria witnessed a lot of corruption scandals, some of 
which are discussed in this work. 
268 The National Assembly has recently decided to probe most of the contracts awarded in the 
power sector under the government of Obasanjo and his successors.  See Henry Omoru, ‘Power: 
Obasanjo, Yar’Adua Jonathan Spent N2.74trn in 16 Years’ Vanguard (Lagos, 9 September 2015) 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/09/power-obasanjo-yaradua-jonathan-spent-n2-74trn-in-16-
years/> accessed 11 January 2016. 
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million dollars for the creation of National Identity Cards to SAGEM S.A by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, which was later discovered to have been procured through a 
corruption scam involving top public officers including two federal ministers.269  
Significantly, in the latter case, the contract was awarded to SAGEM, a French 
company, even though the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting Company which had 
the capacity to execute the contract bid for the contract at a lower rate.270 
 
The cases examined in this section are only examples of the continuing interference 
of politicians and political interests in anticorruption efforts in Nigeria.  Amongst other 
things, this is made possible by a system of executive tyranny that has been a constant 
feature of the political milieu since independence.271  It creates patronage systems 
favourable to the executive throughout the polity.272  The operation of anticorruption 
institutions is no exception.  The impact of this on the overall anticorruption regime is 
manifold.  It thwarts its effectiveness by curtailing the ability of institutions to act 
independently in their efforts to control corruption.  In the long term, this undermines 
the credibility of anticorruption institutions and their moral authority to address 
corruption.  It further erodes public support for such institutions which is essential to 
their success.273   
                                                            
269 Cockcroft Laurence, Global Corruption: Money, Power and Ethics in the Modern World (I.B.  
Tauris 2012) 145-9. 
270 Oghogho Obayuwana, ’ID Card Award to French Firm Worries Party’ The Guardian (Lagos, 26 
July 2001) <http://allafrica.com/stories/200107260484.html> accessed 6 January 2017. 
271 Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale, ‘Disorder and Democratic Development: The Political 
Instrumentalisation of Patronage and Violence in Nigeria’ (2011) 5(6) African Journal of Political 
Science and International Relations 283-286; Richard A. Joseph, ‘Class, State and Prebendal Politics 
in Nigeria’ (1983) 21 Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 21-38. 
272 Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘Prebendal Politics and Federal Governance in Nigeria’ in Wale Adebanwi 
and Ebenezer Obadare (eds.) Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretations 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 79-101. 
273 World Bank Helping Countries Combat Corruption (n 52) 44.  Other broader impacts of political 
interference in anticorruption efforts include the injustice caused to persons who are unduly harassed 
by anticorruption institutions and the negative effect on social capital, the rule of law and the human 
rights regime in the country.  As a result of this, popular support for anticorruption measures, even 







This chapter has examined the approach to corruption in the third moment of law and 
development - the era of the new developmentalism.  It has established that, unlike 
the previous two moments of law and development, this era witnessed a change in 
attitude towards corruption.  As a result of a more comprehensive approach to 
development and broadening of the role of law in the development process, 
addressing corruption became a central concern in international development efforts.  
From the 1990s onwards IDIs led by the World Bank introduced a wide range of 
policies and programmes aimed at addressing corruption in countries in the global 
South.  
 
In SSA, the implementation of these reform policies - necessitated by their sudden 
importance to donor organisations, foreign investors and the international community 
in general274 - radically changed the pre-existing legal and institutional frameworks for 
dealing with corruption.  This is perfectly illustrated by the case study of Nigeria where 
there has been an unprecedented expansion of the country’s anticorruption regime.   
Anticorruption efforts are no longer ad hoc and short term as was the case previously.  
A significant impact of the reforms introduced by the rise of anticorruptionism is that 
corruption is now dealt with in a more robust and intricate manner through a broad 
range of laws, institutions and initiatives.   
                                                            
274 Heather Marquette, ‘Corruption Eruption: Development and the International Community’ 




However, these reforms have had little impact in addressing the fundamental problems 
of previous efforts to tackle corruption.  The current anticorruption regime still deals 
with the problems of dealing with corruption through a top-down state-led framework.  
Furthermore, anticorruption efforts are still subject to political interference and are 
consistently co-opted by successive leaders to pursue political goals.   The impact of 
the rise of anticorruptionism on the anticorruption regime in Nigeria has largely been 
about form rather than substance.  And the result of this is the failure of the current 
regime to effectively tackle corruption, despite the implementation of a considerably 
broader anticorruption agenda. 
 
In the light of this, the important question worth asking is why the global reform agenda 
to address has had little practical impact in terms of improving the pre-existing 
anticorruption regime?  How come the problems faced by local efforts to tackle 
corruption persisted despite the broad reform policies and programmes that were 
pursued by IDIs in Nigeria - and arguably other countries in SSA - in the aftermath of 
the rise of anticorruptionism?  It is to these questions bordering on the supply-side 




Chapter Six:     EXPLANATIONS FOR THE APPROACH TO CORRUPTION IN 
THE THIRD MOMENT OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter considers why the approach to corruption in the third moment of law and 
development had little impact in terms of practically improving anticorruption efforts at 
country level.  It looks at the underlying reasons why the problems faced by local 
efforts to address corruption persisted despite the broad reforms introduced by the 
heightened attention to corruption during this period.  The chapter argues that the 
explanations for this has to do broadly with two related issues.   
 
The first relates to the evolution of the agenda of good governance and 
anticorruptionism.  The discussion below shows that the agenda was conceived and 
implemented in furtherance of a particular development ideology without taking into 
consideration the realities of addressing corruption in countries in SSA.  Secondly and 
corollary to the above, the chapter argues that the reforms failed to have the desired 
impact because they are based on long-standing problems and ill-considered 






6.1 Origin of Good Governance and Anticorruptionism 
 
There have been brief references to the origin of the current global anticorruption 
agenda at various points in this work.1  Such references have been made to the extent 
that they demonstrate the relationship between the historical development of the 
agenda and the various issues discussed at each point.  What follows is however a 
relatively more comprehensive examination of this history to the extent that it explains 
the inherent drawbacks of the approach to corruption in the third moment of law and 
development. 
 
As noted earlier, the history of anticorruptionism can be traced back to the governance 
reforms of the World Bank that commenced around the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s.2  Until then, the World Bank had clearly abstained from 
engaging with the subject of corruption.  This was attributed to the fact that corruption 
was considered a political issue and therefore outside the economics-focused 
mandate of the Bank.3  However, a major event in the development history of countries 
in the global South, especially in SSA in the 1980s changed all this.  At the beginning 
of the decade, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war that followed a 
year later led to a global oil crisis.4  This resulted in high levels of inflation in major 
                                                            
1 Earlier references to this history can be found in the discussion of the conception of corruption 
(section 2.1), conception of development during the second moment of law and development (section 
3.2.1), and the approach to corruption in the third moment of law and development (section 5.3). 
2 Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development (The 
University of Chicago Press 2008) 38-51. 
3 See Article IV, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the World which provides that ‘The 
Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member: nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.  Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be 
weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I [which deals with the purposes 
of the Bank]’ 




economies around the world.  The United States and other western countries reacted 
to this by tightening monetary policy mainly through the increase of interest rates.  At 
the time, most countries in SSA buoyed by a commodity boom in the 1970s had 
borrowed heavily from commercial lenders in these major economies to finance 
development projects.5  These loans were mainly dollar-denominated and based on 
floating interest rates.  Hence, the inevitable result of the increase of those rates was 
that countries in the region were no longer able to keep up with their ever-increasing 
debt repayment obligations.6 
 
From 1981 to 1983 a good number of countries in the global South had defaulted on 
their debt obligations.  In sub-Sharan Africa alone, about eleven countries defaulted 
during this period.7  There was an urgent need to find a solution to prevent the crisis 
from spreading further and worsening the state of the global economy.  To this end, 
the World Bank and the IMF stepped in to restructure the debt of the defaulting 
countries by lending them money to repay their debt.8  This was made conditional on 
the countries adjusting their economies in accordance with neoliberal policies that 
entailed trade liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation and reduction of price rigidities, 
amongst others.  These were collectively referred to as Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP).  The expectation was that the implementation of these policies 
would bring about stability in the short term and economic growth down the line. 
 
                                                            
5 Richard N. Cooper and Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘The 1972-75 Commodity Boom’ (1975) 3 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 671-723. 
6 William Easterly, ‘The Lost Decades: Developing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of Policy Reform 
1980-1998’ (2001) 6(2) Journal of Economic Growth 135-157. 
7 These were Zambia, Angola, Cameroon, Tanzania, Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, Gambia, 
Congo, Ivory Coast and Gabon.  See Frederico Sturzeneggar and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Debt 
Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises (MIT Press 2007) 3-30. 
8 Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis and Richard Webb (eds), The World Bank: Its First Half Century 
(The Brookings Institution 1997) 683. 
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However, as the decade came to an end, it was clear that these expectations were far 
from being met and the situation in most countries was worse off than it had been 
before the adoption of the SAPs.9  In essence, the neoliberal policies had failed in 
bringing about expected economic growth and this occasioned pressure on the 
relevant IDIs to provide an explanation.  This was worsened by the fact that the failure 
of the programmes in countries in SSA could not be explained by existing economic 
theories at the time.10  In addition, organisations like the UNICEF and UNDP strongly 
criticised the neoliberal orthodoxy for the heavy suffering exacted on the most 
vulnerable people in countries in the global South, because of the implementation of 
the conditionality clauses of SAPs.11 
 
In response, the World Bank commissioned a study to consider the reasons for the 
dismal performance of its neoliberal agenda.12  The study situated the failure of the 
SAPs, not on the inadequacies of the programmes themselves, but rather on the lack 
of institutional capacity on the part of states in the region to manage the process of 
                                                            
9 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa 
(Penguin Books 2009) 22. 
As a matter of fact, the statistics show that between 1980 and 1990 investment declined at an 
annual rate of 3.9 percent compared to a growth of 4.0 percent between 1973 and 1980.  Real per 
capita income fell by 1.2 percent annually after having grown by 0.6 percent from 1973-1980.  Also, 
exports fell by 0.6 percent per annum and per capita food production fell by 6 percent.  All this was 
taking place at a time when the region was accumulating enormous additional debt burden.  It is 
estimated that from 1980 to 1988, debt increased at an annual compound rate of 12 percent and the 
debt-to-exports ratio rose at a rate of 17.7 percent per annum to an astronomical 360 percent of gross 
domestic product.  Debt relative to gross national product was at 98.3 percent in 1989, up from 27.4 
percent in 1980. 
See Howard Stein and E. W. Nafziger, ‘Structural Adjustment, Human Needs and the World Bank 
Agenda’ (1991) 29(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 173-189; Finn Tarp, Stabilisation and 
Structural Adjustment: Macroeconomic Frameworks for Analysing the Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Routledge 1993). 
10 Gerald J. Schmitz, ’Democratisation and Demystification: Deconstructing “Governance” as 
Development Paradigm’ in David B. Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development 
Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press 1995) 54-90. 
11 Morag Goodwin and Kate Rose-Sender, ‘Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome 
Addition to the Development Discourse’ in Martin Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds) Corruption and 
Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 222. 
12 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth - A Long-Term 
Perspective Study (Washington, D.C 1989) 
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adjustment.13  It was therefore recommended that the Bank direct its policy towards 
building and strengthening state institutions - improving governance  - that would be 
capable of providing the needed support for neoliberal adjustment development 
policies to thrive.  This marked the commencement of the Bank’s governance agenda. 
 
It is worth noting that the conclusion reached by the Bank contrasted with the views of 
most critics who blamed the failure of structural adjustment on the inappropriateness 
of the reforms for countries in the region, the indiscriminate imposition of similar 
market-based conditions on different countries and the inherent unfairness of market 
reforms.14  This notwithstanding, the governance reforms that followed were informed 
by the conclusion of the failure of public institutions.  This had the effect of absolving 
the Bank and the IMF, and their policies of blame.  It also provided further justification 
for the continuation of neoliberal policies in the region, albeit in a broadened form.   
 
The focus on governance reforms was also facilitated by coincidental developments 
in global politics at the time.  The end of the cold war played a major role in this respect 
as Western governments and institutions no longer had motivation to support 
                                                            
13 ibid. 
Howard Stein provides an interesting background to this study of the Bank.  He recounts that 
Bank had initially commissioned Ramgopal Agarwala to be the principal writer of the study.  With the 
aid of a $1 million fund from Scandinavian countries, Agarwala had travelled to around 15 countries in 
SSA and spoken to 300 - 400 Africans.  His findings were highly critical of structural adjustment.  
Upon presenting the first draft of the report, the head of the Africa Office in the Bank at the time, 
Edward Jaycox was extremely dissatisfied with the report and thus brought in Perre Landell-Mills to 
‘tone down the criticisms of structural adjustment’ and provide other explanations for the poor 
performance of African economies in the 1980s.  The final copy of the report as prepared by Landell-
Mills therefore reached the conclusion that reforms needed to go beyond structural adjustment to 
address fundamental questions like human capacities, institutions and governance, amongst others. 
See Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda (n 2) 39-40. 
14 Schmitz, ‘Democratisation and Demystification’ (n 10) 54-90; Kapur, Lewis and Webb (n 8); 
Howard Stein, ‘Crises and the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Crises of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ (Shadow GN Conference, Columbia University, February 2009); Paul Mosley, Turan 
Subasat and John Weeks, ‘Accessing Adjustment in Africa’ (1995) 23(9) World Development 1459-
1473; Bade Onimode, Lawrence O. C. Agubuzu and Adebayo Adedeji, African Development and 
Governance Strategies in the 21st Century: Looking Back to Move Forward (Zed Books 2004). 
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governments in SSA for strategic diplomatic reasons without regard for their 
governance record.15  Public opinion in most Western states also became less 
supportive of aid generally, and more so for aid given for unaccountable or 
indefensible reasons.16  There was an obvious move towards providing support only 
to ‘worthy’ governments and the good governance agenda fitted this purpose perfectly.   
 
The ensuing governance agenda was mainly dedicated to building and strengthening 
state institutions that were necessary to support the functioning of market policies.  
Emphasis was on issues like budgetary and financial management, the legal 
framework for development, efficiency of revenue mobilisation and public expenditure, 
and transparency and accountability in public administration.17  Tackling corruption 
directly was therefore not an immediate focus.  It was only dealt with to the extent that 
it was considered symptomatic of weak and inefficient public institutions and 
processes.  This was the case until the mid 1990s. 
 
 
6.1.1  The Direct Focus on Anticorruption within the Governance Agenda  
A couple of factors can be identified as being responsible for the rise of 
anticorruptionism to a central place within the governance agenda.  Firstly, the General 
Counsel of the World Bank Ibrahim Shihata, in evaluating the mandate of the Bank in 
the light of the newly-introduced governance agenda provided a legal foundation for 
                                                            
15 Mark Gallagher, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth in Africa (Westview Press Inc 1991) ix. 
16 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 11) 225. 
17 These were set out in a special report commissioned to consider the relationship between 
governance and economic development released in 1992.  See World Bank, Governance and 
Development (World Bank, Washington, D.C 1992). 
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the Bank to directly engage in anticorruption.18  In interpreting the mandate which 
prohibits the Bank from interfering in the political affairs of member states and allows 
it only to make decisions based on economic considerations,19 Mr. Shihata provided 
a construction of the Bank’s governance agenda as economic rather than political.20  
He opined that, to the extent that reforming institutions and dealing with impediments 
to good governance like corruption were essential to efficiency in the economy, they 
were within the mandate of the Bank.21  This interpretation which contrasted with the 
previous strict understanding of the mandate of the Bank vis-a-vis corruption, was 
pivotal in enabling the Bank’s direct involvement in anticorruption efforts.  
 
The second factor had to do with the change in approach brought about by the 
leadership of James Wolfensohn who served as the ninth president of the World Bank 
from 1995 to 2005.  Shortly after assuming office, he made ‘deal[ing] with the cancer 
of corruption’ a strategic objective that was necessary for the Bank to achieve its core 
purpose of fighting global poverty.22  Hence, just a couple of years after the 
commencement of his presidency, the Bank released its first policy document on 
                                                            
18 Ibrahim Shihata served as General Counsel and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank from 
1983-1998.  In this role, he was pivotal in evaluating the legal ramifications of the Bank’s work in a 
range of areas including its lending function, rule of law programme, governance agenda and 
anticorruption.  For a consideration of the influence of his role at the Bank on development, see 
Robert C. Effros, ‘The World Bank in a Changing World: The Role of Legal Construction’ (2001) 35(4) 
The International Lawyer 1341-1348. 
19 See Article III, Section 4(vii) and Article IV, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the World 
Bank.  Similar provisions are found in Article V, Section 1(g), Section 6 and Article VI, Section 5(c) of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association. 
20 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘Issues of “Governance” in Borrowing Members: The Extent of Their 
Relevance Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the General Counsel’ (21 
December 1990). 
21 ibid.  See also Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, ‘Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the 
Role of the World Bank’ (1997) 5(1) Journal of Financial Crime 12-29. 
22 World Bank, Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of the World Bank 
President James D. Wolfesohn, 1995-2005 (World Bank 2005) 45.  
For more about the legacy of the leadership of Wolfensohn, see World Bank, ‘History: James 
David Wolfensohn’ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/james-david-
wolfensohn>  accessed 13 February 2017. 
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anticorruption.23  As discussed in section 5.3 of the previous chapter, this approach at 
the Bank provided impetus for other global actors like the IMF, the UN and international 
civil society to take serious steps to address corruption.   
 
It is therefore instructive that, whilst recognising the impetus provided by Wolfensohn, 
anticorruptionism is - to the extent that it is an integral part of the Bank’s governance 
agenda24 - deeply rooted in the neoliberal foundations of the World Bank.  The fact 
that it was not part of mainstream development efforts until the late 1990s, despite the 
obvious effects of corruption on development efforts in countries in SSA, makes it 
important to evaluate the foundations and motivations behind the change in approach.  
A consideration of the problems of current efforts to tackle corruption which does not 
look at this history is unlikely to arrive at a comprehensive conclusion.   
 
As the discussion above shows, anticorruption reforms were not introduced as a 
straightforward response to the state of corruption in countries in the region.  If this 
had been the case, they would have been introduced decades before.  The reforms 
were also not founded on the results of robust empirical studies of the economic 
failures and general development challenges of individual countries in SSA in the 
1980s.  Furthermore, the Bank’s claim that anticorruption reforms were introduced in 
                                                            
23 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (PREM, 
September 1997). 
It is worth noting that apart from James Wolfensohn who provided the impetus from the top, other 
individuals within the Bank also added pressure for the Bank to address corruption.  These include 
Peter Eigen, who left the Bank in the early 1990s to form Transparency International when he was 
told that he could not deal with corruption within the Bank, and Petter Langseth who started working 
on corruption in Uganda without a clear mandate from the Bank to do so.  
See Heather Anne Marquette, ‘The Origins and Development of the World Bank’s Anti-Corruption 
Programme’ (PhD Thesis, Durham University 2002) 186. 
24 Ibrahim F. I Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays and Lectures: 
Volume III (Brill - Nijhoff 2000) 641. 
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response to a demand from countries for assistance in dealing with corruption25 is also 
delusive.  Having set the preconditions through its involvement in governance 
programming - with special regard to the premise of that involvement - the Bank 
created the necessity for countries to seek its assistance to tackle corruption.  This 
evinces the practice of development institutions who often justify intervention by 
constructing the right preconditions, usually a set of problems, a state of crisis26 or as 
in this case, an external demand for such intervention.27  The reality of the evolution 
of anticorruptionism is that these reforms were introduced at the prerogative of the 
Bank as a defensive strategy at a time when its neoliberal development paradigm was 
experiencing a crisis that threatened the ideological foundations and role of the Bank 
in international development. 
 
 
6.2 Anticorruptionism and the Problems of Law and 
Development  
 
A central implication of the above discussion is that anticorruption efforts were 
introduced in the third moment of law and development in spite of its long-standing 
problems, and not necessarily as a response to them.  The examination of the 
approach to corruption in the first and second moments of law and development in 
chapter three noted the plain lack of attention to dealing with the issue.  In chapter 
four, a number of factors providing insights as to why this was the case were 
                                                            
25 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption (n 23) 3. 
26 See for instance, the central background paper to the World Bank’s governance agenda which 
is suitably titled, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth - A Long-Term Perspective 
Study (World Bank 1989). 
27 Henry Bernstein, ‘Agricultural ‘Modernisation’ and the Era of Structural Adjustment: 
Observations on Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1990) 18 (1) The Journal of Peasant Studies 3-35. 
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examined.   These factors - indicative of broader well-established criticisms of the 
movement - have endured even though anticorruption has become a foremost issue 
in development.   
 
The persistence of these factors can be understood in the light of the history of the 
rise of anticorruptionism discussed above.  The fact that the governance and the 
anticorruption agenda did not emerge in international development as a result of a 
considered response to identified development challenges, meant that the introduction 
of the agenda did not respond to those problems in terms of proffering solutions to 
them.  Hence, these fundamental problems remain.  However, their nature and effect 
have evolved in the light of the rise of anticorruptionism.  
 
The discussion that follows examines the role of these problems in explaining the lack 
of impact of anticorruptionism in improving efforts to tackle corruption at the local level 
as demonstrated by the case of Nigeria.  For easy reference, the factors referred to 
here, which were examined in chapter four are: 
 
• Generic legal transplantation and disregard for local context 
• The influence of international financial institutions  
• The challenge of data 
• Predominance of the economic paradigm of development  





6.2.1  A Global Generic Agenda and the Challenge of Local Context 
An oft-referenced element of the approach to development under the new 
developmentalism is the need for local circumstances to be taken into consideration 
in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes.28  In response to 
the criticisms of the transplantation of generic legal institutions during previous 
moments of law and development, there is growing recognition of the need for ‘local 
ownership’ of programmes.29   
 
The manner the current anticorruption agenda is conceptualised and implemented 
however belies this notion and makes it appear theoretical at best.  Ivanov observes 
that ‘although the global agenda aims to be “multi-pronged” and tailored to local 
circumstances, it still prescribes similar policies from Nigeria to Bulgaria.’30   There is 
an evident disposition to pursue generic models without discrimination with reference 
to the contextual differences in countries.31  According to William De Maria, ‘when 
western governments commit anticorruption resources to Africa, they commit similar 
resources to do similar things.’32   
 
                                                            
28 Nilima Gulrajani, ‘The Art of Fine Balances: The Challenge of Institutionalising the 
Comprehensive Development Framework Inside the World Bank’ in Diane Stone and Christopher 
Wright (eds), The World Bank and Governance: A Decade of Reform and Reaction (Routledge 2006) 
48. 
29 Richard Cameron Blake, ‘The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive Development Framework 
and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development’ (2000) 3(1) Yale Human Rights and Development 
Journal 159-189. 
30 Palin S. Ivanov, ‘The Limits of a Global Campaign Against Corruption’ in Sarah Bracking (ed), 
Corruption and Development: The Anti-Corruption Campaigns (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 28. 
31 Alan Doig, Robert Williams and David Watt, Measuring “Success” in Five African Anti-
Corruption Commissions (U4 Report 2005) 36. 
32 William De Maria, ‘The New War on African “Corruption”: Just Another Neo-Colonial 




The World Bank set the agenda for this when it stated its strategy on how it would help 
countries ‘combat corruption’.33  This strategy spelt out five key areas - economic 
policy and management, administrative and civil service reform, financial controls, 
legal and judicial reform and public oversight - where countries would need to 
implement reforms to address corruption.34  There was no regard for pre-existing 
frameworks through which countries had been tackling corruption before the foray of 
the Bank into anticorruption.  In this same vein, there was no recognition of the 
economic, social, cultural and political diversity of the countries where these policies 
would be implemented.  Irrespective of where each country was regarding these 
variables, they simply had to implement these reforms if they were serious about 
tackling corruption.   
 
The IMF, like the Bank, also put forward a range of general reforms.  These reforms 
aimed at improving governance in countries in aspects of the public sector with a 
potential to impact macroeconomic performance.  They included better fiscal 
expenditure control, publication of audited accounts of public agencies and state 
enterprises, streamlined and less discretionary revenue administration and 
improvements in central bank practices.35  Again, these reform proposals also failed 
to recognise the specific contextual differences in countries.  By all indications, this 
was clearly a top-down agenda to deal with corruption based on generic policies that 
aligned with the development ideologies of these institutions.  The reform agenda 
reflected this: an arbitrary definition of corruption focused on the public sector, 
                                                            
33 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption (n 23) 3. 
34 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 
(PREM, June 2000) 22. 
35 International Monetary Fund, ‘Good Governance: The IMF’s Role’ (Washington, D.C. 1997) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 2 February 2016. 
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proposals for institutional reforms in the public sector, a programme to adjust 
economic policy in ways that were favourable to private sector actors, fiscal control 
and a commitment to judicial reforms that emphasised a neoliberal conception of the 
rule of law.36 
 
On its part, the United Nations under the framework of UNCAC also took a broad and 
general view on actions that needed to be taken to address corruption.  Some of the 
generic prescriptions in the Convention include the establishment of specialised 
anticorruption institutions, preventive anticorruption bodies and a code of conduct for 
public officials.37  This generic and broad prescriptive nature of anticorruptionism 
signifies a couple of serious concerns that have constantly plagued law and 
development policies over the years. 
 
Firstly, it points to the unduly broad, simplistic and arbitrary way IDIs and development 
experts conceptualise the development challenges of countries in the global South.38  
In this case, it concerns the expectation that a particular set of reforms would 
sufficiently deal with corruption in different countries.  It masks the very wide-ranging 
number of actions and situations in which corruption could be manifested in distinct 
contexts.  It also ignores the fact that even a specific act of corruption like bribery can 
be viewed differently within the legal, social and cultural frameworks of one country in 
contrast to another.  Even within a particular country, different types of corruption may 
                                                            
36 Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development’ in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (CUP 2006) 253-300. 
37 See Articles 36, 6 and 8 respectively of UNCAC. 
38 Tara Polzer, ‘Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank Discourse’ (2001) Development 
Studies Institute Working Paper 01-18, 10 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP18.pdf> accessed 1 February 2017). 
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pose more serious development challenges at different periods in its history.39  A 
recognition of this informs the need for a more flexible, pragmatic and context specific 
approach to controlling corruption with different policy responses required for different 
countries in different situations, and at different points in time.   
 
The outcome of a failure to do this is illustrated by situations like that in Nigeria where 
the regime for anticorruption is equipped to deal with corruption engaged in for 
financial gain like bribery and embezzlement but less so for acts of corruption not 
engaged in for financial gain like favouritism and nepotism.40  The problem with this is 
that, in a country where there are deep-rooted cultural, regional, ethnic and religious 
differences, corruption in terms of the latter could prove more costly than the former.  
The display of nepotism by a leader from a certain group has the potential of eroding 
patriotism and public trust in government, and engendering public resentment, 
violence and in extreme cases secessionist tendencies.41  In the long run, this might 
be more deleterious to development efforts than corruption in terms of financial 
misappropriations. 
 
Recent events in Nigeria aptly illustrate this point.  The current president of the country 
Muhammadu Buhari was elected on the promise of tackling corruption.  He has 
however provided a peculiar corruption challenge which the current regime for 
anticorruption has proven inadequate to deal with.  Since assuming office, he has 
                                                            
39 An instance of how the challenge of corruption in a particular country can change in different 
periods is discussed below with reference to Nigeria. 
40 For a discussion of the classification of corruption into acts engaged for financial and non-
financial gains, See Michael J. Trebilcock and Mariana Mota Prado, What Makes Poor Countries 
Poor? Institutional Determinants of Development (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2011) 176-8. 
41 See Majeed Dahiru, ‘The Many Side Effects of Buhari’s Sectionalism’ Premium Times (Abuja, 
11 August 2016) <http://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2016/08/11/174303/> accessed 9 March 2017. 
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engaged in appointing his family members, friends, people from his ethnic group and 
his region of the country into key positions.42  The constitution of the country provides 
that appointments into bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels 
of government should be based on the principle of proportional sharing that reflects 
the federal character of the country.43  This has however been blatantly ignored by the 
presidency.   
 
A major factor that allowed this to happen is the vague nature of the constitutional and 
legislative provisions on federal character, which provides ample room for such 
favouritism and nepotism to be carried out.44  However, more significant is the fact 
that, despite repeated public condemnation of the actions of the president in this 
regard,45 no single anticorruption institution took the initiative to even investigate or 
take any form of action on the matter.  Not even the Federal Character Commission 
which was established to enforce the principle of proportionality in appointments46 
called into question the actions of the presidency.  
 
                                                            
42 A good example of this can be found in the security and law enforcement sector where 14 out 
of 17 individuals appointed to lead various arms and agencies are from the North of the country, with 
only 3 of such appointments going to individuals from the South of the country. See Dayo Oketola, 
Fisayo Falodi and Jesusegun Alagbe, ‘Southern Groups Knock Buhari’s Pro-North Security 
Appointments’ Punch (Lagos, 2 July 2016) <http://punchng.com/southern-groups-knock-buharis-pro-
north-security-appointments/> accessed 9 March 2017. 
43 See Section 14 and Paragraph 8, Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
44 Edigin Uyi Lambert, ‘Ethnicity and the Federal Character Policy in Nigeria’ (2011) 8(1) A 
Journal of Contemporary Research 214-222; Ladipo Adamoleku, John Erero and Basil Oshionebo, 
‘“Federal Character” and Management of the Federal Civil Service and the Military’ (1991) 21(4) 
Publius 75-88. 
45 Shaka Momodu, ‘Is Buhari’s Nepotism the Worst in Nigeria’s History?’ This Day (Lagos, 12 
August 2016) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/08/12/rail-of-hope-from-16-years-of-
waste/>; Hassan Adebayo, ‘Protesters Storm Abuja, Accuse Buhari’s Govt of Nepotism, Illegal 
Recruitment’ Premium Times (Abuja, 27 July 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/207673-protesters-storm-abuja-accuse-buharis-
govt-nepotism-illegal-recruitment.html>; Vanguard, ‘Nigerians are Suffering Because of Buhari’s 
Nepotism - Fayose’ (Lagos, 14 August 2016) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/08/nigerians-
suffering-buharis-nepotism-fayose/> accessed 9 March 2017. 
46 See Part 1 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act, Cap F7, LFN, 2004. 
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Whilst this latter fact may be because of broader issues of political influence on the 
activities of state institutions, the important point here is that actions of this nature are 
rarely conceptualised as corruption within the anticorruption regime in Nigeria and are 
never treated as such.  Definitions of corruption in anticorruption legislation do not 
extend to actions like nepotism, concentrating rather on financial and economic 
aspects of corruption.  As noted earlier, this reflects the undue economic focus of the 
current anticorruption agenda.  It further demonstrates the limitations of the current 
anticorruption agenda in taking into consideration issues of corruption that are peculiar 
to individual countries. 
 
Even in situations where differences in the understanding and experiences of 
corruption in countries are recognised,47 they are considered under the broad 
established notion of what constitutes corruption and the appropriate ways of 
addressing it.  Hence, adaptations according to local realities are only admitted to the 
extent of aiding the implementation of the fundamentals of the already-established 
agenda.48  
 
The second concern with the generic nature of the global anticorruption agenda is the 
tendency of policy-makers to prescribe solutions for the development problems of 
countries in the global South, with little regard for pre-existing systems already dealing 
with such challenges at country level.  Hence anticorruption efforts are not built on an 
understanding of what has worked and what has not worked in the past, which could 
inform the appropriate reforms.  Doing this with reference to Nigeria for instance would 
                                                            
47 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 (n 
34) 12. 
48 Schmitz (n 10) 59. 
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have revealed that - based on the experience of the country since independence - the 
creation of anticorruption institutions that were directly dependent on executive will 
would struggle to succeed.  The failure to take such prior contextual experiences into 
consideration has meant that the current anticorruption regime continues to repeat the 
same mistakes of past efforts to address corruption, despite the introduction of new 
laws, institutions and policies. 
 
This reiterates a point that has been repeatedly made and ignored in law and 
development.  Reforms of the type exemplified by anticorruptionism - based on polices 
determined at a global level to be adopted at the local level - cannot be simply imposed 
by a dominant system on a subordinate one without being necessarily adapted to the 
historical, socio-economic and political reality of the subordinate system.49   
 
 
6.2.2  Influence of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
The overwhelming influence of IFIs on the polices, programmes and overall agenda 
of anticorruptionism is evident from the history of the field itself, considered throughout 
this work.  It is no coincidence that the discussion of the approach to corruption in the 
current moment of law and development has centred around the World Bank.  The 
Bank has been at the foundation of the evolution of anticorruption in the last few 
                                                            
49 Polzer (n 38) 5. 
 
 242 
decades.50  Its broader governance agenda has also been reinforced by the policies 
of its sister institution, the IMF.51   
 
This influence is obvious, for instance, from the fact that even though UN institutions 
were concerned about issues like corruption in the decades preceding the 1990s, it 
was only after the World Bank birthed its governance programme that a UN 
mechanism to deal with corruption took hold.  As discussed in chapter three,52 
previous efforts to introduce corruption into the international development agenda 
include the passing of a non-binding General Assembly resolution and the proposal of 
code of conduct for transnational corporations by ECOSOC.  These were all 
unsuccessful. 
 
It is rather ironic that these failed efforts to introduce anticorruption into the global 
agenda were initiated by countries in the global South on which the current 
anticorruption agenda is focused.  The lack of support from global North countries for 
these efforts at the UN has been attributed to the fact that these measures were 
pursued as part of the drive for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).53  Built 
on a 1974 General Assembly Declaration,54 the NIEO was an initiative of countries in 
the global South to reform the international political economy in a manner that would 
                                                            
50 Marquette notes that an obvious indication of this is that the Bank was directly or indirectly 
responsible for the majority of the ‘economics-led’ research on corruption that appeared in the 1990s.  
See Marquette (n 23) 24. 
51 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note’ 
(Approved by the IMF Executive Board, 25 July 1997) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 1 February 2017. 
52 See discussion of the lack of attention to corruption in Nigeria by IDIs in section 3.3.2 above.  
53 See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (Holmes & Meier 
1979). 
54 UNGA Res 3201 (S-VI) (1 May 1974) UN Doc A/RES/S-6/3201. 
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be fair and favourable to their development.55  The above corruption-related efforts at 
the UN were therefore intended to give these countries jurisdiction over acts of 
corruption committed by multinational corporations within their territories.  This was 
necessary as such acts were, in most cases considered violations of the rights to self-
determination and non-intervention of these countries.56  However the rejection of the 
concept of the NIEO by countries in the global North, especially the US, ultimately led 
to the failure of these efforts.57  And this remained the case until the commencement 
of the World Bank’s governance programme.  This was however directed at public 
sector corruption within countries, rather than the international dimensions of 
corruption like the activities of multinational corporations in the private sector.  
 
Apart from the UN, the emergence of polices and instruments intended to deal with 
corruption in the work of regional organisations, civil society, bilateral donor agencies 
and other international actors in the period following the introduction of the Bank’s 
governance agenda and anticorruption strategy is testament to its overwhelming 
influence.  More so, the Bank is undoubtedly the foremost actor in the development 
industry in the past half century or so, with a budget and expertise that gives it 
economic leverage over poor governments especially in SSA.58  This influence has 
made the Bank central to mainstream development discourse and practice.59  There 
                                                            
55 Karl P. Savant, ‘The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Code on Transnational 
Corporations’ (2015) 16 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 11-87. 
56 Surinder K. Verma, ‘International Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations’ (1980) 
Indian Journal of International Law 20-23.  An extreme example of this was the financial involvement 
of ITT in the 1973 coup that removed leftist Chilean President Allende and replaced him with General 
Pinochet who favoured foreign interests and investors like ITT. 
57 James Gathii, ‘International Law and Eurocentricity’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International 
Law 184-205. 
58 See Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton University Press 2011) 55-101. 
59 According to Moore, the influence of the Bank is such that it has become the singular upholder 
of development orthodoxy.  See David B. Moore, ‘Development Discourse as Hegemony: Toward an 
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are few other areas in the field of development where the predominance of the Bank 
has had as much impact as in anticorruption.  In fact, the Bank by its own admission 
tailors its strategy to influence other development actors by ‘adding voice and support 
to international efforts to reduce corruption’.60  The effect of this role is also recognised 
and confirmed by other IDIs.61 
 
The significance of this influence in the context of this work is that financial institutions 
like the World Bank and the IMF are not just value-neutral institutions dedicated to an 
unbiased development agenda.  Their programmes reflect their ideological base and 
the policy priorities of their shareholders which are still substantially countries in the 
global North with a commitment to development based on neoliberal principles.62  
These principles are therefore duly reflected in the economic and market-oriented 
focus and emphasis of the global anticorruption agenda.  The impact of this focus on 
anticorruptionism is considered next. 
 
 
6.2.3  The Predominance of the Economic Paradigm of Development 
As pointed out in the last chapter, the introduction of anticorruptionism in development 
is considered as part of the broader comprehensive approach to development that 
                                                            
Ideological History - 1945-1995’ in David B. Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating 
Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press 1995) 1-53. 
60 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption (n 23) 3. 
61 See for instance, the admission of the IMF that its governance agenda is tailored after that of 
the World Bank and that it refers issues dealing with corruption and outside its limited mandate to the 
Bank. 
International Monetary Fund, ‘The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note’ 
(Approved by the IMF Executive Board, 25 July 1997) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 1 February 2017. 
62 Kapur, Lewis and Webb (n 8) 450-452. 
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defines the new developmentalism.63  This comprehensive conception had been 
broached by scholars and institutions like the United Nations since the inception of the 
post-war development era.64  However, it was only mainstreamed around the turn of 
the century.  This coincided with the introduction of anticorruptionism in the late 1990s, 
leading to the seeming consensus that the attention to corruption is testament to the 
broader understanding of development during this period.  
 
However, as established above, the foundations of anticorruptionism predate the 
mainstreaming of the comprehensive approach to development.65  Its obvious links 
with the governance agenda suggest that it serves to buttress the precepts of the 
predominant market-centric economic development paradigm.  Governance reforms 
were introduced to strengthen this paradigm, and not in pursuance of a supposed need 
to ensure comprehensive development.  Any relationship with such broader 
development objective - without denying that such association exists - is simply 
ancillary or at best coincidental.  This is further reinforced by the relative emphasis on 
economic and fiscal issues in the strategy of the current anticorruption agenda.66  
                                                            
63 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997 (n 
34) 4. See the discussion of this broader approach to development in section 5.1 of chapter 5. 
64 See James Midgley, Social Development: The Development Perspective in Social Welfare 
(SAGE 1995); UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (OUP 1992); Philip Alston, ‘Making Space 
for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human Rights 
Yearbook 3-40; Dudley Seers, The Meaning of Development (Institute of Development Studies 1969). 
65 Even though the move towards emphasising development in other aspects of society apart 
from the predominant economic conception gained momentum in the 1990s, especially with the 
annual publication of the UN’s Human Development Reports, the most definitive event in this regard 
was the issuance of the World Bank’s comprehensive development framework which took place in 
1999.  See World Bank, ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTWEBARCHIVES/0,,MDK:22
201409~menuPK:64654237~pagePK:64660187~piPK:64660385~theSitePK:2564958,00.html> 
accessed 1 March 2017. 
66 Reforms in the areas of management of public resources, maintaining stable and transparent 
economic and regulatory environments, reform of institutions like the central bank, treasury, tax and 
customs authorities, deregulation and demonopolisation, general financial controls, etc. all attest to 
this emphasis.  See International Monetary Fund, ‘Good Governance: The IMF’s Role’ (Washington, 
D.C. 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> accessed 2 February 




Anticorruptionism cannot therefore be understood as neutral as it ‘supports a particular 
economic account of development’.67  
 
The policies and programmes of anticorruptionism reflect this economic foundation in 
a number of ways.  A critical aspect of this is that anticorruption efforts, in accordance 
with principles of neoliberalism, situate the blame for development failures away from 
the market and onto the state.  The immediate outcome of this is that efforts to address 
corruption focus on the state, which is put under immense pressure to act.  This is the 
case even in situations where private-sector corruption might be causing more harm 
to development than corruption attributable to the state.68  Issues like poor 
environmental practices, human rights violations and anti-competitive behaviour which 
may all be occasioned by corruption in the private sector and a reliance on markets 
end up getting less attention.69   
 
For so many years, global anticorruption efforts have struggled to provide polices 
targeted at dealing with private-sector corruption - in the same way as policies directed 
at public sector corruption - despite its obvious impact on development.70  Action in 
this area is only beginning to pick up pace.71  The progress that could have been 
                                                            
67 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 11) 222. 
68 A recent report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) iterated this 
point by noting how current indices that measure corruption concentrate on public sector corruption 
whilst ignoring corruption by especially multinational corporations operating in Africa and international 
dimensions of corruption generally.  See UNECA, Africa Governance Report IV: Measuring 
Corruption in Africa: The International Dimension Matters (Addis Ababa 2016) xi-xviii. 
69 Joseph Stieglitz, ‘Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition’ (Keynote Address at Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C, 28-30 April 1999) 5-
8<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-1251813753820/6415739-
1251814010799/stiglitz.pdf> accessed 8 February 2017. 
70 The failure of various efforts at the UN to deal with corruption by transnational corporations, 
including through the mechanism of a code of conduct attests to this.  See Theodore H. Moran, ‘The 
United Nations and Transnational Corporations: A Review and a Perspective’ (2009) 18(2) 
Transnational Corporations 91-112. 
71 See for instance, the United Nations Global Compact and its efforts to deal with private sector 
corruption, DNV-GL and United Nations Global Compact, IMPACT: Transforming Business, Changing 
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achieved if this was done earlier can only be imagined and will become obvious as 
these efforts to tackle private sector corruption - both at the global and national levels 
- develop. 
 
The blame on the state which informs the public-sector focus of anticorruption policies 
is, to an extent, an attack on the state itself.  It evinces the World Bank’s long-standing 
mistrust of the state in development processes.72  The simple mantra that private is 
good and public is bad is at the core of neoliberal thought and policies.73  It is based 
on this notion that state interference in the market is conceptualised as corruption - in 
terms of rent-seeking - thereby amplifying corruption in the public sector without a 
corresponding conception of private sector corruption.  David Kennedy made an apt 
reference to this conceptual bias when he observed that: 
 
“When the government official uses his discretionary authority to ask 
a foreign investor to contribute to this or that fund before approving 
a license to invest, that is corruption.  When the investor uses his 
discretionary authority to invest to force a government to dismantle 
this or that regulation, that is expertise.  When pharmaceutical 
companies exploit their intellectual property rights to make AIDS 
drugs unavailable in Africa while using the profits to buy sport teams, 
                                                            
the World (UN Global Impact 2015) 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/ImpactUNGlobalCompact2015.pdf> accessed 
10 March 2017. 
72 Gustav Ranis, ’The World Bank Near the Turn of the Century’ in Albert Berry, Roy Culpeper 
and Francis Stewart (eds), Global Development Fifty Years After Bretton Woods (Palsgrave 
Macmillan 1997) 72-89. 
73 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 11) 227. 
 
 248 
that is not corruption, but when governments tax profits to build 
palaces, that is corruption and so forth.74 
 
An outcome of this attack on the state is how it erodes citizens’ trust and faith in their 
governments to act in their best interest.75  With anticorruption institutions established 
by the state, the transfer of such lack of trust to their operation negatively affects their 
efforts to curb corruption.  It does so by stripping such institutions of the support and 
cooperation they require from the general citizenry to be more effective in 
implementing reforms.76  James Jacobs refers to this as a situation where countries 
become vulnerable to ‘too much corruption and too much anticorruption ideology’.77  
This creates a vicious circle in which the state is blamed for corruption and is therefore 
under pressure to act against it.  The state however struggles to be effective in doing 
so, partly because it is deprived of the needed support from the public for the success 
of its efforts, the lack of support arising from the often-undue blame on the state for 
corruption and its negative development outcomes.  The examination of Nigeria’s 
anticorruption regime in this thesis demonstrates the reality and cost of this vicious 
circle on anticorruption efforts.  
 
                                                            
74 David Kennedy, ‘The International Anti-Corruption Campaign’ (1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 455, 462. 
75 Mark Gallagher, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth in Africa (Westview Press 1991) 31. 
76 John Mihevc, The Market Tells Them So: The World Bank and Economic Fundamentalism in 
Africa (Zed Books 1995) 135-136. 
77 James B. Jacobs, ‘Dilemmas of Corruption Control’ in Stephen Kotkina and Andras Sajo (eds), 





6.2.4  The Role of Data 
One of the most striking differences between law and development in its first and 
second moments on the one hand, and the current moment relates to the availability 
and use of data on corruption.  Whereas there was previously little or no data on 
corruption as discussed in section 4.1.3 above, there is now surplus data both on the 
levels of corruption in countries and on the quality of anticorruption and governance 
measures.78  This change has however not proved helpful to current anticorruption 
efforts.  
 
This availability of data should ordinarily be a welcome development.  It satisfies a 
major critique of earlier moments of law and development which referenced the lack 
of quality data as partly responsible for the lack of attention to corruption in those 
periods.79  The availability of data should also be considered positive in terms of 
providing useful information for more informed formulation of anticorruption policy.  
However, this has not been the case for several reasons concerning the nature of 
available data and its underlying purposes.  
 
                                                            
78 Indicators of corruption like Transparency International’s CPI now provide comprehensive 
annual assessments of the level of corruption in countries around the world.  In similar vein, the World 
Bank’s WGI is a tool that measures the quality of governance in over 200 countries on a range of 
dimensions including voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of 
corruption.  See Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview’ 
<http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview> accessed 10 March 2017; Daniel Kaufmann, 
Aart Kraai and Massimo Mastruzzi, ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
Analytical Issues’ (2010) Global Economy and Development at Brookings 1-29. 
79 Thomas Carothers (ed), ‘The Problem of Knowledge’ in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In 
Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006) 15; Elliot M. Burg, ‘Law 
and Development: A Review of the Literature and Critique of “Scholars in Self-Estrangement”’ (1977) 
25 American Journal of Comparative Law 492. 
 
 250 
Firstly on its nature, the statistical and composite nature of current measures of 
corruption makes them devoid of easily understandable and actionable information 
that would be useful for anticorruption institutions and stakeholders.80  Most of the 
current tools are composed of numerical representations which provides little practical 
insights that could inform the choice of appropriate policy response in each country.81  
Hence, beyond drawing attention to the incidence of corruption, the nature of these 
indicators limits their utility in enhancing anticorruption efforts.  Instead, they have 
largely rather become effective tools for pressuring governments, sometimes unduly, 
to take action against corruption in their respective countries, with no specifics on how 
exactly to achieve this from the information available from the data.82  Whilst the 
objective of drawing attention to the need to curb corruption proved significant in the 
early years of the anticorruption era, the relevance of this in the current moment of 
heightened attention to corruption is debatable, especially as these indicators 
contribute little to anticorruption efforts.83   
 
Despite these obvious limitations, the current statistical aggregate measures of 
corruption continue to enjoy widespread acceptance.  This is attributable to their 
usefulness for economic actors and IDIs.  Indices like the CPI and WGI are important 
data sources especially for transnational corporations and other enterprises when 
                                                            
80 Global Integrity and UNDP, A User’s Guide to Measuring Corruption (Oslo, Norway 2008) 3. 
81 Francisco Javier-Urra, ‘Accessing Corruption - An Analytical Review of Corruption 
Measurement and its Problems: Perception, Error and Utility’ (2007) Edmund A. Walsh School of 
Public Service, Georgetown Washington 8. 
82 Gauthier De Beco, ‘Monitoring Corruption from a Human Rights Perspective (2011) 15(7) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 1110. 
83 Mlada Bukovansky, ‘Corruption Rankings: Constructing and Contesting the Global Anti-
Corruption Agenda’ in Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder (eds), Ranking the World: Grading States 
as a Tool of Global Governance (CUP 2015) 60-84; Global Integrity and UNDP, A User’s Guide to 
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accessing risk in making investment decisions.84  In similar vein, bilateral and 
multilateral donor institutions also use these indicators in making lending and 
assistance decisions.85  Their importance is underlined by the fact that governance 
considerations have, since the rise of anticorruptionism, become significant factors in 
such decisions.86 
 
Furthermore, the dominance of these indicators can be understood in the light of their 
role in perpetuating the current global anticorruption regime.  The annual releases of 
these indices highlight the level of corruption in countries, especially in SSA, and 
thereby justify the sustenance of intense anticorruption efforts.87  In addition to 
pressuring countries to take action against corruption, these indices fuel the demand 
for assistance for anticorruption reforms which constitute a substantial part of current 
global development efforts in this era of good governance.88  This latter point does not 
question the relevance of governance reforms and assistance rendered towards such 
reforms generally.  However, when considered from the perspective of the generic 
nature of these reforms, their neoliberal underpinnings and the insignificant results 
achieved thus far in particular countries in forestalling corruption, the role of data in 
                                                            
84 Omar E. Hawthorne, Do International Corruption Metrics Matter: The Impact of Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (Lexington Books 2015) 77-96. Perry-Kessaris argues 
that the rise of indicators has, at a broader level, become a form of economic imperialism that 
subjects the domain of legal and institutional reforms to the economic methods of marketisation, 
mathematisation, and quantification.  See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘Prepare Your Indicators: 
Economics Imperialism on the Shores of Law and Development’ (2011) 7(4) International Journal of 
Law in Context 401-421. 
85 World Bank, Implementation Plan for Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on 
Governance and Anticorruption (Washington, D.C 2007) 21-22; International Monetary Fund, Review 
of the Fund’s Experience in Governance Issues (Washington, D.C 2001) 
86 Carlos Santiso, Governance Conditionality and the Reform of Multilateral Development 
Finance: The Role of the Group of Eight (University of Toronto Press 2002) 21-22. 
87 Vinery Bhargava (ed), ‘Curing the Cancer of Corruption’ in Global Issues of Global Citizens: An 
Introduction to key Development Challenges (World Bank 2006) 341-370. 
88 The World Bank for instance, hinges its support to countries in tackling corruption on a demand 
for such support from the countries.  See World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The 
Role of the World Bank (n 23) 3. 
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sustaining this particular regime of governance reforms necessitates query.  The fact 
that this has not happened much is only testament to the subservience of their 
relevance in enhancing national anticorruption efforts to the wider international 
interests which they appear to serve suitably. 
 
The instrumentality of data in justifying and sustaining the current anticorruption 
agenda is further reinforced by the history of the measurement of corruption.  The 
emergence of corruption as a central explanation for the failures of development 
policies - especially the economic adjustment policies of the World Bank and the IMF 
-  and the resulting turn to good governance as a panacea to corruption flies in the 
face of empirical evidence.89  Studies emanating from these institutions linking 
corruption and development only ensued after the commencement of the governance 
agenda.  In other words, instead of empirical studies that show the negative impact of 
corruption on development providing the foundation for anticorruption policies, the 
data rather came after those policies.   
 
For this reason, Booth and Cammack note that the governance agenda is an 
ideological construct and not a scientific concept supported by evidence as it is now 
made out to be.90  It was therefore only after the World Bank had decided to get 
involved in good governance reforms that the objective of ‘defining, measuring, and 
                                                            
89 Goodwin and Rose-Sender (n 11) 226. 
As noted in the introductory chapter to this work, good governance is used interchangeably with 
anticorruption in current development discourse.  And in the literature of the World Bank in particular, 
the term is used as being antithetical to corruption, thereby providing an ideological justification for the 
Bank’s anticorruption work. 
For an example of the use of the work in this context, see Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Human Rights and 
Governance: The Empirical Challenge’ in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, Human Rights and 
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (OUP 2005) 352-402. 
90 David Booth and Diana Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective 
Action Problems (Zed Books Ltd 2013) 123. 
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finding causes and effects [of corruption] commenced.91  That was when the Bank 
started producing studies that showed, for instance, that there was a correlation 
between corruption and income per capita, infant mortality and literacy rate.92  
Similarly, the systematic measurement of the quality of governance by the Bank began 
in 1996 which was years after the initiation of the governance agenda at the Bank and 
around the same time at its involvement specifically in anticorruption.93  Suddenly, a 
whole new realm of experience and knowledge opened up and information that 
previously was not, became relevant and ‘sayable’.94   
 
The anticorruption agenda and the data supporting it can therefore be best understood 
in terms of their role in locating development failures with countries in SSA and the 
protection of the market economy model of development from criticism.95  The ever-
increasing amount of data that highlight the prevalence of corruption in countries that 
are relatively less developed economically has aided in the perpetuation of this 
narrative.  In addition to reinforcing the governance agenda, this enacts a self-fulfilling 
prophesy for poor countries as their positions on indices like the CPI help to reinforce 
their need for reforms.96  This is worsened by the fact that the use of a ranking system 
                                                            
91 Polzer (n 38) 10. 
92 Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “The Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development’ in David. M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic 
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Unofficial Activity After Communism’ (2000) 76 Journal of Public Economics 495-520. 
93 See World Bank, ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ 
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leaves such countries languishing perpetually at the bottom with little chance of 
improving their position in any significant way.  Andersson and Heywood argue that 
this creates a form of ‘corruption trap’ whereby the inferior position of such countries 
on the scale makes them unattractive to investment and aid, which in turn deprives 
them of the resources needed to make the progress that can alter their ranking.97 
 
 
6.2.5  Blind spots of Law and Development 
A persistent problem of law and development since its inception is how policies often 
lead to outcomes that are different from the development objectives originally 
intended.  This is usually because such policies are shaped by assumptions which, 
although appearing logical in theory, prove to be far from reality or flawed in relation 
to the particular contexts in which they are implemented.98  In section 4.1.5 of chapter 
four for instance, this thesis discussed how the mistaken assumptions of legal 
liberalism in earlier moments of law and development contributed to providing an 
environment for corruption to thrive in countries in SSA. 
 
Trubek and Galanter in particular pointed out how during the first moment of law and 
development ‘increased instrumental rationality in legal processes together with 
government regulation of economic life [may have] contributed to the economic 
wellbeing of only a small elite, leaving the mass no better, or even worse off.’99  Indeed, 
                                                            
97 Stiffen Andersson and Paul M. Heywood, ‘The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of 
Transparency International’s Approach to Measuring Corruption’ (2009) 57 Political Studies 746-767. 
98 Scott Newton, ‘The Dialectics of Law and Development’ in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos 
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the earlier discussion of corruption in Nigeria demonstrates how those in power used 
their access to the machinery of the state to unduly enrich themselves and their allies.  
This notwithstanding and over forty years after warnings against law and development 
policies being informed by assumptions not based on contextual realities,100 the same 
mistakes are being repeated with the current anticorruption agenda. 
 
An illustration of this can be found in the conflicting assumptions or blind spots in the 
approach of anticorruptionism to the issues of formalism and discretion.101  A central 
focus of the current neoliberal ideology of law and development is its emphasis on 
formalisation.102  This entails a conception and application of law and legal institutions 
as clean and formal instruments for enabling economic activity, rather than the 
culturally and politically entangled social systems that they are.103  Based on this, 
anticorruption laws and policies are created with the expectation that they will operate 
independently of the socio-political and cultural context of their application.  This 
mistaken trust in the prospects of what has been aptly described as the 
‘depoliticisation and technicalisation of development’,104 explains why such 
programmes and policies failed to consider the real risk of political interference in the 
                                                            
100 ibid 1062. 
101 It is worth noting that, in similar vein, there are studies that examine, at a broader level, how 
policies of structural adjustment and good governance like privatisation might have created more 
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workings of anticorruption institutions and measures.  This is the case even though 
the history of law and development shows that policies and institutions dependent on 
the will of political leadership have a high propensity to be co-opted for political goals.   
 
The underlying assumptions of formalism further demonstrate how anticorruptionism 
disregards the reality of governance and seeks to impose polices that are impractical 
in the context of their application in specific countries.  Formalism is based on a 
conception of the state as a public realm of administration where decisions are based 
on clear-cut rules with requisite predictability and certainty.105  Such a management-
oriented state is expected to provide an enabling environment for the private sector to 
thrive in a market economy.106  Within this framework, the exercise of discretion by 
public officials is discouraged, such that the state is considered to be acting ‘corruptly’ 
when discretion is exercised in making political choices, instead of mechanically 
following laid-down rules.107  This theorisation therefore creates the perfect justification 
of formalism: 
 
“Where the processes of development are viewed as technical and 
apolitical, politically-based decisions are automatically suspect.  
Political acts or acts of discretion become corruption, further 
justifying the call for formalisation as a means of tackling corruption.  
In other words, formalisation in order to tackle corruption or rent-
                                                            
105 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (OUP 1997) 99-
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seeking creates the conditions which it allegedly is needed to 
tackle”108 
 
Whilst this makes sense at a theoretical level, it is far-fetched from reality in terms of 
implementation.  By attacking discretion, formalism aims to discredit what is not only 
a necessary element of governance but is inherent to governing well - the literal 
objective of good governance.  The ability to exercise discretion allows governments 
the needed flexibility to respond to the needs and interests of its people as they 
arise.109   Hence the attempt to prohibit discretion under the guise of tackling corruption 
shows an inclination to impose on countries a policy that is not only impractical, but 
might actually be inimical to good governance.  In fact, these are standards that do 
not represent the reality of governance in the western countries that are supposed to 
be the models of good governance.110  Polzer iterates this point in noting that the ideal-
type well-performing government which the World Bank’s anticorruption strategy 
pledges to assist countries establish - based on a professional civil service, sound 
financial management, disciplined policy-making, etc - is not only implicitly contrasted 
with the governance milieu of countries in SSA, but also ‘has no basis in empirical 
analysis of how industrialised bureaucracies actually function.’111 
 
In promoting such far-fetched notions of formalism therefore, anticorruptionism 
obscures the political choices that not only need to be made in the normal process of 
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governance, but are constantly being made by political leadership in countries.112  In 
Nigeria, despite the large-scale institutional reforms designed to address corruption, 
the effectiveness of such efforts continues to be dictated by the exercise of discretion 
by political leadership.  Areas where this is evident include decisions on those 
appointed to lead such institutions, the funds allocated to such institutions, the 
independence granted them to perform their duties and the authority conferred on 
such institutions by their enabling laws.  As the discussion in section 5.5.3 of the 
previous chapter shows, the effectiveness of anticorruption efforts is largely 
dependent on the discretion exercised by political leaders in deciding on these issues.  
There is therefore an inherent internal inconsistency in reiterating the need for political 
will to tackle corruption whilst simultaneously promoting reforms that are designed to 
curtail political choices.   The attempt to attack or disregard, rather than take into 
cognisance the role of discretion in governance in the formulation of anticorruption 
policies belies reality and questions the pragmatism of such reforms.  
 
Overall, the indifference towards the incidence of such unintended outcomes and 
internal inconsistencies in anticorruptionism shows the rather arrogant and unjustified 
display of confidence and certainty with which the governance agenda has 
proceeded.113  The language of policy documents and the programming drive 
demonstrates a level of trust in expected outcomes that is not justified by the 
problematic and critique-laden history of law and development thought and practice.  
                                                            
112 Lala Camerer, ‘Tackling the Multi-Headed Dragon: Prospects for a Single Anti-corruption 
Agency in South Africa’ (1999) Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper No 38 
<https://issafrica.org/research/papers/tackling-the-multi-headed-dragon-evaluating-prospects-for-a-
single-anti-corruption-agency-in-south-africa> accessed 13 February 2017. 
113 The World Bank in particular has built its approach to governance reforms on a self-assurance 
of representing a consensus on the right reforms to reduce corruption, built on research and 
expertise.  There is hardly any admission of the possibility that proposed reforms might be ineffective 
in particular contexts or that a negative effect might result.  See Polzer, ‘Corruption: Deconstructing 
the World Bank Discourse’ (n 38) 7. 
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As noted above, perhaps this is made possible by the readily available option of 
blaming the state for any such undesirable consequences that result from 
anticorruption,114 the culpability of the state for underdevelopment being at the very 
foundation of structural adjustment and the governance agenda itself.115  The reality 
of the situation however is that the nature of anticorruption reforms, their underlying 






The discussion in this chapter shows that the problems of the law and development 
movement regarding corruption have come full circle in the current moment.  Despite 
the acclaimed attention to corruption and talk about lessons learnt in the first and 
second moments and espoused in the third, not much has changed practically.  The 
problems of the movement which accounted for its lack of attention to corruption for 
decades have remained despite incidental changes in policy.  
 
                                                            
114 This is in tandem with the general tendency to blame failures of development policies on 
internal factors in Africa rather than looking at external factors or factors inherent to the policies 
themselves.  See Patrick Chabal, ‘The African Crisis: Context and Interpretation’ in Terence Ranger 
and Richard Werbner (eds), Postcolonial Identities in Africa (Zed Books 1996) 34. 
115 It is significant that the distrust of the state in World Bank policies for instance is long-standing 
and predates the governance agenda.  It was the central conclusion of the major background study to 
structural adjustment which was published in 1981.  The study (also known as the Berg report after its 
principal author Elliot Berg) put the blame for Africa’s poor performance in terms of development on 
bad government policies and provided the founding justification for structural adjustment polices to be 
implemented in SSA. 
See World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action 
(Washington, D. C 1981) 4. 
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Instead of dealing with these problems, anticorruption has succeeded in disguising 
their incidence by providing an alternative and over-simplistic explanation for failures 
of development policies.  The reference to institutional failures and corruption in 
particular, and the resulting prescription of good governance and anticorruption - which 
has driven the global development agenda in the last few decades - has led to an 
obvious neglect of long-standing problems of law and development.  And like an 
untreated virus, these problems have become prominent factors in the challenges 
faced by the current approach to corruption under the new developmentalism.  
  
As shown by the consideration of the anticorruption regime in Nigeria in section 5.5 of 
chapter five above, policies and programmes initiated to tackle corruption failed to take 
into cognisance pre-existing efforts to deal with corruption at the local level, and 
therefore did not improve on such efforts.  Instead, the current regime of anticorruption 
is based on the same top-down structure and institutional framework that have been 
ineffective in the past.  This approach smacks of some sort of expectation that this 
would lead to a different outcome this time around.  Whether such assumption is based 
on the mere fact of the involvement of IDIs in anticorruption or that the creation of a 
new set of institutions within the same structure will create a difference, it has 
ultimately proven to be mistaken.     
 
The result of this is that local efforts to deal with corruption under the current regime 
continue to be hampered by the same challenges that existed before the institution of 
the current anticorruption agenda.   Whatever change has been occasioned by the 
rise of anticorruptionism at the global level - and there is ample evidence of such 
change - its impact in effectively addressing corruption at the local level has been 
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negligible.  The increase in institutions and measures designed to deal with corruption 
has made little difference on the ground.  This chapter has examined the reasons for 
this.  The general conclusion is that the rise of anticorruptionism is neither causal nor 
symptomatic of any serious paradigm shift in policy-making and implementation in the 
third moment of law and development.  Any association between the rise of 
anticorruption and a shift in development policy is simply coincidental and represents 
an expedient policy change intended to shore-up the predominant neoliberal 
development paradigm.  The factors in the first and second moments of the movement 
that explain the evident disregard for corruption have therefore endured in the current 





Chapter Seven: THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO ANTICORRUPTION 
 
7.0 Introduction 
In 1995, at the dawn of anticorruptionism, Moisés Naím wrote Corruption Eruption, 
one of the most recognisable works on anticorruption.1  In it, he examined the factors 
responsible for the sudden global attention to corruption and its ramifications.  He also 
previewed various trends in the then-emerging ‘fight against corruption’.2  In the 
concluding section of the article, aptly titled, ‘A Time for Action’ Naím expressed 
optimism in the prospect of shrinking corruption in the world to a historic minimum if 
global trends at the time continued.  He reckoned that ‘with the necessary pressure 
and encouragement, the recent eruption in the global perception of corruption could 
turn out to be the catharsis world politics needed.’3 
Arguably, not even Naím could have foreseen the acceleration of action against 
corruption in the decade following his work.  Between 1995 and 2005 anticorruption 
research, instruments, policies and measures flourished all over the world.  The 
anticorruption agenda dominated the works of global development institutions, 
international CSOs, academic institutions and think tanks, regional organisations and 
                                                            
1 Moisés Naím, ‘Corruption Eruption’ (1995) 2 Brown Journal of World Affairs 245-261.  Some of 
Naím’s views in this work have been explored earlier as part of the discussion of the perspectives on 
the incidence of corruption in SSA in section 2.4 of chapter 2. 
2 ibid 247.  The expression ‘fight against corruption’ is one that has taken hold since the rise of 
anticorruptionism due to its usage in early works like Naím’s.  However, it is one which this work does 
not subscribe to.  Whilst its usuage can be seen as drawing attention to the urgency and intensity of 
the need to take action against corruption, it has become quite subject to political usuage over the 
years by both IDIs and political leaders in various countries.  Also, it is the view of this work that it 
does not grasp appropriately the need to have well-considered and comprehensive responses to 
corruption.  Hence other expressions like ‘address corruption’ and ‘handle corruption’ are preferred in 
this work. 
3 ibid 258. 
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institutions within countries, especially in the global South.4    However, in spite of this 
and in stark contrast to the optimism expressed above, Naím in a reflective piece in 
2005 came to the chilling conclusion that ‘the war on corruption is leaving the World 
worse than we found it.’5  Whilst recounting particular situations attesting to this fact, 
he noted further that the ‘war on corruption is undermining democracy, helping the 
wrong leaders get elected and distracting societies from facing urgent problems’.6  
Daniel Kaufmann, a leading expert in anticorruption efforts and co-author of the 
worldwide governance indicators expressed a similar sentiment thus: ‘The last 10 
years have been deeply disappointing. . . . Much was done, but not much was 
accomplished.  What we are doing is not working.’7 
The above views are representative of the growing questioning of the current 
anticorruption agenda in the last decade or so.  Some works, like Naim question 
generally the efficacy of the whole agenda,8 whilst others question the policies and 
programmes of particular institutions like the World Bank.9  There are also works that 
are critical of the manifestations and ramifications of the agenda in particular regions 
and countries.10   A central theme that emerges from most of these works is the 
                                                            
4 For more on these measures that heralded the global anticorruption agenda, see Section 5.3 of 
this work. 
5 Moisés Naím, ‘Missing Links: Bad Medicine’ (2005) 147 Foreign Policy 95-96. 
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9 Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development (The 
University of Chicago Press 2008); Tara Polzer, ‘Corruption: Deconstructing the World Bank 
Discourse’ (2001) Development Studies Institute Working Paper 01-18, 10 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP18.pdf> accessed 1 February 2017). 
10 Goran Hyden, ‘Political Accountability in Africa: Is the Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty? (2010) 
Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper 6 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b08e5274a31e0000914/appp-working-paper-
6.pdf> accessed 17 March 2017; Alan Doig, Robert Williams and David Watt, Measuring “Success” in 
Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions (U4 Report 2005); Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa (ed), Reforming 
Africa’s Institutions: Ownership, Incentives and Capabilities (United Nations University Press 2003). 
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questioning of the top-down, state-led institutional approach to dealing with corruption 
that the current anticorruption agenda espouses.  Related to this are other issues like 
the application of a generic model across countries, the general inefficiency of 
anticorruption mechanisms, and the issue of political interference in the work of 
anticorruption institutions.11 
A major response to this growing body of critical thought has been calls for the 
consideration of bottom-up participatory anticorruption measures.  Otherwise referred 
to as the rights-based approach to anticorruption (RBAA),12 such measures aim to 
provide an alternative perspective to dealing with corruption in a manner that 
overcomes the problems of the current approach.13   
This chapter looks at the background to this approach within the framework of law and 
development.  It also considers its meaning and justifications, in terms of what 
advantages it brings to anticorruption efforts.  Actions taken thus far towards 
operationalising this approach are also considered with a view to assessing the 
prospects of this approach for addressing corruption going forward. 
                                                            
11 These issues are considered in-depth in the two preceding chapters of this work. 
12 In the rest of this work, this approach will be referred in either the singular form of ‘rights-based 
approach to anticorruption’ or the plural form of ‘rights-based approaches to anticorruption’. 
Whichever form is used, the meaning intended to be conveyed is the same.  As the discussion that 
follows demonstrates, the approach is understood as comprising a range of different measures based 
on the same principles. 
13  It is worth noting that whilst this has been the predominant response to criticisms of the current 
regime for anticorruption, there are also those who continue to look at ways of making the current top-
down institutional approach to addressing corruption more effective.  Recommendations made in this 
regard include anticorruption institutions increasing their monitoring activities to enhance the 
probability of catching corrupt officials, increasing negative incentives against corruption like 
guaranteeing that corruption is punished and ensuring that anticorruption policies in countries are 
aligned with the objectives of all stakeholders involved.  These recommendations are however not 
considered seriously in this work because, to the extent that they are still based on the current 
institutional arrangement, there is no guarantee that implementing them would eradicate the broader 
problems identified in the foregoing chapters of this work, like inefficiency and political interference in 
anticorruption efforts.  For more on these recommendations see Rema Hanna et al., The 
Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn’t and What We Don’t Know: A 
Systemic Review (EPPI Centre 2011) 4-6.  See also UNDP, Anti-Corruption Strategies: 






7.1 Background to the Rights-Based Approach to 
Anticorruption (RBAA) 
The concept of a RBAA can be understood as emerging at the confluence of two 
separate but related approaches to development and governance that have flourished 
since the turn of the century: the rights-based approach to development, and ‘good fit’ 
approaches to good governance.  Before looking at the rights-based approach in 
detail, it is important to examine its background under both approaches.  
Understanding and situating the rights-based approach against the background of 
both is expedient to having a balanced appreciation of its conception, evolution, 
justifications and prospects.  
 
7.1.1  The Rights-Based Approach to Development 
In the last few decades since the turn of the century, the concept of a rights-based 
approach to development has gained significant recognition and acceptance in the 
field of development.  It has emerged as a post-comprehensive development 
framework (CDF) perspective to development.  This is because it goes beyond just 
looking at a holistic view of development comprising economic, social, political and 
cultural components.  It moves the discourse forward by putting the wellbeing of the 
human being at the centre of development through human rights.   Integrating human 
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rights principles in development policies and programming has become standard 
practice for IDIs, and international CSOs, amongst others.14   
The inroads made by the rights-based approach are demonstrated by the very wide 
range of development issues that are now expressed in the language of rights.  These 
include education, health, decent work, environment and climate change, business 
and corporate social responsibility, housing and land, indigenous peoples, justice and 
the rule of law, migrants and refugees, water and sanitation, women and gender and 
children.15  The rights-based approach to anti-corruption is the manifestation of the 
extension of this trend to issues of governance.  To properly situate this within the 
context of this work however, it is important to examine its roots in the rights-based 
approach to development and the implications of this for its conception and 
implementation. 
The relationship between human rights and development can be traced as far back as 
the anti-colonialism struggles of countries in the global South.  The demand for self-
rule by nationalist and anti-colonial movements were considered as being based, not 
just on an aspiration for independence but also an entitlement to liberty and the use of 
resources by such countries for their development.16  In the post-independence 
development era however, the rights-based approach to development can best be 
                                                            
14 Andrea Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, ‘Putting the “Rights-Based Approach” to 
Development into Perspective’ (2004) 25(8) Third World Quarterly 1415, 1425-1429. 
15 See HRBA Portal, ‘UN Practitioners’ Portal on Human Rights-Based Approaches to 
Programming: Topics’ <http://hrbaportal.org/topics> accessed 17 March 2017. 
16 Firoze Manji, ‘The Depoliticisation of Poverty’ in Deborah Eade (ed), Development and Rights 
(Oxfam GB 1998) 12-33.  See also Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa 
and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton University Press 1996).  This history of rights and its 
relationship to development can also be deduced from the provisions of Article 1 of both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights which states that ‘[A]ll peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue 




understood as having evolved initially from the expression of development outcomes 
in the language of rights and their inclusion in international human rights instruments.   
Hence, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provided for an education, 
adequate standard of living, decent work, property ownership, social security and other 
economic, social and cultural needs as rights.17  The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) built on and expanded on the 
provisions of the UDHR in this regard.18  Similar provisions can also be found in other 
human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).19  
However the most vivid statement of development as a right came in 1986 with the 
United Nations Declaration of the Right to Development.20  The declaration which was 
adopted as a UN General Assembly Resolution stated the right to development as ‘an 
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realised.’21 
Thus, in addition to stipulating development as a human right, the declaration also 
confirmed that the realisation of such a right presupposes the observance of all human 
rights - civil and political, economic, social and cultural. This advances the principles 
                                                            
17 See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 
217 A(III) Articles 17, 22-27. 
18 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
19 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.  The Convention provides for the rights to health, social security, 
adequate standard of living and education, amongst others for children directly or through their 
guardians where applicable.  See Articles 24-28 of the Convention. 
20 UNGA Res 41/128 (4 December 1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/128. 
21 ibid Article 1. 
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of indivisibility, interdependence and universality of all human rights.22  In the decade 
following the declaration, the right to development became one of the most important 
subjects in the field of human rights.  In 1993, it was unanimously readopted as part 
of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.23  And in 1998 Indian economist 
Arjun Sengupta was appointed by the UN as an Independent Expert on the right to 
development; an office which produced a good number of reports on conceptual and 
practical issues pertaining to the right.24   
Despite certain critiques that question the impact of the right,25 events in the field of 
development following the declaration attest to its role in the mainstreaming of rights 
issues in development.  It also contributed to the eventual movement beyond just 
rights stipulations to the rights-based approach as a development policy.  Furthermore, 
the right drew attention to the concept of human development and the importance of 
participation in the development process.  In this respect, Article 2(1) of the declaration 
provides that ‘[T]he human person is the central subject of development and should 
be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development.’ 
This focus on human development became a concept that flourished throughout the 
1990s beginning with the publication by UNDP of the Human Development Reports 
                                                            
22 Helen Quane, ‘A Further Dimension to the Interdependence and Indivisibility of Human Rights? 
Recent Developments Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2012) 25 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 49-83. 
23 See World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (25 
June 1993, Vienna) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx> accessed 17 
March 2017. 
24 The mandate lasted from 1998 to 2004 when it was replaced by a high-level task force.  The 
mandate of the Independent Expert is part of various other mechanisms established under the United 
Nations human rights system to deal with conceptual and practical issues on the right to development. 
For more on these and the work of the open-ended Working Group on the right, see OHCHR, 
‘Documents on Development and Human Rights’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/Documents.aspx> accessed 17 March 2017. 
25 Arne Vandenbogaerde, ‘The Right to Development in International Human Rights Law: A Call 
for its Dissolution’ (2013) 31(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 187-209; Peter Uvin, ‘From 
the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How “Human Rights” Entered Development’ 
(2007) 17(4-5) Development in Practice 597-606. 
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which commenced in 1990 and continues to date.26  These reports viewed 
development issues such as economic growth, trade, employment, political freedom, 
cultural values and social needs from the perspective of people, individually and 
collectively.  Human development was therefore conceptualised as the process of 
enlarging people’s freedoms and opportunities and improving their wellbeing.27  To 
achieve this, according to UNDP’s framework, the human capabilities of people need 
to firstly be enhanced through a long and healthy life, education, a decent standard of 
living etc.  Therefore, development has to be about creating the right conditions for 
people, individually and collectively to have the choice to lead the productive and 
creative lives they value through the use of those capabilities.28 
In his landmark work, Development as Freedom published in 1999, Amartya Sen 
provided further conceptual clarity of the human development paradigm when he 
opined that freedom is the ultimate goal of economic life and the most efficient means 
of achieving general welfare.29  According to Sen, development does not depend on 
an individual’s attainment of basic needs - described as functionings in his work30 - but 
rather on the individual’s capabilities to attain such needs.  Hence, it is the freedom to 
attain, and not the functionings themselves that should be the primary goal of 
development.  In this understanding therefore, issues like famine, ignorance, 
unemployment, premature death, hunger, violation of political freedom, lack of access 
to healthcare, sanitation and clean water all amount to deprivations of a person’s 
freedom - or ‘unfreedoms’ as he described them - which impede a person’s capability 
                                                            
26 See UNDP, ‘Human Development Reports 1990-2015’ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports> 
accessed 17 March 2017. 
27 UNDP, Human Development Report 1995: Gender and Human Development (OUP 1995) 11. 
28 ibid. 
29 Armatya Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 1999) 13-34. 
30 It is worth noting that the term ‘functionings’ appears in earlier works by Sen including, Amartya 
Sen, Inequality Re-Examined (Harvard University Press 1992) 39-53. 
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to pursue and attain development.31  Like UNDP, Sen’s work advocates for 
development processes to move away from the model of providing ‘needs’ to eradicate 
poverty to dealing with underlying inequities in societies that impede the freedom of 
people to participate in processes that will enhance their overall wellbeing and lead to 
their development. 
The Human Development Report of 2000 proved to be a crucial document in the 
understanding of the rights-based approach to development.  With the conception of 
rights and the declaration of the right to development particularly, having provided the 
foundation for the focus on human development, the report brought the discourse full 
circle by confirming the place of human rights within the human development 
framework.  Aptly themed, ‘Human Rights and Human Development’ the report 
highlighted the objective of securing freedom for every human being as a common 
purpose shared by both human rights and human development.32  It noted that human 
rights provide an important mechanism through which people can lay claim on systems 
and to entitlements in society in order to enhance their capabilities.  This will in turn 
enable them to enjoy freedom, the ultimate goal of development.33  Furthermore, 
human rights add important principles and tools like transparency, accountability, 
participation and social justice to the assessment of development issues.34 
This however goes beyond just the legal guarantee of rights.  The report looked at 
human rights as being an intrinsic part of development and conversely at development 
                                                            
31 ibid 25, 87-110.  See also E. Wayne Nafziger, ‘From Seers to Sen: The Meaning of Economic 
Development’ in George Mavrotas and Anthony F. Shorrocks (eds), Advancing Development: Core 
Themes in Global Economics (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 50-62. 
32 UNDP, Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development (OUP 
2000) 19. 




as a means of realising human rights.35  This accords with Sen’s emphasis on freedom 
being both a means and an end of development.36  It is therefore on this understanding 
and the application of these principles that the rights-based approach to development 
has progressed.  The definition of the approach post-2000 reflects this: 
A rights-based approach is a conceptual framework of the process 
of human development that is normatively based on international 
human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and 
protecting human rights.  -  (Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2001).37 
 
The human rights approach to development means empowering 
people to take their own decisions, rather than being passive objects 
of choices made on their behalf.  -  (UK Department for International 
Department 2000).38 
 
A [democracy and] human rights approach translates poor people’s 
needs into rights, and recognises individuals as active subjects and 
stakeholders.  It further identifies the obligations of states that are 
                                                            
35 ibid 2.  In this regard, it is also important that the interdependent and mutually reinforcing nature 
of development and human rights was also confirmed by the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 
2000.  See UNGA, ‘United Nations Millennium Declaration’ UN Res 55/2 (8 September 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/2.  
36 Sen (n 29) 36. 
37 Mary Robinson, ‘Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and development: From Normative 
Principles to Operational Relevance’ (World Bank Presidential Lecture, Washington D.C, 3 December 
2001) 
38 DfiD, ‘Realising Human Rights for Poor People’ (Target Strategy Paper 2000) 7 




required to take steps - for example through legislation, policies and 
programmes - whose purpose is to respect, promote and fulfil human 
rights of all people within their jurisdiction.  -  (Sida 2002).39 
 
A rights-based approach deliberately and explicitly focuses on 
people achieving the minimum conditions for living with dignity.  It 
does so by exposing the root causes of vulnerability and 
marginalisation and expanding the range of responses.  It empowers 
people to claim and exercise their rights and fulfil their 
responsibilities.  A rights-based approach recognises poor people as 
having inherent rights essential to livelihood and security - rights that 
are validated by international standards and laws. - CARE 2000).40 
 
As noted above, the rights-based approach has been applied to a wide range of 
development issues.41  Its underlying principles have been significant in 
reconceptualising such issues and how they are approached within the broader 
discourse and practice of development.  Its application to the subject of governance 
provides the second of the factors that constitute the background to the rights-based 
approach to anticorruption.  This is considered next. 
 
                                                            
39 Sida, Perspectives on Poverty (Policy Department Stockholm 2002) 34. 
40 CARE, Promoting Rights and Responsibilities (Newsletter, October 2000) 38. 
41 HRBA Portal (n 15). 
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7.1.2  ‘Good Fit’ Approaches to Governance 
As discussed in section 5.5.2 of chapter five, a major criticism of the global 
anticorruption agenda is its emphasis on a generic top-down institutional approach to 
dealing with corruption.  The criticism involves the argument that anticorruption efforts 
and governance reforms generally are often ‘supply’ driven with IDIs, CSOs and 
experts prescribing ‘best practice’ models for governance for countries in the global 
South.42  In the light of the negligible results achieved thus by anticorruption efforts, a 
growing amount of research and initiatives have surfaced since the turn of the century 
advocating an alternative approach to dealing with corruption and achieving good 
governance. 
The central idea behind this alternative approach is that governance and anticorruption 
efforts should be bottom-up, fitting the ‘demand-side’ necessities of individual 
countries and contexts, instead of a general model of good governance being 
implemented everywhere.43  Hence, there is advocated a shift from ‘best practice’ to 
‘good fit’.44  It is worth noting however that, within this broad consensus, this approach 
                                                            
42 See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and the World Order in the 21st Century 
(Cornell University Press 2004); Peter Evans, ‘Development as Institutional Change: The Pitfalls of 
Monocropping and the Potentials of Deliberation’ (2004) 38(4) Studies in Comparative International 
Development 30-52; Brian Levy, ‘Governance and Economic Development in Africa: Meeting the 
Challenge of Capacity Building’ in Brian Levy and Sahr John Kpundeh (eds), Building State Capacity 
in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons (World Bank 2004) 1-42 
43 Centre for the Future State, An Upside-Down View of Governance (Institute of Development 
Studies 2010) 1-14; Sue Unsworth, ‘What’s Politics Got to Do with It? Why Donors Find It So Hard to 
Come to Terms with Politics, and Why This Matters’ (2009) 21(6) Journal of International 
Development 883-894. 
44 Richard C. Crook and David Booth (eds), ‘Working with the Grain? Rethinking Africa 
Governance’ (2011) 42(2) IDS Bulletin 1-10; David Booth, ‘Governance for Development in Africa: 
Building on What Works’ (2011) Africa Power and Politics Programme Policy Brief 01 
<http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20110406-appp-policy-brief-01-governance-for-
development-in-africa-building-on-what-works-by-david-booth-april-2011> accessed 17 March 2017.  
Whilst it is difficult to trace the foremost usage of the term ‘good fit’, the idea that governance should 
move away from concepts of ‘universal best practice’ to context-specific local solutions can be found 
in the works of scholars like Merilee Grindle, Brian Levy, Dani Rodrik, Sue Unsworth and Mick Moore.  
The contributions of some of these scholars are considered later in this section.   However, a 
comprehensive discussion of the idea of ‘good fit’ approaches to governance can be found in the work 
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has been conceptualised and implemented in different ways, reflecting varying 
emphases on how the approach should proceed.  A number of these are examined 
below to demonstrate their influence on the conception of the rights-based approach. 
An interesting point to start, owing to the obvious irony, is a publication by the World 
Bank in 2008 covering conceptual analysis and case studies on bottom-up contextual 
challenges and solutions in governance.  Titled Governance Reform Under Real-
World Conditions, and in contrast to the Bank’s emphasis on institutions in issues of 
governance, the book accentuated the importance of consensus-building, informal 
networks, dialogue and negotiation in dealing with governance issues.  This was done 
under the three broad categorisations of citizens, stakeholders and voice.45  The 
significance of this work lies in its acknowledgment of the fact that governance 
reforms, especially those promoted by the Bank, were out of touch with ‘real-world 
conditions’ in the context of their implementation and therefore required local input.46   
Apart from this, it did not presuppose any drastic change in policy from the perspective 
of the Bank; and such change did not take place in any case.  The Bank’s 
anticorruption strategy has always focused on the central role of building and 
strengthening institutions with a supporting role for civil society.47  To the extent that 
much of the work captured civil society as representative of citizen action and voice, it 
                                                            
of David Booth and his colleagues at the Africa Power and Politics Programme.  The discussion of the 
concept in this thesis is built on this work.  
45 Sina Odugbemi and Thomas Jacobson (eds), Governance Reform Under Real-World 
Conditions: Citizens, Stakeholders and Voice (World Bank 2008). 
46 In this respect, this work built on an earlier publication sponsored by the Bank which examined 
lessons learnt and new approaches to governance in Africa.  See Brian Levy and Sahr John Kpundeh 
(eds), Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons (World Bank 2004) 
47 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (PREM, 
September 1997) 44-6. Civil society within the Bank’s original anticorruption strategy was mainly 
expected to play the role of creating and maintaining an atmosphere that discourages fraud and 
corruption in public life by acting as watchdogs. 
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is at best a recognition of an extended role for civil society in anticorruption efforts and 
does not go as far as other works examined hence. 
In equally less than drastic measure, Brian Levy considered good fit strategies as 
essentially requiring development and governance strategies to be sensitive, not just 
to the peculiar context of countries but also to their stage of development.  Referring 
to this approach as ‘working with the grain’, he made a case for the jettisoning of one-
size-fits-all best-practice prescriptions in recognition of the uniqueness of every 
country.48  Hence governance reforms should look to ‘getting the fit right’ by adopting 
a multi-stakeholder approach that takes into consideration existing institutional 
arrangements that are interdependent and mutually supportive.49   
Whist recognising its role, Levy did not lay specific emphasis on civil society in his 
work.   This is in stark contrast to Pierre Landell-Mills’ conception of good fit 
approaches to dealing with corruption.  In his work Citizens Against Corruption, Mills 
puts civil society at the centre of bottom-up citizen-led action against corruption.50  The 
book captures the experiences of over 200 case studies involving civil society action 
in 53 countries under the Partnership for Transparency Fund.51  It iterates the massive 
impact of citizen action against corruption.52  This is both in terms of holding state 
                                                            
48 Brian Levy, Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development 
Strategies (OUP 2014) 203-207. 
49 ibid 179-202.  David Booth also built on this idea of working with the grain which he 
conceptualised in less figurative form as ‘building on what works.’  See David Booth, ‘Introduction: 
Working with the Grains? Africa Power and Politics Programme’ in Richard Crook and David Booth 
(eds), ‘Working with the Grain? Rethinking African Governance’ (2011) 42(2) IDS Bulletin 1-10. 
50 Pierre Landell-Mills, Citizens Action Against Corruption: Report from the Front Line (Partnership 
for Transparency Fund 2013) 
51 Established in 2000, the PTF describes itself as a pioneering innovative organisation that 
mobilises expertise and resources to provide advice and small grants to CSOs that engage citizens in 
actions to improve governance, increase transparency and reduce corruption in developing countries.  
See Partnership for Transparency Fund <https://ptfund.org/about-2/> accessed 19 March 2017. 
52 One of the major success stories recorded by Landell-Mills was that of the Development 
Alternatives and Resources Centre, a local CSO in Cross River State, Nigeria.  The CSO developed a 
project aimed at increasing transparency and accountability of the state’s procurement system, and 
with a grant of US$40,000 from the Partnership for Transparency Fund, the project was estimated to 
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institutions and public officials accountable, and proposing and implementing new 
ways of ensuring good governance. 
There are two more perspectives on this that take a broader and more radical view of 
the ‘post-supply side’ approach to governance.  Firstly, Merilee Grindle, who referred 
to this approach as ‘going local’ looked at emerging citizen-driven patterns of municipal 
administrations such as town hall meetings as demonstrations of good fit governance 
approaches.53  Whilst also recognising the role of civil society in extracting benefits 
and demanding accountability,54 she saw these approaches as more pragmatic 
options for attaining the promise of good governance, especially at the local 
government level.  The second work arose from a five-year research project 
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Oversees Development Institute.  The Africa 
Power and Politics Programme (APPP) admits that it broadly falls into the category of 
new thinking on bottom-up good fit approaches to governance which condemns 
governance reforms based on ‘Northern best practices’ that emphasise the role of 
institutions.55  It also proceeded on the premise that improvements in governance 
should start ‘from [the] country reality and how to improve it, not from the donor’s ideals 
or preconceptions.’56  However, the synthesis report on the project, authored by David 
Booth, points out a number of salient ways in which it differs from other works in this 
area and pushes the concept of good fit governance into new frontiers. 
                                                            
have yielded an estimated US$2.7 million in savings in its first nine months of operations.  See 
Landell-Mills (n 50) 159-162. 
53 Merilee S. Grindle, Going Local: Decentralisation, Democratisation and the Promise of Good 
Governance (Princeton University Press 2007) 106-123. 
54 ibid 124-144. 
55 David Booth, ‘Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of 
African Governance’ (October 2012)  Africa Power and Politics Programme Policy Brief 09 
<http://www.institutions-africa.org/filestream/20121024-appp-policy-brief-09-development-as-a-
collective-action-problem> accessed 17 March 2017. 
56 David Booth, Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of 
African Governance (Oversees Development Institute 2012) 7. 
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In the first instance, Booth notes that current conceptions of good fit approaches tend 
to emphasise a simple contrast between top-down supply-side reforms based on 
institutions and bottom-up demand-side reforms built on the premise of stimulating 
demand for good governance through civil society and related mechanisms.57  In the 
bigger picture however, he observes that the actual practice of IDIs and country 
reformers has changed little.  Development assistance policies are still based on 
financial transfers and the provision of technical assistance.58  Fundamental 
presumptions that underlie governance reforms such as the belief that governance 
challenges are about one set of people getting another set of people to behave better 
have also endured.59  So also is the belief that assistance should be provided to 
stimulate and strengthen ‘latent’ commitment of certain institutions and individuals in 
the global South to improving governance and addressing corruption.  The report 
argues that the only difference is that all these are now directed towards a different 
set of actors, such that ‘the so-called demand-side approach simply turns the supply-
side approach on its head’.60  Echoing views expressed earlier by Merilee Grindle,61 
the report therefore argues that more needs to be done to spell out the practical 
implications of the good fit approach and what exactly development agencies and 
country reformers should be doing differently. 
In response to this need, the APPP proposes a move from good fit to what Booth refers 
to as ‘best fit’.62  To achieve this, governance reforms must reach beyond the metaphor 
of supply and demand and see governance as being ‘fundamentally about both sets 
                                                            
57 ibid 8. 
58 ibid 7. 
59 ibid 11. 
60 ibid 10. 
61 Merilee S. Grindle, ‘Governance Reform: The New Analytics of Next Steps’ (2011) 24(3) 
Governance 415-418. 
62 David Booth, Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of 
African Governance (n 56) 95. 
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of people finding ways to act collectively in their own best interests’.63  This challenge 
of applying collective action for governance requires detailed knowledge of contextual 
situations and solutions.  It further requires arriving at ‘practical hybrid’ solutions 
resulting from conscious efforts by elements of the modern state to adapt to local 
cultural preferences.64  This might entail relying on governments that implement 
‘second-best’ policy measures in terms of conventional governance conceptions,65 but 
are economically active and capable of galvanising and integrating local support to 
provide practical solutions to governance challenges.66  The work notes that such 
context-specific hybrid solutions are necessary to overcome institutional blockages 
between government and citizens in pursing good governance.  And due to the 
exceptional local knowledge required to arrive at such solutions, it may well require 
more ‘arm’s length’ dealings between external actors and those on both the demand 
and supply sides of the equation at the local level.67 
It is worth noting that beyond the above few conceptual differences, the fundamental 
idea being advanced is that governance reforms should be more context-specific and 
integrate bottom-up approaches.  This concept has enjoyed much popularity since the 
turn of the century.  Good governance and anticorruption projects built based on this 
approach include the Partnership for Transparency Fund referred to above,68 the 
                                                            
63 ibid viii. 
64 ibid xi. 
65 On the practicalities and prospects of governance reforms that may technically be considered 
‘second best’, see Dani Rodrik, ‘Second-Best Institutions’ (2008) 98(2) American Economic Review 
100-104. 
66 ibid 28. 
67 ibid 95. 
68 Partnership for Transparency Fund (n 51). 
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International Budget Partnership,69 a few projects examined by the APPP,70 the 
Development Leadership Programme71 and certain projects of Oxfam on governance 
and accountability.72 
However, as recognised by proponents of this approach themselves, the firm 
foundations of the extant top-down governance agenda mean that it will be difficult to 
‘turn the ship around’, and align it with this approach.73  It is almost impossible to pull 
down and reverse the institutional arrangements established in various countries, 
based on long-standing practices in governance reforms.  Changing the ideologies, 
culture and institutional formulae of IDIs, CSOs and other stakeholders would also 
prove a difficult challenge.   
This leaves the question of the place of the emerging bottom-up good fit approaches 
in addressing corruption.  Are they expected to merely complement the current top-
down institutional approach or are there prospects for them to supplement the current 
agenda over time?  In what practical ways can they improve on the current approach? 
The answers to these questions are dependent on a number of factors regarding, in 
particular, the conception of the RBAA, its benefits and the approach to its 
implementation.  These issues are considered below. 
                                                            
69 The International Budget Partnership collaborates with civil society globally to use budget 
analysis and advocacy as tools to improve effective governance and reduce poverty.  See 
International Budget Partnership <http://www.internationalbudget.org/who-we-are/> accessed 17 
March 2017. 
70 See Richard Crook and David Booth (eds), ‘Working with the Grain? Rethinking African 
Governance’ (2011) 42(2) IDS Bulletin. 
71 The Development Leadership Programme is an international research initiative that explores 
how leadership, power and political processes drive or block successful development.  Its work is built 
on, amongst others, the proposition that coalitions (formal and informal) are the key political 
mechanisms that can resolve collective action problems are are often based on prior networks.  See 
Development Leadership Programme <http://www.dlprog.org/about-us.php> accessed 17 March 
2017. 
72 Duncan Green, ‘How Can Aid Agencies Promote Local Governance and Accountability? 
Lessons from Five Countries’ (From Poverty to Power, 31 May 2012) 
<http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=10309> accessed 17 March 2017. 
73 David Booth, Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of 





7.2 What the Rights-Based Approach to Anticorruption 
Entails. 
Simply, the RBAA entails the application of the principles of rights-based development 
and bottom-up context-specific governance in dealing with corruption. The approach 
is therefore composite in the sense that it can be used to describe a broad range of 
approaches - policies, practices, initiatives - built on these principles.  The Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) grasped the 
general essence of the approach in the following passage: 
A human rights-based approach to anti-corruption means putting the 
international human rights entitlements and claims of the people (the 
‘right-holders’) and the corresponding obligations of the State (the 
‘duty-bearer’) in the centre of the anti-corruption debate and efforts 
at all levels, and integrating international human rights principles 
including non-discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law.74 
In the first instance therefore, the RBAA considers corruption and the response to it 
within the literal framework of rights violation and remediation.  This conception is 
based on drawing a link between acts of corruption and human rights violations.  
Hence, the fact that corruption negatively impacts on human rights75 is used as a 
                                                            
74 OHCHR, The Human Rights Case Against Corruption (UN, Geneva November 2013) 5. 
75 The nature and ways in which corruption may impact human rights is discussed in section 2.6 
of chapter 2. 
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premise for the use of human rights in addressing corruption.  Proponents of this view 
see it as being essentially about providing remedies for the violation of human rights 
arising from corruption.76  This is usually through rights-based litigation but also 
encompasses other general mechanisms for providing remedies to victims of rights 
violations.77  
In accordance with this view of the RBAA, Carmona and Bacio-Terracino, having 
shown how corruption is linked to specific human rights ranging from civil and political 
to socio-economic rights, concluded that:  
A clear understanding of the practical connections between acts of 
corruption and human rights may empower those who have 
legitimate claims to demand their rights in relation to corruption, and 
may assist States and other  public authorities to respect, 
protect and fulfil their human rights responsibilities at every level . . . 
. Connecting acts of corruption to violations of human rights also 
creates new possibilities for action, especially if acts of corruption 
can be challenged using the different national, regional and 
international mechanisms that exist to monitor compliance with 
human rights.78 
                                                            
76 David Nelken, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: An Afterword’ in Martine Boersma and Hans 
Nelen (eds.) Corruption & Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (intersentia 2010) 241, 251. 
77 International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Corruption and Human Rights: Making 
the Connection (ICHRP, Switzerland 2009) 5-6.  Such other mechanisms include the use of 
mechanisms under the UN and regional human rights systems including special procedures, universal 
periodic review, treaty bodies, human rights commissions and such other instruments that become 
available once there is a violation of human rights.  At the local level, this entails national human 
rights institutions, courts, CSOs and related mechanisms considering issues of corruption in their 
work on human rights. 
78 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona and Julio Bacio-Terracino, ‘Corruption and Human Rights: 
Making the Connection’ in Martine Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds.) Corruption & Human Rights: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 47-48. 
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This is a perspective also shared by Olaniyan.79  He advocated for the rights-based 
approach as an alternative to current national and international frameworks for dealing 
with corruption in Africa.  His work examined how corruption negatively impacts the 
various rights contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
other human rights instruments.80  With a clear focus on litigation, the work considered 
legal, procedural, substantive and practical challenges that may be faced by victims 
of corruption seeking redress for the violation of their rights in court.81   
On his part, Raj Kumar goes further by conceptualising the rights-based approach 
beyond just empowering people to seek remedies for the breach of their rights.  He 
makes the case for a ‘fundamental right to corruption-free governance.’82  Kumar’s 
work links the formulation and recognition of such a right with the elimination of 
corruption and the promotion of integrity and good governance.  In doing so, he 
approached the responsibility of government to ensure corruption-free governance as 
a part of the rights of its people to live meaningful lives under a government free of 
corruption.83  Hence, the commitment of government and public officials to conduct 
the affairs of state in a manner that is transparent and accountable is removed from 
the domain of mere public policy objective or political statement to a rights 
conceptualisation with attendant outcomes: the people as ‘rights-holders’ and the 
government as ‘duty-bearers’.84  Kumar’s work does not however expound on the 
content of such a right beyond the extant understanding of the inherent benefits of 
                                                            
79 Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa (Hart Publishing 2014). 
80 ibid 193-272. 
81 ibid 315-341. 
82 C. Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption, Development and Good Governance: Challenges for Promoting 
Access to Justice in Asia’ (2008) Michigan State Journal of International Law 475, 550. 
83 ibid 550-551. 
84 C. Raj Kumar, ‘Corruption in India: A Violation of Human Rights; Promoting Transparency and 
the Right to Good Governance’ (2015) 49(2) UC Davis Law Review 741, 745. 
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considering corruption as a violation of human rights and its legal and governance 
implications. 
Secondly and at a more comprehensive level, the RBAA goes beyond such a simplistic 
rights violation and remediation framework.  Nor is it just about rights-based litigation.  
It involves the application of human rights principles and utilisation of mechanisms 
built for the protection of human rights in anticorruption efforts.  Admittedly, the use of 
such principles and mechanisms will be based on rights violations arising from 
corruption in some cases.  Yet, the lack of such violations does not ipso facto preclude 
the application of the RBAA.  This is because the principles on which the approach is 
founded - focus on people, empowerment, participation, transparency and 
accountability, etc - are integral elements of current development policy and practice 
which are being extended to the domain of anticorruption.  As discussed above, these 
principles underlie the rights-based approach to development and the emergence of 
good fit approaches to governance.   The RBAA can therefore be considered an 
almost inevitable outcome of the progression of anticorruptionism alongside general 
development policy towards a focus on human development and human rights.  And 
it is based on this broader conception of the RBAA that this work proceeds. 
 
 
7.3 Rationalising the Rights-Based Approach to 
Anticorruption  
This section considers the justifications of the approach.  It examines the arguments 
in favour of the RBAA and the ways in which it can improve on current anticorruption 
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efforts.  In doing this, it explores the question of whether the approach will provide 
answers and solutions to the questions and problems that affect current anticorruption 
efforts as examined in the preceding chapters of this work.  The discussion that follows 
looks at four ways in which the RBAA adds value to efforts to curb corruption.  
 
7.3.1  More Comprehensive Approach to the Obligation of the State to 
Address Corruption 
A hallmark of current efforts to curb corruption is the adoption of a criminal 
perspective.85  Corruption is largely seen as a crime and in accordance with the 
general principles of criminal law, the State assumes the primary responsibility of 
prosecuting those who engage in corruption.  This entails prevention, identifying and 
investigating perpetrators of such crimes, sanctioning perpetrators and cooperating 
with stakeholders at the international and local levels throughout such processes.86   
This approach has been criticised for being parochial and not appreciating the 
multidimensional nature and impact of corruption.  It is in this respect that the RBAA 
provides a comprehensive and more pragmatic understanding of the effects of 
corruption, especially its social implications and human dimensions.   
This understanding provides a broader perspective on the obligation of the state to 
tackle corruption that goes beyond the approach of criminalisation.  It promotes looking 
at the obligation of the state in accordance with the three core levels of responsibility 
which the state bears in relation to human rights.  These are the duty to respect, protect 
                                                            
85 UNHRC, ‘Final Report of Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the Issue of the 





and fulfil.87  In the light of the link between corruption and human rights, the state would 
be required take a wider range of actions as envisaged by these duties in addressing 
corruption.  Whilst certain actions currently undertaken by the state may satisfy some 
of these obligations, the application of this framework would provide an extended view 
of state action on anticorruption.   
Thus, actions in terms of ‘respecting’ human rights would require the state to put in 
place mechanisms to prevent corruption, and also to refrain from corrupt activities that 
interfere with the enjoyment of human rights by citizens.88  The obligation to ‘protect’ 
warrants the state ensuring that citizens do not suffer from corruption perpetrated by 
third parties such as private corporations.89  Where such corruption takes place, the 
state also has to ensure that victims are provided access to effective remedies.90  The 
obligation to ‘fulfil’ human rights would require the state to take affirmative steps in 
establishing institutions and mechanisms for good governance in its administration of 
the State in such a manner that guarantees citizens the realisation of their human 
rights.91 
                                                            
87 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 
2009) 23-26.  See also the case of Social and Economic rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Anor v 
Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60. 
88 Actions to refrain from in this respect include rigging of elections through bribery that has the 
effect of violating the political rights of citizens and embezzlement of public funds meant for the 
building and maintenance of schools and hospitals essential for the enjoyment of socio-economic 
rights. 
89 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have 
Been Recognised?’ (2008) 35(1) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 129, 130. 
90 Practical actions in this regard would include employing legislative and other measures to 
punish private corporations and individuals who engage in bribery or other corrupt activities that lead 
directly or indirectly to rights violations.  Other actions may involve initiating anticorruption campaigns 
for sensitising citizens and providing them with tools and media for reporting corruption and holding 
individuals and private entities accountable. 
91 Actions that states may take in this regard comprise putting in place initiatives which are 
already part of the current regime of anticorruption like establishing public procurement institutions 
and processes, but more generally positive actions that establish transparent and accountable 
governance that guarantee citizens a meaningful life. 
 
 286 
Even though this argument for the RBAA appears quite conceptual, it is significant 
when considered against the other advantages of the approach discussed below.  This 
is because, whilst much of the case for the RBAA focuses on what it adds to bottom-
up responses to corruption, the proposition in this section shows that the approach 
also has positive ramifications for current top-down approaches.  The broader 
conception of the obligation of the state in tackling corruption which the RBAA 
engenders can prove pivotal in influencing how anticorruption institutions set their 
policies and approach their work.  It can also provide a more comprehensive 
parameter for civil society and the media to assess the anticorruption efforts of the 
state; a parameter that takes into consideration the diverse nature of corruption and 
its impact on development. 
 
7.3.2  Leveraging on Shared Principles Between Anti-Corruption and 
Human Rights 
A rights-based understanding of anticorruption diminishes opportunities for corruption 
by requiring compliance with certain principles that are significant for the enjoyment of 
human rights. 
 
The discourse on the integration of a RBAA often refers to the premise that the 
protection of human rights and anticorruption efforts are mutually reinforcing.92  As 
established earlier in this work, all forms of corruption tend to directly or indirectly 
violate human rights.  In the same vein, the lack of protection of human rights is likely 
                                                            
92 International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) and Transparency International (TI), 
Integrating Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, Possibilities and Opportunities 
(ICHRP, Switzerland 2010) vii. 
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to allow corruption to thrive.  Hence, the efforts to tackle corruption and efforts to 
protect and promote human rights are likely to have an obvious mutually reinforcing 
effect. 
 
This effect is underscored by the understanding that human rights principally address 
abuse of power and corruption is essentially defined in terms of the immoral, illegal or 
otherwise wrongful abuse of power.93  Furthermore, state capture by entrenched 
corrupt interests leads to pervasive abuse of public power in ways that make access 
to education, health and other social services and benefits restrictive and 
discriminatory.  In this way, corruption sustains exploitation and social exclusion of 
disadvantaged individuals and groups, thereby impacting on the enjoyment of their 
rights.94  To the extent that corruption reinforces wrongs in society which human rights 
seek to protect against, it becomes obvious that curbing corruption would invigorate 
processes established for the protection of human rights.  Consequently, the adoption 
of a RBAA highlights principles whose application are simultaneously beneficial for 
attaining the goals of enjoying human rights and curbing corruption.95  Commenting 
on the importance of this, the OHCHR noted that: 
 
“An efficient anticorruption strategy must be informed by key human 
rights principles. An independent judiciary, freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, access to information transparency in the 
political system, and accountability are essential for both successful 
anticorruption strategies and the enjoyment of human rights . . . . In 
                                                            
93 ibid viii. 
94 ibid. 
95 Gareth Sweeney, ‘Linking Acts of Corruption with Specific Human Rights’ in European Union, 
Corruption and Human Rights in Third Countries (European Union, Brussels 2013) 10. 
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promoting these basic elements of good governance, human rights 
and anticorruption efforts can be mutually reinforcing”96 
 
The mutually reinforcing nature of the shared principles between anticorruption and 
human rights has clear practical implications.  Firstly, efforts to tackle corruption would 
generally be enhanced in a country with a strong regime for the protection of rights.  
The preservation of rights such as freedom of expression, non-discrimination, freedom 
of assembly, access to information, freedom of the media and the right to a fair trial 
are all essential to addressing corruption.  This encompasses the prevention, 
investigation and punishment of corruption.  It applies also to the provision of remedies 
for victims of corruption.  People are more likely to stand up against corruption, seek 
information and justifications for governance decisions and engage in actions like 
whistleblowing in a country with a good human rights regime. 
 
However, the argument here goes beyond just the impact of the exercise of particular 
human rights on anticorruption efforts.  It looks at broader principles that underlie 
human rights generally, and have parallels with and will therefore benefit anticorruption 
efforts.  Three of these principles are considered in this section.  These are the 
principles of participation, transparency and access to information, and accountability.  
The value of integrating these principles is that, even though they are common to both 
anticorruption efforts and human rights principles, the way they are conceptualised 
and operationalised in both disciplines is different.97  As the discussion below will 
                                                            
96 OHCHR The Human Rights Case Against Corruption (n 74) 5. 
97 ibid 1. 
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show, their application within a human rights framework is more robust and impactful, 
and will therefore enhance anticorruption efforts through a RBAA.  
 
 
7.3.2.1 The Principle of Participation  
 
The principle of participation is integral to rights-based approaches to development.98  
It is also a condition upon which the realisation of most rights is based.99  Efforts to 
confront and hold authorities accountable - which human rights enables - cannot be 
possible without participation.100  Rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs101 are all directly or indirectly geared towards ensuring effective 
participation of people in public life, especially in decisions and processes that affect 
them.  International instruments focused on specific groups in society including the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),102 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),103 and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),104 make specific provision for the 
participation of members of such groups in political, public and cultural life.  The 
                                                            
98 Lisa VeneKlasen, Valerie Miller, Cindy Clark and Molly Reilly, ‘Rights-Based Approaches and 
Beyond: Challenges of Linking Rights and Participation’ (2004) IDS Working Paper 235, 5-6 
<https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/Wp235.pdf> accessed 3 April 2017. 
99 United Nations Population Fund, ‘Human Rights Principles’ (2005) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/resources/human-rights-principles> accessed 3 April 2017. 
100 ICHRP and TI (n 92) 4-5. 
101 See Articles 19-25, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Articles 9-13, 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). 
102 Articles 7 & 8, CEDAW (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 
1249 UNTS 13. 
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importance of participation was highlighted in Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right 
to Development which provides that: 
 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
can be fully realised.105 
 
The effectiveness of participation is often judged by the twin dimensions of breadth 
and depth.106  The breadth of participation applies to the range of persons involved.  It 
requires that all those affected by actions and decisions be involved in the processes 
leading to them.107  A genuinely inclusive process therefore entails identifying all 
potential participants and removing possible obstacles to their participation.  This is 
particularly important for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups like the uneducated, 
the young and the disabled who would otherwise be unable to participate 
meaningfully.108  Actions in this respect would include providing relevant and timely 
information about governance policies and processes to all persons and groups 
concerned.  In doing so, assistance should be given, where required, to those who 
                                                            
105 Emphasis added.  See also Article 2(1) of the Declaration which states that [T]he human 
person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of 
the right to development. 
106 Jeffry M. Berry, Kent E. Portney and Ken Thompson, The Rebirth of Urban Democracy (The 
Brookings Institution 1993) 54-57.  See also Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory 
Politics for a New Age (University of California Press 1984) 173-98; Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to 
Democratic Theory (University of Chicago Press 1956) 63-89. 
107 ICHRP and TI (n 92) 6-8. 
108 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 14, The Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (12 May 2000) paras. 11, 17 and 54; UN Human Rights 
Committee, Ilmari Lansman v Finland (24 October 1994) CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992. para 9.5. 
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require same to access and understand such information, and to participate fully 
without cultural, educational, linguistic, geographical or economic obstacles.  
 
The depth of participation is measured by how meaningful rights-bearers can exert 
influence on the decision-making processes that affect them.  It considers the 
mechanics of the process of participation and requires that participants be directly 
involved in determining outcomes and decisions.109  This goes beyond superficial 
participatory processes aimed at gathering and exchanging information, assessing 
local opinion, identifying interests and taking advantage of local knowledge.110  Deep 
participation envisages a process that fosters critical consciousness and a ‘mutual 
decision-making process, where different power actors share and set agendas 
jointly’.111 
 
Applying this rights-based framework of participation in anticorruption will serve to 
improve the current conception and implementation of participation in addressing 
corruption.  Participation is already a central component of the current anticorruption 
regime.  Article 13 of UNCAC for instance, requires states to take appropriate 
measures to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the 
public sector in anticorruption efforts.  The World Bank and other IDIs also recognise 
the role of civil society in their strategies to curb corruption.112  However, participation 
is often seen as a way of contributing to policy to improve project performance, holding 
                                                            
109 Berry, Portney and Thompson (n 106) 56. 
110 ICHRP and TI (n 92) 9. 
111 VeneKlasen, et al. (n 98) 5. 
112 Marie Chēne and Gillian Dell, ‘UNCAC and the Participation of NGOs in the Fight Against 
Corruption’ (2008) U4 Expert Answer <http://www.u4.no/publications/uncac-and-the-participation-of-
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Organisations Working on Democratic Governance (UNDP 2005); World Bank, Helping Countries 
Combat Corruption: The Role of the Bank (PREM 1997) 44-5 
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state institutions accountable in their anticorruption efforts or assisting in such efforts, 
rather than a way for citizens to deal with corruption themselves.  Hence, practical 
roles in terms of participation often include contributing to the design, implementation 
and review of anticorruption policies and projects, engaging in civic education against 
corruption and serving as a watchdog for governance efforts generally, and the 
performance of state anticorruption institutions particularly.113 
 
The application of a rights-based approach in the area of participation will go beyond 
such oversight functions to ensuring that participation is meaningful both in terms of 
breadth and depth.  The most important demonstration of this is that those affected by 
corruption will be practically involved in acting against corruption, rather than 
depending on top-down approaches or just contributing to processes whose outcomes 
are ultimately out of their control. 
 
 
7.3.2.2 The Principle of Transparency and Access to Information  
 
Having effective access to information is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of human 
rights.  Citizens are better placed to enjoy their rights when they have access to up-
to-date and comprehensive information, understand their entitlements and have the 
opportunity and capacity to use the information.114  Also, the operation of fundamental 
human rights principles like participation depends on having access to information.   
The right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ information is directly recognised under certain 
                                                            
113 See Article 13(2), UNCAC; Article 12, African Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption. 
114 Maeve McDonagh, ‘The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 13(1) 
Human Rights law Review 25-55. 
 
 293 
international human rights instruments such as Article 9 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights which provides that ‘every individual shall have the right 
to receive information’.   
 
However, in most cases, this right is considered an integral element of the right to 
freedom of expression.115  Article 19 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides for instance that: 
 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice116 
 
In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in interpreting a similar provision 
in Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, held that the right to 
freedom of thought and expression includes the protection of the right of access to 
state-held information.  As such, the right to request and receive information may not 
be hindered or refused in any way.117  The court further noted that the right to freedom 
of expression cannot be considered fully respected where the right to information is 
not recognised.118 
                                                            
115 Päivi Tiilikka, ‘Access to Information as a Human Right in the Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2013) 5(1) Journal of Media Law 79-103. 
116 See also Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 1144 UNTS 123; 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5. 
117 Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Case No. 12.108 (19 September 2006) 
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Even through the term ‘transparency’ - understood as the degree to which 
governments and individuals openly disclose information, rules, plans, processes and 
actions119 - does not appear in international human rights instruments, its relevance is 
implicit in the content of the right to freedom of expression and the right of access to 
information.  The essential elements of the principle of transparency underlie and 
enable the enjoyment of these rights. 
 
Irrespective of the sector or issue, transparency is a mainstay of most anticorruption 
strategies and governance programmes.  In similar vein, access to information is 
integral to transparency as it enables anticorruption agencies, auditors, judges, 
parliamentarians, civil society, and citizens to have timely and accurate information 
necessary to evaluate public decisions and actions.  Hence, Article 10 of UNCAC 
requires state parties to enhance transparency in public administration and to adopt 
procedures and regulations that allow the public to obtain, in appropriate 
circumstances, information on the organisation, functioning and decision-making 
processes of its public administration. 
 
This is one area where anticorruption and human rights efforts have leveraged on 
shared principles and objectives to good effect.  The most obvious demonstration of 
this is the emergence of and progress made with respect to the right of access to 
information.  As of February 2014, at least 99 countries had freedom of information 
                                                            
only a violation of their right to freedom of expression but also deprives the public of their right to 
information. 
119 Transparency International, The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide (TI  2009) 44. 
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legislation or related provisions in force.120  In SSA, twelve countries - Angola, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Tunisia and Uganda - have access to information provisions in their national 
law.121  The small number of countries with such laws and the slow progress in the 
enforcement and respect for this right means that a lot still needs to be done in this 
respect in the region.  
 
Progress must take place beyond the formal passage of these laws to an 
understanding of the role of information as a recognised form of power in society.  
Transparency reforms have the potential to impact power relations and to that extent 
the distribution of resources and enjoyment of rights.122  This provides incentive for 
powerful state and private actors to hinder access to public information or at least 
influence information that is disseminated, where access is provided.  It is in this 
context that the extension of the application of human rights principles in this area can 
enhance transparency for anticorruption efforts.   
 
Firstly, the application of human rights principles such as non-discrimination can 
ensure that access to information is not restricted to certain groups like the highly 
educated or formal CSOs.123  Instead it will ensure that access is also granted to 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups who might otherwise be unable to seek, receive 
or make use of information.  Actions to ensure this might include the organisation of 
                                                            
120 For detailed information on countries with such laws showing their regional spread, see the 
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wide-reaching public information campaigns - especially in rural areas, distributing 
information through a broad range of accessible channels - such as radio broadcasts, 
decentralised offices, and the translation of information into minority and indigenous 
languages.  Without the use of such decentralised mechanisms that are sensitive to 
various sections of society, the essence of participation becomes a farce. 
 
Secondly, the use of human rights values and a rights-based understanding of 
transparency can energise public demand for information beyond the current focus of 
seeking information based on legal provisions.  Considering the obvious lack of 
incentive to those in authority to release sensitive information, basing such demands 
on human rights principles can play a significant role in driving this process. 
 
Finally, even though there has been reasonable progress in recent years in enacting 
access to information laws globally, the human rights case for this can provide 
additional thrust for the enactment of constitutional and legislative frameworks for 
transparency and access to information.124   This is especially so in countries currently 
without such laws.   Moreover, this can add pressure for the enforcement of existing 
laws and frameworks in countries where they exist.  
 
7.3.2.3 The Principle of Accountability 
 
Accountability is understood in terms of the relationship that exists between those 
entrusted with power and those affected by their actions, ensuring that the former is 




held responsible for executing those powers properly.125  Accountability applies to both 
corruption and human rights since, in both situations, persons exercising entrusted 
power which has an impact on others, are obliged to explain and justify their actions.  
Accountability therefore entails subjecting power to the obligation that it be exercised 
transparently, that its exercise be justified and that sanctions apply for its wrongful use 
- what Schedler calls the three conditions of monitoring, justification and 
enforcement.126   There are however different perspectives on accountability and these 
differences are apparent from the operation of the principle in anticorruption and 
human rights efforts. 
 
Accountability can be either horizontal or vertical.127  Horizontal accountability, 
otherwise referred to as ‘checks and balances’ takes place when public officials are 
called into question by restraint or oversight by other agencies of government.  This 
could be by courts, ombudsman offices, anticorruption agencies and auditing offices.   
Vertical accountability, on the other hand, refers to instances where citizens or the 
electorate hold public officials responsible for their actions mainly through elections, 
but also though other mechanisms like an active civil society and a free press.  In 
recent times, there has been reference to a third form of accountability, situated 
somewhere in the middle, termed diagonal accountability.128  This refers to situations 
where citizens engender accountability by being involved in processes like budgeting, 
                                                            
125 Annie Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, ‘Voice, Accountability and Human Development: The 
Emergence of a New Agenda’ (2002) Human Development Report 2002 Background Paper 5. 
126 Andreas Schedler. ‘Conceptualising Accountability’ in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and 
Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies 
(Lynne Rienner 1999) 14. 
127 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’ in Andreas Schedler, 
Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in 
New Democracies (Lynne Rienner 1999) 29-52. 
128 ICHRP and TI (n 92) 27. 
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expenditure tracking and policy-making that are administered by government 
institutions.129 
 
The principle of accountability with respect to human rights requires the state, as duty-
bearer, to abide by human rights standards generally and with regard to its specific 
obligations under various human rights instruments.130  Its operation here emphasises 
vertical accountability, allowing citizens to question state behaviour in accordance with 
its obligations.  An important aspect of this is the positive obligation to provide 
mechanisms for those whose rights are violated to seek redress and a concurrent 
negative obligation on the state not to block access to such channels.  Within the 
framework of human rights therefore, the notion of accountability requires that the 
state and by extension those in power explain and justify their actions in accordance 
with their human rights obligations.131  
 
Significantly, vertical accountability, in comparison with horizontal accountability, 
provides mechanisms for the involvement of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups 
who would otherwise not be heard or involved in more formal mechanisms of 
accountability due to economic, educational and other limitations.  Such inclusion is 
founded on and in compliance with the human rights principles of equality and non-
discrimination. 
 
                                                            
129 ibid. 
130 See World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (25 
June 1993, Vienna) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx> accessed 17 
March 2017. 
131 ICHRP and TI (n 92) 26. 
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Accountability in anticorruption efforts has, on the other hand, been predominantly 
concerned with horizontal accountability.  This explains the preoccupation with the 
establishment of institutions that would ensure the accountability of other public 
institutions.  UNCAC, for instance, requires states to create specialised institutions to 
prevent and address corruption.132  Organisations like the World Bank and the IMF 
continue to emphasise the need to establish and strengthen governance institutions 
to deal with corruption.  Experience, as demonstrated in earlier discussions in this 
work, shows that establishing such anticorruption institutions cannot alone ensure 
accountability.  Various factors such as lack of functional autonomy, political 
interference, poor funding, weak establishment laws and their limited enforcement 
powers continue to inhibit the success of these institutions.  
 
Moreover, efforts to pursue vertical accountability in anticorruption efforts are often 
tailored to check and support horizontal accountability institutions and structures, 
rather than being considered as independent accountability mechanisms.  
 
A rights-based approach to the principle of accountability in anticorruption will 
therefore emphasise and enable the consideration of mechanisms and activities 
through which citizens would be able to ensure accountability for corruption.  
Otherwise referred to as social accountability,133 this would also illuminate 
consequences of corruption for which there should be accountability, which are not 
easily visible through current horizontal accountability frameworks.   Such 
                                                            
132 See Articles 6 & 36, UNCAC. 
133 Florian Schatz, ‘Fighting Corruption with Social Accountability: A Comparative Analysis of 




consequences would include the disproportionate effect of corruption on the poor and 
vulnerable groups in society and its overall effect on human rights.  
 
In addition to improving anticorruption efforts, the mutually reinforcing nature of the 
principles of participation, transparency and accountability in both fields has the 
potential of bridging the gap between human rights and anticorruption strategies. The 
prospects of this are discussed in the consideration of the operationalisation of the 
RBAA below.   
 
 
7.3.3  Monitoring and Measuring Advantages 
A central argument for adopting a RBAA is the promotion of access to human rights 
mechanisms in dealing with corruption.  Significant in this respect are the established 
monitoring mechanisms under the United Nations human rights system.134  This 
system which is geared towards standard-setting and monitoring of compliance by 
states with their human rights obligations is carried out through the three instruments 
of special procedures, universal periodic review and the UN treaty bodies.135   
 
Owing to the multi-faceted, entrenched and systematic nature of this monitoring 
mechanism, it continues to be integral in the promotion and protection of human rights 
                                                            
134 Other mechanisms worth mentioning in this regard with similar impact are regional human 
rights systems which monitor and ensure accountability for human rights at that level.  An example 
here would be the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which has been referred to at 
various points in this work.  For more on the Commission, see Rachel Murray, The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law (Hart Publishing 2000). 
135 UN Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms’ (2010) 
<http://shaheedoniran.org/human-rights-at-the-united-nations/human-rights-monitoring-mechanisms/> 
accessed 7 April 2016. 
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globally.136  And in view of the apparent link between corruption and the abuse or 
denial of human rights, it is expected that the consideration of the effects of corruption 
in human rights monitoring processes will highlight the negative effects of corruption, 
especially on human development.  In addition, such integration would also strengthen 
anticorruption efforts by making available a wide range of preventive and remedial 
mechanisms that characterise human rights monitoring to anticorruption practitioners 
and victims of corruption.  The prospects of this lies in the discernible differences that 
currently exist between the underlying purposes and frameworks for human rights 
monitoring and corruption monitoring. 
 
Human rights monitoring assesses the occurrence and nature of human rights 
violations.  It goes further to identify and recommend actions that can be taken to 
reduce such violations and provide remedies for those who suffer from them.137   The 
assessment of human rights violations creates a culture of transparency and is carried 
out based on well-defined standards stated in various human rights treaties.  This is 
done with a view to evaluating the compliance of states with their human rights 
commitments.138  The emphasis is however, not to sanction states for violating their 
obligations, but rather to prevent such violations from occurring in the first place.139  
This is achieved through a mix of actions in the monitoring process, including 
comments by expert committees on the content and nature of obligations that attach 
to various human rights.  It also involves evaluations and recommendations made by 
                                                            
136 John P. Pace, ‘The Development of Human Rights in the United Nations, its Control and 
Monitoring Machinery’ (1998) 50 (158) International Social Science Journal 499-511. 
137 Marek Nowicki and Zuzana Fialova, Human Rights Monitoring (Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights, Warsaw 2001) 14-15 
138 OHCHR, ‘Report on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (8 June 
2009) E/2009/90, 4. 
139 Gauthier De Beco, ‘Monitoring Corruption from a Human Rights Perspective’ (2011) 15(7) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 1107, 1108. 
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treaty monitoring bodies on steps that states can take to improve compliance with their 
human rights commitments.   
 
Such focus on prevention does not preclude the possibility of punitive action being 
taken before judicial bodies for human rights violations.140  In fact, it enhances the 
taking of such action as it makes the public more aware of abuses and empowers 
individuals and groups affected to make claims on the duty-bearer - the state.   
 
Another significant feature of human rights monitoring is that the process is largely 
state-driven.  States are primarily obliged to regularly appraise the human rights 
situation in their respective countries.  The process however, also includes input from 
non-state actors like NGOs who evaluate these reports, raise concerns and make 
recommendations.141  This allows for a more comprehensive, balanced and overall 
purposeful process, to which mechanisms for monitoring corruption compare less 
favourably. 
 
Like human rights monitoring, the monitoring of corruption has the potential to provide 
valuable information on those responsible for corruption and on the nature and effects 
of corruption.142  Such information can aid anticorruption practitioners in designing 
appropriate anticorruption strategies and assist in addressing corruption more 
efficiently.143  This has however not been the case, as the monitoring of corruption has 
                                                            
140 ibid. 
141 Morten Kjærum, ‘State Reports’, in G. Alfredsson et al. (eds.) International Human Rights 
Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Mo ̈ller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001) 17-24. 
142 Daniel Kauffman, Aart Kraai and Massimo Mastruzzi, ‘Measuring Corruption: Myths and 
Realities (September 2006) 
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been bedevilled by several issues that limit its usefulness.   Firstly, there is the lack of 
a widely accepted systematic and comprehensive monitoring framework for 
corruption.  At the level of the UN, a monitoring system in the ilk of that for human 
rights has only just become operational.144  This system is however based on UNCAC 
and therefore only takes into consideration the fulfilment by states of their obligations 
under the Convention.  Hence, reports of states only consider steps taken in 
implementing the various articles in the Convention.145  In view of the very insignificant 
reference to victims of corruption in the Convention146 and its focus on formal 
structures for dealing with corruption, this monitoring mechanism has limited potential 
to contribute to the understanding of the human development implications of 
corruption.  It would also add little to the appraisal of mechanisms that can empower 
citizens and especially victims of corruption: the crux of rights-based approaches. 
 
Apart from this mechanism, organisations like the World Bank and Transparency 
International have been involved in the monitoring of corruption for a couple of 
decades.  However, the process of such monitoring, the methodology applied and the 
nature of these organisations affects the utility of such monitoring for addressing 
corruption.  As noted in section 2.3 of chapter two, Transparency International’s CPI 
for instance, measures, rather than monitors corruption.  As an indicator with a focus 
on representing corruption numerically and ranking countries, the CPI fails to show the 
                                                            
144 United Nations Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, ‘Resolution 3/1: Review Mechanism ‘ (9-13 November 2009) CAC/COSP/2009/3; United 
Nations Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
‘Resolution 4/1: Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (24-28 October 2011) CAC/COSP/4. 
145 See for instance Nigeria’s country report in the review cycle 2010-2015 at, UNODC, ‘Country 
Report of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’ (22 October 2014) 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2014_10_14_Final_Cou
ntry_Report_Nigeria.pdf> accessed 12 April 2016. 
146 Reference to the consequences of corruption can be found in Articles 34 and 35 of UNCAC. 
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practical experiences of victims of corruption, as is the case with human rights 
monitoring.  This provides very little information that could be useful for efforts to curb 
corruption.147  Such statistical measurement lacks what UNDP refers to as policy 
relevance.148  The same can be said of the World Bank’s WGI.149    
 
 
It is worth noting that there is a growing volume of research emanating from these 
institutions that seeks to monitor, rather than measure the state of corruption and 
appraise anticorruption efforts.  Transparency International for instance, now 
publishes a Global Corruption Report (GCR): a thematic report that highlights mainly 
qualitative, but also quantitative research focused on corruption in sectors like 
education, water, the private sector and the judiciary.150  The reports, unlike other 
initiatives like the CPI, focuses on information on the impact of corruption, and lessons 
learnt in anticorruption efforts.  They also seek to provide practical and proven tools to 
improve governance in various countries.   
 
Whilst this is encouraging in terms of its potential to enhance anticorruption efforts, the 
lack of an extensive and established implementation framework to aggregate and 
integrate these lessons into anticorruption efforts by liaising with relevant 
governmental and non-governmental agencies - as is the case with human rights 
                                                            
147 Francisco-Javier Urra, ‘Assessing Corruption: An Analytical Review of Corruption 
Measurement and its Problems; Perception, Error and Utility (May 2007) Edmund A. Walsh School of 
Foreign Service, Georgetown University 9. 
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 305 
monitoring - reduces the potential impact of initiatives like this.  The integration of 
corruption issues in human rights monitoring will therefore provide an essential 
medium to amplify the impact of initiatives like the GCR. 
 
The necessity of such integration is especially important because monitoring the 
effects of corruption in a manner that demonstrates its human effects can be best done 
through the peculiar framework provided by human rights mechanisms.  The emphasis 
on the relationship between duty-bearers and rights-holders in the monitoring of 
human rights and its focus on accountability would make it easier to demonstrate the 
negative impact of corruption on human rights. 
 
Finally, following years of consultation and research, there is now a framework 
established under the UN OHCHR for the measurement of human rights.151  The 
framework for human rights indicators was created in response to long-standing 
demand to develop and utilise statistical indicators to strengthen the capacity of states 
in meeting their human rights obligations.152 In commissioning the framework, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted however, that the 
framework should be utilised with due understanding of the limitations that are intrinsic 
to any indicator.  He cautioned against considering the use of human rights indicators 
‘as a substitute for more in-depth, qualitative and judicial assessments which will 
continue to be the cornerstones of human rights monitoring’.153  The indicators are not 
designed for or suitable for ranking states according to their human rights 
                                                            
151 OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Indicators: Tools for Measuring Progress’ (2012) 
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performance.  Rather, they are developed to highlight the essential attributes of the 
rights enshrined in the various human rights instruments by translating these attributes 
into contextually relevant indicators and benchmarks for measuring and implementing 
human rights at country level.154 
 
This cautious approach adopted by the OHCHR is discernibly different from the 
centrality of indicators with respect to corruption.  It reiterates the significance of the 
UN monitoring system to the realisation of human rights.  It further recognises that the 
use of indicators, whilst serving certain purposes, can only play a limited role in 
assisting states and other stakeholders in efforts to protect human rights.  In a similar 
vein, whilst corruption indicators have played an important role in drawing attention to 
the issue of corruption, they have been fairly limited in strengthening anticorruption 
efforts.  The integration of corruption concerns in the comprehensive and established 
human rights monitoring system has the potential of furthering this purpose.   
 
Considering the work done so far by the HRC regarding the RBAA - which is discussed 
below - one of the expected immediate outcomes is likely to be the inclusion of 
corruption in the mandates of human rights committees and other monitoring 
mechanisms under the UN human rights system.  This will go a long way in highlighting 








7.3.4  Providing Remedies for Victims of Corruption 
Arguably the most pragmatic case for a RBAA is that it would provide a medium for 
victims of corruption to seek redress in court for the violation of their rights arising from 
corruption.  Providing reparation for violation is crucial to human rights.  Hence, based 
on the maxim, “ubi jus ibi remedium” (where there is a right, there is a remedy), a 
RBAA is expected to provide individuals who suffer rights violations because of 
corruption a means of seeking redress in court.155  By doing so, it seeks to put the 
people who suffer from the consequences of corruption at the very heart of the 
anticorruption regime.156   
 
The provision of judicial remedies for victims of corruption is also a response to the 
criminal law approach which concentrates on the prosecution of corrupt public officials.  
The result of such prosecutions, where there is a guilty verdict, is often imprisonment 
or imposition of fines with the proceeds going back to the state in the case of the latter.  
The victims of the acts of corruption are rarely visible in the process, apart from acting 
as witnesses, where necessary. By connecting acts of corruption to attendant human 
rights violations however, a new channel of action can be created through which 
victims of corruption can obtain remedies. 
 
The provision of remedy for victims of corruption through rights-based litigation is 
provided for in UNCAC as follows:  
 
                                                            
155 The principle that victims of rights violations are entitled to effective remedies is fundamental 
and established in human rights law.  See generally Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 
156 UNHRC (n 85) 11. 
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Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons 
who have suffered damage as a result of corruption have the right to 
initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for the damage 
in order to obtain compensation.157 
 
This notwithstanding, reports of various countries in Africa and elsewhere on the 
implementation of this provision show that little success has been made in 
operationalising it.158  Even in countries like Namibia where the the issue of 
compensation for damage resulting from corruption is treated under its legislative 
framework, victims can only seek compensation as part of subsisting criminal action 
instituted by anticorruption agencies.  They would therefore be unable to pursue such 
compensation independently, in the absence of a criminal prosecution or if a 
prosecution results in an acquittal.159  This is a different situation from the approach 
envisaged in this work.  Here, the action for remedies arises from the violation of 
human rights caused by corruption; such action being one for the enforcement of the 
rights violated independently of any other action that may arise from the facts, criminal 
or otherwise. 
 
                                                            
157 Article 35, UNCAC.  See also Article 9 of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against 
Corruption which provides that state parties shall take appropriate steps to provide assistance and 
protection to victims of corruption, including providing access to compensation and restitution, and 
permitting the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of 
criminal trials on corruption.  
158 For country reports on the implementation of UNCAC under the work of the  Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Review of the Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, see  UNODC, ‘Implementation Review Group of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption’ <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/IRG-sessions.html> 
accessed 17 May 2016. 




As would be expected, discussions on this subject often gravitate towards the complex 
substantive and procedural issues that would arise from a rights-based litigation on 
corruption.160  These include questions regarding the nature and justiciability of such 
action, the basis for locus standi,161 evidentiary challenges in proving the causal link 
between acts of corruption, the human rights violations complained about and the 
resulting damage, and the types of remedy that may be granted.   
 
Drawing from principles of human rights, academic research and experiences of 
similar litigations from different jurisdictions, the discussion that follows looks at the 




7.3.4.1 Legal Standing 
 
Legal standing, expressed in the Latin phrase, locus standi, refers to ‘a place of 
standing; standing in court. A right of appearance in a court of justice, or before a 
legislative body on a given question.’162  Any person approaching a court must 
therefore have legal standing.   
 
Generally, only a person who has a personal interest in a dispute and has suffered 
distinct and palpable damage can qualify as a ‘proper party’ with legal standing to 
                                                            
160 See Olaniyan (n 79) 315-338; Adetokunbo Mumuni and Gareth Sweeney, ‘Public Interest 
Litigation for the Right to Education’ in Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: 
Education (Routledge 2013) 307-310. 
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present issues for judicial determination.163  In the context of this work therefore, such 
individual must show that his or her rights have been specifically violated or is in 
danger of being violated by an act of corruption to have legal standing. 
 
Rules on legal standing are necessary to prevent a floodgate of frivolous cases 
capable of straining the court system.164  Courts in common law jurisdictions 
particularly, adopt a very strict interpretation of the principle.  Potential litigants will 
therefore be refused audience if they fail to show a sufficient personal interest in the 
claim before the court.  The Supreme Court of Nigeria reiterated this point when it 
noted: 
 
At common law, the position is that, in the realm of public right, for a 
person to invoke judicial power to determine the constitutionality of 
legislative or executive action, he must show that either his personal 
interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the 
action or that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of 
sustaining an injury to himself, and which interest or injury is over 
and above that of the general public165 
 
However, the trend in many commonwealth jurisdictions and regional courts indicates 
a willingness by courts to admit of exceptions to the need for litigants to show ‘sufficient 
interest or injury’ to have legal standing.  A liberal and progressive interpretation of the 
principle is often adopted where doing otherwise would result in substantial 
                                                            
163 Konrad Schiemann, ‘Locus Standi’ (1990) Public Law 342; W. McCalla, ‘Practice and 
Procedure: Locus Standi’ (1979-1981) Advocacy Quarterly 325-330. 
164 Olaniyan (n 79) 320. 
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miscarriage of justice.  Such liberal interpretation is founded on the doctrine of actio 
popularis166 which allows individual citizens to initiate legal proceedings in the interest 
of the public.  Hence, in cases involving human rights or constitutional interpretation 
for instance, courts have shown a willingness to entertain action by private citizens 
where they would otherwise be unable to do so based on legal standing. 
 
For years, the constitutional and judicial framework of India has been acknowledged 
for its liberal approach towards public interest litigation.  In Fertilizer Corporation 
Kamager Union v. Union of India,167 the Supreme Court rationalised this by stating 
that turning away a plaintiff with a good cause because he is not sufficiently affected 
would create room for government agencies to violate the law without consequences.  
According to the court, doing so would be inimical to the institution of administrative 
law, extremely unhealthy and contrary to the public interest.168 
 
This liberal exception to the principle of legal standing has been applied in other 
jurisdictions, including the United States,169 Pakistan,170 Uganda171 and South 
Africa.172  The courts have shown a clear inclination to grant legal standing where the 
issues raised in a case have merit, the case promotes public good or raises issues of 
grave public importance that affects the rule of law or human rights or has implications 
                                                            
166 This is a Latin term with origins in Roman penal law, used to describe action brought by a 
member of the public in the interest of public order.  See Paul du Plessiis, Borkowski’s Textbook on 
Roman Law (3rd end, OUP 2015) 
167 (1981) AIR 344. 
168 ibid.   
169 NAACP v Button 371 US 138.  See also William J. Aceves, ‘Actio Popularis - The Class Action 
in International law’ (2003) University of Chicago Legal Forum 353-402. 
170 British American Tobacco Ltd v Environmental Action Network Ltd (2003) 2 EA 377; Fazal Din 
v Lahore Improvement Trust 21 DLR (SC) 225 
171 Greenwatch v Attorney-General and Others (2003) 1 EA 87. 
172 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No.2) Case CCT 8/02 
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for the fundamental law of the land, the constitution.  And the courts have done so 
even though the person being granted standing cannot establish personal interest or 
loss.173  
 
With specific reference to human rights cases, the African Commission on Human 
Rights (ACHR) in the case of The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) 
and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria stated that the 
doctrine of actio popularis was applicable to cases brought under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  It confirmed that the court would therefore entertain 
cases brought by private citizens, where those cases would otherwise be inadmissible 
on grounds of legal standing.174 
 
This doctrine enables good-spirited citizens or CSOs to institute such cases on behalf 
of others whose rights have been violated but are unable to seek remedies in court 
due to economic or social vulnerability or other impediments.   Hence, in SERAP v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 
(SERAP)175 sued the State on behalf of the people of the Niger Delta region of the 
country, alleging the violation of the rights to health, adequate standard of living and a 
healthy environment, amongst others, of the people.  The Government objected to the 
                                                            
     173 In Fawehinmi v. Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt 67) 797, the Supreme Court of Nigeria, based on this, 
recognised the right of a private citizen to bring a complaint in respect of a murder case, stating that 
‘the peace of the society at large is the responsibility of all persons in the country and as far as protection 
against crimes is concerned, every person in the society is each other’s keeper’.  
174 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Communication 155/96, paras 55-58.  See also Greenwatch v. 
Attorney-General and Others (2003) 1 EA 87. 
175 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12. The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project is one 
of the most recognised and influential NGOS in Nigeria, with a stated objective of promoting 
transparency and accountability in the public and private sectors in the country through human rights.  
The work of the NGO is divided into the three main areas of Research and Publication, Monitoring 




legal standing of SERAP on the ground that the application was made in its own name 
without the prior information, accord and interest of the Niger Delta people.  The 
ECOWAS Court of Justice dismissed this argument.  It held that SERAP had locus 
standi to institute the action as it had shown that there was a substantial case of abuse 
of human rights and it did not matter if the personal rights or interests of SERAP were 
not affected.176 
 
The ECOWAS Court of Justice applied this doctrine to corruption and human rights in 
the ground-breaking case of SERAP v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and Another.177  Here, the Court was called upon by SERAP to decide whether 
revelations of massive corruption in the Universal Basic Education Commission 
(UBEC), an agency of the Federal Government, amounted to a violation of the right to 
education of Nigerian children.  This was the first case that directly considered the 
issue of the violation of human rights by corruption.  In a landmark decision that 
attracted much acclaim globally,178 the court held that the government had a 
responsibility to ensure that funds disbursed for basic education were utilised for that 
purpose.  Hence, the evidence of embezzlement of those funds disclosed in reports 
                                                            
176 In reaching its decision, the court was persuaded by a plethora of cases cited by SERAP from 
different jurisdictions.  These cases established that, in cases of human rights violations, the plaintiff 
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310; Christopher Tansey, ‘ECOWAS Community Court of Justice Ruling Holds Government of Nigeria 
Accountable for Fulfilling the Right to Education Despite Corruption’ (Human Rights Brief, 11 March 
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of investigations amounted to a prima facie violation of the right to education. The court 
directed the government to make funds available to cover the shortfall arising from the 
embezzlement.  On the issue of the legal standing of SERAP to institute the action, 
the court justified recognizing its standing, by noting that: 
 
The doctrine of ‘actio popularis’ developed under Roman law to allow 
any citizen to challenge a breach of public right in court was a way 
of ensuring that the restrictive approach to the issue of standing 
would not prevent public spirited individuals from challenging a 
breach of a public right in Court.179 
  
It is worth noting that the above issues with legal standing would not arise in situations 
where the victim invoking the jurisdiction of the court can clearly establish that his 





Establishing causation between acts of corruption and human rights violations is 
difficult due to the secretive nature of corruption and the multiplicity of factors that may 
intervene by either aggravating or mitigating the violation of rights resulting from 
corruption. 
 
                                                            
179 SERAP v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Another (n 175) para 33. 
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Causation is concerned with the relationship that exists between causes and effects 
in the natural state of things.180  Causation in law however refers to the legal 
mechanism for deciding the role played by a specific act in bringing about a harm 
complained about.181  In other words, the question as to whether a conduct counts as 
the sufficient, adequate or proximate cause of a harm is resolved through rules of 
causation.182  It is therefore instrumental in determining the limits of attribution and 
responsibility, by identifying the relevant facts to be considered in a case and 
establishing the boundaries of liability based on those facts for purposes of 
reparation.183 
 
It is a fundamental principle of law that a defendant should not be held liable for an 
injury suffered by the plaintiff, unless the action or omission of the defendant caused 
the plaintiff’s injury.184  In analysing this factual causation, the courts must determine 
if the plaintiff’s injury would have occurred, ‘but for’ the conduct of the defendant.185  If 
the answer to this is yes and the injury would have occurred independently of the 
conduct of the defendant, then no liability arises.  If the answer is no, then the 
defendant is liable.  Furthermore, where multiple factors are responsible for the 
                                                            
180 León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, ‘Causation and International State Responsibility’ (2012) ACIL 
Research Paper No 2012-07, 7. 
181 Pointing this out is important because the standard of proof required in a court of law to 
establish causation is more stringent than that required for academic discourse.  Hence, whereas the 
impact of corruption on human rights may be apparent in such discourses, it is a lot more difficult to 
establish this under the rules of evidence applied in court. 
182 Olaniyan (n 79) 331. 
183 See H. L. A Hart and A. M. Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1959). 
184 John Pavlakis and Louise Mallon, ‘What’s the Risk?  Causation, Scope of Liability and Civil 
Liability Reforms’ (Conventus Law 31 August 2012) <http://www.conventuslaw.com/archive/australia-
whats-the-risk-causation-scope-of-liability-and-civil-liability-reforms/> accessed 5 April 2017; A. M. 
Honoré, ‘Causation and Remoteness of Damage’ in A. Tunc (ed), International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law, (Tübingen, JCB Mohr 1983) ch 7. 
185 The effect of the ’but for’ test established in cases like Donoghue v Stephenson (1932) AC 
562, HL, is that if the injury to the plaintiff would have occurred independently of the conduct of the 
defendant, then causation in fact has not been established and there is no liability on the part of the 
defendant.  See also R v White [1910] 2 KB 124. 
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plaintiff’s injury, then the defendant will only be liable if his conduct played a necessary 
or substantial role in contributing to the injury.186 
 
The strict application of the rules of causation to rights-based corruption litigation 
would make it difficult for victims of corruption to establish causation between corrupt 
conduct and resulting suffering arising from a violation of their rights.  The violation of 
human rights in a case could be attributed to a multiplicity of social, economic, political, 
cultural and institutional factors of which corruption is often only a part.  Victims of 
corruption would therefore have to prove that the act or acts of corruption complained 
about played a necessary and substantial role in occasioning the rights violation in 
question.  
 
To overcome these challenges, it has been suggested that the burden of proving 
causation in rights-based corruption litigation should be approached from the 
perspective of the doctrine of state responsibility, especially for human rights 
violations, rather than under the strict rules of domestic law.187  The law of state 
responsibility attaches responsibility to a state for internationally wrongful conduct that 
is attributable to the state under international law or constitutes a breach of an 
                                                            
186 Castellanos-Jankiewicz (n 180) 9.  In certain cases, like the tort of negligence, the plaintiff is 
further required to prove legal causation by showing that the conduct of the defendant was the 
‘proximate’ cause of his suffering.  This relates to the foreseeability of the injury to the plaintiff arising 
from the conduct of the defendant. For liability to arise, the defendant should have foreseen the injury 
to the plaintiff.  The aim of the test of legal causation is to limit the scope of liability to injuries that 
have some reasonable relationship to the risk arising from the conduct of the defendant.  The 
outcome of this is that if a risk was not reasonably foreseeable, liability will not be imposed.  The test 
of legal causation is also referred to as the test of proximate cause or adequate cause. The 
expression used in a particular situation often depends on whether the trial is criminal or civil, and the 
manner in which the test is expressed in statute or common law.  The content of the test itself is 
however often the same. 
See Marshall S. Shapo, Principles of Tort Law (2nd edn. St. Paul Minnesota 2003) 238-244; 
West’s Encyclopaedia of American Law (2nd edn 2008) <http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/causation> accessed 20 May 2016. 
187 Olaniyan (n 79) 334. 
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international obligation of the state.188  According to prevalent views on the subject, 
causation and resulting damage is considered irrelevant to determine an 
internationally wrongful act.   The emphasis is on the wrongfulness of the act, which 
subsumes damage, even though damage may be a necessary consequence in certain 
situations.189   In explaining the difference between the operation of the principle of 
causation in domestic law and under the law of state responsibility, Olaniyan stated: 
 
 While national legal systems require that damages in law amount to 
injury, and as such are capable of being compensated, the notion of 
an internationally wrongful act concerns itself with legal relationships 
arising from a determination of  state  responsibility, regardless of 
damage or injury.  Yet, the element of damage or injury may be said 
to be implicit in the failure to fulfil the obligation.  Accordingly, 
attribution of conduct to the state as a subject of international law is 
based on criteria determined by international law and not on the mere 
recognition of a link of factual causality.190 
 
Furthermore, the principle of state responsibility holds a state accountable for the acts 
of its organs, including persons or entities exercising legislative, executive, judicial or 
other functions.191  The foundation of the application of the concept of state 
responsibility to relationships between states and citizens, and to that extent, the issue 
of causation in rights-based corruption litigation is found in the obligation of states to 
                                                            
188 ILC, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (Vol II, Pt 2 United Nations 2001) 26. 
189 David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (7th end. Sweet and Maxwell 2010) 
424. 
190 Olaniyan (n 79) 333. 
191 See Articles 4-11, ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
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respect human rights.  States have an internationally recognised responsibility for 
violating human rights obligations.192  Hence, where a violation of rights stems from 
corruption, proving causation would simply require showing a connection between the 
corrupt conduct and the resulting violation of human rights.  The responsibility of the 
state for the rights violation would automatically be invoked by the wrongful act of 
corruption. 
 
Moreover, inherent in the responsibility of states to respect and protect human rights 
is the obligation of vigilance and diligence.193  The occurrence of corruption by public 
officials indicates the failure of the state to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish 
perpetrators of corruption.  Where rights are violated as a result, the state bears 
responsibility for its failure to be vigilant and diligent in the protection of human rights.  
In any case, public officials are considered organs of the state.  Hence, the state would 
normally bear responsibility for their wrongful acts and the consequences thereof.  
 
It is this reasoning that was applied by the ECOWAS Court of Justice in SERAP v. 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Another, in holding that the 
embezzlement of funds allocated for the provision of basic education amounted to a 
violation to the right to education of Nigerian children.194  In arriving at its decision, the 
court held that results of a report of an investigation into the affairs of UBEC carried 
out by an anticorruption agency confirming the embezzlement was sufficient to 
establish that the embezzlement led to a violation of the right to education.195  The 
                                                            
192 Theodor Meron, ‘State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights’ in Proceedings of the 
106th Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law 1989) 372-385. 
193 ILC, Yearbook of International Law Commission (Vol II, Pt 2 United Nations 2001) 153-155. 
194 SERAP v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Another (n 175).    
       195 ibid.  Considerable advances have been made in the last couple of decades in the creation of 
detailed quantitative and qualitative tools employed in measuring and monitoring corruption.  Hence, it 
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decision of the Court shows that in rights-based corruption litigation, the court only 
requires proving ‘general causation’ between the incidence of corruption and the 
violation of rights, rather than ‘specific causation’ corruption by named corrupt officials 
and particular rights violations.196  
 
Overall, the SERAP case provides much encouragement for rights-based corruption 
litigation.  It demonstrates the willingness of the courts to relax the rigid rules on 
causation and legal standing to provide fair and reasonable remedies in corruption 
cases. 
 
Furthermore, being civil litigation, a lesser burden of proof is required in such cases.  
This contrasts with the criminal prosecution of corruption under the current regime 
where the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Here, the 
plaintiff would only be required to establish causation on a balance of probabilities.197  
Victims of corruption will therefore find it considerably easier to prove corruption and 
access judicial remedies.  It will also ensure that corrupt public officials who might 
otherwise not be held accountable for their actions due to the inability of prosecuting 
authorities to discharge the burden of proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt in 
                                                            
should not be too difficult to find similar information of embezzlement and other types of corrupt conduct 
for purposes of establishing causation of human rights violations by corruption.  Potential litigants can 
also take advantage of the existence of Freedom of Information laws in most countries including Nigeria 
to acquire the needed information from public records and offices. 
196 According to Olaniyan, ‘General causation would presumably require the establishment of a 
causal link between large scale corruption, failure to exercise vigilance and diligence. . . and the 
resulting human rights violations.  Specific causation, on the other hand, would entail proving that a 
specific human rights violation was caused by a set of corrupt acts or by named or identified corrupt 
officials.  See Olaniyan (n 79) 335. 
197 John Hatchard, ‘Adopting a Human Rights Approach Towards Combating Corruption’ in 
Martine Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds), Corruption and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
(Intersentia 2010) 7, 18. 
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criminal trials, might yet be held accountable due to the lesser burden of proof 
required. 
 
Being a civil action, such litigation avoids the role of political influence in preventing 
certain criminal prosecutions as well.  The discretionary power of anticorruption 
agencies in deciding on cases to prosecute would not affect such civil actions.  And 
the power of nolle prosequi198 which, in common law jurisdictions, empowers the 
Attorney-General to discontinue criminal trials, would also not apply to rights-based 
corruption litigation.  
 
 
7.3.4.3 Possible Remedies 
 
An important factor that precipitated the discourse of a RBAA is the lack of appropriate 
and effective remedies for victims of corruption.  The most obvious remedy would be 
the provision of monetary compensation for damages resulting from the violation of 
their rights.  However, the remedies which a court may generally grant in human rights 
cases go beyond damages and include equitable remedies like injunctions, 
declarations and such other remedies as the court deems effective.     
 
With respect to corruption, the court could also make orders that will have the broader 
effect of preventing corruption, ensuring the punishment of perpetrators and the 
                                                            
198 This is a Latin phrase for ‘we shall no longer prosecute’.  It refers to a declaration by a 
prosecutor in a criminal case to cease from further pursing the case.  The Constitution of Nigeria 
empowers the Attorney-General of the Federation - and of the States - to exercise this power by 
discontinuing at any stage before judgment is delivered, any criminal proceeding instituted or 
undertaken by him or any other authority or person.  See Sections 174 (1)(c) and 211(1)(c) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
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recovery of stolen wealth.199  It is only through a consideration of all these factors that 
the court can provide practical, full and effective remedies that would have a positive 
long-term impact on the anticorruption regime in a country.  This was demonstrated in 
the SERAP Case where the orders made by the court included requiring the Nigerian 
government to provide the necessary funds to cover the shortfall in sums budgeted for 
the education sector and further asking the government to take steps to ensure that 
the right to education was not impaired by corruption.   
 
The courts will therefore grant such legal and equitable remedies as they consider fair 
and just in each case, with due regard to providing reparation for the victims of 
corruption in the specific case, but also within broader objectives of the anticorruption 
regime and human rights obligations of the state.   
 
In conclusion, it is important to recognise the difficulties apparent in pursuing rights-
based corruption litigation.   In countries with corrupt courts, weak judicial systems, 
civil society that concentrates more on advocacy than litigation and poor human rights 
regimes, pursuing such cases can be particularly daunting.  However, as 
demonstrated here, the substantive and procedural challenges to such litigation are 
not insurmountable.  Furthermore, as is obvious from the overall discourse in this 
chapter, rights-based litigation is only one component of a broader anticorruption 
approach founded on human rights. 
 
 
                                                            
199 Olaniyan (n 79) 337. 
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7.4 Towards Operationalising the Rights-Based Approach to 
Anticorruption 
 
Despite numerous conversations about a RBAA since the turn of the century, not much 
has been done in terms of its practical implementation.  There is yet to be any clear-
cut comprehensive policy on operationalising the approach.  Efforts by various IDIs 
and scholars thus far have been largely conceptual.  The discussion that follows looks 
at the steps and recommendations made with a view to operationalise the RBAA.  The 
discussion is broadly divided into two sections.  The first part takes a summary view 
of the approach of various IDIs towards the RBAA, especially with reference to its 
application to countries in SSA.  The second takes an in-depth analysis of actions 
taken under the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) - particularly by the Human Rights Council (HRC) - to operationalise the 
RBAA.  The focus on the latter is because, more than any other institution, it has taken 
the most decisive steps and shown the most enduring commitment towards putting in 
place a framework for operationalising the RBAA 
Before doing this however, there are two issues worth pointing out.  Firstly, as is 
obvious from the preceding sections of this chapter, there is now a consensus in the 
field of development that corruption has a negative impact on human rights.  Secondly 
and drawing from this, there is also a recognition and conviction - and what may rightly 
be considered enthusiasm - that a RBAA will enhance current efforts to curb 
corruption.  Apart from a few dissenting academic perspectives,200 these two views 
                                                            
200 See for instance the views of Goodwin and Rose-Sender who argue that the rights-based 
approach is an unwelcome addition to the global governance and anticorruption discourse.  Morag 
Goodwin and Kate Rose-Sender, ‘Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An Unwelcome Addition to 
the Development Discourse’ in Martin Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds) Corruption and Human Rights: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 221-240. 
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are common to and provide the basis for all the actions and steps to operationalise 
the RBAA discussed below.  Establishing this at this point is important, so that the 
discussion that follows will focus on practical steps to operationalise the RBAA without 
the need to make these points repeatedly. 
 
 
7.4.1  General Actions/Recommendations Towards Operationalising the 
Rights-Based Approach to Anticorruption  
 
7.4.1.1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
 
One of the first IDIs to explore the RBAA was UNDP.  In a paper released in 2004, it 
looked at ways of incorporating anticorruption strategies within broader human rights-
based approaches to development.201  It identified the essential elements of a rights-
based approach to include express linkages to rights, accountability, empowerment, 
participation and non-discrimination.202  Within this framework, the paper looked at 
ways in which anticorruption policies can take these elements into consideration in 
order to deal with corruption more effectively.  To illustrate this further, it looked at how 
these principles are reflected in the provisions of UNCAC and within certain national 
anticorruption regimes, including those of Hong Kong, Botswana, India and Sri 
Lanka.203  This paper was however limited in its scope as the integration of 
                                                            
201 Thusitha Pilapitiya, ‘The Impact of Corruption on the Human Rights Based Approach to 
Development’ (September 2004) UNDP Research Policy Paper 5-6. 
202 ibid 10-14. 
203 ibid 30-37. 
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anticorruption strategies with the rights-based approach was considered with respect 
to the issue of access to justice alone.   
In the time since, UNDP has been a major contributor to the various strategic steps 
taken by the OHCHR to operationalise the RBAA.  For instance, both bodies jointly 
organised a seminar on the subject in Seoul in September 2004 which led to the 
publication of a booklet on Good Governance Practices for the Protection of Human 
Rights.204  UNDP was also a part of the broader United Nations Conference on Anti-
Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights which was held in Poland 
in November 2006.205  In the follow-up to the conference, the OHCHR is developing a 
guidebook on human rights and anticorruption for practitioners in collaboration with 
UNDP and UNODC.  This is expected to be the first comprehensive policy document 
on implementing the RBAA.  These steps are discussed in more detail when efforts of 
the OHCHR are considered below.  
 
7.4.1.2 European Union (EU) 
 
The EU has, in the last few years, taken a few important steps in exploring the 
relationship between corruption and human rights.  In February 2013, the European 
Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights organised a workshop on ‘Corruption 
and Human Rights in Third Countries.’  Presentations at the workshop explored 
various aspects of this subject including the implications of the relationship for 
                                                            
204 See OHCHR, Good Governance Practices for the Protection of Human Rights (United Nations 
2007). 
205 Detailed information on the conference, including its background, themes and documentation 
can be found at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/WarsawConference.aspx> 
accessed 20 April 2017. 
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anticorruption efforts.206  Others emphasised the need for the EU to tackle the question 
both internally in its countries and externally in third countries.207  The nature of the 
connection between corruption and human rights was also examined with respect to 
particular sectors like trade.208  The implications of this within countries like Russia209 
and Angola210 were also discussed.   
The proceedings of this workshop and the actions that followed provided the backdrop 
for a European Parliament resolution on 8 October 2013 titled, ‘Corruption in the Public 
and Private Sectors: The Impact on Human Rights in Third Countries.’211  Even though 
the preambular aspects of the resolution reiterated the negative impact of corruption 
on human rights and the importance of applying human rights principles in tackling 
corruption, it did not provide much detail in terms of recommending particular actions 
that could be taken in this respect.  Instead, it dealt with wider issues like the 
coherence of internal and external anticorruption policies of the EU, capacity building 
for anticorruption institutions, corporate responsibility, and international cooperation 
and assistance, amongst others.  For third countries like those in SSA, the most 
relevant recommendation in this respect was the view that standard human rights 
                                                            
206 Gareth Sweeney, ‘Linking Acts of Corruption with Specific Human Rights’ in European 
Parliament Policy Department, Corruption and Human Rights in Third Countries (European Union 
2013) 8-11. 
207 Jean-Louis Ville, ‘EU Policy and Action to Fight Corruption While Safeguarding Human Rights’ 
(European Parliament Sub-Committee on Human Rights Workshop on Corruption and Human Rights 
in Third Countries, Brussels, 28 February 2013). 
208 Andrew Feinstein, ‘Corruption in Trade and its Impact on Human Rights in Third Countries’ 
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clauses which are contained in agreements between the EU and third countries 
include a commitment to the promotion of good governance.212 
However, more detailed recommendations with relevance to third countries can be 
found in a March 2017 follow-up draft motion for the Parliament.213  The motion goes 
beyond just affirming a connection between corruption and human rights and asserts 
that, ‘there is a direct link between the promotion and strengthening of human rights 
and corruption prevention.’214  It therefore recommends creating synergies between 
current criminal justice approaches to tackling corruption and a human rights-based 
approach.   
Like the 2013 resolution, this motion stressed the need to include anticorruption 
clauses alongside human rights clauses in agreements with third countries with a view 
to consulting, monitoring and, where necessary, sanctioning countries in the event of 
serious corruption that causes human rights violations.215  The motion further calls on 
bodies like the European Commission and the European External Action Service to 
devise joint programming on human rights and corruption through actions such as 
including a specific benchmark on the connection between corruption and human 
rights in the Human Rights and Democracy Strategy Papers.216  It also calls on EU 
member states to support efforts at the UN on the RBAA in areas such as the 
                                                            
212 ibid Par. 47. 
213 European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Draft Motion for a European Parliament 
Resolution on Corruption and Human Rights 2017/2028 (INI)’ (28 March 2017).  The motion was 
referred to the appropriate committees (Development and Foreign Affairs) for necessary amendments 
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214 ibid Par. I. 
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216 The Human Rights and Democracy Strategy Papers are part of the broader EU Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy which is intended to strengthen and reinforce the EU’s human rights 
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Union, EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (European Union 2015). 
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examination of human rights violations arising from corruption in the universal periodic 
review process and the establishment of a UN Special Rapporteur on financial crime, 
corruption and human rights.217 
 
7.4.1.3 The African Union (AU)  
 
In the context of this work, it is rather regrettable that the AU is yet to take any decisive 
step towards implementing a RBAA or even explore seriously, the relationship 
between corruption and human rights.  This notwithstanding, there have been some 
nuanced references to the corruption-human rights nexus within the AU’s legal and 
institutional frameworks for corruption and human rights.  For instance, unlike most 
other international instruments on corruption, the preamble to the AU Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption takes cognisance of ‘the need to respect human 
dignity and to foster the promotion of economic, social and political rights in conformity 
with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments’.218  Furthermore, Article 2 of the Convention states 
the objectives of the Convention to include the promotion of socio-economic 
development by ‘removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
                                                            
217 ibid Par. 14. 
218 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (adopted 11 July 2013, 
entered into force 5 August 2006) (2004) 43(1) ILM 5. 
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rights as well as civil and political rights.’  Respect for human and peoples’ rights is 
also stated as one of the fundamental principles of the Convention in Article 3.219 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance also shows an inherent 
recognition of the relationship between corruption and human rights.   It refers to, 
amongst other things, respect for human rights as one of the guiding principles for 
attaining good governance, rule of law and democracy on the continent.220  In similar 
vein, the Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to 
‘corruption, misuse and misdirection of financial resources’ as some of the restraints 
that states have to address in their bid to take all appropriate measures towards the 
full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.221 
Another mechanism that takes into consideration the RBAA is the monitoring and 
compliance procedure under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  In 
its concluding observations and recommendations on Nigeria’s fifth and most recent 
Periodic State Report - covering the period 2011 to 2014 - the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) commended the country for measures taken to 
address the challenge of corruption as a way of keeping its human rights obligations 
under the African Charter.222  It further called on the government to take more action 
to strengthen and implement measures to deal with corruption in order to guarantee 
the enjoyment of human rights.223  Even though these actions were not taken as part 
                                                            
219 ibid.  Unfortunately, similar provisions recognising the relationship between human rights and 
corruption are not included in sub-regional anticorruption instruments like the ECOWAS Protocol on 
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2004) Article 3. 
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of a policy or practice under a RBAA as such, it demonstrates a recognition by both 
the State and the Commission of the role of anticorruption measures in securing 
human rights and vice versa.  
A final mechanism worth referring to is the role of the AU Advisory Board on Corruption.  
The Board was established as a follow-up mechanism under the AU Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption.  It has a broad mandate to promote and 
encourage the adoption of measures by State Parties to the Convention to deal with 
corruption.224   
Significant for the current discourse is the mandate of the Board to build partnerships 
with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to facilitate dialogue in 
addressing corruption.225  Even though the AU Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption entered into force in August 2006, the Board was only created 
in May 2009.  It is rather instructive that the Commission is credited with being one of 
the key stakeholders who facilitated the process leading to the establishment of the 
Board with the objective of tackling gross violations of socio-economic rights in Africa.  
In further demonstration of an emerging path to partnership between both bodies, the 
Chairperson of the Board was invited to give a speech at the joint opening ceremony 
of the 59th ordinary session of the Commission and 28th ordinary session of the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child on 21 October 2016.  In 
his speech, Hon. Daniel Batidam noted that ‘the fight against corruption in Africa is 
also an effort towards deepening socio-economic rights on the continent.’  He 
                                                            
224 AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Art. 22.  Such measures include the 
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accordingly pledged the commitment of the Board to the protection of human rights in 
its effort to address corruption.226 
Hence, even though there is yet to be a well-defined policy or mechanism exploring a 
RBAA under the AU, the instruments, mechanisms and emerging partnerships 
discussed here show that there is a broad framework within which the approach can 
be explored and implemented.  
 
7.4.1.4 The World Bank 
 
The World Bank has had a tumultuous and controversial relationship with human rights 
throughout its history.  Broadly, the controversy concerns the question of whether the 
Bank’s apolitical mandate - discussed in section 6.1.1 of chapter six227 - allows it to 
consider human rights in its decision-making, development policies and operations.  
The discussion here does not intend to deal with the various issues and developments 
concerning the World Bank and its handling of human rights issues, as this is beyond 
the scope and objectives of this work.228  However, it will make a number of points that 
                                                            
226 See full text of the speech at 
<http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/59th/statements/auabc_statement/auabc_opening_statement.pdf
> accessed 20 April 2017. 
227 See Article III, Section 4(vii) and Article IV, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the 
World Bank. 
228 For more on this see David Kinley, ‘Human Rights and the World Bank: Practice, Politics, and 
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provide some insights on the current and prospective role of the Bank regarding the 
RBAA. 
Firstly, in contrast to its long-standing position not to consider human rights issues on 
the grounds of their political nature, the Bank has since the 1990s at least, admitted 
the relevance of human rights in its work, albeit to a limited degree.  This has been 
made possible by the work of two General Counsels of the Bank, Ibrahim Shihata and 
Roberto Dañino.  Through a progressive interpretation of the Articles of Agreement of 
the Bank, they expressed the view that the Bank could engage in human rights issues, 
subject to certain conditions.229  The essence of these conditions was that the Bank 
could take human rights into account in its work where such issues had an economic 
impact or relevance.   Whilst Shihata appeared to be of the view that this should apply 
more to economic, social and cultural rights,230 Dañino took an ‘all human rights’ 
perspective on the premise that civil and political rights had clear implications for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights and vice versa.231  
The second point worth noting is that, despite this, the Bank continues to adopt a 
rather cautious approach on the issue of human rights.  It has shown no willingness to 
mainstream human rights in its work.  This is buttressed by the fact that decades after 
the liberal interpretation of the Bank’s mandate referred to above, it still does not have 
a single comprehensive human rights policy.  This has been a ground for much 
criticism of the Bank with a 2015 report by the UN special rapporteur on extreme 
                                                            
229 Roberto Dañino, ‘The Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights: Some 
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(Vol 2, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 295-324. 
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poverty and human rights referring to the Bank’s approach to human rights as 
incoherent, counterproductive, unsustainable and outdated.232   
Even though the Bank has subscribed to and actively promoted the concept of a rights-
based approach to development, its engagement with the approach shows a rather 
superficial and reactive commitment to human rights.  This is demonstrated in a couple 
of ways.  The first is by simply showing how the work of the Bank contributes positively 
to the realisation of human rights.233  Hence most policy and programme documents 
of the Bank try to illustrate and argue on how, for instance, its work in the area of health 
contributes to the enjoyment of the right to health and how its education programmes 
contribute to the realisation of the right to education, and so on.  The second way the 
Bank approaches human rights is by arguing that, by emphasising local participation 
in various stages of its projects, it is keeping to human rights principles like 
participation.234  In doing all this however, the Bank avoids analysing its human rights 
commitments within established frameworks that refer to concepts such as rights-
holders and duty-bearers. 
The third and final point is that, drawing from the above, it is rather obvious that the 
Bank approaches human rights and rights-based approaches as development policy 
with attendant practices and outcomes, whilst ignoring the legal guarantees and 
obligations that attach to human rights.  This conception enables the Bank to use the 
language of rights to envelope its work without necessarily introducing any serious 
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strategic changes which a pragmatic engagement with human rights would entail.  This 
has obvious implications for the prospects of the RBAA with regard to the Bank. 
In the first instance, in keeping with its practice on most other issues, the Bank may 
rechristen some of its current and emerging anticorruption policies and programmes 
as espousing the RBAA by expressing them in the language of rights.  This could be 
done especially for policies and programmes that share common attributes with, and 
are based on similar principles as rights-based approaches to anticorruption.  In fact, 
the contents of the Bank’s World Development Report for 2017 show the imminence 
of this possibility.  The report titled, ‘Governance and the Law’ encourages a rethink of 
‘governance for development’ by promoting ideas like elite bargains, citizen 
engagement and collective action, all of which are based directly or indirectly on the 
principles of a RBAA.235  Considering the Bank’s history of co-opting alternative and 
critical discourses and also reframing issues to bring them within the always expanding 
policies of the Bank, it is not improbable that, as the concept of a RBAA takes hold 
globally, the Bank will react by simply reframing these policies and programmes as 
evidencing such an approach.  
The second possible scenario is that the Bank might eventually give in to pressure 
and articulate a comprehensive human rights policy within which the RBAA will be 
contained.  In the last few decades, it has shown a propensity to evolve by responding 
to global economic and political developments, and the policies of other development 
institutions.  The Bank’s relatively recent involvement with issues of governance and 
anticorruption is testament to this fact.  It is therefore foreseeable that the Bank may 
move from its incoherent approach to human rights to a more direct comprehensive 
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strategy.  How and when this might happen will of course, depend on how entrenched 
the RBAA becomes, especially at the global level.   
Apart from these institutions, other organisations that have explored different elements 
the RBAA include Transparency International,236 USAID,237 and the defunct 
International Council on Human Rights Policy which undertook arguably the most in-
depth academic analysis of the approach with useful insights and recommendations 
for implementation.238   However, as noted above, the most decisive steps towards 
operationalising the approach have been taken under the OHCHR, particularly by the 
HRC.  
 
7.4.2  Specific Role of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) - Particularly the Human Rights 
Council (HRC) - Towards Operationalising the Rights-Based Approach to 
Anticorruption  
The discussion here is divided into three phases.  The first is on the actions taken by 
the predecessor to the HRC, the Commission on Human Rights, in exploring the 
relationship between corruption and human rights.  The second relates to initiatives 
driven by the OHCHR in this regard between the conclusion of those actions and when 
                                                            
236 See Transparency International, ‘Human Rights and Corruption’ (2008) Working Paper 
05/2008 
<http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/working_paper_no._5_2008_human_rights_and_
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237 See USAID, ‘USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance’ (June 2013) 
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HRC was established and carried on exploring the issue.  The third looks at the efforts 
and recommendations by the HRC up until date.  
 
7.4.2.1 Initial Efforts under the Previous Commission on Human Rights 
 
Even though there had previously been nuanced references to the relationship 
between corruption and human rights within the UN human rights system, the most 
direct action in this regard was undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights.  In 
2003, its Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
appointed a Special Rapporteur, Christy Mbonu to prepare a comprehensive study on 
corruption and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights generally and 
particularly economic, social and cultural  rights.239  Following the endorsement of this 
decision by the Commission,240 the Special Rapporteur went on to produce a working 
paper on the subject in 2003,241 a preliminary report in 2004,242 and a progress report 
in 2005.243  The mandate ended in 2006 when the Sub-commission was replaced by 
an Advisory Committee as the new HRC’s expert advisory mechanism. 
The work of the Special Rapporteur was important in drawing the attention of the UN 
human rights machinery to the need to consider the human rights implications of 
corruption.  It also provided a preliminary framework within which to engage the issue 
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241 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘Working Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. 
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of corruption and human rights at a crucial time when concern over corruption was 
taking a strategic place on the global stage.  However, it did not go as far as 
considering practical ways of promoting and implementing a RBAA.  Instead the 
reports dealt with precursory issues like the general nature of corruption, an overview 
of actions being taken against corruption at the time, the socio-economic, civil and 
political consequences of corruption in society, and how the existence of corruption in 
institutions like the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and political parties can have 
devastating effects on the enjoyment of human rights. 
 
7.4.2.2 Intermediate Actions Taken within the UN Human Rights System  
 
It is worth noting that whilst the work of the Special Rapporteur was ongoing, the 
OHCHR, at the request of the Commission on Human Rights organised a joint seminar 
with UNDP on good governance practices for the protection of human rights.  The 
conference took place in Seoul in September 2004.  Based on its proceedings, the 
OHCHR published, in 2007, a booklet on Good Governance Practices for the 
Protection of Human Rights.244  Even though reference is often made to this 
publication in discourses about human rights and anticorruption, this was not the direct 
specific focus of the publication.  The publication did not specifically engage with the 
issue of the impact of corruption on human rights or the application of human rights 
principles and practices in addressing corruption.  It only presented 21 case studies of 
governance reforms from different parts of the world that helped with the enjoyment of 
human rights.  These cases highlighted issues like strengthening democratic 
                                                            




institutions, improving service delivery, the rule of law and combating corruption.  They 
confirmed the general premise that good governance is important for the protection of 
human rights.  However, even with cases dealing specifically with corruption, there 
was no specific reference to the application of human rights principles or practices in 
anticorruption efforts.  
Furthermore, in November 2006, OHCHR organised the United Nations Conference 
on Anti-Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights which took place 
in Poland.245  This conference served as a follow-up to the Seoul Conference and took 
place in response to Resolution 2005/68 of the Commission on Human Rights.  It had 
in attendance representatives of States, national human rights institutions, IDIs, CSOs 
and anticorruption and human rights practitioners.  Compared to the Seoul 
Conference, this conference dealt more specifically with the relationship between 
corruption and human rights, including the impact of corruption on human rights and 
how human rights principles and approaches can help in curbing corruption.  
Moreover, the conference was structured in a manner that led to the consideration of 
practical and concrete recommendations.246  
In the follow-up to this conference, OHCHR is developing a guidebook on human rights 
and anticorruption for practitioners.  This is being done in collaboration with UNDP and 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and is expected to provide 
the first comprehensive policy framework on the issue of a RBAA.  Without necessarily 
pre-empting the content of this document, indications of what the policy of UN human 
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rights machinery might be in this area can be gleaned from the more recent work of 
the HRC in this respect. 
 
7.4.2.3 More Recent Efforts of the Human Rights Council 
 
Following its establishment in 2006, the HRC has taken some definitive steps in 
promoting work on corruption and human rights.  In 2011, the Council passed 
Resolution 18/13 which stressed the need for States to promote enabling 
environments for the prevention of human rights violations by, amongst other things, 
tackling corruption.247  In related moves, the Council has, through several resolutions, 
also highlighted the need for action in dealing with the negative impact of the non-
repatriation of proceeds of illicit endeavours to their countries of origin on the 
enjoyment of human rights.248 
Furthermore, in June 2012, Morocco issued a cross-regional statement on behalf of 
132 States to the 20th session of the HRC.  The statement expressed deep concern 
about the increasing negative impact of widespread corruption on the enjoyment of 
human rights through the weakening of institutions and erosion of public trust in 
governance, and the undermining of initiatives to improve the lives of citizens.249  The 
statement concluded by calling on the human rights and anticorruption movements to 
                                                            
247 UNHRC Res 18/13 (14 October 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/18/13. 
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work together to leverage on the close connection between anticorruption and human 
rights measures.   
Subsequently, in March 2013, the Council convened a panel discussion on the 
negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights.  The panel had 
representatives of OHCHR, Transparency International, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, UNDP and UNODC, amongst others.  Its significant 
contributions included calling for the establishment of a mandate for a UN Special 
Rapporteur on corruption and human rights in the hope that this would go a long way 
in making corruption a standing issue on the agenda of the HRC.250  The view was 
also expressed that such a move would prove to be a meaningful and sustained 
approach to considering the issue.   
Arguably the most significant step taken by the HRC in its current form came in June 
2013 when it requested its expert Advisory Committee to submit a research-based 
study to the Council on the issue of the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment 
of human rights and to make recommendations on how the Council and its subsidiary 
bodies should consider this issue.251  Following a detailed consultative process which 
involved the issuing of questionnaires to states, human rights institutions, CSOs and 
academia,252 the Advisory Committee submitted its final report to the HRC in January 
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2015.253  Like most other mechanisms discussed in this work, the report began on the 
premise that corruption negatively impacts human rights.  It looked at various ways in 
which a violation of human rights may occur because of corruption, by building on the 
various perspectives from which the issue had been considered.   
More importantly, the report provided a more detailed examination than any document 
or measure before it, of the value of linking corruption to human rights for anticorruption 
efforts.   Whilst decrying the limitations of a purely criminal perspective to addressing 
corruption, the report pointed out various ways a RBAA will enhance anticorruption 
efforts.  These include moving victims to the centre of anticorruption efforts, providing 
an enhanced understanding of the responsibility of the state in dealing with corruption, 
leveraging on the shared principles between anticorruption and human rights efforts, 
and providing access to national, regional and international human rights monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Most of these advantages have been explored in detail in preceding sections of this 
chapter.  What is important here are the recommendations made by the Advisory 
Committee for operationalising the RBAA.  In addition to a couple of conceptual 
recommendations, the Committee proposed the following steps: 
• The use of the special procedures mechanism of the HRC through a special 
thematic mandate established to examine, monitor, advise and report on major 
phenomena of human rights violations caused by corruption.  To augment this, 
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every existing thematic and country mandate should also consider paying 
attention to the relationship between corruption and human rights. 
• The consideration of corruption as a possible cause of human rights violations 
should be integrated into the universal periodic review mechanism.  This is so 
that states can deal with the question of whether and to what extent, human 
rights violations are consequences of corruption. Furthermore, this will mean 
that actions taken by states against corruption are considered as means of 
improving the state of human rights under the review process. 
• Specific attention should be paid to possible violations of human rights caused 
by corruption in the framework of the complaints procedure of the HRC.  Where 
any such connection is found to exist, this should be indicated in the 
communication in question and the recommendations made.  
• Finally, an inter-institutional approach should be adopted to create a dialogue 
between relevant UN bodies and other international institutions to share 
information and establish linkages between the work of such institutions.  This 
should be done with a view to mutual consideration and integration of measures 
for a more effective anticorruption alliance. 
At the 29th session of the Council in June 2015, member States adopted Resolution 
29/11 on the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights.  In doing 
so, they took ‘note with interest’ of the final report of the HRC Advisory Committee on 
the issue, and encouraged cooperation between national anticorruption and human 
rights institutions.  The HRC also encouraged the OHCHR and UNODC to exchange 
views on the subject.  It further recommended existing mechanisms of the Council like 
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special procedures to consider the issue of corruption within their mandates, whilst 
also requesting the OHCHR to compile best practices of efforts to counter the negative 
impact of corruption on human rights. 
This resolution therefore went no further than adopting the recommendations of the 
Advisory Committee.  Considering this, and until the guidebook discussed above is 
published,254 or a clearer policy emerges from other sources, the recommendations of 
the Advisory Committee remain the most recent, authoritative and comprehensive 
indicator of the approach of the HRC in promoting a RBAA.  Taking this and all the 
actions examined above into consideration, the next section looks at some 
conclusions and concerns with respect to the prospects of this approach within the 
broader context of anticorruption efforts in SSA.   
 
7.5 Concerns Over the Prospects of the Rights-Based 
Approach to Anticorruption  
 
Considering the obvious potential benefits of the RBAA, it should ordinarily be a 
welcome development to the anticorruption endeavour in countries in SSA.  Amongst 
other things, the approach is expected to provide new avenues for bottom-up 
responses to corruption.  The application of human rights principles should also 
provide impetus for existing and emerging citizen-led actions against corruption.  
Furthermore, the promise of integrating concerns about corruption into human rights 
monitoring and compliance mechanisms at various levels will undoubtedly benefit 
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anticorruption efforts.  The same optimism applies to the fact that the approach 
focuses on providing remedies for victims of corruption who are unjustly ignored by 
the current anticorruption regime.  
However, the proposals for its implementation raise a few concerns on whether these 
advantages will materialise.  Firstly, they do not appear to have given much attention 
to developments in the field of anticorruption, especially in the last decade.  Apart from 
cursory references to, and criticisms of the predominant criminal law approach to 
anticorruption, most recommendations on the RBAA do not consider the approach in 
the light of emerging trends in the field of anticorruption, like the good fit approaches 
to governance discussed earlier in section 7.1.2 of this chapter.  The approach is 
therefore being introduced without properly assessing the realities of the extant 
anticorruption environment.  The danger here is that, without properly situating the 
approach within current realities, it might end up disrupting or delegitimising efforts 
already underway on the ground.  Moreover, taking stock of such realities will inform 
better policy and action by highlighting areas where the approach might prove more 
beneficial, especially in terms of building synergy with other bottom-up approaches. 
As the research throughout this work shows, the failure of the current anticorruption 
regime to make significant impact at the local level is attributable in part, to the fact 
that it ignored pre-existing anticorruption efforts in countries when introducing new 
reforms.255  It is important that this mistake is not repeated with the RBAA.  
The second concern worth noting concerns the general framework at the international 
level within which the approach is being explored.  The RBAA is fundamentally a 
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bottom-up citizen-led response to corruption.  Hence, the institutional structure - 
comprising the OHCHR, UNODC, UNDP, etc - under which the policy framework for 
the approach is to be introduced raises questions as to the true character of the policy 
that will eventually emerge and how it will be implemented.  The RBAA is rightly 
supposed to be a framework that empowers civil society and citizens to act against 
corruption.  These institutions - especially UNODC and UNDP to a lesser degree – are 
however, favourably structured to working with state institutions.  There is therefore 
the danger of the approach being yet another tool in the arsenal of ineffective state 
anticorruption and human rights institutions, rather than one geared towards 
empowering citizens to hold state authorities accountable.   
Moreover, the involvement of these institutions might lead to the formulation of yet 
another top-down policy expressed in the language of rights.  The implementation of 
such a policy is likely to rob the RBAA of its emancipatory and empowering impact.  
More than that, it would also deprive the approach of its ability to be context-specific 
and not be based on a generic template of practices determined by IDIs.    
Related to this concern is the emphasis on the role of anticorruption and human rights 
institutions for operationalising the RBAA.  Various recommendations point to the need 
for these institutions to collaborate in pursuing this approach.  Whilst the idea of 
collaboration itself evokes positive sentiments and is often encouraged in the field of 
development, there are serious reasons to question its place in the implementation of 
a RBAA.  In the first place, as argued above, the RBAA is not essentially intended for 
institutional application as a development policy.  Even though there is no harm in 
formal institutions taking cognisance of the human rights implications of corruption, the 
approach is historically and conceptually built for bottom-up citizen-based action.   
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Secondly, in view of the problems of anticorruption institutions and their documented 
ineffectiveness in addressing corruption, it is difficult to see how their collaboration with 
human rights institutions will make much difference.  The general inefficiency of 
anticorruption institutions and especially the interference of political interests in their 
work are not issues that can be easily solved by a collaboration with human rights 
institutions.  If anything, such collaboration which current proposals for the RBAA 
encourages, might provide a route through which the influence of politics in the work 
of anticorruption agencies might extend to human rights institutions.  This will defeat 
one of the underlying purposes of the RBAA, to provide an alternative to the current 
institutional approach to addressing corruption with its attendant problems. 
Hence, whilst the involvement of human rights institutions in implementing the RBAA 
is somewhat inevitable considering this is an approach built on human rights and, at 
least for now, is being promoted by the field of human rights, the emphasis on 
collaboration with anticorruption institutions appears inexpedient.   
Apart from these concerns, there are further issues of whether anticorruption 
institutions have the necessary knowledge, organisational culture and manpower to 
properly and effectively assimilate human rights in their work.  Not taking all these 
practical factors into consideration could mean that the potential of the RBAA might be 
- for want of a better expression - ‘lost in collaboration and institutionalisation.’ 
Whilst the conversation in this section has focused on practical concerns about 
operationalising the RBAA, it is also worth noting that there are general questions 
about the overall usefulness of the application of human rights to development issues.  
These concerns range from those who argue that connecting human rights to 
development issues like anticorruption blunts the ability of human rights to serve as a 
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means of resistance to the economic and institutional framing of development,256 to 
those who question generally the efficacy and suitability of a western ideologically 
defined normative framework of human rights for the development aspirations of 
countries in the global South.257  These arguments need to also be taken into 
consideration in the evolving framing of the RBAA. 
  
7.6 Conclusion  
 
After years of propagating a top-down institutional approach for tackling corruption 
with negligible results, there is an emerging paradigm shift in anticorruptionism.  The 
place of civil society and citizen engagement in dealing with corruption is slowly being 
moved from a supporting to a central role as alternative bottom-up anticorruption 
mechanisms.  The RBAA lies at the intersection of this trend in the field of 
anticorruption and the development of rights-based approaches in the broader field of 
law and development.   
In fact, looking at the evolution of the field of development in the last couple of 
decades, it can be said that its integration in anticorruption efforts was fated.  Human 
rights have made unprecedented inroads into every possible development issue in the 
                                                            
256 See Morag Goodwin and Kate Rose-Sender, ‘Linking Corruption and Human Rights: An 
Unwelcome Addition to the Development Discourse’ in Martin Boersma and Hans Nelen (eds) 
Corruption and Human Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Intersentia 2010) 221-240. 
 
257 Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms (Polity Press 2008) 58-76; Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Rights as Regulation: The Integration of 
Development and Human Rights’ in Bronwen Morgan (ed), The Intersection of Rights and Regulation: 
New Directions in Sociolegal Scholarship (Ashgate 2007) 167-191. 
 
 347 
last few decades, such that it was only a matter of time before it was applied to 
corruption and issues of governance generally.   
For the approach to prove effective however, it is important to exercise caution in the 
use of language associated with the approach and the practical objective that drives 
its implementation.  It is important that the institutions working towards introducing 
policies to operationalise the approach do not limit its conception to a set of new 
practices and actions based on human rights, whilst ignoring the emerging bottom-up 
good fit approaches in the field of anticorruption.  The obvious parallels between these 
developments in both fields mean that the understanding of the RBAA needs to be 
broad enough to include all approaches that emphasise bottom-up, people-focused, 
context-specific, citizen-led actions against corruption.   
At the other extreme is the danger of simply window-dressing certain bottom-up 
approaches to anticorruption without the necessary commitment to human rights 
principles.  Such repackaging will devalue a fundamental component of the RBAA and 
therefore needs to be discouraged.  The integrity of the approach must be maintained 
especially with respect its dual aspects as stated above.  This is important, not just for 
achieving conceptual clarity, but also due to the practical implications of the approach 
that finally emerges from such clarity. 
Finally, it is significant to determine at this stage, what the underlying objective of the 
RBAA is:  is it to tackle corruption for the protection of human rights or to apply human 
rights principles and practices for the purpose of addressing corruption, or is it to do 
both?  Ascertaining this at this stage is important because it will determine the type of 
policies and programmes that are proposed and implemented.  If the objective is to 
tackle corruption for the protection of human rights, then human rights institutions will 
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be disposed to support any kind of action - including top-down institutional 
anticorruption mechanisms - provided this leads to or will potentially lead to the 
protection of human rights.258  Whilst there is no obvious problem with the outcome in 
such situations, it would mean that the language of rights would be applied to 
institutional mechanisms that have proven to be ineffective in dealing with corruption 
in most situations; the very reason that precipitated calls for alternative bottom-up 
mechanisms.  This will make useless the very essence of the RBAA.  In the long run, 
the ineffectiveness of these measures will also defeat the objective of protecting 
human rights.   
However, where the objective is to apply human rights principles for addressing 
corruption, then the emphasis will of course, be on ensuring the application of bottom-
up rights-based approaches in tackling corruption.  This is clearly more aligned with 
the historical and functional objectives behind the introduction of a RBAA.  Pursuing 
this objective will also serve the dual purpose of adding practical value to 
anticorruption efforts through new mechanisms, whilst also ultimately contributing to 
human rights as a natural outcome of the reduction of corruption and improvement of 
governance.  It is therefore this objective that accords with the position and analysis 
in this work.  It is hoped that it will also inform the work of the various institutions 
involved in efforts towards operationalising the RBAA. 
The early indications do not show clearly which of these objectives informs the work 
of the HRC and other institutions promoting the RBAA.  It would seem that both 
objectives are being pursued simultaneously based on the premise of the inherent 
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mutually reinforcing nature of both objectives.  Whilst this is fine in theory, the policies 
and programmes that are likely to emerge from such strategy are not likely to enhance 
the practical prospects of the RBAA.  
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This thesis set out to examine the challenges and prospects of anticorruption efforts 
in countries in SSA, the experience of Nigeria serving as a case study.  A robust 
approach was adopted in dealing with the subject, to provide a complete picture.  This 
is evident in two respects.  Firstly, the thesis reflects the perspective of both IDIs in 
terms of their approach to tackling corruption in the region, and the perspective of 
anticorruption efforts within countries.  This reveals the policy and practical outcomes 
of the interface between the approach at the global stage and actions at country level 
in such a way that demonstrates the influence of the former on the latter.  Secondly, 
the work looks at the past, examines the present and looks forward to the future.  This 
enables an informed and thorough examination of the history, attributes and problems 
of efforts to address corruption in the region and the expectations of yet emerging 
reforms. 
 
The various moments in the law and development movement - the vehicle for legal 
and institutional reforms in countries in the global South – provided the framework 
within which the discourse was undertaken.  It was established that the first and 
second moments of law and development disregarded the need to deal with the 
incidence of corruption and its impact on development in countries in SSA.  Chapter 
four looked at some of the reasons for this including the preoccupation with top-down 
transplantation of generic legal institutions from the global North without much 
attention to local contextual realities, and the overwhelming influence of IFIs in the 
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field of development with a resulting economistic development emphasis.  In the latter 
respect, corruption was ignored because it was considered a political issue and 
therefore dealing with it would have amounted to violating the apolitical mandate of 
these institutions.  Other factors that informed the disregard of corruption were the 
dearth of empirical and systematic knowledge in the field of law and development 
about realities at the local level that would have informed the prioritisation of issues 
like corruption. 
 
Despite this disregard of corruption at the international level, the experience of Nigeria 
shows that corruption was a serious challenge to development.  Furthermore, 
successive governments since independence had put in place various initiatives to 
curb corruption during this period.  Most of these efforts however proved largely 
unsustainable and unsuccessful.  They were usually ad hoc and short term as 
determined by the government in office.   Hence, they were changed quite frequently 
as the country experienced erratic changes in government in the first few decades 
after independence.  Furthermore, the initiatives were formulated and implemented in 
a top-down, state-led structure with little decentralisation and citizen-led frameworks.  
And the initiatives were often used to achieve broader political objectives, including 
harassing and intimidating political opponents and in some cases, using the promise 
of addressing corruption as a premise to capture state power. 
 
Against this backdrop, chapter five considered the rather drastic change in the 
approach to corruption in the third and current moment of law and development.  In 
line with the mainstreaming of a more comprehensive approach to development that 
took place in the 1990s up to the turn of the century, corruption became a central focus 
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of global development discourse and practice.  Led by the World Bank, IDIs became 
preoccupied with efforts to address the challenge of corruption in countries in the 
region.  In less than a decade beginning from the mid 1990s, almost ten global and 
regional instruments on corruption were adopted and most IDIs, including bilateral 
donors put in place some form of policy or strategy targeted at addressing corruption.  
This change in approach - referred to as the rise of anticorruptionism - was also 
reflected by the emergence of CSOs with a focus on various aspects of corruption and 
an increased attention to corruption research in academia.   
 
The rest of the chapter looked at the influence of this change in approach on 
anticorruption efforts at the country level.  Here, the experience of Nigeria 
demonstrated that the rise of anticorruptionism brought about clear changes in the 
legal and institutional frameworks for addressing corruption.  A good amount of laws 
specifically focused on corruption have been passed since the turn of the century.  A 
couple of specialised anticorruption institutions - the EFCC and the ICPC - were also 
established, as were other complementary institutions and initiatives designed to 
implement broader governance reforms.  However, these formal changes have had 
little practical impact in addressing the challenge of corruption.  Compared to previous 
efforts to tackle corruption, the current regime suffers from the same problems of being 
largely top-down, state-led and generally inefficient.  The various institutions and 
initiatives are also still very much subject to political interference and instrumentalism.  
 
The thesis argued that the reason for this is that anticorruption reforms in the third 
moment were introduced without due regard to the realities in the country in terms of 
the pre-existing regime to address corruption and its challenges.  Instead, the rise of 
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anticorruption - as evident in its historical foundations, underlying assumptions and 
implementation strategies - was a response to developments in global politics and 
economic policy that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.  These included the failure of 
the SAPs initiated by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and the end of the Cold 
War.1  These factors occasioned a change of approach in international development 
that emphasised governance reforms, which eventually culminated in the 
anticorruption agenda.   At an institutional level, the broader interpretation of the 
mandate of the Bank by its General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata to accommodate 
governance as an economic issue2 and James Wolfensohn’s focus on tackling 
corruption during his tenure as president of the Bank were other factors that enabled 
the mainstreaming of anticorruption in international development discourse and 
efforts.3 
 
Given this history, chapter six makes the point that anticorruption efforts continue to 
respond to the dictates of its neoliberal ideological and institutional foundations.  
Hence, even though a lot has been done in terms of anticorruption reforms in the last 
two decades, not much has been achieved in confronting the long-standing challenges 
to effectively addressing corruption at country level.  This is because reforms have 
been more responsive to standard long-standing ‘top-down’ ways of ‘doing 
development’ than the specific challenges of dealing with corruption in specific 
countries like Nigeria.  The chapter examined various aspects of the current 
anticorruption agenda that attest to this.  These include the commitment to a certain 
                                                            
1 Howard Stein, Beyond the World Bank Agenda: An Institutional Approach to Development (The 
University of Chicago Press 2008) 38-51. 
2 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, ‘Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank’ (1997) 5(1) Journal of Financial Crime 12-29. 
3 World Bank, Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and Writings of the World Bank 
President James D. Wolfesohn, 1995-2005 (World Bank, Washington D.C 2005) 45. 
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general catalogue of reforms determined by IDIs, the continuing influence of IFIs, the 
widespread reliance on quantitative data and its role in influencing policy responses 
and actions of stakeholders, and the preference for the market over the state in current 
development ideology, which is reflected in the disproportionate focus on public sector 
corruption in comparison to corruption in the private sector. 
 
Looking at the history of the law and development movement, these factors are 
reminiscent of the reasons why corruption was ignored in the first and second 
moments of the movement.  The fact that they have persisted, despite the rise of 
anticorruptionism, demonstrates the rather superficial and circumstantial nature of the 
introduction of anticorruption into development discourse and practice.  The reforms 
have been introduced in spite of, and not because of the challenges of addressing 
corruption in particular countries.  This explains why they have had negligible impact 
in improving pre-existing efforts to deal with corruption.  They do not get to the root of 
the realities and problems at the local level.   
 
This situation has given rise to ever-increasing criticisms of the global anticorruption 
agenda and its failure to effectively deal with the problem of corruption in most 
countries, especially in SSA.  A lot of the criticisms have centred around the 
commitment to a top-down, state-led institutional approach in dealing with corruption.  
As a result, there have been recommendations for the consideration of alternative 
bottom-up participatory anticorruption policies and strategies.  To provide a 
comprehensive picture of the approach to corruption in law and development, chapter 
seven considered the rights-based approach to anticorruption (RBAA) as an example 




With its foundations in the emergence of a rights-based approach to development 
since the beginning of the century and the more recent consideration of good fit 
perspectives on governance reforms, the chapter examined some of the ways in which 
the RBAA could improve on current efforts to curb corruption.  Firstly, it can provide a 
more comprehensive way of looking at the obligation of the state to address corruption 
beyond the current criminal law focus of anticorruption efforts.  By emphasising the 
negative impact of corruption on human rights, the RBAA would require state action 
with respect to anticorruption to be in line with its human rights obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights.  This includes, amongst things, measures to punish 
private individuals and corporations that engage in corrupt acts that violate human 
rights; this being an issue not receiving deserved attention under the current 
anticorruption agenda.  Secondly, the RBAA can provide conceptual and practical 
mechanisms through which citizens - individually and collectively - can play a more 
central role in anticorruption efforts.  Through the application of a human rights 
perspective to principles like participation, transparency and accountability, citizens 
can become more active participants in dealing with corruption.  Such citizen-led 
action against corruption is less likely to be affected by the problems of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and political interference that bedevil current top-down institutional 
approaches to anticorruption. 
 
Two further arguments in favour of the RBAA were examined.  First, the approach 
would lead to the consideration of corruption as a violation of human rights under the 
established and multi-faceted monitoring mechanisms of the UN and other regional 
and national human rights systems.  This will provide a more comprehensive 
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understanding and highlight the multiple impacts of corruption in society.  Secondly, it 
will make available a wide range of preventive and remedial mechanisms that 
characterise human rights monitoring to anticorruption practitioners and victims of 
corruption.  In this respect, it was also pointed out that the focus on specific cases in 
human rights monitoring will deliver useful qualitative information that will be more 
beneficial for anticorruption efforts than the quantitative data that is currently prevalent 
in the sphere of anticorruption.  Furthermore, the RBAA was discussed as means of 
providing remedy for victims of corruption who can seek redress in court for the 
violation of their rights arising from corruption.  This is important considering the 
current regime of anticorruption pays little attention to the plight of those who suffer 
the consequences of corruption. 
 
As with most development policies, whether the RBAA will prove effective in improving 
anticorruption efforts in the afore-mentioned ways or not depends on how it is 
implemented.  Hence, the concluding sections of chapter seven looked at the 
prospects of actions being taken by various IDIs towards operationalising the 
approach.  Specific attention was given to steps taken by OHCHR - especially by the 
HRC - in this regard.  This is because, more than any other institution, it has shown 
the most enduring commitment towards operationalising the approach and taken the 
most decisive steps.  Whilst recognising that the approach is still in a developing stage, 
the actions taken and recommendations made thus far raise some concerns, 
especially in terms of its prospects as an alternative to the existing anticorruption 




Significant amongst these are the fact that the policy framework for the approach is 
being put together at the global level by IDIs like other failed anticorruption reforms, 
and the emphasis on the roles of anticorruption and human rights institutions in 
operationalising the approach.  What this points to is a real possibility that the RBAA 
might end up being implemented in a top-down nature through an institutional 
framework that has thus far proved ineffective in tackling corruption.  This will rob the 
approach of its intended bottom-up citizen-based emancipatory effect and subject it to 
most of the problems of the current anticorruption regime. 
 
From the broader perspective of the approach of law and development to corruption, 
this shows the entrenched nature of the problems of the movement and how - despite 
new conceptual insights and incidental changes in policy over time - its practical 
approach on the subject continues to be dictated by the same factors and bedevilled 
by the same problems.  New thinking and approaches often end up being co-opted 
into the long-established top-down structure of formulating and implementing reforms 
that has held consistent despite decades of criticism.  As the overall picture of this 
thesis shows, what little change has taken place has often been at a conceptual and 
formal level.  There has been very little effect in terms of solving the practical problems 
of addressing corruption on the ground.   
 
 
8.2 Implications of Thesis 
 
From a situation of evident neglect to one of indirect engagement to the current state 
of prioritisation, the approach of the law and development movement towards 
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corruption has undergone drastic changes through its history.  This thesis makes an 
original contribution to the understanding and ramifications of this history in a couple 
of ways.  Firstly, it provides a comprehensive geneology of the approach of the law 
and development movement to corruption through its three moments.  In doing so, it 
adopts an innovative approach to problematising corruption and anticorruption efforts.  
By using the various moments in law and development as an analytical framework, 
the thesis identified and elucidated the various ideological and institutional influences 
on the approach to corruption in international development from its post-war 
emergence to date. 
 
Secondly, the thesis applied this framework to the case study of Nigeria, thereby 
providing a salient empirical policy context to the analysis of the approach to corruption 
in law and development.  This showed the interplay between the global level and local 
level in seeking to address corruption during each moment.  Understanding this 
dynamics is significant as it highlights the practical implications of the global effort on 
the continuing challenge of dealing with corruption in countries in SSA.  
 
Building on this, and having examined the pitfalls of the approach to corruption in the 
past and present, this thesis has also provided a comprehensive background to and 
analysis of emerging trends in efforts to address corruption in SSA.  In doing so, it 
examined the prospects of such trends for remedying the mistakes of the past and 
enhancing anticorruption efforts in the region. 
 
From a practical policy perspective, the overriding implication of the research 
undertaken in this work is its revelation of how fundamentally inert the approach to 
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corruption in law and development has been over the years.  Despite the initiation and 
implementation of new ideas, recommendations, policies and programmes, they have 
all been executed through the same strategy that has proven unsuccessful. 
 
The failures of the anticorruption agenda therefore have to do more with the overall 
structure and strategy employed, rather than with the details of specific policies.  This 
is where change is needed.  The current situation where reforms are initiated and 
implemented from the top by IDIs with an obvious commitment to particular economic 
and political ideologies will, only by coincidence, lead to an outcome different from the 
current poor results.  Even where programmes are supposedly initiated at the local 
level, support only comes from IDIs with conditions that require such programmes to 
be implemented within expected global standards of best practice.  This is why even 
though much has been said about ‘local ownership’ and being sensitive to ‘local 
contexts’, the reality always belies that pretext when it comes to governance and 
anticorruption reforms.  As aptly pointed out by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi: 
 
Despite the frequently reported death of the Washington Consensus, 
international policy prescriptions for low-income Africa remain 
ideological, unimaginative and out of touch with reality.  The 
intellectual capital and financial leverage Western donors and 
concessional lenders still exercise are dissipated on the promotion 
of a standard package of institutional ‘best practices’ which includes 
sound macroeconomic management, transparent public finances, 
free and fair elections, the rule of law, well-defined property rights 
and an arm’s length relationship between private enterprises and the 
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state.  These are increasing grounds for regarding this approach as 
bankrupt.4 
 
What is therefore needed is an absolutely different way of addressing the challenge of 
corruption.  This has to go beyond moving from a reliance on institutions to relying on 
civil society action; what has been referred to as stimulating demand for good 
governance and anticorruption.5  Provided this is still carried out through the current 
top-down structure, there is little evidence that it will make any significant difference.  
The Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) refers to the kind of fundamental 
change needed as ‘turning the ship around’.  It suggests that that IDIs have to ‘change 
to meet the needs of development, and not the other way round’.6  In other words, 
reforms need to come genuinely from the local level.   
 
In recent times, the need for such a change towards a whole different way of 
approaching governance and corruption challenges is gaining recognition from a 
variety of perspectives and institutions.  Chapter seven looked at some of the terms 
and approaches that can be considered as part of this growing emphasis on bottom-
up alternative frameworks.  These include, ‘good fit’, ’working with the grain’, ‘citizens 
against corruption’, ‘best fit’ and ‘collective action solutions’.  Even institutions with a 
long-standing commitment to institution-building and directing reform policy from the 
                                                            
4 David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of 
Rwanda’ (2011) Africa Power and Politics Programme Working Paper 16, 1 <http://www.institutions-
africa.org/filestream/20110321-appp-working-paper-16-developmental-patrimonialism-the-case-of-
rwanda-by-david-booth-and-frederick-golooba-mutebi-march-2011> accessed 10 May 2017. 
5 David Booth and Diana Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective 
Action Problems (Zed Books 2013) 125-126; Brian Levy, ‘Governance and Economic Development in 
Africa: Meeting the Challenge of Capacity Building’ in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh (eds), Building 
State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons (World Bank 2004) 1-42. 
6 Africa Power and Politics Programme, Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing 
the Real Challenges of African Governance (APPP, Oversees Development Institute 2012) 95-96. 
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top like the World Bank now appear to be moving in this direction.  In its 2017 World 
Development Report, the Bank emphasised the need to move beyond institutional 
transplants to more localised solutions in the form of elite bargains, citizen 
engagement and collective action.7  
 
This notwithstanding, the consideration of the RBAA under which the prospects of this 
trend were discussed in chapter seven shows how difficult it is to change how 
anticorruption reforms are carried out.  Even though these new approaches emphasise 
the need for alternative bottom-up context-specific solutions to corruption, the 
entrenched structure of governance reforms and anticorruptionism threatens to rob 
them of their essence.  The early indications are that these solutions are likely to 
become policy prescriptions themselves with IDIs and experts working on 
implementing them across countries and in different contexts.  So, what can be done 
to avoid this? 
 
Firstly, there needs to be an acceptance by the major IDIs involved in anticorruption 
and good governance reforms that they have got it wrong with the current and long-
standing way of doing things.  This needs to go beyond ‘not just this but also that’ 
arguments that try to defend extant policies, whilst simultaneously advocating for 
expansion to co-opt new and alternative discourses and recommendations.  The 
problem is not with specific policies but rather with the overall structure of how things 
are done.  There can hardly be any fundamental change without such recognition.  
This should also provide a moment for reflection, instead of the current situation where 
                                                            
7 World Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (The World Bank, 
Washington D.C 2017). 
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new ideas are emerging whilst old ones remain prevalent, making it difficult to map out 
what and where real change is taking place.  
 
Secondly, there needs to be practical demonstration of a commitment to this new way 
of undertaking reforms that is now gaining recognition.  Being reforms that emphasise 
local solutions, the first place to start logically is for IDIs to exercise restraint; what 
Putzel refers to as ‘doing no harm’.8  Instead of being quick to develop policies that 
are supposed to be bottom-up from the top - based on preconceptions, ideological 
commitments and limited knowledge of realities on the ground - it might be best to 
allow time for such solutions to develop organically from the specific context of 
countries.  Such restraint would require trusting that citizens in various countries 
understand and experience the negative impact of corruption.  And that they are willing 
and able to stand up against corruption, at least to a certain extent before the 
involvement of international actors, if required.  The law and development movement 
has always demonstrated an inherent lack of trust in the ability of local actors and 
citizens to understand and confront development challenges on their own.  This needs 
to change.  
 
Getting context-specific, local bottom-up solutions entails intensive skilled labour and 
a real local presence which most IDIs do not possess and may not be able or willing 
to afford.9  It might therefore be better to expend their financial and human resources 
and concentrate their efforts on tackling international dimensions of corruption like 
money laundering, tax evasion, illicit financial flows and similar challenges.  These 
                                                            
8 James Putzel, Conflict and Fragility: Do no Harm: International Support for Statebuilding (OECD 
2010). 
9 Booth and Cammack (n 5) 138. 
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have been shown to be as harmful - if not more harmful - to the development of 
countries in the global South as public-sector corruption.10  
 
This is not saying that there is no place for IDIs in dealing with corruption in individual 
countries.  It however points to the need to ensure that the emerging paradigm for an 
alternative way of addressing corruption departs from old ways of doing things that 
have proven ineffective.  The development of anticorruption reforms has been top-
heavy and bottom-light for too long, despite the academic and institutional rhetoric 
suggesting otherwise.  A lot of the research itself that informs policy - like the policies 
themselves - is undertaken by research institutions and academics that are usually 
based outside SSA.  Most experts who assess corruption and governance in countries 
in the region are also based outside the region.  The whole system is such that even 
the learning on how to improve current efforts is inevitably taking place at the 
international level in locations and institutions dispersed from the countries where 
practical results are intended for and needed.   
 
For the RBAA to make a real difference in addressing corruption in countries in SSA, 
the emphasis must be on ensuring that it is initiated, not just implemented, from the 
local level. 
 
In Nigeria, there are indications of positive prospects for a RBAA in addressing 
corruption.  Landell-Mills’ work referred to in chapter seven demonstrated the impact 
                                                            
10 See Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows to and From Developing Countries: 2005-
2014 (Global Financial Integrity, Washington, D.C 2017).  Such international dimensions of corruption 
are also intertwined with corruption within countries in terms of enabling the latter.  If IDIs therefore 
focus more on issues like money laundering, tax evasion and illicit financial flows, it might have as 
much impact on development in countries in SSA and the global South generally, as current efforts 
directed at public sector corruption. 
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being made by projects designed and implemented by local CSOs.11  The enactment 
of the Freedom of Information Act also provides an essential infrastructure for the 
success of the approach.  The judicial decisions on rights-based litigation examined in 
this work shows promise too.  Even though they were reached by a regional court, 
recent developments mean that local courts now have a framework within which to 
provide remedy to victims of corruption.  The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
2015 for instance, provides that judges take into consideration the provision of 
compensation to victims of crimes like corruption when passing judgement.12 
 
There is therefore a clear potential for bottom-up solutions to addressing corruption.  
The role of the government has to move more towards providing the framework for 
such approaches to thrive.  The state-centric institutional approach needs to be 
replaced with the state playing an enabling role for rights-based approaches which 
should become central to addressing corruption.  All emerging research and ideas 
point towards this as the more pragmatic solution to dealing with corruption.   
 
The implementation, from the perspective of IDIs, is however where progress remains 
slow.  Even though there is a recognition of this fact, there is still a lukewarm attitude 
towards committing fully to it, by abandoning the old top-down model of anticorruption 
reforms.13  There is a need for a dialogue amongst IDIs on this new vision that would 
                                                            
11 Pierre Landell-Mills, Citizens Against Corruption (Partnership for Transparency Fund 2013) 
159-162.  For more on the impact made by this CSO in Nigeria and other CSOs around the world, see 
discussion in section 7.1.2 above. 
12 See Sections 319-325, 336 & 342 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015.  A similar 
position is also stated in Paragraph 9 of the Federal High Court (Corruption and Related Offences) 
Sentencing Guidelines and Practice Direction 2015. 
13 For instance, a 2009 report showed that even though the World Bank has a long-stated 
commitment to supporting demand for good governance by engaging with CSOs, only 40 per cent of 
its country assistance strategies included demand-for-good-governance component in 2007/2008.  
Also, the Bank’s recent Multi-Donor Trust Fund in support of the Global Partnership for Social 
Accountability was allocated only US$5 million annually, even though estimates show that US$500 
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hopefully build the needed consensus and commitment on the right strategy to 
operationalise the RBAA
                                                            
million was more likely to give the impetus to make a difference.  See Vinay Bhargava, Kit Cutler and 
Daniel Ritchie, Stimulating the Demand for Good Governance: An Agenda for Enhancing the Role of 
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